

CHAPTER 3

CRITICISMS OF HARTSHORNE'S PANENTHEISM

Hartshorne is the author of many books and quite a great number of articles; there are not so many criticisms of his thought though. Why is it so? For one reason, it may be that his doctrine of process thought which is relevant to metaphysics, is not of interest among English-speaking philosophers and theologians. Hartshorne himself seems to realize this well. In the preface of his book Beyond Humanism: Essays in the Philosophy of Nature he wrote:

In the thirty-two years since the writing of these essays, the philosophical scene has changed in many ways... The influence of formal logic is perhaps greater than it was, but what Ryle calls "informal logic," or some call "linguistic analysis," has become still more influential. Distrust of metaphysics, except in some very attenuated form, is probably stronger than it was (Hartshorne's BH, 1975: vii).

Accordingly, it appears very often in his works that he is arguing with anonymous opposers. Hence the phrases like "the counter argument that," "the objection that," "the case against," "if someone should say that," "imagine someone to," "some at least of the critics of," "a possible objection to," "it is sometimes said that," "it may be objected that," "a common objection to," "it may be replied that," "it may be thought that," etc., are very common in Hartshorne's arguments. This implies that he just assumes someone to argue with him. As already mentioned before, even though Hartshorne has received

high regards from his students, friends and colleagues, none of them pronounce immediately to follow his thought. Most analytic theists ignore his work on the concept of God, as Dombrowski puts it:

Analytic theists have, for the most part, ignored Charles Hartshorne's work on the concept of God, even if some of them have taken into consideration his works on the ontological argument. William Alston* is an exception in that, as a former student of Hartshorne's and as a philosopher who is familiar with Whitehead's writings, he has directed his attention to Hartshorne's concept of God in at least two critical articles (Dombrowski, 1994: 129).

The reason why analytic philosophers have ignored Hartshorne's works, at first glance, may be that his works are too numerous and too obscure to follow, as Hick comments:

Hartshorne's collection of writings on the subject (the ontological argument)...is so considerable that it has in the end diffused the impact of his contribution and made it harder, instead of easier, to concentrate upon his central contentions; and the highly polemical and almost obsessive tone of some of his writings on this subject has likewise tended to obscure their logical content (Hick, 1970: 93-4).

*Alston is one of the leading reformed epistemologists who maintain the thesis that a person can be rational in holding certain beliefs about God even in the absence of evidential backing for such beliefs because belief in God can be properly basic, i.e., it does not need to be based on other beliefs or propositional evidence.

Another reason why analytic philosophers have ignored Hartshorne's works on God may be that atheist philosophers would never try to inquire into the nature of God. They do not need to do so because they deny the existence of God. Since the investigation of the nature of God presupposes the acceptance of God's existence, if a philosopher denies God's existence, then she would never waste her time in inquiring into God's nature. Atheists only attempt to answer the question: Does God exist? Of course, they would answer this question negatively. If they answer it negatively, then they do not need to answer the questions like "Is God eternal?" or "Is God independent of the universe of entities other than himself?" Consequently, atheists would never argue with Hartshorne on the concept of God because it deals with God's nature. They would argue with him only on the ontological argument because it deals with God's existence.

Though Hartshorne seems to have been ignored, he was cited 138 times during 1990-1991 (Rescher, 1993: 743). Since "Among process philosophers, Charles Hartshorne has characteristically championed arguments for the existence and nature of God which derive their force and validity from the logic of divine perfection" (Ford, 1973: 85), we may divide criticisms of Hartshorne's thought into two main lines: arguments against the concept of God and arguments against the ontological argument. Prospective criticisms of the concept of deity may be from either the classical theist or the pantheist, or both while criticisms of the ontological argument would be from the classical theist, the sceptic and the atheist. We would consider their arguments altogether in this chapter.

1. Arguments Against the Panentheistic Concept of God

It seems to the researcher that what might happen to Hartshorne would be similar to what has happened to Rawls in social philosophy.* Rawls has attempted to compromise between libertarianism and egalitarianism, but he has been attacked by both libertarians and egalitarians. The same may happen to Hartshorne in philosophical theology and the philosophy of religion. In analogy, we may compare the classical theist, the pantheist and the panentheist with a bird, a rat and a bat respectively. When the bat goes to see birds, the birds would not accept him to be in their group. They would, if they can, say: "You look like a rat, so you should go to stay with rats." When the bat comes to see rats, the rats would say, "You have wings like a bird, so you should go to live with birds." Similarly, the classical theists and the pantheists may treat Hartshorne the same way as the birds and the rats do to the bat.

Considering Hartshorne's panentheistic concept of deity, the prospective pantheist would argue that an abstract aspect of God as Hartshorne has speculated is superfluous and beyond human experience. The abstract aspect of God is beyond human experience because this pole is transcendent. The pantheist would maintain that Hartshorne is apparently mistaken when he

*John Rawls proposes the doctrine of justice as "fairness" which includes two principles: First, each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. Second, social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all. See his A theory of Justice, 1972. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 60-65.

argued that: "The error of most pantheists has been to deny the externality of concrete existence to the essence of deity. They have not realized that the inclusive actuality of God... is as truly contingent and capable of additions as the least actuality it includes" (Hartshorne's DR, 1976:89). The pantheist would argue that it is her intention to throw away God's transcendence and turn to his immanence instead. Since God as transcendent is in no way related to all spatio-temporal creatures, God must be immanent. Hence God's immanence is enough to explain the relation between God and his creatures. In other words, for the pantheist "God is All" is adequate whereas "God includes All" is superfluous. The pantheist argues that if by substance we mean what can exist by itself, there is only one substance, the whole of reality. If there is but one substance, and this is the whole of reality, it is clear that what we ordinarily call things, including our individual selves, cannot be substances. Hence, all things, including our individual selves, are nothing but modes or modifications of the one substance. If by God we mean a Being which is absolutely infinite, there can be only one God, the whole of reality, and this Being exists necessarily. An absolutely infinite being will have an infinite number of attributes. Of this infinite number men know two: thought and extension (Scruton, 1986: 45). The modes of thought and extension apply to the things of this world. Since there cannot be two substances with the same attribute, God and substance mean the same thing. Accordingly if God and substance are identical, then the goal of inquiry and the goal of religion turn out to be identical. The goal of man can thus be called either wisdom or the intellectual love of God. As Charlton puts it:


Spinoza's main philosophical concern is ethical. His ethical teaching is based on his philosophy of mind, and his philosophy of mind on his metaphysics. Two themes are central to his ethics. One is that the

notion of substance does have application. Our aim in life is to identify ourselves with, and recognize our identity with, the one all-inclusive substance. The other is that we can be active as well as passive. The two themes are connected in that the more we are active, the more we identify ourselves with the one substance (Charlton, 1981: 528).


The pantheist would further argue that Hartshorne's attempt to prove an abstract aspect of God, as independent of the world and consequently transcending it, is an attempt to go beyond the actual system of the world. Such an attempt is regarded as inherently meaningless. Scruton interprets Spinoza's metaphysics as follows:

The ideas of God's unity and self-generation also have their equivalents in modern science... to the views: (1) that all objects in the world are in thoroughgoing causal interaction; (2) that the universe is a closed system, beyond which we cannot search (and, given the truth of (1), beyond which we need not search) for the cause of anything within it. There is no answer to the question 'why?' that does not refer to the actual system of the world, and the attempt to go beyond that system -to find a 'transcendental causality' of created things- is inherently meaningless (Scruton, 1986: 51).

The difference between pantheism which holds the thesis "God is all things" and panentheism which holds the thesis "God includes all entities" may be shown in the form of the following schemas.



pantheism



panentheism

From the above schemas we can see clearly that the abstract aspect of God is unacceptable to pantheism. It is the part that the pantheist considers as superfluous. The problem to be raised here is: How can we reply to this criticism? The answer to this question will be given in the next chapter.

The classical theist, on the other hand, would argue with Hartshorne in a different way. While the abstract aspect of God is unacceptable to pantheism, the concrete aspect is unacceptable to classical theism. The classical theist could not accept panentheism from two perspectives: theology and religion. From the theological point of view, the panentheistic concept of God is unacceptable to classical theism because God according to panentheism is not absolutely perfect. If God has the concrete aspect of contingent actuality, then he is said to grow. If God grows, then he is finite in his being and knowledge. If God is finite in his being and knowledge, then he is not absolutely perfect. If

God is not absolutely perfect, then he is not supreme. If God is not supreme, then he could not be God at all. Since the panentheistic God has the concrete aspect of contingent actuality, he is not supreme and thus could not be God at all.

From the religious point of view, the panentheistic concept of God is unacceptable because God according to panentheism is not worthy of worship. The classical theist would argue that if God includes the world, then he includes imperfect beings. If God includes imperfect beings, then he is not perfectly good. If God is not perfectly good, then he is not worthy of worship. Since the panentheistic God includes imperfect beings, he is not perfectly good and thus not worthy of worship. We would argue against these criticisms from both points of view in the next chapter. Now in order to see the contrast between Hartshorne's view of his own neoclassical theism and that of St. Thomas' classical theism in details, let us consider the list of comparative attributes collected by Alston (1984:79-80) as follows:

Classical Attributes	Neoclassical Attributes
1. Absoluteness (independence or absence of internal relatedness to creatures).	1. Relativity. God is internally related to creatures by way of his knowledge of them and his actions toward them.
2. Pure actuality. There is no potentiality in God for anything he is not.	2. Potentiality. God does not actualize everything that is possible for him)
3. Total necessity. Every truth about God is necessarily true.	3. Necessity and contingency. God exists necessarily, but various things are true of God (e.g., his

<p>4. Absolute simplicity.</p> <p>5. Creation <i>ex nihilo</i> by a free act of will. God could have refrained from creating anything. It is a contingent fact that anything exists other than God.</p> <p>6. Omnipotence. God has the power to do anything (logically consistent) he wills to do.</p> <p>7. Incorporeality.</p> <p>8. Nontemporality. God does not live through a series of temporal moments.</p> <p>9. Immutability. This follows from 8. God cannot change since there is no temporal succession in his being.</p> <p>10. Absolute perfection. God is, eternally, that than which no more perfect can be conceived.</p>	<p>knowledge of what is contingent) that are contingently true of him.</p> <p>4. Complexity.</p> <p>5. Both God and the world of creatures exists necessarily, though the details are contingent.</p> <p>6. God has all the power any one agent could have, but there are metaphysical limitations on this.</p> <p>7. Corporeality. The world is the body of God.</p> <p>8. Temporality. God lives through temporal succession, but everlastingly.</p> <p>9. Mutability. God is continually attaining richer syntheses of experience.</p> <p>10. Relative perfection. At any moment God is more perfect than any other individual, but he is surpassable by himself at a later stage of development.</p>
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Let us start with contrast (1) first. Unhappy with Hartshorne's argument that if God is wholly absolute, then he does not know or love us and if God knows or loves us, then he is not wholly absolute, the classical theist

would argue that Hartshorne is mistaken. For classical theism, if God is wholly absolute, then he still can love or know or will us because God is omnipresent. The classical theist argues that God is a soul, for whose existence and operation no body is even causally necessary. "He is omnipresent in the sense of being able to act intentionally anywhere without intermediary (he can act directly on the world in the way that we can act directly on our brains) and knowing what is happening everywhere without intermediary (he just knows what is happening at any place in the way we know the contents of our visual field)" (Swinburne, 1994: 127). Similarly, if God knows or loves us, he still can be wholly absolute because God's love is heavenly love, i.e., agape. The divine love is spontaneous and unconditional. For the classical theist, God's love for us does not mean that God sympathizes with us, or wants any benefit in return "Rather God's love is like the sun's way of doing good, which benefits the myriad forms of life on earth but receives no benefits from the good it produces" (Hartshorne's OOTM, 1984: 4). The classical theist further argues that Hartshorne is mistaken in assuming that God is internally related to creatures by way of his knowledge of them and his actions towards them. If God is internally related to his creatures, then he is influenced by them. But it is not true that God is influenced by his creatures. Therefore, God is not internally related to the creatures. For classical theism, since the creatures depend for their existence on God, their relations to God affect them but not God. Hence God will never be influenced by any creature. As Swinburne argues:

God is perfectly free in that nothing ... acts from without on him to determine or in any way influence how he will act; nor does he act at one period of time so as causally to influence how he himself will act at another. For, if he did so act, he would not be perfectly free at the

next period, and given that, as I shall be arguing shortly, the divine properties belong essentially to God, that would involve depriving himself of a property essential to him - and that is logically impossible. He chooses there and then how he will act at each moment, that is, over each period of time. God is guided by rational considerations alone. But such guidance... may leave available to an agent a multitude of different possible acts - and nothing determines which of them God will do (Swinburne, 1994: 128).

Turning to contrasts 2-4, the classical theist maintains that Hartshorne's argument for the internal relatedness of God to his creatures presupposes that there are alternative possibilities for God's knowledge, and if there are alternative possibilities for divine knowledge, then this implies that there are unrealized potentiality for God. Then it follows that pure actuality and total necessity cannot be defended as divine attributes. Hence classical theism would never accept Hartshorne's argument for divine knowledge which may be simplified as follows (Alston, 1984:84) :

1. (A) 'God knows that W exists' entails (B) 'W exists.'
2. If (A) were necessary, (B) would be necessary.
3. But (B) is contingent.
4. Hence (A) is contingent.

What does it mean by "(A) is contingent"? For Hartshorne this means that divine knowledge changes. As new events occur each moment, God knows them; But prior to their occurrences, when they are not yet actual, God's knowledge does not grasp them as actual, since to do so would be to falsify them. God does know them as possibilities, but as possibilities they are within

an indefinite range of indeterminate alternatives. No possibility is definitely actual before it is realized. Hence God does not know what will happen tomorrow until it does happen. For Hartshorne if the future is indeed partly indeterminate, then God knows it as such and not as something fully settled from all eternity (Sia, 1985: 64).

The classical theist, then, argues that if God knows only what happened yesterday and what is happening now and does not know what will happen tomorrow, then he is ignorant and imperfect in knowledge. "Since God is unchangeably perfect, whatever happens must be eternally known to God. Our tomorrow's deeds, not yet decided upon by us, are yet always or eternally present to God, for whom there is no open future. Otherwise... God would be "ignorant," imperfect in knowledge, waiting to observe what we may do" (Hartshorne's OOTM, 1984: 3). The classical theist insists that even an atheist like Ernest Nagel understands well that theism is the view which holds "that the heavens and the earth and all that they contain owe their existence and continuance in existence to the wisdom and will of a supreme, self-consistent, omnipotent, omniscient, righteous, and benevolent being, who is distinct from and independent of, what he has created."* By God's omniscience the classical theist means God's knowledge of all true propositions and

*See Ernest Nagel. 1959. "A Defense of Atheism." In Paul K. Moser ed. 1990. Reality in Focus. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, pp. 395-404.

statements.* Swinburne argues:

God could know all true statements if he knew of each period of time picked out non-indexically, namely, by its date or its temporal relation to a named event, what happens (i.e. happened, is happening, or will happen) then. He could know that Jerusalem falls in 587 BC, that Charlemagne is crowned in AD 800, and that Japan surrenders three months after Germany surrenders at the end of the Second World War... But God could know all true statements without knowing whether the events they report are past or future. To know that, he needs to know at least one true proposition which says that - for example, that expressed by the sentence 'It is now AD 1994' (and not merely some proposition which determines the same statement - for example, that expressed by the sentence 'In AD 1994 it is AD

*Swinburne makes a distinction between a proposition and a statement. Two sentences express the same proposition if and only if they are synonymous. 'Res mortuus est,' uttered by a Latin speaker of the fourteenth century, 'Le roi est mort,' uttered by a French speaker of the eighteenth century, and 'The King is dead,' uttered by an English speaker of the twentieth century express the same proposition. But these three sentences express different statements, for they concern different kings. Two sentences express the same statement if and only if they attribute the same property to the same individual at the same time and place. "I am healthy," spoken by me, 'You are healthy,' addressed to me, and 'He is healthy,' spoken of me, all spoken at the same time, express the same statement, though not the same proposition. See Richard Swinburne. 1994. The Christian God. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp.96-105.

1994') (Swinburne, 1994: 130).

The classical theist, hence, could not accept the panentheistic God who is complex, namely, both relative and absolute. His relative aspect would destroy not only pure actuality and total necessity, but also omniscience in the orthodox sense.

Concerning contrast 5, the classical theist wonders how Hartshorne could consider God to be the Creator when he believes that "God is "not before but with" all creation" (Hartshorne, 1973: 133). However, contemporary classical theists seem to realize or even admit that there are some difficulties in the classical theistic version of creation *ex nihilo*. The classical theist may admit that Hartshorne is keen to point out: "In making me did God use my parents or was I made simply from nothing?" I believe... any answer will show the difficulty that classical theism faced. If my parents were not causally required for my existence, then we know nothing of the meaning of "cause." And if they were, then clearly I was not made from nothing' (Hartshorne's OOTM, 1984: 74). At first classical theists strongly supported the idea of creation from nothing, but now they seem to lose their self-confidence. Even a strong advocate of classical theism like Swinburne seems to soften his voice when he says:

God is the creator and sustainer of any universe there may be in the sense that any substance that exists apart from himself exists because God causes it to exist as long as it exists or permits some other being to do so; and if it began to exist at a time, it did so because God caused it to begin to exist or permitted some other being so to do. If the universe (of substances other than God) had a beginning, God caused

that beginning; and if it has always existed, God continually sustains it in being (Swinburne, 1994: 128).

Concerning contrast 6, the classical theist claims that belief in creation *ex nihilo* and belief in divine omnipotence are separate beliefs such that to argue against the former is not necessarily to argue against the latter. The classical theist does not agree with Hartshorne who rejects the orthodox notion of omnipotence which was defined as "being able to do whatever is intrinsically possible or self-consistent" (Sia, 1985: 77). For Hartshorne this definition can be misleading in that it can be assumed to mean that God can do anything that can be done. "God, being defined as perfect in all respects must, it seems, be perfect in power; therefore, whatever happens is divinely made to happen. If I die of cancer this misfortune is God's doing" (Hartshorne's OOTM, 1984:3). Then it would follow that God has a monopoly of power that he makes our decisions in their full details and thus that the only genuine decisions are God's. This is a conclusion that Hartshorne regards as non-sensical (Sia, 1985: 77). For Hartshorne, "The idea of omnipotence, as usually construed, contradicts dual transcendence;* for it means that God is wholly active, independent, or absolute in relation to the creatures and that the creatures are wholly passive in relation to God. It means that God does either everything or nothing. If everything, then the creatures do nothing and are nothing" (Hartshorne's OOTM, 1984:45). So Hartshorne suggests that God's power should be understood as "unsurpassable power over all creatures." God's power is the

*For Hartshorne when the law of dipolarity is applied to God, it is known as the principle of dual transcendence. As we have already learned, this principle places God not on one side of the metaphysical opposites but on both.

greatest possible, but even the greatest possible is still one power among others (Sia, 1985: 77).

The classical theist argues that Hartshorne is confused between omnipotence and totalitarianism. God's omnipotence or all-powerfulness does not entail totalitarianism or monopoly of decision-making. Even though God is all-powerful, yet he still allows his creatures to be free in their decisions. Since Hartshorne has added a concrete aspect to God, he is forced to redefine the concept of omnipotence. But his attempt is ridiculous, for "whatever might be the full meaning of "omnipotence" it is clear that anything said to be omnipotent must be very powerful. Now if everything that exists is caused to exist by X then X must be very powerful since it is able to bring all things into existence. If X is said to bring all things into existence, but if X is also said not to be "very powerful," then "very powerful" is being used in a very odd sense indeed" (Davies, 1982: 49). Hence the classical theist is not reluctant to conclude that to be God, namely, supreme and worthy of worship, God must have unlimited power, i.e., power to do anything he wills to do. Swinburne argues:

God is omnipotent in that whatever he chooses to do, he succeeds in doing. This has sometimes been understood as involving a claim that God can do the logically impossible. However, ...that is a senseless claim. God can do anything, that is, any action. The only actions that we can coherently describe him doing are those that we can describe by descriptions which make ultimate sense. We may rightly say of God that there are certain things which, for reasons of logic, he cannot do - for instance, change the past, or make something red and green all over. But despite appearances, we are not describing a limit to God's power; we are saying that certain sentences - for example, 'God

changes the past,' - do not make ultimate sense; or that certain thoughts - for example, that God change the past - contain implicit contradictions. We cannot coherently describe publicly or think privately some actions which the rules of logic prevent God from doing - for our sentences and our thoughts which purport to do so prove incoherent and we fail to describe or think anything; there is nothing which would count as changing the past. Some of us may, however, be subject to confusion on this point. We may suppose that 'God changes the past' does make ultimate sense; yet, not seeing how it could be that God changes the past, suppose that there is something more ultimate than God - for instance, the laws of logic - which prevent God from so acting. God, however, being omniscient, will not be subject to confusion on these matters. He sees the consequences of all sentences; and thus sees which do and which do not make ultimate sense (and which thoughts do and which do not involve contradictions). Hence if a sentence does make ultimate sense, he will be able to bring about what it describes, and if it does not it will not describe any action God cannot do, because there is nothing which would count as such an action. Similarly with respect to God's thoughts. In thinking each thought, he sees its consequences... Hence he cannot conceive as a possible action one which involves a self-contradiction... So, whatever God can conceive, he can bring about (Swinburne, 1994: 129-30).

Concerning contrast 7, the classical theist may interpret Hartshorne's panentheism as the view which holds that God has a body and that his body is the world. She may interpret God's abstract aspect as the divine soul and his concrete aspect as the body of the world. Then she would argue that since

Hartshorne maintains that God and the world have always been interaction (Hartshorne, 1973: 133), he is forced to accept that God “is not simply supreme Creator, but also supreme Creature” (Sia, 1985: 78). This implies that God can cause the world, and vice versa. The classical theist, then, would argue that it is true that God causes the world, but it is not the case that the world causes God. Hence to understand God as Creator-Creature (cause-effect) is just a mistake. The Christian God must be essentially bodiless as Swinburne puts it:

By saying that God is essentially bodiless, I mean that, although he may sometimes have a body, he is not dependent on his body in any way. We need our bodies in order to exist - barring divine intervention to keep us in being after destruction of our bodies - and we need them in order to learn about the world and to make a difference to it. Only by stimuli landing on our sense organs do we learn what is happening elsewhere in the world; and only by moving our limbs and other organs can we causally affect the world. God, Western religion universally holds, does not need a body for these or any other purposes. God is thus....a soul, for whose existence and operation no body is even causally necessary (Swinburne, 1994: 127).

Concerning contrasts 8-10, the classical theist understands well that the concrete aspect of God is temporal and historical and thus mutable or changing. She may interpret, as Alston does, that for Hartshorne if God is internally related to the world, and if the world is in different states at different times, then, it follows that God must be in different states at different times. “For at one time God will have one set of relations to the world; at another time another set. Hence, if these relations are internal to God, the total concrete nature of God at the one time will be partly constituted by the relations he has

to the world at that time; and so on with another time. Since these relations will be different at the two times, the total concrete nature of God will be correspondingly different" (Alston, 1994:89). The classical theist also well realizes that for Hartshorne "Decay or loss takes two forms: deterioration of character, capacity, or mode of action; and forgetting... To form the concept of eminent process, we must deny both the very possibility of deterioration of character and of forgetting. God must always be equally strong and good. He also must forget nothing worth remembering" (Hartshorne, 1973: 118). Even though the classical theist understands that for Hartshorne "God changes" means "God gains or grows, not loses," she still could not accept that. Why not? Because the panentheistic God is a temporal being. For classical theism the Christian God is not a temporal being; therefore, the Christian God is not identical to the panentheistic God. Whereas the panentheistic God exists in time, though everlastingly, the Christian God is timeless. The classical theist, then, argues that since the panentheistic God exists in time, he may be considered as time's prisoner. Swinburne says:

Why should any theist find that view unsatisfactory? Because it seems to make God less than sovereign over the universe. It seems to imply that time stands outside God, who is caught in its stream. The cosmic clock ticks inexorably away, and God can do nothing about it. More and more of history is becoming past, accessible to God only by remote memory, and unaffected by any action of his. The future, however, God does not enjoy, but more and more of it is unavoidably looming up on God; and, as it keeps on appearing, if creatures have free will, it may contain some surprises for him. God can only act at the present period of time, and his lordship of the universe is ever confined to the time of his action (Swinburne, 1994: 138).

So far most (if not all) of the contemporary classical theists could not have accepted the panentheistic concept of God. The concrete aspect of God, according to panentheism, exists in time. The classical theist holds that this aspect of God makes God relative, potential, contingent, corporeal and mutable. These attributes certainly set limitation to God. Since the classical theists firmly holds the thesis that God must be unlimited, they could not adopt the panentheistic concept of God. As Ross puts it:

The statement "God is an omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, benevolent, living, intelligent, free being" is not, in terms of what is sufficient and what is necessary, a complete delineation of the concept "a divine being." Nor will it be complete if we add everything else we know about God. For we must also say that God exists perfectly or without limitation (Ross, 1969: 62-63).

In summary, Hartshorne's panentheistic concept of God is based on the thesis that what is finally self-sufficient is neither God nor the world, but both in reciprocal interaction (Ford, 1973: 88). But the panentheistic concept of God is unacceptable to both pantheism and classical theism. Whereas it appears to the pantheist that the abstract pole of God is meaninglessly superfluous, it appears to the classical theist that the concrete pole makes God limited and imperfect. Classical theism could not accept the panentheistic God from both perspectives of theology and religion. The researcher would argue against their criticisms and defend the panentheistic concept of God in the following chapter.

2. Arguments Against the Second Form of the Ontological Argument

As already mentioned in the previous chapter, the existence of God is the realm which has been discussed among theists, sceptics, and atheists. Inquiring into the ontological argument carefully, we would surprisingly find that there are different views of this kind of proof even among theists themselves. In fact, it seems not correct to call "The Ontological Argument" because there is actually no single argument which deserves to be the only reference. Since there are a group of related proofs, we had better call them "the ontological arguments." (Davies, 1982:26). In this section we would concentrate on arguments against Hartshorne's argument from three different points of view: theistic, atheistic, and logical. We would consider Hick, Nagel and Hubbeling as representatives of theism, atheism and logic respectively.

John Hick is a British philosopher of religion. Like other philosophers, Hick agrees that the ontological argument is different from all the other proofs in being a priori, and that it proceeds from the idea of God as infinite perfection to his real existence, instead of from some feature of the world to God. As an a priori argument it has the form of a logical demonstration, and as such it either totally succeeds or totally fails (Hick, 1970: 68). Some philosophers do not make a distinction between the first and the second forms of the ontological argument. Hick himself believes that: "I do not think that Anselm himself regarded these as two different arguments; but nevertheless they have had widely different histories since his day and have in that sense become different arguments" (Hick, 1970: 70). So some philosophers, e.g., Anthony Kenny treats the ontological argument as one and

the same as Aquinas and Kant did.* But, as we have already learned, Hartshorne makes a distinction between the first and the second forms. Whereas Descartes took up St. Anselm's first form of the ontological argument, Hartshorne adopts the second one. Whereas the first form was criticized by Kant, the second one was criticized by Hick. In Hartshorne's argument what interests Hick most is the first proposition, namely, Anselm's Principle which says: That God exists strictly implies that he exists necessarily. Hick makes a distinction between logical and ontological necessity. He believes that Hartshorne's argument is fallacious. The fallacy consists in an equivocation in the use of the term "necessary" (Hick, 1970: 94). The two senses of "necessary" which are switched, Hick believes, in Hartshorne's argument are the logical necessity of analytic propositions and the factual or ontological necessity of an eternal being who exists independently. Hick believes that whereas "the notion of logical necessity in the modern sense was not in Anselm's mind" (Hick, 1970: 96), Hartshorne himself states that his argument is to be understood in terms of logical necessity. Hick quoted Hartshorne's utterances from his book The Logic of Perfection: "In general it means analytic or L-true, true by necessity of the meanings of the terms employed. This is the sense intended in the present essay" (Hartshorne,

*These philosophers consider St. Anselm's ontological argument as the first form only. The first form maintains that even the fool who says in his heart that there is no God has an idea of God as a being that than which nothing greater can be conceived. But a being than which nothing greater can be conceived must exist in reality as well as in idea, since to exist in reality is something greater than to exist merely in idea. Hence to deny the existence of perfection is to utter a contradiction. See St. Anselm's Proslogion II in John Hick. 1968. The Many - Faced Argument. London: Macmillan, pp.4-6.

1962:53). Hick argues that if Hartshorne interprets N as logical necessity, then his argument fails unquestionably at the beginning. For the first proposition reads: "God exists" strictly implies "God exists" is logically true. In other words, Hick argues, Hartshorne's initial premise is an analytic truth. But it is basic to the modern empiricist understanding of N that existential propositions are not analytic and therefore not L-true. Accordingly, it is impossible to make sense of Hartshorne's first proposition. However, Hick accepts that: "If his first proposition were acceptable, the argument could proceed by valid steps to its conclusion" (Hick, 1970:95). This implies that Hick has no problem with the other propositions. Now suppose, Hick suggests, we interpret Hartshorne's proposition 1 in terms of Anselm's notion of a factual necessity. This would enable the argument to begin and proceed as far as proposition 6 (Hick, 1970:96):

1. That God exists means that he exists eternally.
2. Either God exists eternally or it is not the case that he exists eternally.
3. That God does not exist eternally means that it is eternally the case that he does not exist (eternally).
4. Either God exists eternally or it is eternally the case that he does not exist (eternally).
5. That it is eternally the case that God does not exist (eternally) means that eternally he does not exist (eternally).
6. Either God exist eternally or it is eternally the case that he does not exist (eternally).

Then the argument, Hick argues, is unable to progress beyond this point. For from the disjunction in proposition 6 we cannot infer either that there is an

eternal being or that there is not. We have proved that since the divine nature is defined as eternal, God's existence is either factually necessary or factually impossible. But the argument does not supply us with any grounds for preferring one of these two possibilities to the other. In order to proceed from proposition 6 to proposition 10, the meaning of "necessary" has to change at this point from factual to logical necessity. The argument can then proceed as follows (Hick, 1970: 96-7):

6. Either "God exists" is logically necessary or "God does not exist" is logically necessary.
7. "God does not exist" is not logically necessary.
8. "God exists" is logically necessary.
9. "God exists" is logically necessary' implies "God exists."
10. God exists.

But the continuity of the argument from proposition 1 to 10, Hick argues, depends on the change of interpretation of N at proposition 6; therefore, the argument as a whole is invalid.

It should be remarkable that Hick has no problem with proposition 7 which is considered as another fundamental assumption apart from proposition 1. Why is it so? Perhaps, the researcher thinks, he, like most (if not all) theists, accepts that the cosmological argument is the most compelling. As Davies puts it: "... the Cosmological Argument ... has a long history and versions of it can be found in the work of many philosophical and religious writers from the early Greek period to the present time. For many people who believe in God it is the most appealing argument of all" (Davies, 1982:38).

Is the cosmological argument really compelling? No, not at all for atheists. An atheist like Ernest Nagel would argue that proposition 7 in Hartshorne's argument is unacceptable. The cosmological argument, unlike the ontological one, is a posteriori, proceeding from some feature of the world, such as causality, to God. To review it briefly, let us consider the argument summarized by Nagel as follows: "Every event must have a cause. Hence an event A must have as cause some event B, which in turn must have a cause C, and so on. But if there is no end to this backward progression of causes, the progression will be infinite; and in the opinion of those who use this argument, an infinite series of actual events is unintelligible and absurd. Hence there must be a first cause, and this first cause is God, the initiator of all change in the universe" (Nagel, 1990:397). As mentioned before, for the sake of convenience, the researcher will use "order" as the center of the cosmological arguments, the teleological argument or the argument from design. Thus we may say that these arguments are a posteriori in that they proceed from order of the world to the existence of God. When considering the arguments of this kind, we would find that what is regarded as the most controversial is the principle: "Every event has a cause." Let us consider its validity together now. The first question to be raised here is whether it is true that every event has a cause. This question is of interest among determinists, indeterminists, and compatibilists. This question, however, is not relevant to our main concern here, so we would leave it out. Now suppose that the principle is assumed. Is it necessary to postulate a first cause in order to escape from an infinite series? The atheist would say no:

For if everything must have a cause, why does not God require one for His own existence? The standard answer is that He does not need any, because He is self-caused. But if God can be self-caused, why cannot

the world itself be self-caused? Why do we require a God transcending the world to bring the world into existence and to initiate changes in it? On the other hand, the supposed inconceivability and absurdity of an infinite series of regressive causes will be admitted by no one who has competent familiarity with the modern mathematical analysis of infinity. The cosmological argument does not stand up under scrutiny (Nagel, 1990:397).

Thus for atheists it is not necessary to postulate God. The order of the world can be explained by nature itself. For atheists and physicalists gravitation, magnetism, and strong and weak interaction all together are sufficient to constitute order of the world (Martin, 1984:62). From this it follows that God or proposition 7 in Hartshorne's argument is superfluous.

H.G. Hubbeling, as a logician, has criticized Hartshorne's proof in a different way. Hubbeling raises three critical questions to Hartshorne. First, Hartshorne should have identified clearly which logical system he uses. Since "Such a system is connected with a whole philosophy and with various philosophical presuppositions....," we are forced to accept "that Hartshorne's proof is only valid within a certain system!" (Hubbeling, 1991:365-6). Second, Hubbeling assumes that Hartshorne uses S5 in his argument for it is obvious in step 3 that Hartshorne adopts the postulate, which is allowed only in S5, that: "modal status is always necessary." Still, Hubbeling also assumes that: "Further it is important in Hartshorne's philosophy that he gives a temporal interpretation of the modalities. Time is an objective modality and we may not interpret eternity in an a-temporal way" (Hubbeling, 1991:360). The problem is that the temporal interpretation of the modalities is incompatible with S5, so what should Hartshorne do? Third, since the

temporal interpretation of the modalities is incompatible with S5, Hartshorne needs to make up his mind to choose between them. Hubbeling says: "... Hartshorne should have acknowledged that even in a rational philosophy like his choices must be made..." (Hubbeling, 1991:366).

It seems obvious that whereas Hick and the atheist pay attention to propositions 1 and 7 respectively, Hubbeling's main concern is proposition 6 in Hartshorne's argument. He calls it "central thesis" (CT) because it is so important that "if we could show that God's existence is at least possible, i.e., that it is not self-contradictory, or in other words that it is not true that it necessarily does not exist," then we could prove God's existence as follows (Hubbeling, 1991:357):

- (1) CT: Either God exists necessarily or he necessarily does not exist.
- (2) God's existence is possible (by hypothesis).
- (3) It is not true that he necessarily does not exist (from 2).
- (4) God exists necessarily (from (1) and (3) by modus tollendo ponens).

The logical symbolism of the above argument can be found in an appendix IV. Hubbeling keenly points out that if Hartshorne agrees that the system he has used is S5, he will have a problem with proposition 2 (in Hartshorne's version) for it is not allowed in constructive or intuitionistic logic. Hubbeling argues:

What can be proved in *consturctive* logic is also a theorem in classical logic, but the reverse is not true. The principle of *consturctive* logic (and mathematics) is that one has to give a positive proof for a positive theorem. It is not allowed to start with a negative hypothesis, e.g. non-p and then with the help of a reductio ad absurdum to prove P. It

is allowed to start with P and then to prove non-P with the help of a reductio ad absurdum. Thus in *consturctive* logic the law of excluded middle: either P or non-P is not valid... In classical logic the method of reductio ad absurdum is allowed without restrictions and thus the law of excluded middle is valid... In classical logic the logical laws are valid independently of the human mind. In most cases classical logic is connected with a certain 'platonc view' in that a certain existence is granted to logical laws, irrational numbers, etc. *Consturctive* logic is usually connected with a conventionalistic view. Logical laws are an invention (construction) of man. They do not exist independently of man (Hubbeling, 1991:365).*

So far we have seen criticisms of Hartshorne's argument from different points of view. How would we deal with these criticisms? The researcher would argue with these critics in the next chapter, and try to defend Hartshorne's proof, but just in a humble way.

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*All italics belong to the researcher.