

รายงานการวิจัย

## โครงการวิจัยพระเอก นางเอก ผู้ร้าย ตัวอิจฉา:

บุคลิกฐานแห่งค่านิยมและความเห็นสาธารณะในกรุงเทพมหานครยุคสงครามเย็น

สัญญาเลขที่ CU-CLUSTER-Human-๑๑-๑๑๓-๕๓

โครงการส่งเสริมการทำงานวิจัยเชิงลึกในสาขาวิชาที่มีศักยภาพสูง กองทุนรัชดาภิเษกสมโภช  
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## กิตติกรรมประกาศ

โครงการวิจัยเรื่อง “พระเอก นางเอก ผู้ร้าย ตัวอิจฉา: บุคคลาธิษฐานแห่งค่านิยมและความเห็น  
สาธารณะในกรุงเทพมหานครยุคสงครามเย็น” (Cold War Idols: The Personification of Values and  
Public Opinion in Post-Second World War Bangkok) เป็นโครงการวิจัยนำร่องของโครงการใหญ่ที่  
ใช้ชื่อว่า “ปริมนตลแห่งการต่อรอง: มหานครโลกาภิวัตน์กับอัตลักษณ์ไทยในโลกพหุวัฒนธรรม”  
(Negotiating Spaces: The Globalized City and Thai Identity in a Multicultural World) โดย  
เริ่มต้นจากบทความวิจัยชิ้นแรก 2 ชิ้นคือ

1. “พระเอก หรือ ผู้ร้าย: การศึกษาเชิงเปรียบเทียบระหว่างบทบาทชาวจีนโพ้นทะเลในขบวนการเสรี  
ไทยและการจลาจลบนถนนเยาวราช (เถียะพะ) ในปี พ.ศ. 2488” (Heroes or Villains: A  
Comparative Study of Overseas Chinese Contribution to the Free Thai Movement and  
Their Role in the Yaowarat Uprising of 1945)—อ. ดร. วาสนา วงศ์สุรวัฒน์ (ผู้วิจัย/ หัวหน้า  
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2. “มนต์รักหนังไทย: แบบฉบับใหม่ของความรักระหว่างชายหญิงในภาพยนตร์ที่นำเสนอโดย มิตร  
ชัยบัญชา และ เพชรา เชาวราษฎร์” (Magical Love in the Moviehouse: (Re)Negotiations  
of Thai Heterosexuality in the Films of Mitr Chaibancha and Petchara Chaowarat)—  
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โครงการนำร่องอันประกอบด้วยบทความทั้งสองเรื่องดังกล่าวข้างต้นนี้ได้รับเงินทุนอุดหนุนการ  
วิจัยจากโครงการส่งเสริมการทำงานวิจัยเชิงลึกในสาขาวิชาที่มีศักยภาพสูง กองทุนรัชดาภิเษกสมโภช หรือ  
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## บทคัดย่อ

โครงการ “พระเอก นางเอก ผู้ร้าย ตัวอิจฉา: บุคคลาธิษฐานแห่งค่านิยมและความเห็น  
สาธารณะในกรุงเทพมหานครยุคสงครามเย็น” (Cold War Idols: The Personification of  
Values and Public Opinion in Post-Second World War Bangkok) มุ่งศึกษาค่านิยมและ  
ความเห็นสาธารณะเกี่ยวกับแง่มุมสำคัญต่างๆ ในวิถีชีวิตของคนเมืองในยุคหลังสงครามโลกครั้งที่  
2 ผ่านแนวโน้มนทางประวัติศาสตร์นิพนธ์ เช่น การวิเคราะห์ ดีความ และประเมินอิทธิพลและคุณค่า  
ของเหตุการณ์และบุคคลสำคัญในประวัติศาสตร์สมัยสงครามโลกครั้งที่ 2 และในยุคสงครามเย็น  
และศึกษาผ่านสื่อศิลปวัฒนธรรมต่างๆ โดยเฉพาะสื่อภาพยนตร์ซึ่งมีพัฒนาการและได้รับความนิยม  
มากขึ้นอย่างยิ่งในยุคสงครามเย็น จนทำให้ตัวละครและดารานักแสดงที่มีชื่อเสียงบางคนกลายมา  
เป็นบุคคลาธิษฐานแห่งค่านิยมและความเห็นสาธารณะในมหานครใหญ่ที่กำลังก้าวสู่ความเป็น  
สมัยใหม่อย่างเต็มตัวในยุคสมัยดังกล่าว

## Abstract

“Cold War Idols: The Personification of Values and Public Opinion in Post-  
Second World War Bangkok” investigates values and public opinions concerning  
various aspects of post-Second World War city dwellers. The first part of the study is  
conducted from a historiographical perspective, which the analysis, interpretation, and  
evaluation of influences and values attached to important events and personalities in  
World War II and Cold War history. The second part of the study is conducted  
through cultural medias, especially through films, which went through an important  
period of development and were hugely popular during the Cold War years.  
Consequently, some film characters as well as the movie stars who played them  
became the personification of the values and public opinion of the metropolis that was  
becoming fully modern during that era

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- “มนต์รักหนังไทย: แบบฉบับใหม่ของความรักระหว่างชายหญิงในภาพยนตร์ที่นำแสดงโดย มิตร ชัยบัญชา และ เพชรา เชาวราษฎร์” (Magical Love in the Moviehouse: (Re)Negotiations of Thai Heterosexuality in the Films of Mitr Chaibancha and Petchara Chaowarat)	
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## บทนำ

### 1. ความสำคัญและที่มาของปัญหาการวิจัย

โครงการนี้เป็นโครงการนำร่องของโครงการวิจัยชุดใหญ่ซึ่งได้ยื่นขอทุนมหาวิทยาลัยวิจัยแห่งชาติไปแล้วชื่อโครงการ “ปริทัศน์แห่งการต่อรอง: มหานคร โลกาภิวัตน์กับอัตลักษณ์ไทยในโลกพหุวัฒนธรรม” (Negotiating Spaces: The Globalized City and Thai Identity in a Multicultural World) ซึ่งมีที่มาและความสำคัญโดยสังเขปดังนี้

“ตั้งแต่ปลายศตวรรษที่ 19 เป็นต้นมา โลกาภิวัตน์ ซึ่งมีทุนนิยมเป็นแรงขับเคลื่อนสำคัญนั้นได้แสดงพลังผ่านช่องทางของชาติเป็นหลัก แต่เนื่องจากอำนาจอธิปไตยของชาตินั้นมีรากฐานมาจากการควบคุมอาณาเขตที่จำกัด จึงก่อให้เกิดภาวะตึงเครียดทั้งในแง่แนวโน้มและในความเป็นจริงระหว่าง โลกาภิวัตน์ กับ ชาติ”<sup>1</sup>

นับเป็นเรื่องที่ชวนฉงนไม่น้อยที่ทันทีที่มนุษยชาติเริ่มเรียนรู้ที่จะมีปฏิสัมพันธ์ข้ามขอบฟ้า ณ รุ่งอรุณแห่งยุคโลกาภิวัตน์ โลกก็เริ่มถูกแบ่งเป็นรัฐชาติต่างๆ ทุกรัฐถูกกำหนดขอบเขตอย่างชัดเจนและแบ่งแยกจากรัฐข้างเคียงโดยเด็ดขาดด้วยพรมแดนแห่งชาตินิยมอันทรงพลังภาพ สภาพความเป็นจริงอันแสนพิสดารนี้ยังคงดำเนินอยู่ต่อมาจวบจนถึงปัจจุบัน ยิ่งผู้คนเดินทางข้ามพรมแดนระหว่างรัฐชาติต่างๆ มากขึ้นเท่าไร กฎหมายตรวจคนเข้าเมืองก็ดูเหมือนจะเข้มงวดและยุ่งยากซับซ้อนมากขึ้นเท่านั้น ยังมีความต้องการติดต่อ สื่อสาร คมนาคม และค้าขายข้ามพรมแดนมากขึ้นเพียงใด ความเกลียดกลัว และไม่ไว้วางใจคนต่างชาติ ต่างภาษา ต่างวัฒนธรรม ก็ยิ่งเพิ่มมากขึ้นในนามของการรักษาความมั่นคงของชาติ อันที่จริงแล้วคงมีแนวคิดอื่นอีกไม่มากนักที่จะสามารถนิยามยุคโลกาภิวัตน์ได้ดีกว่าเส้นพรมแดนจำนวนนับไม่ถ้วนที่ถูกสร้างขึ้นมาด้วยความพยายามอย่างจำเป็นเร่งด่วนที่จะกีดขวาง เปลี่ยนแปลง และ/หรือ เตะถ่วงกระบวนการ โลกาภิวัตน์ให้ช้าลง

ภาวะกลืนไม่เข้าคายไม่ออกระหว่างกระแสโลกาภิวัตน์กับชาตินิยมได้กลายมาเป็นส่วนสำคัญที่ขาดไม่ได้ของวิถีชีวิตในมหานครของรัฐชาติเกิดใหม่ทั้งหลายทั่วทั้งภูมิภาคเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ตั้งแต่ปลายศตวรรษที่ 19 จวบจนถึงปัจจุบัน ยุคโลกาภิวัตน์

<sup>1</sup> Prasenjit Duara. "Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty: China, 1900-1945," in *The American Historical Review*, vol. 102 no. 4 (October, 1997), p.1030.

ได้นำเอากระแสแห่งความก้าวหน้า การค้า และความเป็นสมัยใหม่ มาสู่เมืองท่าอันแออัดคับคั่งตลอดแนวชายฝั่งของมหาสมุทรแปซิฟิกและอินเดีย นอกจากนี้โลกาภิวัตน์ยังนำมาซึ่งอิทธิพลครอบงำแห่งจักรวรรดินิยมอันทรงแสนยานุภาพมหาศาล ไม่เพียงแต่ยึดครองและสถาปนาอาณานิคมเท่านั้น ยังจุดประกายความมุ่งมั่นที่จะปกครองตนเองซึ่งได้กลายเป็นไฟแห่งลัทธิชาตินิยมอันโชติช่วงไปทั่วทุกมุมโลกในเวลาต่อมาด้วย กรุงเทพฯ หรือ บางกอก ซึ่งเป็นเมืองท่าใหญ่และศูนย์กลางการแลกเปลี่ยนสำคัญ ทั้งด้านการค้า การเมือง และวัฒนธรรม ในเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้มาตั้งแต่ศตวรรษที่ 19 นั้นเป็นตัวอย่างที่ชัดเจนของการปะทะกันอย่างรุนแรงระหว่างกระแสโลกาภิวัตน์ที่มีแนวโน้มครอบงำทุกสิ่งกับพลังชาตินิยมที่มุ่งมาดปรารถนาจะเป็นอิสระจากการครอบงำจากภายนอก ในขณะที่กรุงเทพฯ มุ่งหน้าสู่ความเป็นสมัยใหม่ รัศมีของตัวเองไว้ในความสับสนวุ่นวายของระบบรางและสายโทรเลข มหานครแห่งนี้กำลังต่อสู้กับความต้องการที่จะสร้างอัตตลักษณ์ของตนเองที่จะสามารถเก็บรักษาและถ่ายทอดไปชั่วลูกชั่วหลานได้ ภาวะกลืนไม่เข้าคายไม่ออกนี้เหมือนดังเช่นที่ Clifford Geertz พรรณนาไว้อย่างชัดเจนว่า,

“...ประชาชนของรัฐใหม่นั้นถูกกระตุ้นด้วยแรงบันดาลใจอันทรงอาณภาพสองประการซึ่งเกิดขึ้นพร้อมกัน แต่เป็นอิสระต่อกัน แยกจากกันโดยเด็ดขาด และบ่อยครั้งมักขัดแย้งกัน ในทางปฏิบัติด้วย แรงบันดาลใจแรกคือความปรารถนาที่จะได้รับการยอมรับในฐานะผู้กระทำที่มีความรับผิดชอบ ผู้ซึ่งมีความมุ่งมั่น การกระทำ ความปรารถนา และความคิดเห็นที่ “มีความหมาย” เป็นความต้องการที่จะสร้างรัฐสมัยใหม่ที่มีประสิทธิภาพและมีชีวิตชีวา แรงบันดาลใจนี้มีความมุ่งหมายที่จะได้รับการยอมรับในความมีอยู่ของตนเอง เป็นการค้นหาอัตตลักษณ์ และการเรียกร้องให้อัตตลักษณ์นั้นได้รับการยอมรับโดยสาธารณชน โดยทั่วไปว่ามีความสำคัญ เป็นการนำเสนอตนเองในสังคมว่าเป็น “ผู้มีความสำคัญ” ในโลกนี้ จุดมุ่งหมายที่มากับแรงบันดาลใจอีกประการหนึ่งนั้นเน้นผลในทางปฏิบัติ เป็นการเรียกร้องความก้าวหน้า การยกระดับคุณภาพชีวิต การสถาปนาระบบอบการเมืองที่มีประสิทธิภาพมากขึ้น เพิ่มความยุติธรรมในสังคม และยิ่งไปกว่านั้นคือการมีบทบาทของตนเองในเวทีการเมืองโลก เพื่อแผ่อิทธิพลของตนเองไปยังรัฐชาติอื่นๆ”<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Clifford Geertz, “Primordial and Civic Ties,” in John Huntington and Anthony Smith (ed), *Nationalism* (Oxford, 1994), p.30.

ตั้งแต่กลางศตวรรษที่ 19 เป็นต้นมาพื้นที่ภายในเขตเมืองของกรุงเทพฯ ได้กลายเป็น ปริณทตแห่งการต่อรองระหว่างพลังแห่งความเป็นสมัยใหม่ของกระแสโลกาภิวัตน์กับความ ปราปรณาทที่จะเป็นอิสระ เป็นไทแก่ตัว ของแนวความคิดชาตินิยม วิธีชีวิตของชาวเมืองกรุงเทพฯ นั้นทั้งศิวิไลซ์และทันสมัย แต่ในขณะที่เดียวกันก็อดอ้างเอกลักษณ์ทางประเพณีและแก่นแท้ของ ความเป็นชาติ มหานครแห่งนี้เจริญรุ่งเรืองเฟื่องฟูไปด้วยความหลากหลายทางสังคมและวัฒนธรรม ที่มาจากการค้าและการพานิช พร้อมๆ กับที่จับตามองกลุ่มชนต่างชาติต่างภาษาอย่างใกล้ชิดเพราะ เกรงว่าพวกเขาอาจเข้ามาทำลายมาชาติแห่งความเป็นหนึ่งเดียวกันของวัฒนธรรมไทยได้

การต่อรองดังกล่าวข้างต้นนั้นยังคงดำเนินต่อมาจวบจนทุกวันนี้ หลักฐานที่ยืนยันการต่อสู้ที่ ยังไม่สิ้นสุดนี้อาจพบได้ในทุกๆ ด้านของชีวิตคนกรุงเทพฯ เช่น ศิลปะ วรรณกรรม มโนคติทาง การเมือง ธุรกิจการบันเทิง วัฒนธรรมอาหารนานาชาติ เป็นต้น ร่องรอยของการต่อรองอัน ยากลำบากนั้นอาจสืบค้นหาต้นตอกลับไปได้ถึงเมื่อเกือบสองศตวรรษที่แล้ว ทั้งหมดคือข้อมูลทาง ประวัติศาสตร์ที่สำคัญเกี่ยวกับกระบวนการ โลกาภิวัตน์ในเมืองหลวงของเราและมโนทัศน์ชาตินิยม สมัยใหม่ที่ถูกสถาปนาขึ้นมาเพื่อต่อต้านกระแสดังกล่าวด้วย

บางที่ข้อมูลเกี่ยวกับการต่อรองมากมายที่เกิดขึ้นและถูกนำมาศึกษาอย่างละเอียดใน โครงการวิจัยนี้อาจจะช่วยให้เราเข้าใจความขัดแย้ง ความแตกต่าง และคู่ตรงข้ามทางความคิดที่มีอยู่ มากมายในสังคมไทยทุกวันนี้ได้ดียิ่งขึ้นด้วย

ทั้งนี้โครงการ “พระเอก นางเอก ผู้ร้าย ตัวอิจฉา: บุคคลาธิษฐานแห่งค่านิยมและความเห็น สาธารณะในกรุงเทพมหานครยุคสงครามเย็น” (Cold War Idols: The Personification of Values and Public Opinion in Post-Second World War Bangkok) จะมุ่งศึกษาค่านิยมและ ความเห็นสาธารณะเกี่ยวกับแง่มุมสำคัญต่างๆ ในวิถีชีวิตของคนเมืองในยุคหลังสงครามโลกครั้งที่ 2 ผ่านแนวโน้มทางประวัติศาสตร์นิพนธ์ เช่น การวิเคราะห์ ดีความ และประเพณีอิทธิพลและคุณค่า ของเหตุการณ์และบุคคลสำคัญในประวัติศาสตร์สมัยสงครามโลกครั้งที่ 2 และในยุคสงครามเย็น และศึกษาผ่านสื่อศิลปวัฒนธรรมต่างๆ โดยเฉพาะสื่อภาพยนตร์ซึ่งมีพัฒนาการและได้รับความนิยม มากขึ้นอย่างยิ่งในยุคสงครามเย็น จนทำให้ตัวละครและคาแรกเตอร์ที่มีชื่อเสียงบางคนกลายมา เป็นบุคคลาธิษฐานแห่งค่านิยมและความเห็นสาธารณะในมหานครใหญ่ที่กำลังก้าวสู่ความเป็น สมัยใหม่อย่างเต็มตัวในยุคสมัยดังกล่าว

## 2. วัตถุประสงค์ของโครงการ

- 2.1. ศึกษาค่านิยมและความเห็นสาธารณะของสังคมกรุงเทพมหานครในยุคหลังสงครามโลกครั้งที่ 2
- 2.2. ศึกษาบทบาทและอิทธิพลของประวัติศาสตร์นิพนธ์กระแสหลักที่มีต่อค่านิยมและความเห็นสาธารณะในสังคมกรุงเทพฯ ยุคหลังสงครามโลกครั้งที่ 2
- 2.3. ศึกษาบทบาทและอิทธิพลของการเมืองระหว่างประเทศในยุคสงครามเย็นที่มีต่อค่านิยมและความเห็นสาธารณะในสังคมกรุงเทพฯ ยุคหลังสงครามโลกครั้งที่ 2
- 2.4. ศึกษาภาพสะท้อนของสภาพสังคมและประวัติศาสตร์นิพนธ์กระแสหลักที่พบในภาพยนตร์ยอดนิยมของไทยในยุคสงครามเย็น
- 2.5. ศึกษาบทบาทและอิทธิพลของภาพยนตร์และดาราภาพยนตร์ชั้นนำของไทยที่มีต่อค่านิยมและความเห็นสาธารณะในสังคมกรุงเทพฯ ยุคหลังสงครามโลกครั้งที่ 2

## 3. ผลงานวิจัยที่เกี่ยวข้องและเอกสารอ้างอิง

โครงการวิจัย “พระเอก นางเอก ผู้ร้าย ตัวอิจฉา: บุคคลาธิษฐานแห่งค่านิยมและความเห็นสาธารณะในกรุงเทพมหานครยุคสงครามเย็น” นี้ประกอบด้วยโครงการย่อยๆ อีก 2 โครงการเพื่อมุ่งผลิตบทความวิจัยเพื่อตีพิมพ์ในวารสารวิชาการระดับนานาชาติรวมทั้งสิ้น 2 ชิ้นด้วยกัน ชิ้นแรกเป็นการศึกษาในเชิงประวัติศาสตร์นิพนธ์ โดยเน้นภาพลักษณ์ที่ขัดแย้งกันของชาวจีนโพ้นทะเลในกรุงเทพมหานครในช่วงสงครามโลกครั้งที่ 2 และหลังสงครามโลกครั้งที่ 2 ชื่อเรื่อง “พระเอก หรือ ผู้ร้าย: การศึกษาเชิงเปรียบเทียบระหว่างบทบาทชาวจีนโพ้นทะเลในขบวนการเสรีไทยและการจลาจลบนถนนเขาวราช (เลี้ยวพะ) ในปี พ.ศ. 2488” (Heroes or Villains: A Comparative Study of Overseas Chinese Contribution to the Free Thai Movement and Their Role in the Yaowarat Uprising of 1945) บทความวิจัยนี้จะมุ่งตั้งคำถามเกี่ยวกับมุมมองในประวัติศาสตร์นิพนธ์กระแสหลักที่มักแสดงภาพชาวจีนโพ้นทะเลในแง่ดีและแง่ร้ายแบบสุดโต่ง กล่าวคือ ชาวจีนโพ้นทะเลที่ดีคือกลุ่มที่ยืนทำมาหากิน เป็นพลเมืองดี เคารพกฎหมาย จงรักภักดีต่อชาติ ศาสนา และพระมหากษัตริย์ของไทย กลุ่มนี้มักได้ดิบได้ดีเป็นเจ้าสัวหรือรับราชการจนได้เป็นขุนนางขุนนาง และเป็นที่ยกย่องเชิดชูในสังคมไทยมาจนถึงทุกวันนี้ ในขณะที่อีกกลุ่มหนึ่งคือชาวจีนโพ้นทะเลที่ไม่ดี คือกลุ่มที่เข้ามาก่อความเดือดร้อนวุ่นวาย ไม่สำนึกในพระมหากรุณาธิคุณที่ทำให้มีโอกาสเข้ามาพึ่งพระบรมโพธิสมภาร สมคบกันเป็นสมาคมลับอั้งยี่ของโจร ก่อการร้ายก่อจลาจล จนถึงปลุกปั่นโฆษณาชวนเชื่อให้ประชาชนชาวไทยหลงใหลไปกับลัทธิคอมมิวนิสต์ซึ่งจะกลายเป็นภัยต่อความมั่นคงของชาติและสถาบันกษัตริย์ในยุคสงครามเย็นด้วย แต่เมื่อศึกษาในข้อเท็จจริงทางประวัติศาสตร์เกี่ยวกับชาวจีนโพ้นทะเลในประเทศไทยในยุคสงครามโลกครั้งที่ 2



เรื่อยมาจนถึงยุคสงครามเย็นกลับพบว่า ในหลายๆ กรณีนั้น “คนจีนที่ดี” กับ “คนจีนที่ไม่ดี” กลับเป็นคนกลุ่มเดียวกัน ดังเช่นคนจีนที่มีส่วนช่วยสนับสนุนขบวนการเสรีไทยซึ่งมีฐานะเป็นวีรบุรุษของชาติที่ช่วยให้ไทยรอดพ้นจากการเป็นประเทศผู้แพ้สงครามในยุคหลังสงครามโลกครั้งที่ 2 นั้น กลับเป็นคนกลุ่มเดียวกันกับกลุ่มที่รัฐบาลไทยอ้างว่าเป็น “อั้งยี่” ผู้อยู่เบื้องหลังเหตุการณ์จลาจลบนถนนเขาวราชในปี พ.ศ. 2488 นั่นเอง การอธิบายถึงกลุ่มบุคคลและเหตุการณ์สำคัญทางประวัติศาสตร์ในลักษณะคู่ตรงข้ามของ “คนจีนที่ดี” กับ “คนจีนที่ไม่ดี” ในลักษณะดังกล่าวนี้ทำให้เกิดความเข้าใจผิดหลายๆ ประการเกี่ยวกับภาพลักษณ์และบทบาทของชาวจีนโพ้นทะเลในประเทศไทยในยุคหลังสงครามโลกครั้งที่ 2 และเป็นการสร้างกระบวนการกดดันทางสังคมที่จะส่งเสริมแกมบังคับให้ชาวจีนโพ้นทะเลที่ยังคงหลงเหลืออาศัยและทำกินอยู่ในเขตกรุงเทพมหานครนั้นพยายามอย่างยิ่งยวดที่จะเข้าไปรวมกลุ่มกับ “ชาวจีนที่ดี” ซึ่งเป็นกลุ่มที่ได้รับการสนับสนุนจากรัฐและยกย่องเชิดชูจากสื่อกระแสหลัก (รวมไปถึงประวัติศาสตร์นิพนธ์กระแสหลักด้วย) งานวิจัยเกี่ยวกับอัตลักษณ์ชาวจีนโพ้นทะเลในประเทศต่างๆ นั้นนับว่ากำลังเป็นที่นิยมพอสมควร ความขัดแย้งระหว่างชาตินิยมจีนกับชาติอื่นๆ ก็เป็นหัวข้อที่มีการศึกษามาแล้วอย่างกว้างขวางพอสมควร งานที่มีชื่อเสียงในระดับนานาชาติมีอยู่หลากหลายพอสมควร เช่น งานของ Aihwa Ong ได้แก่

Ong, Aihwa and Donald Nonini. ed. *Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism*. London: Routledge, 1997.

Ong, Aihwa. *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1999.

หรืองานของ Wang Gungwu และ Leo Suryadinata เช่น

Suryadinata, Leo. *China and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies, 1997.

Wang Gungwu. *China and the Overseas Chinese*. Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1991.

แต่งานที่ศึกษาเกี่ยวกับกรณีของชาวจีนโพ้นทะเลในประเทศไทยยังมีอยู่ค่อนข้างจำกัด และแม้จะมีนักวิชาการชาวไทยทำการศึกษาเกี่ยวกับบทบาทของชาวจีนโพ้นทะเลในประเทศไทยในยุคสงครามโลกครั้งที่ 2 และสงครามเย็นอยู่บ้าง เช่น

พรณี บัวเล็ก. *การเติบโตและพัฒนาการของนายทุนธนาคารพาณิชย์ในประเทศไทย (2475-2516)*. วิทยานิพนธ์อักษรศาสตรมหาบัณฑิต จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย, 2528

กวาดล ทรงประเสริฐ. *ทุนจีนปีกไม้ได้: ทุนหลังเบื่องลิกทุนใหญ่โพ้นทะเล*. กรุงเทพฯ: Tipping Point Press, 2546.

แต่งงานเหล่านี้ก็ไม่ได้ทำการศึกษาในแง่ที่เกี่ยวกับบทบาทของคนกลุ่มนี้ที่มีต่อค่านิยมและความเห็นสาธารณะในสังคมไทยโดยรวมแต่ประการใด การศึกษาตามแนวทางของโครงการวิจัยนี้ นอกจากจะช่วยเติมเต็มส่วนที่ขาดหายไปในการบวกรวบรวมวิจัยเกี่ยวกับชาวจีนโพ้นทะเลและประวัติศาสตร์นิพนธ์ไทยสมัยใหม่แล้ว ยังมีส่วนสำคัญอย่างยิ่งในการทำความเข้าใจภาพลักษณ์และบทบาทของชาวจีนโพ้นทะเลที่มีต่อค่านิยมและความเห็นสาธารณะของสังคมคนเมืองในยุคสมัยใหม่ในประเทศไทยด้วย บทความวิจัย “พระเอก หรือ ผู้ร้าย: การศึกษาเชิงเปรียบเทียบระหว่างบทบาทชาวจีนโพ้นทะเลในขบวนการเสรีไทยและการจลาจลบนถนนเยาวราช (เลี้ยวพระ) ในปี พ.ศ. 2488” นี้ อ.ดร. วาสนา วงศ์-สุรวัดน์ (หัวหน้าโครงการ) เป็นผู้รับผิดชอบ

บทความวิจัยชิ้นที่สองของโครงการนี้คือเรื่อง “มนต์รักหนังไทย: แบบฉบับใหม่ของความรักระหว่างชายหญิงในภาพยนตร์ที่น่าแสดงโดย มิตร ชัยบัญชา และ เพชรา เชาวราษฎร์” (Magical Love in the Moviehouse: (Re)Negotiations of Thai Heterosexuality in the Films of Mitr Chaibancha and Petchara Chaowarat) บทความวิจัยนี้จะมุ่งศึกษาบทบาทและอิทธิพลของภาพยนตร์ซึ่งนำเสนอโดยดาราคู่ขวัญยอดนิยมทั้งสองท่านนี้ที่มีต่อค่านิยมและความเห็นสาธารณะในสังคมเมืองกรุงเทพฯ เกี่ยวกับอุดมคติเรื่องความรัก ชีวิตคู่ และปฏิสัมพันธ์ระหว่างชายหญิง ในบริบททางสังคมและวัฒนธรรมที่เปลี่ยนไปในยุคสงครามเย็น การศึกษาเกี่ยวกับค่านิยมเรื่องความรักระหว่างชายหญิงที่เปลี่ยนไปในบริบทสังคมสมัยใหม่นั้นนับเป็นหัวข้อที่ได้รับความสนใจและมีการศึกษาค้นคว้าอย่างแพร่หลายพอสมควรแล้ว งานในแนวนี้ที่สำคัญและสมควรยกมาเป็นตัวอย่าง ได้แก่

Binnie, Jon. *The Globalization of Sexuality*. London: SAGE, 2004.

LaMarre, Thomas, and Nae-Hui Kang. *Impacts of Modernities*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004.

นอกจากนี้บทบาทและอิทธิพลของภาพยนตร์ไทยและประวัติศาสตร์และพัฒนาการของวัฒนธรรมและค่านิยมเกี่ยวกับความรัก เพศสภาพ และเพศวิถีในสังคมไทยก็เป็นเรื่องที่จะได้รับความสนใจจากวงวิชาการนานาชาติมากพอสมควร จะเห็นได้จากผลงานตีพิมพ์ในระดับนานาชาติที่ผลิตออกมามากมายในช่วงไม่กี่ปีที่ผ่านมา เช่น

Barmé, Scot. *Woman, Man, Bangkok: Love, Sex, and Popular Culture in Thailand*. Bangkok: Silkworm, 2002.

Boonrak Boonyaketmala. "The Rise and Fall of the Film Industry in Thailand, 1897-1992." *East-West Film Journal* 6 (1992): 62-98.

Jackson, Peter A., and Nerida M. Cook, eds. *Genders and Sexualities in Modern Thailand*. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 1999.

Meiersonne, Bastian, ed. *Thai Cinema / Le Cinéma Thaïlandais*. Lyon: Asiexpo, 2006.

แต่ทั้งหมดนี้ก็ยังไม่มีใครศึกษาเรื่องอิทธิพลของสื่อภาพยนตร์และดาราคู่ขวัญยอดนิยมที่มีต่อ ค่านิยมและความเห็นสาธารณะในสังคมเมืองกรุงเทพฯ ในยุคที่มีความสับสนทั้งทางการเมือง เศรษฐกิจ และวัฒนธรรมอย่างมากอย่างในยุคสงครามเย็น การศึกษาในบทความวิจัย “มนต์รักหนัง ไทย: แบบฉบับใหม่ของการรักระหว่างชายหญิงในภาพยนตร์ที่นำเสนอโดย มิตร ชัยบัญชา และ เพชรา เชาวราษฎร์” นี้จะศึกษาบทบาทและอิทธิพลของภาพยนตร์ มิตร-เพชรา ควบคู่ไปกับการศึกษาบริบททางสังคมและการเมืองในยุคหนึ่งซึ่งผู้วิจัยเชื่อว่ามีส่วนสำคัญอย่างยิ่งในการ ปรับเปลี่ยนค่านิยมและความเห็นสาธารณะเกี่ยวกับเรื่องความรักและความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างชาย หญิงในสังคมเมืองกรุงเทพฯ ซึ่งยังคงความสำคัญและมีอิทธิพลอย่างต่อเนื่องจนถึงปัจจุบันนี้ (แม้ จะเคยยุค มิตร-เพชรา มานานมากแล้วก็ตาม) บทความวิจัยชิ้นนี้ อ.ดร. เบร์ท ฟาร์เมอร์ เป็น ผู้รับผิดชอบ

#### 4. วิธีดำเนินการวิจัย

- 4.1. เก็บรวบรวมข้อมูลที่เป็นหลักฐานชั้นปฐมภูมิที่เป็นสิ่งพิมพ์ ได้แก่ เอกสารทางราชการ หนังสือ ข่าวและบทความหนังสือพิมพ์ ที่ร่วมสมัยกับช่วงระยะเวลาที่ศึกษา (ยุค สงครามเย็น) จากหอสมุดแห่งชาติ และหอจดหมายเหตุแห่งชาติ
- 4.2. เก็บรวบรวมข้อมูลที่เป็นหลักฐานชั้นปฐมภูมิที่เป็นภาพยนตร์ในยุคสงครามเย็น โดยเฉพาะภาพยนตร์ไทยยอดนิยมยุคทศวรรษที่ 1960-1970 กว่า 100 เรื่องจาก หอสมุดภาพยนตร์ในสถาบันอุดมศึกษาต่างๆ และที่สะสมไว้เป็นการส่วนตัวอีกส่วน หนึ่ง
- 4.3. เก็บรวบรวมข้อมูลที่เป็นเอกสารชั้นทุติยภูมิจำพวกหนังสือและสิ่งพิมพ์ต่างๆ ที่บันทึก รวบรวม วิเคราะห์ และประเมินสภาพสังคม ค่านิยม และความเห็นสาธารณะของ สังคมกรุงเทพฯ ในยุคสงครามโลกครั้งที่ 2 และหลังสงครามโลกครั้งที่ 2 ซึ่งจัดทำ และตีพิมพ์ในสมัยต่อมา จากห้องสมุดของสถาบันอุดมศึกษาต่างๆ

- 4.4. จัดหมวดหมู่และศึกษาข้อมูลที่เกี่ยวข้องได้ทั้งชั้นปฐมภูมิและทุติยภูมิโดยละเอียด แล้วนำมาวิเคราะห์และตีความเพื่อให้เข้าใจค่านิยมและความเห็นสาธารณะในสังคมกรุงเทพฯ ยุคหลังสงครามโลกครั้งที่ 2 ให้ดียิ่งขึ้น
- 4.5. ศึกษา วิเคราะห์ เพื่อหาบทสรุปเกี่ยวกับความต่อเนื่องเชื่อมโยงของสังคมและวัฒนธรรมในกรุงเทพมหานครยุคสงครามเย็นที่ยังมีผลสืบเนื่องและมีบทบาทสำคัญในสังคมและวัฒนธรรมเมืองใหญ่มาชจนถึงยุคปัจจุบัน

## 5. ขอบเขตการวิจัย

- 5.1. ข่าวน่าและเหตุการณ์ทางประวัติศาสตร์ที่ได้รับความสนใจอย่างกว้างขวางของจากสาธารณชนทั้งภายในและภายนอกประเทศไทยในยุคที่คาบเกี่ยวกันของสงครามโลกครั้งที่ 2 กับยุคสงครามเย็น
- 5.2. ภาพยนตร์และคาราภาพยนตร์ที่ได้รับความนิยมอย่างยิ่งในยุคหลังสงครามโลกครั้งที่ 2 โดยเฉพาะในช่วงทศวรรษที่ 1960-1970

## 6. ผลการวิจัยต่อการพัฒนาองค์ความรู้และการนำไปใช้

คาดว่าจะได้บทความวิจัยที่สามารถนำเสนอต่อที่ประชุมวิชาการระดับนานาชาติและได้รับพิจารณาตีพิมพ์ลงในวารสารวิชาการระดับนานาชาติอย่างน้อย 2 ชิ้นภายในกำหนดระยะเวลาดำเนินการ 10 เดือนของโครงการนำร่องดังกล่าวนี้

### 6.1. การประชุมวิชาการระดับนานาชาติที่คาดว่าจะนำผลงานไปเสนอ

- Association for Asian Studies (AAS) Annual Meeting ณ ประเทศสหรัฐอเมริกา
- EuroSEAS (European Southeast Asian Studies) Conference ณ สหภาพยุโรป

### 6.2. วารสารวิชาการระดับนานาชาติ (ในฐานข้อมูล Scopus) ที่คาดว่าจะส่งบทความวิจัยไปตีพิมพ์

- *Journal of Chinese Overseas*
- *Camera Obscura*.

# Heroes or Villains

## A Comparative Study of the Overseas Chinese Contribution to the Free Thai Movement and Their Role in the Yaowarat Uprising of 1945

Wasana WONGSURAWAT

### Abstract

In February 1943, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek decided to support the Free Thai Movement and broadcasted to the world that Thailand was also a victim of Japanese imperialism and that China would support Thailand's independence and respect its sovereignty after the end of the Second World War. He made this decision for the sake of the wellbeing of millions of overseas Chinese in Thailand who had been supporting the anti-Japanese war efforts since 1931. Soon after the war finally ended in September 1945, the overseas Chinese in Bangkok Chinatown got into a violent clash with local authorities because they were rehearsing for the Double-Ten Anniversary of the Chinese Republic and failed to display Thai national flags in accompaniment of the Republican flags that were the main component of their celebration. How could the heroes of World War II who contributed so much to saving Thailand from the status of a defeated nation turn into unpatriotic villains within months of the conclusion of the war? This paper will discuss and analyze the complex position of the overseas Chinese vis-à-vis the modern Thai State. It will demonstrate how closely intertwined the notions of 'The Thai Nation,' 'Thai Nationalism,' and 'Thai-ness' is with the identity and political position of the overseas Chinese community.

The bombing of Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7<sup>th</sup> 1941 left little to the imagination in terms of when the United States of America became embroiled in the Asia - Pacific front of the Second World War. When and why the rest of Asia was caught up in this horrendous international entanglement was and remains a much more complicated matter. The Republic of China under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had formally declared war against the Empire of Japan in July of 1937 after a military confrontation at Marco Polo Bridge in the outskirts of Beijing. In fact, some six years earlier, in September 1931, the Mukden Incident had already triggered an invasion by Japanese troops. A Japanese puppet state had been operating in

Manchuria for nearly five years before the Kuomintang government ever made a formal declaration of war.

In Thailand, textbooks of modern Thai history all date the Second World War from Monday, December 8<sup>th</sup> 1941, when Japanese troops arrived in the country demanding right-of-way to transport their armies en route to strategic battlefields in Burma and Malaya. Not unlike China, however, much had already happened in Thailand during the 1930s, prior to the arrival of Japanese troops. Most notably, Japan had been the key arbitrator in the Franco-Thai War (October 1940-May 1941) which ended with the allocation of all disputed territories to Thailand. What is more noteworthy, though perhaps generally less known, is the fact that many prominent members of the overseas Chinese community in Thailand had been involved in anti-Japanese activities and had been contributing to the Chinese war effort since the 1931 invasion of Manchuria.

In reality, much of what happened during and after the Second World War, especially regarding the Asia-Pacific front, was the outcome of events which occurred long before formal declarations of war were made by China or Thailand. To describe this theatre of conflict as opening in 1941 leads to a rather skewed picture in the Thai case, and ignores the crucial role of the Republic of China and the overseas Chinese in the victory of the Allied Powers on the Asia-Pacific front.

A too-narrow cropping of the historical perspective also obscures the critical role of the overseas Chinese community in securing a favorable outcome for Thailand at the conclusion of the Second World War. The Free Thai Movement (FTM), which took so much credit for saving Thailand from the disastrous fate of being classified among the defeated Axis nations, was dominated by upper class Thai expatriates from Britain

and the US. Their overseas Chinese comrades in the FTM were only grudgingly acknowledged as minor and insignificant players in what was and continues to be depicted as a prestigious Anglo-American-born movement. In Thailand, working class overseas Chinese who persevered in various underground anti-Japanese activities from the early 1930s, continue to be viewed in the popular imagination to this day as a secretive and malign force. Though they fought tirelessly against Japanese aggression for most of the 1930s and through the early 1940s, overseas Chinese political groups were categorized as secret societies, criminal gangs, and even communist terrorists through most of the Cold War years.

The 1945 Yaowarat Uprising in Bangkok's Chinatown occurred only months after the end of the war, even before the final peace agreement was settled. The character and timing of the riot reflects in Thai society a tenacious bias against the overseas Chinese. It showcases the highly volatile nature of Thai nationalist sentiments, the need for a convenient scapegoat, and the projection of overseas Chinese in the role of the conventional national *other*. Within a span of less than five years, patriotic overseas Chinese who had engaged in underground anti-Japanese activities in Thailand went from being enemies of the state during the period of the Phibunsongkhram – Axis alliance, to national heroes and brothers in arms of the Free Thai Movement (FTM), to fifth-column criminal hooligans to be shot dead on Yaowarat Street only days after FTM Chief, M.R. Seni Pramoj took office as Thailand's new Prime Minister. The post-war Thai government readily embraced their (new) Anglo-American allies but turned harshly against citizens of the Republic of China (the most prominent Allied Power in the Asia-Pacific region). The Yaowarat Incident raises difficult questions, not only in matters concerning the relationship between the Thai state and its overseas Chinese minority, but also about the essential foundations of alliances within the

Allied Powers, and Thailand's professed position as an active partner of the victorious nations.

## **Some problems with mainstream historiography concerning the Second World War in Thailand**

The highly sensational nature of Japanese-American military encounters during the Second World War is not only phenomenal, but also appears to be exceptional rather than the norm. The bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941 initiated formal and direct involvement by the US in the Asia-Pacific front. Spine-chilling Japanese *kamikaze* attacks marked the last ten months of the war. Finally, the atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 ended Japanese military resistance in two horrific mushroom clouds. The first and only actual use of nuclear weapons in the history of conventional warfare, the unconditional surrender by the Japanese Emperor himself, and the new world order in which the US emerged as the first nuclear superpower fixed the eye of history in the Asia-Pacific war on American involvement. The brutal naval engagements and the protracted and bloody battles for control of numbers of Pacific islands became part of Hollywood's vast lore, fully acknowledged in the mainstream of world history as well. Considering the dominant role of the US in the Cold War in Southeast Asia and its position as the most prominent ally and generous supporter of Thai military dictatorships through most of the 1960s and 1970s, it is not surprising that mainstream historiography concerning the Second World War in Thailand puts the US at center-stage during that critical period, though at the cost of ignoring other major players.

The official narrative of Thai history during the course of the Second World War focuses on the fluctuation between Thailand's two sets of alliances—the Japanese-



Thai partnership, as confirmed by the Treaty of Alliance signed by Prime Minister Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram in December 1941, and the commitment to the Allied cause, represented by the legendary Free Thai Movement. Thailand's involvement in the war is often narrated as a sort of mirror image of the domestic political struggle that took place between the two major factions of the ruling People's Party. One was led by the militaristic and pro-Japanese Premier Phibunsongkhram, the other by the civilian intellectual and pro-Allies Minister of Commerce-turned-Regent, Pridi Phanomyong. The British and American branches of the Free Thai Movement (led by Pridi Phanomyong and M.R. Seni Pramoj, respectively) were also jockeying for power toward the end of the war and afterward.

Classic works on Thailand in the Second World War—especially those published in the Thai language—accord only a marginal position for the role of China and the overseas Chinese in the impressive emergence of the Free Thai Movement to save the day at the conclusion of the war. Even within that marginal space, much is devoted to the problematic Sino-Thai state relations and the questionable position of the overseas Chinese in Thai nationalist politics—giving an overall impression that the Chinese proved to be much more of a hindrance than help to the Free Thai cause in the Second World War. Even less was mentioned of another major force among the Allied Powers. All things considered, it is almost impossible not to notice how heavily the Cold War mentality bore upon mainstream historiography in Thailand as it is nearly impossible to find any substantial mentioning of the role of the Soviet Union in the Asian front of the Second World War at all.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Direk Jayanama. *Thailand and the Second World War* [Thai kap songkhram lok khrang thi song] (Bangkok: Prae Pityaya, 1966).

Fortunately, more recent works—also published in the Thai language—seem to display an increase awareness of China’ s role in the Asia Pacific front of the Second World War. A few even managed to link that to the heroic accomplishments of the Free Thai Movement. However, the contributions of the US and Great Britain remain prominently at the centre-stage, vastly overshadowing the marginal accomplishments of Chiang Kai-shek’ s forces and the magnitude of Chinese Diaspora supporting him. One most prominent mentions of this Chinese contribution was a brief—less than two full pages—summary of the four Free Thai missions to China during the last two years of the war, and even this ended with a rather feeble concluding statement,

“It is difficult to judge what exactly resulted from the four missions sent by Pridi Phanomyong [to China]. However, what is obvious is that these envoys led to the cooperation between Free Thai agents in and outside of Thailand. This was the first time Free Thai agents in Britain and America became aware that there was also a Free Thai Movement within Thailand.”<sup>4</sup>

Clearly, the author views the resistance movement in Thailand during the Second World War as a matter directly relating to Britain and the US. Even the FTM missions to China were only meaningful in that they made FTM agents outside of Thailand aware of the resistance movement within the country. China, despite being the destination of four missions sent by FTM leader Pridi Phanomyong himself, appeared to be little more than a rather limp ‘Plan B’ as regards Thailand’s fate at the conclusion of the war.

A grim reality of the Second World War is that approximately 60 million people perished during the course of it. Nearly half of those casualties (approximately 27

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<sup>4</sup> Thaemsuk Numnon. *Thailand in the Era of the Second World War*. [Mueang Thai samai songkhram lok khrang thi song] (Bangkok: Saitharn, 2005), pp.182-183.

million) were civilians and soldiers of the Soviet Union. The second largest number of casualties was in China, where nearly 20 million died. The majority of Japanese fighting forces on the Asia-Pacific front during the Second World War were deployed in China. As mentioned earlier, Japanese troops began their invasion in 1931, when they occupied three northeastern provinces of China and soon after established the puppet state of Manchukuo. War was not officially declared until July 1937, nearly six years after the first invasion of Manchuria, but more than four years before Pearl Harbor. The total number of casualties estimated for this theatre of the war—which is also known as the Second Sino-Japanese War or the War of Resistance—represents more than half of all casualties from the Asia-Pacific front of the Second World War. No other Asian country fought longer or suffered greater losses in the war than China. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the China War Zone at the outbreak of the Pacific War, and China alone, out of all Asian countries, was accorded a seat in the United Nations Security Council following the conclusion of the war. Its significant contribution to this particular period in world history is acknowledged in that gesture.

## **The lopsided history of the Free Thai Movement**

Considering the greatly enhanced role of the United States in world politics, American academia has had more than its fair share in the writing of the modern history of China and Southeast Asia. The US was also the birthplace of the postwar discipline of area studies, so it is actually not very surprising to see China's contribution in the Second World War overshadowed by America's story, despite the fact that China entered the war nearly a decade before the US. Nevertheless, the

distorted histories of these great powers inevitably skew other perspectives of mid-20<sup>th</sup> century world history. Mainstream Thai historiography, for example, also exhibits a highly biased tradition. As mentioned earlier, the official Thai historical narrative is that, mostly because of the actions of the Free Thai Movement, Thailand was rescued from defeated nation status at the conclusion of World War II, despite having signed a treaty of alliance with Japan and having declared war on the UK. The supposedly heroic Free Thai Movement is depicted as an underground, anti-Japanese movement established, organized, and executed mostly by Thai expatriates and Thai students in Britain and the United States. This official version is predictably blind to the highly significant contributions of the Chinese government and the overseas Chinese, underground anti-Japanese movements. Overseas Chinese influence in matters relating to Thailand's position in the Second World War is virtually obliterated from mainstream historiography.

Mainstream historiography of Thailand's involvement in the Second World War tends to mark the beginning of the war on the evening of 7 December 1941 when Direk Jayanama, then the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was notified by the Japanese Ambassador of Japan's intention to transport its troops through Thai territory on military expeditions to British Malaya, Burma, and India. Premier Phibunsongkhram was away – supposedly on affairs of state – at the eastern border between Thailand and French Indochina. At two o'clock in the morning of 8 December, Japanese troops made amphibious landings at seven locations along the coast of the Gulf of Thailand. These troops encountered armed resistance from local militia and police forces at a few locations. Phibunsongkhram returned after daybreak to convene an emergency cabinet meeting. At seven o'clock in the morning, the Thai government ordered an end to all resistance and announced that Thailand would grant passage to Japanese

troops. Almost immediately after the cabinet meeting was over, Pridi Phanomyong, then Minister of Finance, and the most outspoken opponent of Phibun's decision to collaborate, established a secret, anti-Japanese/pro-Allied movement with a few likeminded colleagues and close friends. At the same time, on the other side of the globe, M.R. Seni Pramoj, Thai Minister to Washington, notified the US State Department that Phibun's government no longer represented the true intentions of the Thai people and that the Thai legation would no longer take orders from a Thai government under the control of Japanese troops. The Free Thai Movement (FTM) would, instead, represent the true intentions of the Thai people by doing its utmost to support the Allied Powers. Secret meetings following Pridi's and Seni's mutiny against Phibun's government marked the founding of the Free Thai Movement. These two individuals were the major leaders.<sup>5</sup> A British branch of the Thai resistance soon joined the FTM with a sizable cohort of exiled members of the Thai royal family<sup>6</sup> who headed small groups of Thai students overseas.

It is not difficult to see that this analysis and description of the FTM fits perfectly with the mainstream narrative of Thailand's position during the Second World War, which emphasizes the struggle between the patriotic Thai/British/American Free Thai Movement and Phibun's pro-Japanese government. In the same way that mainstream historiography tends to overemphasize the role of the US in the Asia-Pacific front of the Second World War, mainstream historiography in Thailand tends to overemphasize the role of the FTM. Despite the large number of literature devoted to this movement, the Free Thai Movement at the time of its earliest inception had very

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<sup>5</sup> Vichitvong Na Pombhejara, *The Free Thai Legend* [Tamnan Seri Thai]. (Bangkok: Saengdow, 2003), pp. 25-33.

<sup>6</sup> This included the then recently abdicated King Prajadhipok (Rama VII), his queen Rambhai Barni, her brother HSH Prince Suphasawatwongsanit Svastivatana, and HRH Prince Chula Chakrabongse.

little credibility as an effective resistance movement. Even less confident were those whom the movement early on claimed as its allies. Documents from the British Foreign Office from early in 1942 reveal serious doubts and suspicion as to the purpose and practicality of the Free Thai Movement. One note describes "the small number of Siamese in the country [Britain] (they are well under 100) ... the majority (about 55) are young students, the remainder being largely made up of members of the discredited royal family."<sup>7</sup> This movement was viewed hardly capable of any strategic assistance in terms of rallying support from the local populace against Phibun's pro-Japanese regime, or in mounting effective resistance against Japanese forces in Southeast Asia. The British Foreign Office appears to have been even less impressed by the American counterparts of the "young students" and "members of the discredited royal family,"

"...There are thus some slight chances of establishing a Free Thai movement. But it would be a mistake to try to hurry this on too quickly and in any event things are not going to be easy. Even the Thai Minister in Washington is not, according to what Mr. Butler tells me, a man of character, so that we are extremely short of possible leaders. And there is not really any influential body of Thais either in this country [Britain] or in the United States."<sup>8</sup>

By the end of 1942, it appeared that the Free Thai Movement had gained neither the confidence nor any substantial support from supposed backers among the Allies. Neither the British nor the Americans were willing to formally endorse the Free Thai Movement. Nor were they willing to unfreeze Thai government funds under their

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<sup>7</sup> PRO: Foreign Office, 3/1/31862, "Free Siamese Movement: question of releasing Siamese funds to finance the movement," in *Free Thai Movement*, June 1942.

<sup>8</sup> PRO: Foreign Office, 3/1/31862, "Free Thai Movement in Great Britain and the United States," in *Free Thai Movement*, February 1942.

control to finance this fledgling resistance movement.<sup>9</sup> The British Foreign Office was wary of endorsing a Thai resistance led by “members of the discredited royal family” on the one side of the Atlantic, or by an employee of the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs who had mutinied against his own government on the other. The US obviously enjoyed a closer working relationship with the Thai Minister to Washington, but Britain stood to lose much of its dominant influence in Southeast Asia if Seni led a Free Thai Movement sanctioned by the Allies. However, even the U.S. government, which stood to gain influence from Seni’s political rise in postwar Thailand, remained unsure of the practicality of granting endorsement for such an organization. Publicly expressed support might also put American noncombatants in Thailand at risk, and “might prejudice the chances of their getting the United States Minister at Bangkok out.”<sup>10</sup>

Having failed to gain official recognition from either Britain or the US, the Free Thai legend would have died quietly and anonymously had not it been for an historic and perhaps unexpected broadcast by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in February, 1943. The Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the China War Zone made the following statement via a radio broadcast directed to the people of Thailand:

“I can give my solemn word that China as well as her Allies have no territorial ambitions in Siam and no intention of undermining her sovereignty and independence. The Siamese, however, should recognize the fact that the territory and freedom of Siam can only be restored to her by the victory of China and her Allies.”<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> PRO: Foreign Office; 371/31862, “Free Siamese Movement: question of releasing Siamese funds to finance the movement,” in *Free Thai Movement*, June 1942.

<sup>10</sup> PRO: Foreign Office; 371/31862, “Free Thai Movement in Great Britain and the United States,” in *Free Thai Movement*, February 1942.

<sup>11</sup> AH: Foreign Affairs; 172-1/0703(4)012 “Report from the 32<sup>nd</sup> meeting of the Sino-Thai Problem discussion,” in *DSTP*, 5 April 1943. (See also, PRO: Foreign Office; 371/35983, *Chiang Kai-shek's broadcast to Siam*, 1943.)

In its entirety, this broadcast emphasized that the Chinese state recognized Siam as being, like China, a victim of Japanese imperialism rather than the perpetrator of expansionist ideals. The Generalissimo's broadcast was promptly endorsed and reaffirmed by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Foreign Office documents from the British Public Record Office show that considerable pressure came from both the US State Department and from Pridi, as leader of the Free Thai Movement, for British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to also publicly endorse Chiang's policy towards Thailand, and to formally affirm support for the Free Thai Movement. However, no such declarations were forthcoming from the British side. The same documents also suggest that the Foreign Office remained concerned with various disputed territories in Burma and Malaya which were seized by Japanese troops and awarded to the Thai government throughout the course of the war.<sup>12</sup> The British were, as a result, reluctant to commit to what seemed to be a rather generous postwar policy towards Thailand.<sup>13</sup>

Only after Chiang Kai-shek's broadcast, Roosevelt's endorsement, and the cold shoulder from the British Foreign Office, did leaders of the Free Thai Movement come to seriously consider China as a sympathetic and effective ally whose helpful influence was to be actively encouraged. The first Free Thai mission to China set off on 28 February 1943.<sup>14</sup> They were a humble team of two individuals, the envoy and

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<sup>12</sup> All such territories were returned to British control at the end of the Second World War (See, PRO: Foreign Office, 371/54362, *Terms of Peace Agreement*, 1946.)

<sup>13</sup> PRO: Foreign Office: 371/36983, *Chiang Kai-shek's broadcast to Siam*, 1943. See also, PRO: Foreign Office, 371/35979, *Post-war settlement with Siam*, 1943.

<sup>14</sup> It was later claimed that Pridi had attempted to send a group of representatives to China since early 1942, but the group mysteriously disappeared during the course of the journey and never made it to China. Documental evidence that could substantiate this claim have been discovered neither in the British Public Record Office nor among the KMT



representative of Free Thai leader Pridi Phanomyong, Mr. Chamkad Balankura and his interpreter, Mr. Phaisan Trakunli. The Chamkad Mission was deployed to accomplish the following four major tasks, according to Pridi's agenda,

1. Convey Pridi's agenda to M.R. Seni Pramoj, the Thai Minister to Washington D.C. and leader of the American Branch of the Free Thai Movement, and have Seni negotiate that agenda with British and American authorities
2. Rally support from the Allied Powers for the future activities of the Free Thai Movement
3. Request intelligence and tactical support from the Allied Powers to help transport leading members of the Free Thai Movement and the pro-Allied faction in the Thai government that was to establish a government in exile in British India
4. Convince leaders of major Allied Powers (especially Britain) to allocate the then frozen funds<sup>15</sup> of the Thai government to finance future activities of the Free Thai Movement

Aside from managing to get in touch with Seni in a highly roundabout fashion through the authorities in Chongqing, it would be fair to say that the Chamkad Mission failed in every other objective. Documents from the KMT's Ministry of Foreign Affairs clearly suggest that Chinese authorities, having discussed the matter with the British and other allies, did not take Chamkad Balankura seriously at all.

"From the information available, Foreign Office considers that B. [Chamkad Balankura] has gone off at half cock and has in fact no practical plan which could now profitably be put into effect.

Moreover, they do not think time is ripe to promote an active Free Thai Movement, since this would invite reprisals which would hinder action at a later date. Siamese army would probably be more of a hindrance than help at present and Japanese difficulties in running the country would probably be overcome with assistance of Siamese "Quislings".

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documents in *Academia Historica* in Taiwan. The only record of this illusive mission is from the third-person account of Malai Chuphinit, writing with his pseudonym 'Nai Chanthana,' in *X.O.Group*. (See, Nai Chanthana, *X.O.Group*. (Bangkok: Kao Na, 1954).)

<sup>15</sup> Sawat Sisuk, "Chamkad Balankura Mission" [Patibatkan Chamkat Phaiangkun], in *Free Thai Movement: Observations on the "Chamkad Balankura Mission" and certain military operations (funerary memorial of Dr. Sawat Sisuk)* [Serri Thai: Kho Sangket "Patibatkan Chamkat Phaiangkun" lae Patibatkan thang thahan bang rueang (anuson ngan phrarachatan ploeng sop Dr. Sawat Sisuk)] (Bangkok: n.p., 1995), p.38.

Foreign Office favour careful preparation of a Free Thai Movement now to be actively used at appropriate moment coupled with a go-slow political warfare offensive.

For the above reasons Foreign Office do not favour trying immediately to put into effect any scheme for getting Siamese leaders out of the country whether by air or secret exfiltration.

As regards ultimate development of a Free Siamese Movement, H. M. Government would propose to continue on their present lines. There is no present question either of the formal recognition of such a movement or unfreezing Siamese funds."<sup>16</sup>

Consequently, no Free Thai leaders were smuggled out of Thailand; no Thai government in exile was established; and no frozen funds were reallocated to the Free Thai Movement as a result of Chamkad's visit to Chongqing.

A second group of Free Thai envoys was sent by Pridi in August 1943 when it became obvious that the Chamkad Mission had been a complete failure. The second group was led by a former MP and influential personality in the overseas Chinese community in Thailand, Sa-nguan Tularak. Sa-nguan's mission was to reiterate the objectives of the Chamkad mission. KMT foreign affairs documents of the Sa-nguan Mission clearly show that Sa-nguan, the lead negotiator of the mission, presented himself not so much as a Thai statesperson, but more as a leading member of the overseas Chinese community in Thailand—a group that had been in support of the Chinese war effort long before Thailand became directly involved in the Second World War. Representatives of the Chinese government seemed to favor this approach more than Chamkad's previous attempt. Although the requests for assistance in the establishment of a Free Thai government in exile and the reallocation of frozen Thai government funds continued to be ignored, the Chinese government did agree to provide military resources for the training of Free Thai agents in Simao

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<sup>16</sup> AH: Foreign Affairs, 172-1/0737(1)001 "Most confidential on Balankura, from British Legation," in *The Free Thai Movement* (1), 13 May 1943.

and other areas in Southern China. There were also significant improvements in terms of communications and cooperation between the various branches of the FTM as a result of the Sa-nguan Mission. After the conclusion of the negotiations in Chongqing in December 1943, Sa-nguan and his chief assistant, Daeng Khunadilok, traveled to Washington to report to Seni, and continued their journey to join Allied headquarters in Kandy, Sri Lanka, as representatives of the Free Thai Movement.<sup>17</sup>

A third Free Thai mission was sent to Chongqing toward the conclusion of the war. MP Thawin Udon arrived in September 1944 to reaffirm the FTM's dedicated cooperation and support of the Allies and to assure the Chinese government in particular that the era of anti-Chinese nationalism in Thailand would most definitely come to an end, once the war ended with the victory of the Allies and the overthrow of the pro-Japanese Phibun regime. The following are the initial terms of postwar settlement put forward by the Chinese government and responded to with great respect by the Thai delegates,

“1. The Free Thai Provisional Government should be established with China's approval. After the Free Thai Movement successfully seizes power [in Thailand], it should immediately send representatives to discuss a diplomatic treaty and to make plans for the establishment of formal Sino-Thai diplomatic relations between our two nations.

2. After the establishment of formal Sino-Thai diplomatic relations, a Sino-Thai treaty of trade and commerce should be established within six months.

The treaty of trade and commerce mentioned above should include the following principles,

The principle of mutual benefit

'Most-favored nation' clause

Overseas subjects of both countries would be granted freedom to reside, conduct business, labor, travel, study, and practice religious faith [in both countries]

Exchange of consul personnel

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<sup>17</sup> AH: Foreign Affairs: 172-1/0737(1)001 "Thailand's anti-Japanese leader, Sa-nguan Tularak visits China," in *The Free Thai Movement* (1), 17 September 1943.

3. All overseas Chinese who had been unlawfully expelled from Thai territory during the war must be allowed to return [to Thailand] and allowed the freedom of association with no interference from the Thai government.

4. The Thai government must compensate for all lost of overseas Chinese lives and property, which occurred in Thai territory during the time of [Japanese] occupation.

5. All laws, which were promulgated during the war and used to discriminate against or persecute the overseas Chinese, must be abolished. The Thai government's control of overseas Chinese education must also be modified accordingly after liberation [from Japanese occupation].<sup>18</sup>

Of all Free Thai missions to China during the Second World War, it would be fair to conclude that the Thawin Mission achieved the most practical and substantial outcome. Yet, the above mentioned Sino-Thai postwar settlement, which was the central concern of discussions between Thawin, the head of the Free Thai envoy, and Chinese authorities, is nowhere to be found in the mainstream narrative of Thailand's wartime history. It is not recorded even in publications devoted to the history and achievements of the Free Thai Movement.

### **Chinese Interest: a more logical explanation of Thai victory**

In one of the most ironic historiographic twists, the mainstream narrative of Thai history during the Second World War credits the Free Thai Movement with saving Thailand from the fate of a defeated nation status at the conclusion of the war. In reality, the FTM did not and could not possibly have achieved anything of the kind. The most it had to offer was the outcome of the Thawin Mission, i.e. an assurance by a leading Allied Power which had already decided to support Thailand's postwar position of independence and sovereignty even before the arrival of the first Free Thai mission in Chongqing, with the expectation that the postwar Thai government would be a gracious friend of the Republic of China and the overseas Chinese. In other

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<sup>18</sup> AHJ Foreign Affairs; 172-1/0737(2)001 "Principles of political negotiations with Thailand," in *The Free Thai Movement* (2), December 1944.

wards, the Generalissimo is even more deserving of the heroic accolades to which the mainstream narrative in Thailand continues to assign to Pridi, Seni, and their Free Thai cohorts. However, Chiang Kai-shek did not come up with the idea of that historic, international radio broadcast in early February 1943 simply out of the goodness of his heart, or because of his rumored fondness for the sweet Chinese radish produced in Thailand. Documents from the KMT's Ministry of Foreign Affairs provide undeniable evidence that leading members of the overseas Chinese community in Thailand had been working in close connection with the Chinese government to carry out anti-Japanese activities in Thailand, supporting the war efforts of the Chinese government and making ceaseless attempts to improve Sino-Thai relations generally and the Thai government's attitude in particular towards the overseas Chinese community in Thailand. From July 1932 (less than one year after the Japanese invasion of China's three northeastern provinces)<sup>19</sup> to October 1943 (barely one month after the arrival of the Sa-nguan Mission) there were more or less regular monthly meetings of a body called 'the Sino-Thai problem discussion group' [中泰问题讨论会- zhong-tai wenti taolun hui].<sup>20</sup> The discussion group consisted of representatives from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Overseas Chinese Affairs, together with representatives of the overseas Chinese community in Thailand. From this well-documented series of discussions, it is clear that as early as January 1940, overseas Chinese businesses were actively pledging

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<sup>19</sup> Better known as the 'Mukden Incident' or 'Manchurian Incident,' the Japanese invasion of the three northeastern province of China occurred on 18 September 1931.

<sup>20</sup> AH: Foreign Affairs, 172-1/0703(1)012, *Discussion of Sino-Thai Problem*, July - October 1932.

AH: Foreign Affairs, 172-1/0703(2)012, *Discussion of Sino-Thai Problem*, November 1939 - December 1940.

AH: Foreign Affairs, 172-1/0703(3)012, *Discussion of Sino-Thai Problem*, August 1941 - June 1942.

AH: Foreign Affairs, 172-1/0703(4)012, *Discussion of Sino-Thai Problem*, 2 June 1942 - October 1943.

support for the Chinese government through the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Thailand. The following is one of many lists of monthly donation quotas which the CCC reported to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Sino-Thai problem discussion group in January 1940,

- “1) rice merchants 50,000 baht
- 2) grain merchants 100,000 baht
- 3) medical industries 1,000 baht (at least)
- 4) overseas Chinese wholesalers 6,000 baht
- 5) slaughter houses and pig raisers 9,000 baht
- 6) general stores 3,000 baht (at least)
- 7) dyeing industries 1,000 yuan (at least)
- 8) insurance industries 1,600 baht
- 9) banking industries 500 baht
- 10) tobacco industries 1,000 baht
- 11) others (including laborers and students) will donate as much as they can afford
- 12) pawnshops 200 yuan
- 13) gold merchants 200 yuan
- 14) timber industries 5,000 baht”<sup>21</sup>

Aside from their active support of the Chinese war effort from the earliest years of the Chinese War of Resistance, the overseas Chinese community and their fertile business territory in Thailand represented a significantly wealthy resource for China’s postwar reconstruction and for the Republic’s future modernization projects. As far back as the early days of Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary activities, relying on overseas Chinese capital for China’s development was considered a far healthier alternative to the politically dubious practice of acquiring foreign loans. Financial support from overseas Chinese business tycoons in Thailand was similarly perceived. Hence, the political wellbeing of the Thai state was understood to help guarantee a healthy economic environment for overseas Chinese businesses. Thai sovereignty had an important role in the KMT’s postwar recovery plans. The hidden agenda of the

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<sup>21</sup> AH: Foreign Affairs; 172-1/0703(2)012, “Primary Reports and Suggestions,” in *DSTP*, 15 January 1940.

Republic of China's postwar foreign policies towards Thailand is spelled out most clearly in a report early in 1943 from the Sino-Thai problem discussion group,

“Of the four most important export products of Thailand—rice, tin, timber, and rubber—overseas Chinese are in charge of half of the rice industry, the majority of the timber industry (except teak), 5,700 Chinese are in the rubber industry and more than half of the so-called Thai people working in the Thai rubber industry are actually overseas Chinese,...half of the Thai tin industry was pioneered by the overseas Chinese. Moreover, most daily products used by Thai people are imported from China. After the war is over, Thailand could become an important market for Chinese fuel, machinery, and textile products.”<sup>22</sup>

In other words, Thailand was best spared the status of a defeated nation, despite its formal alliance with Japan and its formal declaration of war against the Allies, for the sake of the wellbeing of the overseas Chinese and their massive business investments in Thailand. Chiang Kai-shek's government was counting on substantial and continuous financial support from the overseas Chinese community in Thailand for China's postwar reconstruction projects, counting on Thailand as a friendly source for raw materials and as a generous and reliable market for China's industrial goods in the postwar era. With its heroic contribution to the Allied war efforts in the Asia-Pacific theatre, China was sure to gain significant political clout in the world arena.<sup>23</sup>

Its generous postwar policy toward Thailand would not only assure its increasing influence in Southeast Asia, but would also contribute to a swift recovery of its war torn economy. Considering the position of the overseas Chinese in the economy of Southeast Asia at the time, and the long-term postwar reconstruction plans that had been carefully drawn out since the earliest days of the Japanese invasion, the Republic of China could have risen as an Asian superpower much sooner than the twenty-first

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<sup>22</sup> AH. Foreign Affairs; 172-1/0703(4)012, *Discussion of Sino-Thai Problem*, 2 June 1942 - October 1943

<sup>23</sup> With the establishment of the United Nations on 24 October 1945, China did indeed gain the much coveted seat as a permanent member of the UN Security Council along with the US, UK, USSR, and France.

century had it not been for the irreconcilable conflicts with the Chinese Communist Party.

## **The Yaowarat Incident**

### **Denying the Overseas Chinese their place in Thai History**

On the evening of 20 September 1945, a group of overseas Chinese patriots were rehearsing for the celebration of the ‘Double Tenth Anniversary,’ also known as the National Day of the Republic of China, which was due to take place on October 10<sup>th</sup>. It was indeed an occasion worth celebrating, considering that the eight-year, Second Sino-Japanese War had recently concluded with China’s victory. More importantly, as part of the larger worldwide conflict and the major arena of the Asia-Pacific front, China’s significant wartime contribution to the Allies would definitely elevate her politically in the new, postwar world order. As for the overseas Chinese in Thailand, their faithful contribution towards the Chinese war effort and to underground anti-Japanese activities from the onset of the Japanese invasion left little room for doubt that their position in Thai society was definitely set to improve. After all, the last Free Thai envoy to China had so promised, and the postwar Prime Minister of Thailand was none other than the founder and major leader of the Free Thai Movement, M.R. Seni Pramoj—the wartime Thai ambassador to Washington. Yet things did not turn out quite as planned. At seven o’clock, Thai police officers arrived to find preparations in full swing on Yaowarat Road.<sup>24</sup> They began to close down the rehearsal, announcing that it was against Thai law to display foreign flags without the accompaniment of Thai flags. No one in the crowd had been aware of this law and there were no Thai flags ready to use in the rehearsal. As the officers were attempting

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<sup>24</sup> One of the few main roads of Bangkok Chinatown.



to remove all Chinese flags from the scene, a vigorous scuffle erupted. Unable to subdue the increasingly hostile crowd, the police called for reinforcements. Chinatown was subsequently cordoned off, and by ten o'clock a full-scale shootout was in progress between a combined police-military force and members of the Yaowarat community.<sup>25</sup>

The exact number of casualties varies significantly, depending on the source. Official Thai documents never admit to more than a dozen civilian deaths, while newspapers published in China, Hong Kong, and Singapore put the highest toll in the 30s or 40s.<sup>26</sup> According to the Thai authorities, the government had no choice but to put an end to the unrest as swiftly and effectively as possible. The would-be celebrants - turned-rioters were described as armed and dangerous. They were fighting on their own turf in Chinatown and employing the upper floors of Yaowarat shop houses as pillboxes from which they fired at police and military personnel. There was considerable disruption in the area and the lives and property of the inhabitants of Bangkok's Chinatown—mostly overseas Chinese, no doubt - were being put at risk.<sup>27</sup> Despite the conciliatory tone of the government report, the damage to the overseas Chinese community in the Yaowarat area went far beyond the outburst of violence during the night of September 20<sup>th</sup>. Most businesses in the area closed down during the following week, either in protest of the heavy-handed methods of the government or out of fear of retaliation from the general public, who had been exposed throughout the period of the Second World War to anti-Chinese propaganda

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<sup>25</sup> NA: [2] ๙.๙. 0201.77/16 *Report to the Prime Minister concerning the unrest on the night of September 20<sup>th</sup>* 2488 B.E., 22 September 1945.

<sup>26</sup> AH: Foreign Affairs; 172-1/0656. *Siam persecutes the overseas Chinese, 1945.*

<sup>27</sup> NA: [2] ๙.๙. 0201.77/16 *Report to the Prime Minister concerning the unrest on the night of September 20<sup>th</sup>* 2488 B.E., 22 September 1945.

by Thailand's pro-Japanese government. Looting and robbery were rampant and law enforcement officers seemed to turn a blind eye. There were even reports of state officials engaging in unlawful searches and confiscation of private property in the Chinatown area.<sup>28</sup> According to official documents, as many as 9 days were required before the government managed to regain control of the situation, though life in Chinatown had yet to return to normality.<sup>29</sup>

There was a vast discrepancy in the way the Thai government depicted the Yaowarat Incident for domestic and international audiences. The violence had broken out so soon after the conclusion of the war, and Thailand's status as a victorious or defeated nation was still being hotly debated among the leading Allied powers. Whether or not Thailand was to be accepted as a member of the newly created United Nations remained uncertain. Much depended on the approval of the five permanent members of the Security Council. China was one of them, and especially influential on matters concerning the Far East. China's support for Thailand's application to the United Nations was contingent upon the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. The violence in Yaowarat raised some serious questions. Bearing all this in mind, the Thai Foreign Ministry took great pains to reassure the Chinese government and the world community—especially the US and those under its influence—that the incident was nothing more than a minor conflict between the locals of Chinatown and law enforcement officers - more of a procedural misunderstanding rather than any sort of racial discrimination. M.R. Seni had always been known as a friend of the Chinese

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<sup>28</sup> NA: [2] ร.ส. 0201.77/16 Letter from Minister of Interior to the Prime Minister concerning allegations of a robbery committed by military and police officers, 15 November 1945.

<sup>29</sup> NA: [2] ร.จ. 0201.77/16 *Minutes of meeting on supplying and selling food to the general public due to mass closing down of Chinese food stores*, 25 September 1945.

and his government would certainly treat Chinese residents no differently from Thai citizens. Such were the general outlines of the article entitled, "Notable Achievements," published in *Democracy* on 30 September, 1945, and "Sino-Siamese Amity Promoted Further," published in *Liberty* on 2 November, 1945. Both newspapers were circulated locally in Washington, and both articles were submitted for publication by the Thai legation there.<sup>30</sup> Constant communication between the Thai legation and the Chinese Embassy in Washington reassured Chinese authorities that M.R. Seni's government was being fair and thorough in investigating the Yaowarat Incident. Records of these communications reflect the eagerness of the Thai government to respond positively to any requests or suggestions from the Chinese Embassy in Washington that would help improve Sino-Thai relations and potentially lead to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries.<sup>31</sup>

The apologetic tone of the Thai government's communications with the Chinese Embassy and with other diplomats in Washington is in stark contrast to the portrayal of the Yaowarat Incident in the Thai media at the time and in later years in mainstream Thai historiography. Documents from the Department of Public Relations concerning the violence on Yaowarat Road in September 1945 indicate that the government was well aware of the anti-Chinese record of the wartime Phibun government. Official comments reflect some paranoia, a certain expectation that the overseas Chinese community would seek revenge in the form of a fifth column supporting a Chinese state and potentially gaining military control of Thailand. To be

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<sup>30</sup> NA: [2] 8.1. 0201.77/16 Letter from Minister of Interior to the Prime Minister concerning Sino-Thai conflict in Bangkok Chinatown, 22 November 1945.

<sup>31</sup> NA: [2] 8.1. 0201.77/16 Letter from Minister of Interior to the Prime Minister concerning Sino-Thai conflict in Bangkok Chinatown, 30 October 1945. See also, AH: Foreign Affairs, 172-1/0656. *Siam persecutes the overseas Chinese.*, 1945.

fair, suggestions had indeed been put forward by several leading Chinese academics that the Republic of China be allowed to station troops in Thailand during the first few postwar years—in the same manner as the US occupation of Japan. This would better ensure that the postwar Thai government would keep its Free Thai Movement promise to abolish all the anti-Chinese policies, laws, and regulations promulgated during the wartime Phibun regime.<sup>32</sup> Nonetheless, as the Generalissimo had clearly established in his historic broadcast to Thailand in February 1943 and reconfirmed through negotiations with the last Free Thai envoy, Thawin Udon, in September 1944, any breach of Thai independence and sovereignty was never seriously considered by the government of the Republic of China. Yet rumors were rampant and the threat seemed so imminent that the Department of Public Relations felt the urgent need to publicize the following statement on 24 September 1945,

“...The authorities wish to stress once more, so that the Chinese people may not be deceived about the sinful rumours of Siam being defeated in the war [and] that the persons who spread such rumours have impure intentions and desire only to cause public disorder and harmful happenings.”<sup>33</sup>

That the Republic of China was among the victors in the Second World War was obvious from the day in August 1945 that Japan formally surrendered. At the end of September, however, it was still a matter for debate as to whether or not Thailand was now to be treated as friend or foe. The Department of Public Relations was justified in insisting that the rumor about “Siam being defeated in the war” was premature. On September 24<sup>th</sup> when this statement was published, however, the Thai government was still unable to state with full certainty that Thailand would definitely be spared

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<sup>32</sup> Skinner, G. William, *Chinese Society in Thailand*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), pp.281-282.

<sup>33</sup> NA: [2] ฐ ๕. 0201.77116 *Communique* | *from Department of Publicity*, 24 September 1945.

the status of a defeated nation.<sup>34</sup> The fate of the country now depended upon the decisions of the leading Allied powers, a small group of nations among which China had become a major player.

In the mainstream historiography of Thailand, the Yaowarat Incident is widely recalled as a provocation in which the overseas Chinese were incited by the prominent political position of China at the conclusion of the Second World War to take revenge against the Thai government for the anti-Chinese policies which had been enforced during the war. Thai sovereignty was insulted through the display of the Chinese national flag in the absence of the Thai national flag. Direk Jayanama states in his classic work, *Thailand and the Second World War*, that the Yaowarat incident forced Thailand to establish formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China.<sup>35</sup> Direk's treatment of the history of the overseas Chinese in Thailand is quite cursory, but with heavy emphasis on the generosity and tolerance of the Thai government, contrasted with suggestions of the increasing threat to the Thai state posed by resident overseas Chinese since the emergence of the Chinese revolutionary movement in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Direk makes no mention of Thawin Udon's promise as representative of the Free Thai Movement to establish formal diplomatic relations with China once the war was over and a Free Thai leader became Prime Minister. Nor is there any mention of the crucial role played by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in endorsing and encouraging the Free Thai Movement in his February 1943 broadcast.

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<sup>34</sup> Thailand's postwar status was firmly established only after the *Formal agreement for the termination of the state of war between Siam and Great Britain and India* was ratified by both parties on 1 January 1946. (See, Direk Jayanama, *Thailand and the Second World War*. [Thai kap songkhram lok khrang thi song] (Bangkok: Prae Pittaya, 1966), p.509.)

<sup>35</sup> Direk Jayanama, *Thailand and the Second World War*. [Thai kap songkhram lok khrang thi song] (Bangkok: Prae Pittaya, 1966), pp.535-541.

Nothing is said about the anti-Japanese underground activities in which the overseas Chinese risked so much long before the war officially arrived in Thailand. Chiang Kai-shek's crucial decision to back Thailand as a free and sovereign state in the postwar period hinged on the vitality and dedication of the overseas Chinese community residing there.

Looking critically from the Thai nationalist narrative, it is not difficult to see why the overseas Chinese are perhaps the most convenient group to be obliterated from the mainstream history of anti-Japanese resistance in Thailand. Considering the fact that much of the earliest foundations of Thai nationalist sentiments were established upon the anti-Chinese rhetoric of King Wachirawut (Rama VI), it would be fair to conclude that overseas Chinese participation in what eventually became the key to Thailand's national salvation is a major anomaly in the Thai nationalist narrative from the earliest decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to the end of the Second World War. They have long been designated as the ethnic/cultural *other* against which Thai nationality and nationhood were to be defined. Labeled *Jews of the Orient* by King Wachirawut himself—writing under the pseudonym, Atsawaphahu—the overseas Chinese continued to be ostracized and vilified as the economic colonizers and the main obstacle of Thailand's economic development and modernization throughout the prewar period of the People's Party's political dominance. During the war years, Phibunsongkhram's government actively promoted a heavily anti-Chinese brand of nationalism and promulgated a large number of anti-Chinese laws and regulations. The notion of national traitor was tagged on to the long list of insults related to the already troublesome position of the overseas Chinese vis-à-vis Thai nationalism. By the time the treaty of alliance between Thailand and the Empire of Japan was signed in the Temple of the Emerald Buddha, this ethnic minority was not only obstructing

Thailand's path to power and prosperity but also siding with the enemies in the greatest war the nation has ever participated in. To acknowledge the overseas Chinese wartime activities as the major driving force that brought about Thailand's postwar national salvation would pose far too many difficult questions for each and every nationalist policy maker of the prewar era—Wachirawut, Phibunsongkhram, and Luang Wichitwathakan, to name only the most prominent ones. Taking all this into consideration, one realizes that according the overseas Chinese their rightful place in Thai history does not only dampen the vitality of the heroic Free Thai legend, but also threaten the legitimacy of the Thai nationalist narrative that has dominated mainstream historiography for most of the 20<sup>th</sup>

## **How dangerous is this history?**

“When Japan surrendered in August 2488 B.E. (1945 C.E.) the Free Thai Movement in Thailand subsequently dissolved. The fight and resistance against the Japanese was over. But another sort of struggle continued. That is, the fight for power and the political game among members of the Free Thai Movement. Who could deny that the conflict and jealousy among Free Thai agents during the Second World War became an important cause for misunderstanding among them. This led to further conflicts that developed into irreconcilable fissures among Thai politicians.”<sup>36</sup>

The dangerous history concerning the overseas Chinese contribution to the Free Thai Movement and the September 1945 tragedy of the Yaowarat Incident is not so much in the story of violent suppression. Modern Thai politics has weathered much bloodier incidents since the end of the Second World War. Compared with the ongoing violence in the South of Thailand today, a brief urban shootout with a dozen anti-government, civilian casualties might not make headlines these days. The profound

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<sup>36</sup> Thaemsuk Numnon, *Thailand in the Era of the Second World War*. [Mueang thai samai songkhram lok khrang thi song] Bangkok: Saitharn, 2005, p.197. [author's translation]

danger of this history lies instead in its thorough deconstruction (demolition) of the myth of the Free Thai hero. The above quote from Thaemsuk's *Thailand in the Era of the Second World War* begs the question of why "conflict and jealousy among Free Thai agents" should have led to "further conflicts that developed into irreconcilable fissures among Thai politicians." The simplest answer is that many of those Free Thai agents became politicians in the postwar era. From this group – so disdainfully described by the British Foreign Office as consisting of "young students and members of the discredited royal family" – came four Prime Ministers, at least a dozen cabinet members, and a wealth of high ranking government officials, including a Governor of the Bank of Thailand and members of the Privy Council. Such a record is quite impressive, considering how little the Free Thai Movement actually managed to achieve as an underground resistance organization during the Second World War.

Considering the decisive role of the overseas Chinese in saving Thailand from the status of a defeated nation, it is understandable that the postwar ruling class would prefer to wipe out any memory of Chiang Kai-shek's 1943 broadcast and the overseas Chinese contribution completely from mainstream historiography. Contrary to what Thaemsuk proposes in the last paragraph of her book quoted above, members of the Free Thai movement did not enter the political ruling class after their heroic contribution during the war. Rather, they were already members of the ruling class, destined to lead Thai politics and government long before the Free Thai Movement was even established. Most were educated in top universities and colleges in Britain and the United States. Considering the level and quality of the educational system in Thailand at the time, it was most certain that a group having attained such prestigious training would at least return to occupy higher administrative positions in the state bureaucracy. Seni did not become the postwar Prime Minister because he was the



hero who saved Thailand from defeated nation status. His ascension to the office of Prime Minister appears to have had more to do with domestic politics and early influence of the Cold War race for world domination. Establishing Seni as the postwar Prime Minister of Thailand was a strategic move that set the stage for US dominance in Thai politics for the entire Cold War era.

Pridi's involvement in the Free Thai Movement would also appear to be motivated by a hidden agenda in domestic politics. Months prior to the outbreak of the Second World War in Southeast Asia, Pridi, the future leader of the pro-Allied Free Thai Movement and former law graduate from France, joined the rest of parliament in a standing ovation for Phibun's success in the Franco-Thai War (1940-1941). As a result of Japanese arbitration at the end of that brief conflict, Thailand gained control of the entire disputed area (24,039 sq.km.) along the Thai-French Indochina border. That moment was arguably the peak of Phibun's popularity. Despite Seni's repeated claims that Phibun's alliance with Japan did not represent the true will and intentions of the Thai people, neither Pridi nor any of the Thai people generally appeared to have any problem in receiving French territory with the support of Japanese arbitrators. Pridi's special relationship with the British government and the British branch of the Free Thai Movement had more to do with his strategic desire to counterbalance the dominance of his arch political rival, Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram and his military powerbase. What could be more predictable than that "conflict and jealousy" should arise between the British and American branches of the Free Thai Movement? In *Thailand in the Era of the Second World War*, Thaemsuk provides a detailed description of the conflicts among several leading personalities in the Free Thai Movement. She states that there was definitely personal animosity between Seni and Pridi. To demonstrate the degree of hostility between the two Free Thai leaders, she

quotes Seni's comment about the alleged cooperation between the Washington based FTM and Pridi's domestic branch,

"Most people think that my Free Thai Movement in the US worked in cooperation with Pridi's Free Thai Movement...In reality, all this is false...We've never communicated at all!"<sup>37</sup>

Pridi enjoyed illustrious revolutionary credentials as a civilian leader of the People's Party, which was responsible for the 1932 Revolution that ended absolute monarchy in Thailand. Again, it is hardly surprising that Pridi would find his political position at odds with the conservative royalist, M.R. Seni Pramroj, who was also a distant member of the royal family. Their political differences were further aggravated after Seni became fully engaged in politics, helped to found the Democrat Party, and continued the rivalry with Pridi during the Cold War years.

In a place like Thailand where political influence enjoys more than its fair share in dictating mainstream history, it is not at all surprising that alternative narratives that challenge the legitimacy of the ruling powers tend to be meticulously muted and, at times, violently suppressed. Even the participation of the Free Thai Movement in the war was markedly played down once Phibun returned to power only a few years after the war and continued to be carefully muted throughout much of the era of military rule that followed up to the mid-1980s. Too much celebration of Free Thai heroism would have brought back too many suspicious memories of Phibun's fateful commitment with the Japanese and the perils that had once accompanied military rule in this country. While there is no doubt that anti-Chinese sentiments, which were provoked to feverish heights during the Second World War, most definitely played a

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<sup>37</sup> Thaemsuk Numnon, *Thailand in the Era of the Second World War* [Mueang Thai samai songkhram lok khrang Ithi song] Bangkok: Saitarn, 2005, p. 187.

crucial role in encouraging the violent suppression of Chinese dissent in the Yaowarat Incident of 1945, the more grievous implications of that tragic occurrence resonates with far more damaging influence upon the legitimacy of the nationalist narrative of mainstream historiography in Thailand. This is why, even at the present, despite the domineering rise of China in the world arena, the history of the Yaowarat Incident of 1945 remains muted and the overseas Chinese participation in the Second World War in Thailand continues to be meticulously ignored. Too many of the major players in Thai politics today—the conservative royalist heirs of Seni Pramoj, the progressive leftist disciples of Pridi Phanomyong, even the military with its long and illustrious pro-American stance throughout the Cold War—rely on the myth of Free Thai heroism to allow a reevaluation of the overseas Chinese role into the mainstream narrative. Instead, a revised version of the old mainstream nationalist narrative has been in the making for quite sometime now to match the rising dominance of the People's Republic of China in the world context. This version is not only completely unaware of the Yaowarat Incident, but has also entirely forgotten all instances of oppression and discrimination the overseas Chinese had suffered at the hands of various nationalist governments in Thailand from the early 20<sup>th</sup> century through to the end of the Cold War era. Hence, it allows the reemergence of the notion of the “patriotic overseas Chinese” [lukjin rak chat], only this time instead of meaning patriotic towards their ancestral homeland as the original meaning during the war, the term expresses singular and unwavering loyalty towards the Thai nation. Ironically, descendants of the national villains of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century have been reformed through the mainstream historical narrative to embrace the nationalism that vilified their ancestors and revere the same made-belief heroes who usurped the rightful place in Thai history from their own people.

*Magical Love in the Moviehouse: Thai Erotic Modernities and (Re)Negotiations of  
Heterosexuality in the Films of Mitr Chaibancha and Petchara Chaowarat*

**Abstract:**

Working from the social constructionist premise that sexuality is a culturally and historically conditioned discourse, this paper focuses on the transformative impact of post-war modernization on Thai heterosexuality through an engaged critical analysis of the films and combined star image of Mitr Chaibancha and Petchara Chaowarat. Appearing in over 150 films together from 1961-1970, Mitr and Petchara were unquestionably the most popular star couple of Thai Cinema's so-called Golden Age and were an omnipresent aspect of the popular cultural landscape. Part of their appeal, and arguably part of their ideological function, was their embodiment of a new style of heterosexual relationality or 'coupledom' that, this paper contends, was reflective of the era's changing social economies of erotic intimacy rooted in, among other things, gender egalitarianism, urbanized capitalism, and consumerist identities. Through their films and generalized personae, Mitr and Petchara offered Thai audiences of the time a popular and deeply affective mediated space within which to negotiate and make sense of the rapidly changing sociosexual cultures of Thai modernity in the 1960s.

In late 2009, Thailand's notoriously excitable celebrity media industry was thrown into effusive overdrive by news that legendary film star, Petchara Chaowarat was set to return to the public limelight for the first time in decades. The star of an astonishing 300 feature-length films made during the 1960s and early 70s, Petchara is without doubt the most popular female celebrity of Thai cinema's so-called Golden Age of 16mm film production. In particular, she is widely remembered and beloved for the many, many films—some 160 in fact—that she made alongside fellow Golden Age icon, Mitr Chaibancha. In their own way, Petchara and Mitr were as close to screen royalty as Thai cinema has yet produced, forming a fabled star couple union, or *darakhukwan* ดาวคู่ขวัญ in Thai, that parallels those of other popular cinemas around the world such as Bogart and Bacall, Gabin and Morgan, Kapoor and Nargis. Abridged in publicity and popular discourse as a single hyphenated entity, as precisely Mitr-Petchara, these two stars dominated the Thai film and popular cultural landscape of the 1960s like no others before or since. Starring in almost half of all films produced in Thailand at the time, their cultural ascendancy was so great that, even today, the

sixties is often popularly dubbed the Mitr-Petchara era. At the height of their success, however, a tragic turn of events intervened that forcibly ended the careers of this beloved screen duo, even as it ironically served to augment their iconic status even further. In 1970, Mitr was killed in an on-set accident when a stunt he was performing misfired and a few short years later, Petchara was afflicted by a series of chronic health problems that left her effectively blind in both eyes, driving her into a Garbo-like, reclusive retirement from which she had hitherto studiously refused to emerge.

Given this history, it is not surprising that the 2009 announcement the now-66 year old Petchara would be making her first public appearance in thirty years evoked such intense excitement, becoming what one newspaper account described with typical hyperbole as 'the story that is stampeding across the country'. The immediate occasion for the return was a special one-off televised publicity campaign for Mistine cosmetics with proceeds to benefit a local charity for the blind, but it engendered a wide range of ancillary events and media coverage including TV specials, news articles, retrospective screenings, memorabilia exhibitions, special themed magazine issues, and several commemorative publications. Almost without exception, the dominant discursive register for much of this media attention was roundly nostalgic, assuming the form of a retrospective gaze focused longingly on a romanticized, disembodied past perceived as qualitatively different and, in that difference, somehow 'better'—more glamorous, more coherent, more innocent—than the present.

The Mistine commercial, which, as suggested, formed the centrepiece of Petchara's hyped return, is exemplary here. Released after an intense promotional build-up, complete with daily countdown, designed to pique curiosity and maximize audience desire, the commercial trades openly on a structure of fetishistic nostalgia. The legendary star appears in the commercial dressed in an angelic, flowing, white gown

and bathed in an ethereal soft-focus glow as she glides serenely among a series of large projected images of herself from her classic 1960s films, while musing in gentle voiceover about the passing of time and the persistence of beauty. That the present-day Petchara, heavily cosmeticized and carefully shot, appears remarkably little changed from the images of her younger self, combined with the commercial's otherworldly mise-en-scene, fosters the idealist illusion of her as a quasi-mythical figure that has somehow magically transcended time, bridging a thirty year span to re-materialize, apparition-like, before our eyes.<sup>1</sup>

This register of mythologized nostalgia has arguably emerged as the default setting for many, if not most, contemporary receptions of the whole Mitr-Petchara legacy at large. A spate of recent films as otherwise diverse as *Fa thalai jone* (2000), *Yam yasothon* (2005) and Michael Shaownasai's *Iron Pussy* series, to say nothing of innumerable TV shows, advertisements and music videos, explicitly recycle the style, themes and aesthetics of the Mitr-Petchara films in the service of an idealized and 'timeless' pop cultural image economy. Even critical responses to the Mitr-Petchara films routinely fall back on a nostalgic romanticism. An elegiac essay by critic Kong Rithee, for example, laments what it sees as the dearth of "true superstars" in contemporary Thai entertainment media, marshalling Mitr and Petchara as lionized counterpoint, "two deities" with a "gravitas so irresistible that audiences flocked to...see them" and "an enigma that seems to grow in intensity as time passes". (Kong, 2005)

While nostalgia is a complex register of cultural experience with diverse, even resistant, capacities (Tannock 1995), the trouble with this type of intensely sentimental nostalgia is that it ultimately works to dehistoricize and dematerialize the Mitr-Petchara legacy. Imbued with mystifying values of atemporal transcendence,

Mitr-Petchara and their films are effectively abstracted in this tradition from the real world conditions of their production and reception, reconstructed as reified ideals that are beyond banal determinants of the social and historical real. It is an approach that is of course fully congruent with the self-mythologizing rhetoric of celebrity, which as the very metaphor of stardom attests is rooted in a mystifying tropology of extramundane otherness, but it is not an approach that is particularly conducive to thinking critically and productively about Mitr-Petchara and their significance to Thai film and cultural history.

This paper is an attempt to redress the widespread tendency to acritical abstraction in contemporary apprehensions of Mitr-Petchara by relocating their stardom firmly and explicitly within its embedded historicity. It proceeds from the assumption that Mitr-Petchara are figures that quite simply 'matter' in historical terms, both in the sense of being significant to their era and in the sense of emerging out of, and bearing determinant traces of, their specific material locations in time and place. More specifically, the paper seeks to position the Mitr-Petchara stardom in the context of shifting socio-historical discourses of sexuality in mid-century Thai culture, arguing that much of the appeal, and a good part of the cultural labour, of this massively popular star couple stems from their embodiment of new styles of gendered identity and heterosexual relationality that were emerging to dominance within the context of postwar Thai cultural modernity.

In mounting its argument, the paper positions itself at the intersection of, and draws much of its theoretical framing from, two intersecting paradigms of contemporary film and cultural studies: revisionist theories of cinema and the modern public sphere, and social critiques of stardom. In terms of the former, recent film scholarship has underscored the important role that cinema and other popular cultural media have

played, and continue to play, as organs of civic discourse and exchange (Donald and Donald 2005; Shimpach 2007). Drawing from but equally reworking classic Habermasian models of the bourgeois public sphere, this work apprehends cinema as an important forum in modern industrialized societies for the communicative flows of public knowledge, a nodal point in the broader field of multiple but overlapping public spheres through which matters of social interest and concern are engaged and worked through by diverse audience constituencies. Cinema's unique combination of individual fantasy and collective ritual is understood in this approach to endow it with a rich capacity for actualizing dynamic configurations of publicness and staging diverse scenarios of cultural communication that are at once accessible and deeply affective.

In a particularly influential version of this approach, Miriam Hansen (1995, 1999, 2000, 2010) argues for popular cinema as a form of what she calls 'vernacular modernism', a popular-reflexive public sphere for the staging and exploration of cultural responses to modernization. A seminal contribution to the broader critical project of complicating and diversifying understandings of modernity and its cultural avatars — as precisely modernities and modernisms in the plural — Hansen's argument is that, for much of its history, cinema has been perceived and enjoyed as "the incarnation of the modern," an aesthetic medium that has not only emblematised contemporaneity but actively articulated what and how it means to be modern and up-to-date for variant mass publics around the world (1999, 68). Film, and by extension other audio-visual media, does this not simply at the level of representation or content but equally, and more importantly, at the level of sensual experience: providing an sensory-aesthetic matrix for the experience of modernity and its various identifications, meanings, desires, and anxieties. More capacious than the



hyperrationalist model of public sphere promoted by Habermas (see McGuigan, 2000), the public sphere of cinema envisaged by Hansen is a mass mediated horizon by which multiple and heterogeneous publics formed, becoming visible both to themselves and society at large, and through which they were able to register, respond to and reflect upon the pleasures and traumas of modern life. Indeed, by calling this capacity of film, 'vernacular modernism', Hansen stresses the localized contingency of cinema's publicness and its negotiations of modernity. As a mass medium, film addresses its viewers in and through the 'language' and styles of the cultural vernacular, offering an accessible idiomatic register — or, more to the point, range of idiomatic registers — whereby the multiple transformations of modernity can be processed in locally-meaningful ways by different audiences.

Significantly, Hansen and others who have followed this conceptual lead accord stardom a privileged status in the vernacular modernist operations of film. Crucial to the economic and aesthetic economies of popular cinemas around the globe, stars are understood to provide a resonant "relay of desire and identification" (Hansen 2000, 17) between audiences and the various formations of modernity showcased in film. It is an insight that is pursued more broadly in the rich literature that has developed around the cultural functions of stardom and mediatized celebrity cultures at large. Coincident with the rise and global spread of technologized modernity, media stardom is widely regarded as one of the principal sense making structures of modern societies. The para-social or "non-reciprocal intimacy" (Thompson 1995) fostered by celebrity cultures is at once reaction against and corrective to the destabilizing flux and rootlessness that shadows the upheavals of social and economic modernization, becoming "a perfect trust-building, self-locating mechanism...a glue that...provides significant emotional connections for otherwise relatively disconnected individuals".

(Hinerman, 2001, 203) An integral part of this restorative labour is the provision of a representational space in which to figure and work through notions of cultural identity, especially to the extent that these have become unfixed and problematized under modernity. Stars, writes Richard Dyer (1986) in an oft-cited formulation, "articulate what it is to be a human being in contemporary society". They do so, he asserts, not in a simple or straightforward fashion but "complexly, variously" as polysemic intertextual structures through which "both the promise and the difficulty" of modern identities are figured and processed in diverse and contestatory ways by different audience groups (1986, 8).

This combined scholarship offers a suggestive theoretical framework for thinking about the Mitr-Petchara stardom and its cultural and historical functions. As the two biggest stars of the 1960s, Mitr and Petchara assumed a central position in the mediatized public sphere of post-war Thai culture. The extraordinary popularity and volume of their cinematic output, to say nothing of their extra-filmic representations in the form of promotional images, press reports, magazine profiles and the like, afforded them a level of civic visibility unmatched by any other Thai public figure of the era outside the monarchy and insinuated them as a familiar and readily identifiable presence in the everyday lives and affections of Thai audiences. This potent mix of mediatized ubiquity and intimacy in turn helped establish Mitr-Petchara as figures of considerable social authority and influence, elevating them to the emblematic status of what P. David Marshall (1997) terms "representative subjectivity," the capacity of celebrities to house conceptions of cultural identity and "embody 'collective configurations' of the social world" (xi-xii).

Of the many 'collective configurations' housed and serviced by the Mitr-Petchara stardom, one of the most prominent is undoubtedly sexuality. The obvious fact of

their status as an iconic star couple renders discourses of the sexual—most notably, heterosexuality and associated categories of intimacy, courtship and marriage -- foundational constituents of their star persona in both its collective and individual modes. Building on the long-standing argument that stars circulate largely as romantic ideals, Virginia Wright-Wexman (1993) defines the star couple as a figuration of shifting cultural norms of heterosexual relationality. “As a form of modern popular ritual,” she writes, “movies define and demonstrate socially sanctioned ways of falling in love”, with star couples enacting “acceptable romantic fantasies” and “changing styles of courtship and marriage” (ix). In a similar vein, Kathrina Glitre (2006: 183) contends that “[t]he star couple provides a potent site of ideological negotiation” around evolving discourses of heterosexual union, naturalizing “certain patterns of behaviour as important and appropriate, while negotiating, masking or excluding values that may contradict or threaten current social norms.” It is for this reason that star couples are such a resonant aspect of popular film cultures around the world, forming what Martha P. Nochimson (2002: 5) calls “a cultural legacy of how [people] thought (and think?) about desire and love,” but also why their form and values can differ quite markedly across different social and historical contexts.

In the case of Mitr-Petchara, it is not without significance that their stardom emerged in the context of major transformations in Thai cultures of sexual selfhood and intimacy. Indeed, Peter Jackson (2000) nominates the 1960s as a watershed era in the history of modern Thai sexualities, arguing it witnessed major revisions to Thai gender/sex systems and the proliferation of new modes of erotic selfhood and relationality.<sup>ii</sup> In large part, these changes were due to the post-war intensification of Thai modernization as the nation underwent substantial economic redevelopment and become more explicitly enmeshed than ever before in the geopolitical circuits of

transnational capitalism. The implementation of the first National Development Economic Plan in 1961, for example, defined by Medhi Krongkaew as the symbolic beginning of "the modern era of the Thai economy", saw domestic GDP almost treble in the ensuing ten years and the industrial sector move to eclipse agriculture as the dominant source of revenue and employment. The resultant shifts in labour patterns fueled a sudden surge of urban growth and mass internal migration with people moving from rural-based occupations and areas to urban centres, notably Bangkok which experienced a radical transformation "from a moderately-sized metropolis of some 1 million in 1950 to a large diversified and growing industrial city of some 3 million by 1970" (Porphant, 2000: 14). In addition, transnational capitalism started to assume an expanded role as the country was fully incorporated into the global market economy in a process Jim Glassman (2004) dubs the post-war "internationalization of the Thai state." Spearheaded and facilitated by widescale US political and military intervention in the region at the time, Thailand experienced massive inflows of international investment, growth in foreign tourism, and the increasing normalization of new transnational cultures of spectacular commodity consumerism.

The net effect of these major changes on Thai sexual and gender cultures was unsurprisingly substantial and keenly felt. Industrialization ruptured the hegemony of traditional agrarian-based kinship structures; expanded educational and employment opportunities resulted in prolonged periods of youth and an overall postponement in the average age of marriage; while urbanization and increases in real wealth afforded more autonomous and varied domestic and erotic lifestyle practices. These changes were of course neither universal nor uniform--being subject to multiple pre-existing variations in terms of, among other things, region, class, and ethnicity, as well as the added structural differentials of Thailand's notoriously uneven processes of economic

and social development (Glassman 2004)--but their transformational impact was widespread and decisive.

The Mitr-Petchara star coupling forms an integral component of this history of post-war sexual revision and can be read, at least in part, as at once a manifestation of the multiple changes that were besetting Thai sexuality at the time, as well as a 'working through' of them in the mass mediated public sphere of Thai popular culture. As might be expected of a star couple with such a prodigious and diverse output--more than 160 feature films in a ten year span, recall--it is difficult to make generalized observations about the cultural values and meanings of their stardom and, indeed as shall be detailed further, a heterogeneous logic of shifting pluralism is arguably a constitutive aspect of their persona and its popular receptions. Nevertheless, there are a number of key dynamics that emerge persistently, if not necessarily *consistently*, across the intertextual field of their stardom and that signal important cardinal points in their representational mapping of shifting scripts of Thai sexuality. For the purposes of this analysis, three core aspects of the Mitr-Petchara star pairing might be marshalled as a way of both illustrating and further exploring the theoretical propositions presented thus far: companionate coupledness; sexual cosmopolitanism; and flexible heterosexual citizenship.

#### Companionate coupledness

It has become a critical commonplace to suggest that one of the more prominent aspects of erotic modernity has been a shift in the social organization of primary sexual relationships away from 'traditional' models premised on the role of social

obligation and the reproduction of kinship toward more individuated conceptions based on the primacy of affection, intimacy and commitment. Variouslly dubbed the rise of the companionate marriage, conjugal love, or, in Anthony Giddens' (1992) celebrated, if slightly loaded, term, "the pure relationship", this newer model is understood as a conjugal or para-conjugal union that is freely chosen on the basis of romance and companionship and characterized by mutual reciprocity in terms of interests, activities and desires. Emerging first and most fully within the context of Euro-American modernities and thus often most closely associated with them (Coontz 2005; Simmons 2009), the ideal of companionate coupledness has nevertheless emerged as a striking feature of various modernities around the world and there is an increasingly voluminous literature charting the articulation of competing formations of companionate romantic ideals across diverse cultural and historical contexts (Hirsch and Wardlow 2006; Padilla et al 2008). This literature is careful to point out that, though the widespread transcultural emergence of a companionate ideal suggests the structuring presence of globalizing influences—and, indeed, most commentators highlight cultural globalization as a crucial element in its rise—these are not simply multiple manifestations of a single transnational phenomenon but contingent, deeply local cultural forms where new practices of intimacy are forged in the variable pull between global or regional flows and the lived experiences and practices of specific cultural contexts. As the editors of one recent collection put it, "the idealization of companionate marriage is increasingly pervasive, but also locally variable" (Hirsch and Wardlow, 2006, 14).

In Thailand, the emergence of a companionate ideal has very much been a process of localized modernity. It is possible, for example, to discern potential roots of companionate conjugality within indigenous Siamese cultures themselves where

discourses of romantic love and gender complementarity have a long history. Furthermore, while the practice of the arranged marriage, which is generally posited as the traditional antithesis of the companionate model, was an important and widely exercised aspect of pre- and early-modern Siamese social relations, its hold was at best variable, operating with greatest force among the ruling elites and Sino-Thai immigrant classes, while elsewhere among the vast spectrum of common society its applications were much more subject to pragmatic negotiations.<sup>iii</sup> Nevertheless, the rise of the companionate ideal as a structuring norm in Thai conjugality is effectively a modern phenomenon that really only takes substantial purchase, first, among the rising middle classes in the early-twentieth century and, then, more broadly across the Thai social corpus. Indeed, as late as 1959, a publication from the Thai government was claiming that parental selection or at least confirmation of spouses was still the common practice for almost sixty per cent of the rural population, concluding that marriage for many in Thailand was not generally “conceived of as a partnership, a union of hearts...but rather as a juncture of complementary functions, each by and large exclusive of the other” (Cited in Sumalee 1995, 5).<sup>iv</sup> The normalization of companionate conjugality in Thai society was the over-determined result of multiple determinants, including many of the socio-economic changes already outlined, but significantly many commentators highlight the role of mass media in popularizing novel conceptions of companionate romance among Thai audiences. Scot Barmé (2002), for example, notes how the emergence of a cosmopolitan popular commercial culture in Thailand during the twenties and thirties was instrumental in the hegemonic legitimation of the middle classes and their ideological worldview, chief among which was “a bourgeois notion of romantic love” and other such “modern ideas of marriage and the family” (179-180). Similarly, in her survey of shifting cultural practices of

conjugalities in twentieth century central Thailand, Sumalee Bumroongsook (1995) claims that popular media, both foreign and indigenous, has been crucial to the steady normalization of “modern attitudes towards male-female relationship[s]” such as “ideas of romantic love, female equality, and individual freedom of choice” (187-188). Mitr-Petchara clearly merit a significant position in this mediatized popularization of companionate romance. Not only does their combined star persona enshrine an overt logic of romantic heterosexual coupledness, as already suggested, but their films are replete with images and themes that articulate consolidating Thai ideologies of companionate conjugalities. Indeed, their very first on-screen pairing in 1961’s *Ban Teuk Rak Khong Pimchawee / The Love Diary of Pimchawee* บันทึกรักของพิมพ์ฉวี occurs in the context of a film that is effectively a popular symbolic exposition of the pleasures and the perils of companionate coupledness and that thus offers a good case in point.

Based on a radio serial of the same name produced in the late-fifties by the Kantana Group, the film tells the story of the eponymous Pimchawee (Petchara), a young girl living in a small provincial town who is deeply in love with the handsome Athon (Mitr), a local swain with burning ambitions for self-improvement. Knowing that Athon hopes to study abroad but is refused the funding to do so by his father, Pimchawee decides selflessly to give him her modest savings so that he might realize his dream, with the two vowing to marry once he has completed his studies. After Athon departs, Pimchawee discovers she is pregnant with their child but is dissuaded by Athon’s father from letting him know and advised to marry another young man in order to give the child a father. Pimchawee then patiently waits the years till Athon returns only to discover when he does that he has a new high society fiancée in tow, matching his newfound lifestyle and self-image of sophisticated urbanity. A series of



fraught melodramatic twists then ensue including deceit and tarnished reputations, penury and eviction, attempted suicide, and even abduction before the truth is finally revealed and Athon realizes the error of his ways, returning to Pimchawee for a happy reunion finale.

The actual constituent events of the narrative are possibly less interesting than the way the text is orchestrated at the macro-level by a centripetal structure of heterosexual union that effectively grounds the film in a discourse of companionate coupledness. It is a structure that is articulated, among other ways, in spatial terms whereby the process of heterosexual coupling is mobilized to govern, and thus determine, the dynamics of cinematic space. At the very start of the film, in the opening credit sequence, Pimchawee and Athon are first introduced and rendered spatially via a split screen montage that reveals Pimchawee in lower screen left, writing in her diary, while various shots of Athon appear in the corresponding upper right corner of the screen. The balanced framing and complementary parallelism of the composition serve at once to inscribe and prescribe the eventual union of the two characters as a process of spatial correspondence and coupling. That the images of Athon are superimposed on a graphic background of an open book, presumed of course to be the diary of the film's title in which Pimchawee is shown here to be writing, metonymically fuses the two together even further in a spatialized regime of companionate desire.

In this context, it is revealing that a little later in the body of the film, the first scene in which Pimachawee and Athon are physically seen together occurs via an introductory manoeuvre of spatial fusion. Having decided to give her savings to Athon. Pimchawee arranges to meet him at nighttime in a nearby field. As she prepares to leave the house, she moves increasingly forward in the direction of the camera until her body fills the

screen in extreme close-up. The film then cuts to a matching graphic shot of the back of Athon who proceeds to move outward from the camera in a mirroring reverse action. Thus even before the two are united in frame, the film has effectively represented them as a couple inhabiting a single continuous spatiality. It is a process of spatial coupling further underscored in the ensuing sequence by the use of progressive framing as the two lovers are shown in increasingly closer two shots. In this way the film uses cinematic space to articulate and naturalize their coupledness as a formation of companionate blending, two becoming one, and the ensuing narrative is then staged essentially as a dynamic spatial interplay between the various obstructions and impediments that serve to separate the two lovers and the drive to reunite them in the same cinematic and social space.

One of the biggest impediments encountered to successful union of the companionate couple in *Ban Teuk Rak* is parental obstruction. Athon's father is roundly opposed to the romance and does everything in his power to obstruct it, even resorting to subterfuge and calumny. Significantly, in light of the spatial reading outlined here, his obstruction is often literalized as a physical blockage of space as he positions himself or otherwise intervenes between the two lovers. The issue of parental prohibition or disapproval of the young lovers' union is a recurrent theme across many, if not most, of the Mitr-Petchara films where it functions in part to highlight the modernity of the companionate coupledness represented by the Mitr-Petchara romance by setting it against a thematic backdrop of generational conflict and change. As representatives of traditionalism, parents and other such authority figures in these films are frequently positioned in contradistinction to the modernity of the companionate couple, shown either not to support or simply not to understand the new-fashioned romance and erotic lifestyles of the emerging generation.

Inevitably, however, love and modernity prevail and in *Ban Teuk Rak*, as in almost every other of the 150 Mitr-Petchara films made in its wake, the two stars are (re)united at film's end for a mandatory romantic finale. In this film, as again in almost all others, it is a finale that is figured via a triumphal two shot with the stars shown side by side in happy coupledness, positioned firmly in the absolute centre of frame. Embracing their child between them and dressed in the height of contemporary fashion against a background vista of traditional Thai ruralism, they appear as the perfect embodiment of the modern Thai companionate couple. It is a clotal motif that, almost without exception, typifies the ending of the classic Mitr-Petchara film where the image of the united companionate star couple is used as the culmination and fulfillment of narrative desire, an textual exclamation point that asserts companionate coupledness as not only the ideal endpoint of the film but also an ideal endpoint for Thai heterosexual relationality and identities.<sup>v</sup> Indeed, the narrative and audience demand for a clotal affirmation of Mitr-Petchara as ideal companionate couple was so great that

There is obviously much more that can be said about the normalization of companionate heterosexual coupledness and other aspects of erotic modernity in the films of Mitr-Petchara and in the longer version of the paper I do say a lot more. However, hopefully, this brief exploration serves to give a sense of the significance of Mitr-Petchara to histories of post-war Thai heterosexuality and how I am attempting to read and analyze that significance in my current work.

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<sup>i</sup> It is an illusion that the management team worked assiduously to protect, issuing a legal embargo on any unauthorized images of the star other than their licensed, studio-produced shots.

<sup>ii</sup> Jackson pursues post-war revisions to Thai sexual discursivity principally in relation to transgender and homoerotic categories, both because these are the focus of his research interests and also because the proliferation of such categories in Thailand since the 1960s best "document[s] the stunning transformations that have taken place in the past four decades" (2000, 407). Nevertheless, his argument that late-twentieth century discursive constructions of sexuality in Thailand have undergone major revisions holds equally as true of normative heteroerotic categories as well.

It is worth noting here that a good deal of contemporary Anglophone studies of Thai sexuality, of which Jackson's work is a leading exemplar, is frequently marked by a principal focus on 'queer' or non-normative sexual and gender forms. As indispensable as this work is it has resulted, unwittingly for sure, in the unfortunate situation where mainstream or normative Thai genders and sexualities remain comparatively undertheorized and, by implication, unproblematized. Obviously, if we are to understand the social construction of Thai sexualities and how that construction is changing under modernity then it is imperative that we attend equally to the discursive revisions of normative sexual and gender categories as well.

<sup>iii</sup> It is instructive that one of the first attempts to reform traditional patterns of arranged marriage, King Rama IV's Abduction Act decrees of 1865 and 1868, granted legal protection to common women in choosing their own partners without parental consent but, conversely, reinforced paternal authority over spouse selection among the nobility, the essential rationale being preservation of social hierarchy and the Sakdina caste system. Cross-class unions among the lower echelons were of little import but a noble woman marrying a man of lower class would result in an insufferable loss of rank. See, Koizumi 2000, and Loos 2004.

<sup>iv</sup> The fact that practices such as elopement were widely used among rural Thais across the early and mid twentieth century as a convenient and surprisingly legitimate way to circumvent familial control over marriage and/or avoid payment of prohibitive dowries—some studies put the incidence of elopement in rural Thai communities during this period as high as twenty per cent—questions the sweeping conclusion that unions for love were largely absent from the Thai rural ethos. See, Sumalee 1995, pp. 44-51.

<sup>v</sup> The drive to instate Mitr-Petchara as clotural spectacle of companionate coupledom is so great that, in certain films, it overrides narrative logic and plausibility. For example, in *Rak Oie / Forever Love* (2511/1968), the characters played by Mitr and Petchara are both dead by narrative's end but the film, despite being a realist drama, closes nevertheless with a fantasy sequence showing Mitr and Petchara as ghostly spectres reunited in heaven; while in *Atsawin Daab Kaiyasit / The Magical Swordsman* (2513/1970), an international coproduction made with Mitr in Hong Kong and Taiwan, a special character for Petchara was expressly written into the film for its Thai release and an additional coda sequence was also included in which Petchara's character rescues Mitr after he's been badly wounded in battle and the two ride off together into the sunset.

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## บทสรุป

ในฐานะงานวิจัยนำร่องของโครงการวิจัย “ปริมนทลแห่งการต่อรอง: มหานคร โลกาภิวัตน์กับอัตลักษณ์ไทยในโลกพหุวัฒนธรรม” (Negotiating Spaces: The Globalized City and Thai Identity in a Multicultural World) นั้นบทความ “พระเอก หรือ ผู้ร้าย: การศึกษาเชิงเปรียบเทียบระหว่างบทบาทชาวจีนโพ้นทะเลในขบวนการเสรีไทยและการจลาจลบนถนนเยาวราช (เลี้ยวพะ) ในปี พ.ศ. 2488” (Heroes or Villains: A Comparative Study of Overseas Chinese Contribution to the Free Thai Movement and Their Role in the Yaowarat Uprising of 1945) และบทความ “มนต์รักหนังไทย: แบบฉบับใหม่ของความรักระหว่างชายหญิงในภาพยนตร์ที่นำเสนอโดย มิตร ชัยบัญชา และ เพชรา เชาวราษฎร์” (Magical Love in the Moviehouse: (Re)Negotiations of Thai Heterosexuality in the Films of Mitr Chaibancha and Petchara Chaowarat) นับว่าประสบความสำเร็จตามที่ได้วางแผนไว้อย่างดียิ่ง กล่าวคือ ทั้งสองบทความได้นำเสนอในที่ประชุมวิชาการระดับนานาชาติคือ บทความแรกนำเสนอที่ Association of Asian Studies Annual Meeting 2009 ณ นครฟิลาเดลเฟีย มลรัฐเพนซิลวาเนีย ประเทศสหรัฐอเมริกา และบทความที่สองนำเสนอ ณ EuroSEAS (European Southeast Asian Studies) Conference ประเทศสวีเดน สหภาพยุโรป และทั้งสองบทความกำลังอยู่ในระหว่างการแก้ไขปรับปรุงเพื่อนำไปตีพิมพ์ในวารสารวิชาการระดับนานาชาติ โดยบทความแรกจะตีพิมพ์เป็น special issue ในวารสาร Journal of Southeast Asian Studies ในหัวข้อเรื่อง Dangerous Histories โดยมี ศ. ดร. ธงชัย วินิจกุล จาก University of Wisconsin (Madison) เป็นบรรณาธิการ ส่วนบทความที่สองคาดว่าจะส่งไปตีพิมพ์ใน Camera Obscura ได้ในปีหน้า (2555)

แม้ว่าโครงการวิจัย “ปริมนทลแห่งการต่อรอง: มหานคร โลกาภิวัตน์กับอัตลักษณ์ไทยในโลกพหุวัฒนธรรม” (Negotiating Spaces: The Globalized City and Thai Identity in a Multicultural World) จะยังไม่ได้รับการสนับสนุนอย่างเต็มรูปแบบจากแหล่งทุนใดๆ แต่ความมุ่งมั่นตั้งใจในการดำเนินการวิจัยก็ดำเนินต่อไปอย่างไม่หยุดยั้ง เมื่อวันที่ 20-22 กรกฎาคม 2554 ได้จัดการสัมมนาวิชาการเชิงปฏิบัติการระดับนานาชาติขึ้นในหัวข้อที่เกี่ยวข้องกับโครงการวิจัยนี้คือ Sites of Modernity: Asian Cities and their Evolution through Trade, Colonialism, and Nationalism โดยมีนักวิชาการจากหลายประเทศทั้งในเอเชีย ยุโรป และอเมริกาเข้าร่วมนำเสนอผลงานกว่า 20 ท่าน ในจำนวนนี้มีบทความที่เกี่ยวข้องกับความเป็นสมัยใหม่ของกรุงเทพมหานคร และบทบาทของความเป็นไทยในมหานครยุคโลกาภิวัตน์อยู่ด้วยถึง 3 บทความ หนึ่งในนั้นเป็นบทความวิชาการของหัวหน้าโครงการนี้ (วาสนา วงศ์สุรวัฒน์) เรื่อง Home-based

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ภาคผนวก

## ประวัติผู้วิจัย

### ชื่อหัวหน้าโครงการ

วาสนา วงศ์สุวรรณ

ตำแหน่งทางวิชาการ อาจารย์

Wasana WONGSURAWAT

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### ประวัติการศึกษา

มหาวิทยาลัย	ปริญญา	สาขาวิชา	ปีที่ได้รับ พ.ศ.
University of Chicago	B.A.	East Asian Languages and Civilizations	2546
University of Oxford	M.St.	Modern Chinese History	2547
University of Oxford	D.Phil.	Modern Chinese History	2550

### ผลงานวิจัยที่พิมพ์เผยแพร่

“From Yaowaraj to Plabplachai: The Thai State and Ethnic Chinese in Thailand during the Cold War,” in Tuong Vu and Wasana Wongsurawat (eds.) *Dynamics of the Cold War in Asia: Ideology, Identity, and Culture*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009)

“The Foreign Print Capitalism that Founded a Nation: The Role of Overseas Chinese Newspapers in the Emergence of Thai Nationalism,” in *Journal of Asiatic Studies*. vol.51 no.3, September 2008.

“Contending for a Claim on Civilization: The Sino-Thai Struggle to Control Overseas Chinese Education in Thailand,” in *Journal of Chinese Overseas*. vol.4 no.2, November 2008.

### โครงการวิจัยอื่นๆ ที่กำลังดำเนินการ

ลำดับที่	ผู้วิจัยหลัก	หัวข้อเรื่อง	แหล่งทุน	ปีที่ได้	ปีที่แล้วเสร็จ
1	วาสนา วงศ์สุวรรณ	จากอั้งยี่ถึงลูกจีนรักชาติ: ภาพลักษณ์ที่ขัดแย้งในประวัติศาสตร์ความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างรัฐไทยและชาวจีนโพ้นทะเล	สกว.	2553	2554

## ประวัติผู้วิจัย

### ชื่อผู้ร่วมโครงการ

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ตำแหน่งทางวิชาการ อาจารย์

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University of Queensland	B.A.	French/ English	1988
Griffith University	B.A. (Honors)	Media Studies	1990
Griffith University	Ph.D.	Media Studies	1997

### ผลงานวิจัยที่พิมพ์เผยแพร่

“The Loves of Siam: Contemporary Thai Cinema and Vernacular Queerness,” in *Queer Bangkok*. P. Jadeson (ed.) Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010.

“Can’t Get You Out of My Head: Celebrity and Sexual Identity,” in *Cultural Theory in Everyday Practice*. K. Schlunke and U. Anderson (eds.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

สัญญาเลขที่ CU-CLUSTER-Human-๑๑-๑๑๓-๕๓

โครงการวิจัยเรื่อง โครงการวิจัยพระเอก นางเอก ผู้ร้าย ตัวอิจฉา: บุคคลาธิษฐานแห่งคำนิยามและ

ความเห็นสาธารณะในกรุงเทพมหานครยุคสงครามเย็น

การรายงานความก้าวหน้าผลการดำเนินการ (ครั้งที่ ๑)

รายงานช่วงระยะตั้งแต่วันที่ ๑ เมษายน ๒๕๕๓ ถึง วันที่ ๓๑ มีนาคม ๒๕๕๔

ชื่อหัวหน้าโครงการ อ. ดร. วาสนา วงศ์สุรวัฒน์

หน่วยงาน คณะอักษรศาสตร์ จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

๑. การดำเนินงาน ได้ดำเนินงานตามแผนที่ได้วางไว้ทุกประการ

๒. สรุปผลการดำเนินงาน

สามารถเขียนบทความวิจัยและนำเสนอในที่ประชุมวิชาการระดับนานาชาติได้ ๒ ชิ้น  
ขณะนี้กำลังอยู่ในระหว่างปรับปรุงแก้ไขเพื่อตีพิมพ์ (ได้รับขอมรับตีพิมพ์แล้ว ๑ ชิ้น)

๓. การดำเนินงานในช่วงต่อไป

สิ้นสุดโครงการในส่วนที่ได้รับงบประมาณแล้ว

๔. อุปสรรคและแนวทางแก้ไข

ยังไม่ได้รับงบประมาณครบเนื่องจากเบิกล่าช้า

วาสนา วงศ์สุรวัฒน์

(หัวหน้าโครงการ)

๓๑ สิงหาคม ๒๕๕๔

สัญญาเลขที่ CU-CLUSTER-Human-๑๑-๑๑๓-๕๓

โครงการวิจัยเรื่อง โครงการวิจัยพระเอก นางเอก ผู้ร้าย ตัวอิจฉา: บุคคลาธิษฐานแห่งค่านิยมและ  
ความเห็นสาธารณะในกรุงเทพมหานครยุคสงครามเย็น

## รายงานการรับ-จ่ายเงิน

รายได้	ประมาณการ	งบที่เกิดขึ้นจริง
เงินอุดหนุนงบประมาณแผ่นดิน	270,000	270,000
รวมรายได้	270,000	270,000
รายจ่าย		
ค่าตอบแทนผู้วิจัย	100,000	100,000
ค่าจ้างผู้ช่วยวิจัย	120,000	120,000
ค่าเดินทางไปเก็บข้อมูล/ นำเสนองาน	20,000	20,000
ค่าครุภัณฑ์	30,000	30,000
รวมรายจ่าย	270,000	270,000

ขอรับรองรายรับ-จ่ายเงินข้างต้นเป็นความจริงทุกประการ

(อ. ดร. วาสนา วงศ์สุรวัฒน์)

หัวหน้าโครงการวิจัย

31 สิงหาคม 2554