

บทบาทของสาธารณรัฐประชาชนจีนและสหรัฐอเมริกาในการประชุมอาเซียนว่าด้วยความร่วมมือ  
ด้านการเมืองและความมั่นคงในภูมิภาคเอเชียและแปซิฟิก ระหว่างปี ค.ศ. 1994-2004



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# สถาบันวิทยบริการ จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

วิทยานิพนธ์นี้เป็นส่วนหนึ่งของการศึกษาตามหลักสูตรปริญญาศิลปศาสตรมหาบัณฑิต

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ลิขสิทธิ์ของจุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

THE ROLE OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES  
IN THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF) FROM 1994-2004



Miss Janette Techathanapol

สถาบันวิทยบริการ

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

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
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
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เจเนนัท เศรษฐนพล : บทบาทของสาธารณรัฐประชาชนจีนและสหรัฐอเมริกาในการประชุม  
อาเซียนว่าด้วยความร่วมมือด้านการเมืองและความมั่นคงในภูมิภาคเอเชียและแปซิฟิก  
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การประชุมอาเซียนว่าด้วยความร่วมมือด้านการเมืองและความมั่นคงในภูมิภาคเอเชียและ  
แปซิฟิก (ARF) เป็นเวทีปรึกษาหารือด้านความมั่นคงแห่งแรกในภูมิภาคภายหลังสงครามเย็น นับแต่  
ปีก่อตั้งในค.ศ. 1994 เออาร์เอฟได้พัฒนาเป็นการประชุมเพื่อการปรึกษาหารือโดยมีจุดมุ่งหมายใน  
การป้องกันความขัดแย้งในภูมิภาคเอเชีย-แปซิฟิก เออาร์เอฟมุ่งที่จะส่งเสริมความไว้วางใจ เชื่อใจ ความ  
ร่วมมือ และความสัมพันธ์อันดีระหว่างประเทศผู้เข้าร่วม และพัฒนาแนวทางการดำเนินการทูตเชิง  
ป้องกัน

วิทยานิพนธ์ชิ้นนี้เน้นการอธิบายบทบาทของสาธารณรัฐประชาชนจีนและสหรัฐอเมริกาในเอ  
อาร์เอฟ การประชุมนี้ดูเหมือนเป็นเวทีการแข่งขันทางอำนาจการเมืองระหว่างสาธารณรัฐประชาชน  
จีนและสหรัฐอเมริกา ทั้งสองประเทศพยายามที่จะสร้างความชอบธรรม และแผ่ขยายผลประโยชน์  
ด้านความมั่นคงของแต่ละฝ่ายในภูมิภาค ผลลัพธ์ของการต่อสู้แข่งขันนี้จะส่งผลต่อความมั่นคง และ  
เสถียรภาพในภูมิภาค และอาจส่งผลต่อการพัฒนาการประชุมในอนาคต

เออาร์เอฟยังคงมีบทบาทที่สำคัญที่ยังเป็นประโยชน์ต่อเหล่าประเทศสมาชิกโดยเฉพาะ  
สาธารณรัฐประชาชนจีนและสหรัฐอเมริกา ในประเด็นความมั่นคงต่างๆ ประเทศมหาอำนาจเหล่านี้  
จะยังคงเป็นผู้เล่นสำคัญในการสร้างความมั่นคงในภูมิภาคเอเชีย-แปซิฟิก ความสัมพันธ์ระหว่าง  
สาธารณรัฐประชาชนจีนและสหรัฐอเมริกาเป็นความท้าทายที่ทั้งภูมิภาคจำเป็นต้องจับตามองต่อไป

สาขาวิชา เอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ศึกษา  
(สหสาขาวิชา)

ปีการศึกษา 2548

ลายมือชื่อนิสิต .....

ลายมือชื่ออาจารย์ที่ปรึกษา.....

ลายมือชื่ออาจารย์ที่ปรึกษาร่วม.....

# # 4789508020: MAJOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

KEY WORD: ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF)/ CHINA / UNITED STATES

JANETTE TECHATHANAPOL: THE ROLE OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF) FROM 1994-2004. THESIS ADVISOR: ASSISTANT PROFESSOR PRANEE THIPARAT, Ph.D. THESIS CO-ADVISOR: ASSISTANT PROFESSOR SORAVIJ JAYANAMA, 98 pp. ISBN 974-14-3822-2

ASEAN Region Forum or ARF is the first regional cooperation that deals with security issues of Asia-Pacific after Cold War. Since its founding in 1994, the ARF has developed into a useful forum for consultation and dialogue with the goal of preventing future conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region. The ARF has developed important confidence building measures that contribute to transparency and may form the basis for successful preventive diplomacy down the road.

This thesis focuses on the explanation of the People's Republic of China and the United States' participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum.. The ARF seems to be caught in a power and geopolitical struggle between the PRC and the United States. Both states have attempted to extend and legitimize their security interests in the region. The outcomes of this struggle or geopolitical maneuverings will likely impact the regional security and stability and may hinder the progress of the ARF in the future.

The ARF would continue to have a useful role so long as it remains in the interests of all members, and especially China and the United States, to be engaged in cooperative security in this manner. The great powers will continue to be the key players in shaping regional security in the Asia Pacific. The effective crafting of Sino-American relations is a challenge that the entire Asia-Pacific region is obliged to follow with the greatest of attention.

Field of Studies Southeast Asian Studies  
(Inter-Department)

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Student's signature.....  
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สถาบันวิทยบริการ  
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

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## ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY

ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ARF SOM	ASEAN Regional Forum Senior Officials Meeting
AMM	ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
ASEAN	Association of the Southeast Asian Nations
APT	ASEAN Plus Three
ASPC	ARF Security Policy Conference
CBMs	Confidence-Building Measures
ISM on CT-TC	Inter-sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime
ISG	Inter-sessional Support Group
PD	Preventive Diplomacy
PRC	People's Republic of China
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
USA	United States of America
ZOPFAN	Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

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# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Rationale

This thesis focuses on the explanation of the People's Republic of China and the United States' participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which is the only region-wide forum where members discuss security issues in a broad context. The ARF seems to be caught in a power and geopolitical struggle between the PRC and the United States. Both states have attempted to extend and legitimize their security interests in the region. The outcomes of this struggle or geopolitical maneuverings will likely impact the regional security and stability and may hinder the progress of the ARF in the future.

The end of Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, as well as the reduction of the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific, have also left a political vacuum in the region that has created a window of strategic opportunity. The Post-Cold War era has brought about new conditions. The past confrontation between major powers in the region had ended, enabling countries in the region to reconcile their differences and enjoy more freedom in pursuing their security interests. ASEAN has taken the lead in ensuring that the new regional order will include the security interests of member countries.

Viewed from this perspective, the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Bangkok 1994 was also considered a milestone in the grouping's political cooperation. For years, ASEAN had been attempting to engage major powers in the region in a more systematic way. The ARF provides the opportunity for the

countries in the Asia-Pacific region, big or small, to exchange views and learn of one another's intentions and expectations.

ASEAN Region Forum or ARF is the first regional cooperation that deals with security issues of Asia-Pacific after Cold War. Since its founding, the ARF has developed into a useful forum for consultation and dialogue with the goal of preventing future conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region. The ARF has developed important confidence building measures that contribute to transparency and may form the basis for successful preventive diplomacy down the road. However, with its 23 member states, it has faced many difficulties, both internal and external that might hinder the further development of the Forum. Despite ASEAN's initiation to establish the forum and its role in the driver's seat, the development of the ARF depends on the balance of power factor between two major powers: China and the U.S. Apparently, the U.S. foreign policy has aimed on unilateralism in order to secure its hegemonic role since the Cold War. While China grows in power and achieves more recognition in the Asia-Pacific region, it has a direct impact on the U.S. power. Therefore, competition between both countries is inevitable and it directly affects the ARF as a stage for their political maneuvering. The relations between China and the U.S. are more complex than any other relations that the U.S. has. There are a number of cooperation especially in economic, at the same time, doubt, concerns and tension in political and security spheres also exists.

The terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, followed by the Bali bombings of 12 October in 2002 have become new factors that changed major power-relations in Asia-pacific. The American war against terrorism has a great impact on the security of Asia-Pacific as a whole. It drew the United States back in the region again since the Vietnam war. Allies and coalition were being requested.

Washington attempts to build both bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with other Asian nations in order to secure its strategic goals. In the mean time, the U.S. can not avoid the growing anti-American sentiment particularly in the Islamic world, who tend to judge the U.S. not only on the basis of their bilateral relationship but by its actions toward the rest of the world. Meanwhile, China becomes a new powerful factor in regional security. China's disputes in the South China Sea, its claim over Taiwan, and its close tie with North Korea have made its neighbor feel threatened. Thus it is necessary for Beijing to adjust its strategic image. China understood very well that it is impossible right now to be a unilateralist like the U.S. especially in the area of security. Therefore, China saw a need to participate more in regional multilateral cooperation like the ARF which not only help creating good China's image in the regional and international stages but also become a channel for China to raise issues, considered to be beneficial for Beijing's national interests.

Accordingly, the relations between China and the U.S. will have a great impact on the security of Asia-Pacific and the progress of the ARF. At present, Washington and Beijing may be able to work for closer economic and financial ties but neither regards the other with much beyond suspicion on the political and security fronts. In the longer run, there are concerns especially from smaller countries about the role of the United States, the unilateralist superpower and China, the rising regional power. It is difficult to predict the future direction of these major powers. The outcome of this contestation will definitely impact the Asia-Pacific security and the progress of the ARF.

## **1.2 Objectives**

1. To study the role of The United States and China in Asia-Pacific security after the Cold War.
2. To assess the impact of the U.S. – China interaction on the development and progress of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

## **1.3 Scope of the study**

Due to the fact that the ASEAN Regional Forum is the first multilateral security cooperation in Asia-Pacific, the scope of the study, therefore, will limit within ten years—from 1994 to 2004. Regardless its shortness as an international forum, the ARF has delivered some success in security issues that might not have happened, had the forum not existed.

## **1.4 Conceptual Framework**

This study uses the balance of power approach as a conceptual framework. The study explains the influence of the balance of power factor on the calculations of some participants namely the People Republic of China and the United States in the ASEAN Regional Forum. This factor can influence the modalities of cooperative security regime by aiming to contain a disposition to hegemony on the part of a rising power. The theory of balance of power was given different definitions. Some view it as a guide to statesmen; other a cloak that disguises their imperialist policies. Some believe that a balance of power is the best guarantee of the security of states and the peace of the world; others, that it has ruined states by causing most of the wars they have fought.

According to Inis Claude, the term *balance of power* has two principal meanings. First, “a situation of equilibrium”, and second, “a system of states engaged in competitive manipulation of power relationships among themselves.”<sup>1</sup>

Hans Morgenthau in his book, *Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace*, distinguishes between the balance of power as “a policy” aimed at creating a certain state of affairs, and “an actual state of affairs”.<sup>2</sup>

Hedley Bull distinguishes between what he calls the “general balance of power” and “local” or “particular” balances of power. A general balance exists when no one actor has a preponderance of power in the international system as a whole. In some areas of the world, such as Southeast Asia, a local balance of power exists.

Another way of thinking about the balance of power is to consider it as a policy or as behavior pursued by states. Scholars who take this interpretation often refer to a balance of power system, or to *balancing* behavior on the part of states. As a policy, states following the balance of power theory use both internal and external efforts to achieve their goals. Internal efforts, often simply referred to as “self-help”, include “moves to increase economic capability, to increase military strength, and to develop clever strategies”. External efforts include “entering alliances, strengthening existing alliances or weakening the alliances of one’s opponents”. This kind of policy or strategy is also sometimes called “power politics”.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Inis L. Claude, Jr. “The Balance of Power Revisited,” *Review of International Studies* 15 (1989): 77.

<sup>2</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau. *Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1978), p. 173.

<sup>3</sup> Michael Leifer, *The ASEAN Regional Forum*. Cited in David Capie and Paul Evans. *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), p.30.

Michael Leifer also notes :

There is a conspicuous absence of a regional constituency for moving beyond individual force modernization towards multilateral defense cooperation. This absence stems from a number of factors, but above all from the judgment that the traditional instrument of balance of power, if expressed in a new multilateral form, is more likely to provoke than protect, particularly regarding China.<sup>4</sup>

Realists such as Michael Leifer believe that institutions such as the ARF inevitably only reflect the realities of power distribution in the region. Leifer describes the ARF as a "valuable adjunct to the workings of the balance of power in helping to deny dominance to a rising regional power with hegemonic potential". He concludes, "It is more realistic to regard the Forum as a modest contribution to a viable balance or distribution of power within the Asia-Pacific by other than traditional means."<sup>5</sup>

In contrast, constructivists argue that institutions such as the ARF can actually help shape state behavior and change state interests through processes of socialization and by promoting norms of acceptable conduct. They argue that over time the ARF can contribute to the goal of a balance of power in the region. Amitav Acharya suggests that

No ASEAN country sees the ARF as a substitute for balance of power mechanisms in the short term. They also recognize that military balancing is not an adequate guarantee of regional security.

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p.33.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p.34.



Since they cannot individually or collectively aspire to defense self-reliance, a policy of military balancing will amount to increased dependence on external military powers. To prevent this, a balance of power approach must be supplemented by multilateral security dialogues and cooperation.<sup>6</sup>

Despite the different view on the Balance of Power factor approach in the Asia-Pacific security issues, the establishment of the ARF was influenced by balance of power practices. These practices should be understood as constraining power through political means within the cooperative process rather than a reliance on traditional military tactics. The future and development of the Forum lies in the balancing factor between great powers, specifically the United States and China. Undoubtedly, the U.S. is the greatest super power whose role is hegemonic and has been unilateral in foreign policy. When China steps up and becomes a rising power, it threatens the U.S. proportionally. According to the balance of power theory, if the threat grows large enough, the decision makers in the threatened states have a strong incentive to unite and oppose the rising power. The threatened states can restore the balance by expanding their alliances, by negotiating economic or territorial concessions in order to compensate for the power of the rising state, or by engaging in a limited war that curbs the rising nation without destroying it.<sup>7</sup> From this perspective, it means that the U.S. will try to maintain its status quo power and contain China, the anti-systematic power, in possible ways.

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<sup>6</sup> Amitav Acharya. *Avoiding War in Southeast Asia*, manuscript. Cited in David Capie and Paul Evans. *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon*, p.35.

<sup>7</sup> Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson. "Balance of Power" chapter 8, in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.113.

However, using the balance of power theory to explain the China and the U.S. behaviors in the Asia-Pacific security has some limitations. The balance of power theory was originally created from the Western concept and has been used in explaining the political situations mainly in the West. The Asia-Pacific's political and security conditions are clearly different from the Western. In Asia, there are many local powers but none has an ability to be a leader of the region. Countries that have a potential to be a regional powers are Japan and China. Japan is the biggest economic power in Asia but its military power is quite low due to the Japan's constitution that not allows the country to have any standing Army. And Japan has been a good ally of the United States. Therefore, Japan could not and would not act against the U.S. power. China is a more potential threat to the U.S. compared to Japan. China's rising power could be seen from its growing military capability and the increasing defense budget. However, its military power is still far less than the U.S. It is difficult for China to be an equal opponent to the U.S. Although China clearly opposes the role of the United States as a hegemonic power in the Asia-Pacific, China realizes that it is crucial to have a good relation with the U.S. which is beneficial to the development of Chinese economy and helps mitigate any tensions that might lead to the confrontation between two countries. Thus, the regional power that could really balance the U.S. hegemonic power, like to Soviet Union did in the Cold War, might not be possible at present. Although the ASEAN Regional Forum tries to equally balance between major powers in the Asia-Pacific, the distribution of power in the forum is unequal. The ARF is still overshadowed and dominated by a few major powers, namely the United States and China. From these perspectives, the balance of power theory might not fully fit in the Asia-Pacific conditions; however, it still helps explain the power politics in the region, especially in the ARF.

## 1.5 Methodology

This study uses the documentary research method deriving on information from various sources that is,

1. Primary sources which are declarations and speeches of both the U.S. and Chinese leaders, conference reports, matrix of decisions, agreement, and press release reports.
2. Secondary sources which are books, articles from academic journals, newspapers, and website

The information from both sources will be used in the study with descriptive analytical method.

## 1.6 The structure of thesis

The structure of the study is as follow:

- Chapter 1: A short introduction to the rationale of the study, conceptual framework, scope of the study, and research limitation.
- Chapter 2: The establishment of the ASEAN Region Forum
- Chapter 3: Explanation of the reasons, objectives and factors that contributes to China's participation in the ARF. In addition the assessment of China's role is described in this chapter.
- Chapter 4: Describe and explain the decision of the United States to join the ARF. The characteristics of U.S. foreign policy together with its view toward the Forum are also included in this chapter.

Chapter 5: Discuss the Sino-U.S. strategic balance in the regional security after the Cold War. In addition Asia-Pacific security after the terrorist attacks on September 11 is analyzed.

Chapter 6: Concluding remarks and summary are presented in this chapter including problems, prospects and suggestion.



สถาบันวิทยบริการ  
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

## **CHAPTER II**

### **THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM: ARF**

ASEAN Regional Forum or ARF was created in 1994 by the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern and to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>8</sup> The ARF's members consist of 10 ASEAN countries: Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam with 11 dialogue partners including, Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, North Korea, Russia, The United States, Papua New Guinea and Mongolia. Accordingly, ARF is the only region-wide organization for security discussions after the end of the Cold War.

ARF was never intended to be an alliance, only a platform for foreign ministers to discuss a wide range of regional security issues, such as globalization's effects on security, proliferation of nuclear weapons, missile defense, the Korean Peninsular, the sovereignty dispute over islands in the South China Sea, the challenges to Indonesian unity, the recent political crises in Fiji and the Solomon Islands, and international crime, including trafficking in drugs, humans and small arms.

The Forum was founded in 1993 in the annual meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers, the founding dinner of the ARF was held in Singapore on 25 July 1993 and it was agreed that the first working session would take place in Bangkok one year

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<sup>8</sup> See Association of Southeast Asian Nations Website at [www.aseansec.org/arf](http://www.aseansec.org/arf)

later. The first ARF meeting, held in Bangkok in July 1994, included discussions on regional arms build up, territorial disputes and fostering positive dialogue mechanisms. Consensus was reached that the ARF would meet annually\*, with each member-state's delegation usually headed by its foreign minister. ASEAN-PMC Senior Officials Meetings (SOMs) would precede the ARF's annual working sessions by several months and would prepare ARF agendas.<sup>9</sup>

ARF was also conceived as a process, not an institution. It focused on building mutual trust and confidence and sought to develop norms through confidence building measures (CBMs). The Forum was expected to create a more predictable and stable pattern of relationships between major powers and Southeast Asia. Implicit in its conceptualization was the recognition that regional issues required the engagement of the great powers in regional affairs. The ARF introduced a new norm into the ASEAN process of cooperative security which emphasized inclusiveness through the promotion of dialogue among both likeminded and non-likeminded states.<sup>10</sup> ASEAN's commitment to the ARF reflects a shared belief among its members that the involvement of major powers is essential to the security and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. The forum sought the participation of the major powers as well as mid-sized powers such as Australia, Korea and India which could have a significant impact on regional developments.

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\*The ASEAN Regional Forum year consists of a fall and spring Inter-sessional Support Group (ISG) Meeting (where initiatives are presented and issues discussed), a Senior Officials' (SOM) Meeting (where initiatives are finalized) and an ARF Ministerial meeting (where initiatives are approved). There are also ARF workshops spread throughout the year and an Inter-sessional Meeting on Counterterrorism and Transnational Crimes. The SOM, held in the ARF's chair country, is usually in May, 4-6 weeks after the Spring ISG and 4-6 weeks before the ARF Ministerial. The ARF Chair rotates annually, in English alphabetical order, among the ASEAN countries (last cycle Indonesia, this cycle Laos, next cycle Malaysia). In this cycle (2004-2006), the Fall ISG was held in November 2004 in Phnom Penh, the Spring ISG will be in Berlin (Germany hosting for the EU), the SOM and Ministerial in Laos.

<sup>9</sup> Cameron J. Hill and William T. Tow, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: Material and Ideational Dynamics," in *Reconfiguring East Asia: Regional Institutions and Organizations after the Crisis*, ed. Mark Beeson (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002), p.167.

<sup>10</sup> Barry Desker, "The Future of the ASEAN Regional Forum": internet; from [http://www.ntu.edu.sg/idss/Perspective/research\\_050105.htm](http://www.ntu.edu.sg/idss/Perspective/research_050105.htm) [2005, August 10]

The ARF, comparing to ASEAN, is a more extensive inter-governmental grouping, which focuses on dialogue and confidence-building measures as a first step in promoting cooperative security, while ASEAN is a diplomatic association for political and security cooperation.<sup>11</sup> At its first meeting, the objectives of the Forum is to foster the habit of constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern,<sup>12</sup> and to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region. The 27<sup>th</sup> ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (1994) stated that “The ARF could become an effective consultative Asia-Pacific Forum for promoting open dialogue on political and security cooperation in the region. In this context, ASEAN should work with its ARF partners to bring about a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations in the Asia Pacific.”<sup>13</sup> In July 1996 ARF adopted the following criteria for participation:

- Commitment. All new participants, as sovereign states, must subscribe to the key goals of ARF and work cooperatively to help achieve them. Before their admission, all new participants should agree to abide by the decisions and statements already made by ARF. All ASEAN members are automatically ARF participants.
- Relevance. A state should be admitted only if it can be shown that it has an impact on the peace and security of the “geographic footprint” of key ARF activities (i.e. Northeast and Southeast Asia and Oceania).

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<sup>11</sup> Ralf Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p.10.

<sup>12</sup> G.V.C. Naidu, “Multilateralism and Regional Security : Can the ASEAN Regional Forum Really Make a Difference?,” *Asia Pacific Issues* 45, (August 2000): 3, (journal on-line); available from <http://www.eastwestcenter.org/stored/pdfs/api045.pdf>; accessed 10 September 2004.

<sup>13</sup> ASEAN Secretariat, “The Objectives of ARF.” Available from; <http://www.aseansec.org/3531.htm> [2004, September 10]

- Gradual expansion. To ensure the effectiveness of ARF, efforts are made to control the number of participants to a manageable level.
- Consultations. All applications for participation should be submitted to the ARF chairman, who will consult all the other ARF participants and ascertain whether a consensus exists for admitting the applicant. Actual decisions on participation would be approved by the ASEAN ministers.<sup>14</sup>

## 2.1 The Emergence of the ARF

ARF is the culmination of a process that started in 1990. At that time, Australia and Canada first advocated a multilateral institutional structure in the Asia Pacific along the lines of those in Europe. At the time most countries, including the ASEAN, the United States and China, were skeptical about multilateralism's viability in the Asian context.<sup>15</sup> According to ASEAN's member, the initial proposals for a European-style "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia" were thus rejected as too "Western" and incompatible with the unique cultural mores of core Asian states.<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, the closure of America's largest overseas bases in the Philippines in 1992 raised new concerns about the future of U.S. involvement in the region. Regional powers such as China, India and Japan were becoming stronger and more assertive. There were fears of a possible power vacuum and resulting competition and clashes among the regional powers. Thus, the post-Cold War period saw the need for building institutions for security dialogue and co-operation.

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<sup>14</sup> ASEAN Secretariat. "ASEAN Regional Forum." Available from <http://www.aseansec.org/328.htm> [2004, September 10]

<sup>15</sup> G.V.C. Naidu, "Multilateralism and Regional Security : Can the ASEAN Regional Forum Really Make a Difference?," *Asia Pacific Issues*, p.2.

<sup>16</sup> Cameron J.Hill and William T.Tow, "The ASEAN Regional Forum : Material and Ideational Dynamics," in *Reconfiguring East Asia : Regional Institutions and Organizations after the Crisis*, p.166.



The very complexity and seriousness of these issues led to a growing recognition of the need for an intraregional institution to deal with security matters, or at least a regional forum where views could be exchanged and differences discussed, reducing the chances of open conflict.<sup>17</sup> Thus, in 1994, ASEAN and its dialogue partners decided to create the ASEAN Regional Forum. ASEAN claims the Forum, not merely because the AMM (ASEAN Ministerial Meeting) provides a convenient venue, but because it represents and replicates a successful approach to achieving stability.<sup>18</sup> What's more, the ARF, indeed, suits the interests of all the major powers. It is viewed as an important vehicle to engage China and help induct it into a rule-based international system, to keep the United States involved, and to help ensure that Japan remains a constructive and positive factor in the changing Asia-Pacific security environment.<sup>19</sup>

ASEAN remains in the driver's seat in the ARF and has adopted some norms and cultures to run the ARF. Its meetings are held in ASEAN capitals after the annual AMM, they are chaired by the Foreign Minister of the host ASEAN government, and ASEAN has a significant say in the agenda and on admission of new members. It regards the ARF as an evolutionary process that proceeds by consensus and at the pace comfortable to all members. Thus ASEAN has steered the pace between those, like some Western countries, which want the ARF to move faster and those like China which prefer a slower pace. However, skeptics ask: How can a loose organization of small or medium-sized sovereign states 'manage' or influence the roles and interests of the great powers in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region? ASEAN's answer

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<sup>17</sup> G.V.C.Naidu, p. 2.

<sup>18</sup> Michael Antolik, "The ASEAN Regional Forum : The Spirit of Constructive Engagement," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 16,2 September 1994: 118.

<sup>19</sup> Daljit Singh, "ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia," in *ASEAN in the New Asia : Issues & Trends* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), p.137.

would be that its leading role in the ARF is unavoidable at this stage because no other power or group is acceptable in the driver's seat to all members.<sup>20</sup>

ASEAN has its own ideas on how ARF should work. By the second ARF meeting in Brunei in 1995, a more ambitious "Concept Paper\*" laid out two broad guidelines for future meetings. First, it stated that "meetings will have no formal agenda and approach sensitive security issues in an oblique and non-confrontational manner." This is standard ASEAN practice. Second, the paper outlined a three-step process for ARF development: Confidence-Building Measures, Preventive Diplomacy, and, finally, Conflict Resolution mechanisms.<sup>21</sup> (At China's insistence, the last stage was renamed "Approaches to Conflict Resolution.") The 'ASEAN Way' was introduced, whereby regional cooperation would be promoted through informal consultations. A separation of functions was also embedded into the ARF's decision-making procedures. The 'track one' and 'track two' process was consolidated, with immediate policy priorities to be resolved at the official level (track one) and longer-term policy initiatives to be explored by semi-official, non-governmental groups such as the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and various other regional 'think tanks' (track two).<sup>22</sup>

Consistent with past policy preferences, the ASEAN members have followed a non-confrontational approach, described as "constructive engagement" to resolve conflicts in the region. Constructive engagement implies that states with differences and conflicts of interest are, nonetheless, committed to consultations and will follow

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid, p.138.

\* See more information in Appendix D.

<sup>21</sup> Shaun Narine, "ASEAN and the ARF : The Limits of the "ASEAN Way," *Asian Survey* 17, 10, (1997): p.964.

<sup>22</sup> Cameron J. Hill and William T. Tow, "The ASEAN Regional Forum : Material and Ideational Dynamics," in *Reconfiguring East Asia : Regional Institutions and Organizations after the Crisis*, p.167.

agreed-upon norms and rules. The ASEAN members used this AMM (ASEAN Ministerial Meeting) to articulate such principles as the solution to the security flashpoint of the Spratly Islands. However, these territorial disputes and other regional conflicts still exist and can not be solved easily by using the existence ‘ASEAN Way’ And ASEAN itself might be an inappropriate-model for the ARF.

## 2.2 The Limits of “ASEAN Way”

By the early 1990s, it had become evident that the member states of ASEAN had developed a distinctive way of conducting intra-ASEAN relations. The ASEAN Way or ASEAN process is about the management and containment of problems. It was a product of a combination of factors. These included the particular geopolitical circumstances in which the Southeast Asian countries found themselves, some common cultural features of the member states, and the socialization of the representatives of the various member states through their constant interaction over a length period of time.<sup>23</sup> It is a method of interaction that is still evolving, and it is a “consultative process” primarily motivated by the desire to create a stable intramural environment.<sup>24</sup> There are three characteristics to the ASEAN Way. First, ASEAN members value their sovereignty and have worked hard to ensure not only that they are free from great-power interference, but also that they refrain from interfering in their neighbors’ internal affairs. Secondly, the ASEAN states emphasize consultation and consensus in relations at the regional level. The consultation process is generally informal and based on personal networks of relationships among not only politicians but also, and just as importantly, among bureaucrats and increasingly among people in

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<sup>23</sup> Amitav Acharya,, “Ideas, Identity and Institution-building: From the “ASEAN Way” to the “Asia-Pacific Way,” *The Pacific Review* 10,3: 319-46. Cited in Mark Beeson, ed. *Contemporary Southeast Asia: Regional Dynamics, National Difference* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp.222-3.

<sup>24</sup> Shaun Narine, “ASEAN and the ARF : The Limits of the “ASEAN Way,” *Asian Survey*: 964.

policy institutes and business organizations around the region. This approach clearly has its limitations, however it also has the great benefit of guaranteeing that individual members of ASEAN can properly safeguard their interests. Thirdly, ASEAN members operate on the basis of the primacy of political pragmatism and an agreement not to resort to the use of force in regional or international relations. The region's history of inter-state conflict prior to the formation of ASEAN and the general problems that this caused, led to ASEAN's renunciation of the use of force and Association's commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes through political negotiations.<sup>25</sup>

Many ASEAN leaders have suggested that ARF adopt the ASEAN way of approaching security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. Based on ASEAN's experience, it is hoped that constructive dialogue processes would help build trust and confidence and inculcate habits of cooperation and consultation.<sup>26</sup> Nevertheless Shaun Narine argues that the political, economic and strategic considerations that have made ASEAN a success within Southeast Asia do not necessarily apply to the more powerful states of the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, ASEAN is an inappropriate model for the ARF.<sup>27</sup> This is because, firstly, ASEAN practices a cautious diplomacy. Conflicts are dealt with internally by the postponement of difficult issues, compartmentalization of an issue so that it does not interfere with other areas of cooperation, and quiet diplomacy.<sup>28</sup> As a result, ASEAN is not capable of resolving many issues, but it only moves those issues aside. Secondly, there are three key ASEAN principles that all member states must follow that is; restraint, respect, and

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<sup>25</sup> Mark Beeson, ed. *Contemporary Southeast Asia: Regional Dynamics, National Difference* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp.223-4.

<sup>26</sup> Kusumu Snitwongse, "ASEAN's Security Cooperation: Searching for a Regional Order," *Pacific Review*, 8 (1995): 528.

<sup>27</sup> Shaun Narine, "ASEAN and the ARF : The Limits of the "ASEAN Way," *Asian Survey* : 962.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

responsibility. “Restraint” refers to a commitment to noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, “respect” between states is indicated by frequent consultation, and “responsibility” is the consideration of each member’s interests and concerns. ASEAN has to decide policies through consensus. This consensus-building process is often slow and tedious, but it is necessary in order to maintain ASEAN’s coherence.<sup>29</sup> Another point is that ASEAN has not developed techniques to confront conflict directly. And it lacks ability to reconcile conflicts between member states. It has not altered how its members understand their regional security interests. Its ability to reconcile conflicting objectives or resolve contentious relations of states is extremely limited, even among the ASEAN member states. Within the context of the organization, it is true that the ASEAN process has been quite successful. It has contributed to the alleviation of intra-ASEAN tensions. However, its techniques were developed within, and operated under, conditions of external threat and cannot simply be transplanted to the larger Asia-Pacific region.

There are two elements explaining ASEAN’s development and success: state weakness and external threat. During the Cold War period, member states saw themselves as relatively weak and in constant danger of being undermined through the actions or influence of superpowers. ASEAN states recognized that their own influence in the region was greatly enhanced by being part of a united diplomatic front, and so they were willing to put aside their conflicts and cooperate, at least on certain issues and to a limited degree. Most of ASEAN’s institutional growth came in direct response to perceived increases in threats from the external environment. ZOPFAN, the Bali Conference, and the response to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, all are reactions to the potentially threatening actions undertaken by extra-

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

ASEAN actors. Thus, without the presence of external threat, it is highly unlikely that ASEAN would have evolved into its present form, or developed the ASEAN process.

State weakness and external threat are characteristics that are manifested differently within ARF. ARF is a region-wide organization that includes all of the great, and potentially great, powers of the contemporary international system—the U.S., China, Russia, Japan, and India. There is little potential for the emergence of an external threat to the region that would act as a unifying force. Unlike the ASEAN member states, the great powers will not cooperate or make difficult compromises out of a sense of mutual weakness.<sup>30</sup> Thus, the two elements most necessary to explaining ASEAN's development and success simply do not fit into the ARF context.

The ASEAN Way has also been criticized for blocking necessary decisions in the ARF. Western members of the forum are impatient with indirect discussions, the consensus principle and non-binding decisions lacking measures of verification and sanction. They want a forum determined by strong legalization and quickly moving toward with PD and conflict resolution. However, this proposition is hardly possible to happen due to two important reasons. First, several regional states simply will not accept or join such a forum. Second, the ASEAN Way within the ARF has the big advantage of rendering participation attractive for all members because it functions like an insurance policy. If the ARF is working too hard against core interests of a member, it can stop the progress of a particular topic or refrain from endorsing the decisions taken. Therefore, the consensus principle has a stabilizing effect.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid, p. 975.

<sup>31</sup> Dominik Heller, "The Relevance of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for Regional Security in the Asia-Pacific," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 27, 1 (2005): 140.

The ASEAN Way works towards convincing ARF members that they do not run a risk with enhancing this space. Each time this is successful further deepening of cooperation is possible by widening the limits of the overall framework. In an ideal case a self-enforcing effect, a spiral of trust and cooperation within the ARF will be the result of this approach.<sup>32</sup> This form of cooperation is less tangible than the legalistic Western way but it works. The ARF's social control mechanisms and its approach of ameliorating certain conflicts by improving overall relations among actors in the Asia-Pacific work slowly but successfully. The ARF code of conduct influences its members toward constructive cooperation, and it encourages cooperation to secure territorial integrity, national sovereignty and economic well-being because it provides an important channel of communication and improves mutual understanding.

### **2.3 ASEAN and the ARF's Establishment**

The post-Cold War period saw the building of much-needed institutions for dialogue and cooperation. The establishment of the ARF was a significant achievement. It happened soon after the end of the Cold War, in a region without any precedent for such a region-wide organization for security discussions, indeed with members who were enemies only a few years earlier; it was established in a time of peace and rapid economic growth and not in response to any immediate threat. Its birth was facilitated by two favorable circumstances<sup>33</sup>. Firstly none of the major powers in the region, all of whom are members of the ARF, opposed it. Secondly, the ARF could be built around the ASEAN-PMC which had already been in existence for years as a forum involving many Asia-Pacific countries. It was much easier to build from an existing forum with a track record than to start a new one.

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Daljit Singh, "ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia," in *ASEAN in the New Asia : Issues & Trends*, pp.136-7.

ASEAN's decision to establish the ARF resulted from several motivations. First, changes in the regional strategic environment forced the ASEAN countries to question their sub-regional approach to security. Rather than expanding the PMC, the Association decided to form a new multilateral security dialogue. Second, the ARF, in ASEAN's perception, is an instrument to 'engage Beijing in a comprehensive fashion in a stable regional international system'. Finally, ASEAN hoped to consolidate its diplomatic position in the post-Cold War.<sup>34</sup> Most regional actors supported the position of leadership adopted by ASEAN. Still, the Forum would never have been realized without the support and participation of the United States, Japan and China.



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<sup>34</sup> Ralf Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF*, p.31.



## **CHAPTER III**

### **CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM**

The role of the People Republic of China (PRC) in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is considered to be vital in shaping the direction and future of the Forum. Even though each ASEAN country has different attitude toward China, most agree that it is vital to have constructive engagement with Beijing as it contributed a great influence in the whole security issues in Southeast Asia, and in the Asia-Pacific especially in the South China Sea conflict, the Korean peninsular, and the Taiwan conflict. More importantly some ASEAN members are deeply concerned about the role of China in the region and still regard China as a long term threat. Therefore, in order to have a good relation with the PRC whilst maintaining the existing economic, political and security ties with the United States, it is important to encourage China to participate in the ASEAN multilateral talks, namely ASEAN Plus Three and the ASEAN Regional Forum.

To understand the China's perceptions and policies toward these multilateral institutions, it is necessary to study the characteristics of the Chinese foreign policies that have been going through significant changes, from caution and suspicion to optimism and enthusiasm.

#### **3.1 China's Interaction with Southeast Asia**

Throughout the Cold War period, China's interactions with ASEAN states were conducted solely on a bilateral basis. No institutionalized linkage was formally established between China and the regional organization. Since the Tiananmen incident in 1989, threat perceptions, security policies and military postures in Asia-

Pacific have changed drastically. In addition to a major retreat of American forces and the reduction of Russian influence, the growing importance of regional conflicts shifted international attention to the issue of China's rising military budget and to what has become known as a "China Threat".<sup>35</sup> The relationship between the ASEAN states and China has historically been burdened by China's involvement in a number of abortive coups by supporting local communist insurgents and by trying to use the so-called *oversea* Chinese as a fifth column for its own political ends in order to increase its leverage by interfering in internal affairs of ASEAN states. It was only in the 1970's that most of the ASEAN states started to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing.

Until the end of the 1980's, Chinese strategic thinking was preoccupied with territorial claims while its navy was reduced to coastal shipping capabilities. In the mid of 1990's, this situation changed rapidly when the idea of an "oceanic territory" began to influence Chinese strategic thinking. As such, China especially increased its naval capacities during the 1990's. China's Asian neighbors increasingly became afraid of a Chinese *blue water capability* which might have a direct impact on regional conflicts. The conflict about the claim over the Spratly Islands with some of China's neighbors seemed even more important than a possible conflict with Taiwan, which recently again reached a special prominence in international attention.<sup>36</sup> At the beginning of the 1990's, the tension between ASEAN and China became eased. Beginning in 1991, ASEAN invited China as an observer of the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings (AMM). Later in 1994, China became a consultative partner of the newly created ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and finally, in 1996, a dialogue partner of

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<sup>35</sup> Julia Hurtzig and Eberhard Sandschneider, "National Interest and Multilateral Cooperation: The PRC and its Policies towards APEC and ARF," in Jörn Dosch and Manfred Mols, eds. *International Relations in the Asia-Pacific: New Patterns of Power, Interest, and Cooperation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000 ), p.225.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

the ARF. China's increasingly active involvement in these multilateral forums has considerably shaped the dynamics of its ASEAN policy. At the turn of the new century, multilateral diplomacy has become an important component of China's ASEAN policy in the eyes of many analysts.

It must be noted that that Beijing's move to involve itself in ASEAN activities since the early 1990's was part of the country's "good neighborliness" policy that aimed at strengthening its tie with the neighboring countries in the wake of the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, rather than a fresh orientation in the conduct of Chinese foreign policy.<sup>37</sup> Bilateralism remained the principal thrust of China's policy towards Southeast Asian countries.

Although the ASEAN countries have become increasingly accommodated with the People Republic of China (PRC) in the post-Cold War period since 1992, the nature of ASEAN's relationship to China remains ambivalent. Whilst most of ASEAN's policies towards China are guided by the economic perspectives of a huge Chinese market, explaining ASEAN's *constructive engagement* strategy towards China, Beijing's ambiguous foreign and security policies are simultaneously a major concern in the region.<sup>38</sup>

### **3.2 China's Involvement in the ASEAN Regional Forum**

Based on the patterns and levels of its involvement, China's participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum can be divided into three major phases:

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<sup>37</sup> Kuik Cheng-Chwee, "Multilateralism in China's ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution, Characteristics, and Aspiration," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 27, 1 (2005): 103.

<sup>38</sup> Frank Umbach, "ASEAN and Major Powers: Japan and China –A Changing Balance of Power?," in Jörn Dosch and Manfred Mols, eds. *International Relations in the Asia-Pacific: New Patterns of Power, Interest, and Cooperation*, pp.173-4.

Phase One (early 1990's until 1995): Passive Involvement

Phase Two (1996-1999) : Active Participation

Phase Three (2000- present) : Proactive Proposition<sup>39</sup>

### **1) Phase One (early 1990's until 1995): Passive Involvement**

Throughout this period, China's perception of multilateral institutions largely remained cautious and suspicious. Due to its deep-seated concerns that multilateral security arrangements might be detrimental to its national sovereignty, China did not respond positively to the proposal of creating a multilateral security forum in the Asia-Pacific.. Although China eventually decided to join the ARF in 1994, its initial involvement in this multilateral institution was passive and apprehensive.

Prior to joining the Forum in 1994, the PRC remained reluctant and only vaguely indicated a possible consent to multilateral cooperation in Asia-pacific. Beijing's attitude to security cooperation is dominated by these important concerns: the first and perhaps major concern certainly is not to move the Taiwan issue (and other territorial disputes) onto a multilateral stage, because in China's view issues of national sovereignty are non-negotiable internationally. The second important Chinese concern refers to the possible role of the United States in a forum of multilateral security in Asia-Pacific. In China's view, the US as the only remaining superpower would certainly try to dominate any form of international cooperation. Third, Beijing was uneasy about the possibility that ASEAN might use the forum to internationalize the Spratly Islands dispute and take united standpoint against China. Finally, the PRC was concerned about the problem of military transparency. These

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<sup>39</sup> Kuik Cheng-Chwee, "Multilateralism in China's ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution, Characteristics, and Aspiration," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*: 105-9.

concerns led China to feel that the forum was created with the intention of interfering its domestic affairs and limiting its strategic choices.

Moreover, China has already demonstrated that it prefers a bilateral rather than a multilateral approach to regional security. First, the Chinese have traditionally believed that diplomacy should reflect the hierarchical nature of the international state system, with China recognized as first among unequals. Secondly, China has enjoyed advantages in one-on-one negotiations with most other countries that would be negated in a multilateral agreement. Thirdly, China is highly suspicious of multilateral organizations, fearing that they may create breaches in Chinese sovereignty through which foreigners might intervene in China's affairs to the detriment of China's interest. Fourthly, traditional Chinese military thought puts special emphasis on the use of secrecy and deception, creating a deeply held resistance to transparency in defense matters, which is one of the fundamental issues of multilateral security discussions.<sup>40</sup> In short, the major risk posed by multilateralism for Beijing, according to Chinese analysts and officials, is that a multilateral security forum or structure could be a platform for China-bashing.<sup>41</sup>

Despite its initial reservations, China eventually decided to take part in the security forum. According to the report prepared by the influential Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)' Institute of Asia Pacific Studies (IAPS)<sup>42</sup>, it reflects that China's decision was a product of a careful calculation over strategic benefits and political costs. The report recognizes that the emergence of multilateral security

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<sup>40</sup> Denny Roy, "The Foreign Policy of Great-Power China," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 19, 2 (September 1997): 132-3.

<sup>41</sup> Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific Region and its Impact on Chinese Interests: Views from Beijing," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*.16, 1 (June 1994): 25.

<sup>42</sup> Kuik Cheng-Chwee, "Multilateralism in China's ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution, Characteristics, and Aspiration," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*: 106.

cooperation mechanism in Asia-Pacific is an unstoppable trend. It thus asserts that it is imperative for China to involve itself in the multilateral process in a pragmatic way. Specifically, it recommends that China should proactively shape the development of the mechanism from within, in order to ensure a favorable position in a fluid and complex security environment.

Other reasons for China's positive appraisal of the ARF are that since the ARF is directly based on ASEAN principles, China may safely rely on support from ASEAN countries to exclude debates on human rights and other sensitive political issues from the agenda. Furthermore, cases of disagreement and conflicting issues will under no circumstances be discussed publicly and every participant will strictly obey the principle of non-intervention in other participants' domestic affairs.<sup>43</sup> Relying on these principles, the PRC succeeded to exclude the Taiwan topic from the ARF debates since in Beijing's official view, there is only one China, Taiwan is a part of it, and therefore the conflict between both sides is a domestic Chinese problem not to be discussed on an international platform.

Nevertheless, Beijing's involvement in the newly established forum was not immediately translated into enthusiastic participation. China cautiously guarded against any institutional development of ARF that might challenge its sovereignty

## **2) Phase II (1996-1999) : Active Participation**

After the period of reservation for several years, China gradually changed its perception of multilateral cooperation. It increasingly realized that multilateral forum

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<sup>43</sup> Julia Hurtzig and Eberhard Sandschneider, "National Interest and Multilateral Cooperation: The PRC and its Policies towards APEC and ARF." Cited in Jörn Dosch and Manfred Mols, eds. *International Relations in the Asia-Pacific: New Patterns of Power, Interest, and Cooperation*, p.227.

could be used a diplomatic platform to promote its own foreign policy agenda. During this period, although bilateral diplomacy remained the main thrust of China's ASEAN policy, multilateral diplomacy had slowly begun to play a supplementary role. This was indicated by China's increasingly active participation in ARF activities and other forums for multilateral cooperation in the region.<sup>44</sup> It has embraced ASEAN's diplomatic centrality and managerial role within the ARF as a way to enhance multipolarity in the Asia-Pacific and to avoid US domination of the institution. This position has also been adopted by Russia and by India since it joined ARF in 1996. In addition, the PRC supported India's participation during the ARF's third annual meeting as a means for promoting a multipolar regional order.

In April 1996, Beijing offered to co-chair with Manila the next ARF inter-sessional support group (ISG) meeting on CBMs. In 1997, in addition to hosting the ISG meeting China also sent representatives to take part in the first meeting of defense college chiefs held in Manila.<sup>45</sup> The following years witnessed China's further widening of involvement in the forum. Through its participation in various CBM activities, China hoped to reassure its neighbors and to lessen the China threat theory.<sup>46</sup>

Beyond the ARF framework, China had also been actively involved in the newly created ASEAN Plus Three (APT) process. Four factors that explain China's enthusiasm toward the APT process are: First, China's earlier involvement in the ARF, ACC, APEC and ASEM has enhanced Beijing's level of confidence over

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<sup>44</sup> Kuik Cheng-Chwee, "Multilateralism in China's ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution, Characteristics, and Aspiration," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*: 107

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid*, p.108.

<sup>46</sup> Dao Shulin et al, "A Research Report on China's ASEAN Policy," *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi* (Contemporary International Relations) 10 (2002): 1-10. Cited in Kuik Cheng-Chwee, "Multilateralism in China's ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution, Characteristics, and Aspiration," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*. Vol.27, No. 1 (2005): 108.

regional cooperation. Second, the Asian Financial crisis in 1997-98 had shown that financial problems of one country would inevitably produce contagious effects for other countries in the region. Thus financial cooperation is imperative to prevent a recurrence. Third, Regionalism is seen as a means to protect Chinese national interest against the wave of globalization. Finally, based on geopolitical calculations, China views APT as an ideal platform to push for East Asian cooperation that is likely to expand its political influence and to reshape regional security order in the long run.<sup>47</sup>

### **3) Phase III (2000-present) : Proactive Proposition**

China's embrace of multilateral diplomacy reached new heights in 2000, when it proposed the idea of establishing the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) at the ASEAN Plus Three (ATP) process and the ASEAN-China summits. These agreements have shown that China has now entered a new phase in which it begins to proactively initiate bold regional proposals. Multilateral forums have since been used as valuable diplomatic platforms that are aimed at transforming its foreign policy propositions into long-term strategic reality.<sup>48</sup> China's calculated moves to use multilateral forums to attain its foreign policy ends can be seen at the 7<sup>th</sup> China-ASEAN Summit in 2003. Beijing joined the grouping's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), making itself the first major power to join the non-aggressive pact. More significantly, upon Beijing's initiative, China and ASEAN also signed the "Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership" at the same meeting. This partnership, despite its "non-aligned, non military, and non-exclusive" nature, is likely to make the two sides move closer to each other.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid, p.109.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, pp. 109-10.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid, p. 111.

\* In the 11<sup>th</sup> ARF meeting, Jakarta, 2 July 2004, the ministers endorsed China's proposal on the ARF Security Policy Conference and welcomed China's offer to host the 1<sup>st</sup> ASPC by the end of



Beijing also stressed the need for non-traditional security cooperation in the 10<sup>th</sup> ARF meeting in Phnom Penh in 2003. China proposed to create the “ARF Security Policy Conference” (ASPC)\*, to be attended by military personnel of the Asian Pacific countries.<sup>50</sup> This move is a great leap forward for a country that had reservations about multilateral security cooperation just a decade ago.

Despite this growing cooperation in the ARF, it does not imply that China will change its strategic policies regarding Asia –Pacific especially the ones with the United States nor the security atmosphere in the Asia-Pacific will become less threatening and more peaceful. Clearly, the tension between the PRC and its neighbors still exists and some are unlikely to be resolved soon. The most recent incident causing regional worries in connection with the rise of China was the EP3 spy plane incident with the United States in April 2001. China decisively asserted its sovereign rights to protect its territorial airspace and strongly demanded that the United States apologize for "encroaching" on Chinese territory. Southeast Asia views China's reaction in this incident as an indication of China's growing confidence in international affairs. During the 1980s and early 1990s, China exhibited "a passive and reactionary pattern of behavior in foreign affairs<sup>51</sup>." But China's pattern of

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2004 and agreed that Indonesia would chair this conference. The Ministers underlined the principle that the ASPC should be convened back-to-back with the annual ARF Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) and therefore subsequent ASPC will be hosted and chaired by the ARF Chair country. The 2<sup>nd</sup> ASPC will therefore be held in Vientiane under the chairmanship of Laos PDR. From ASEAN Secretariat, “The Matrix of ASEAN Regional Forum Decisions and Status 1994-2004,” *ASEAN Secretariat Information Paper* (October 2004). Available from [http://www.aseansec.org/artf\[2005, July 20\]](http://www.aseansec.org/artf[2005, July 20])

<sup>16</sup> Lyall Breckon, “SARS and a New Security Initiative from China.” Cited in Kuik Cheng-Chwee, “Multilateralism in China’s ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution, Characteristics, and Aspiration.” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 27, 1 (2005): 111.

<sup>17</sup> Denny Roy, "China and Southeast Asia: ASEAN Makes the Best of the Inevitable," *Asia Pacific Security Studies* 1 (November 2002): 2.

behavior has become more and more assertive recently. Since the EP3 incident, the degree of mistrust between the United States and China has increased and some Southeast Asian states also have been affected by it.

### 3.3 The ARF and the Constraining of China

China may have recognized since the mid-1990s the advantages of adopting a restrained regional policy on established norms. It has introduced an element of relative moderation in its foreign policy and has respected the standard international norms promoted by the ASEAN states through the ARF. For instance, China has played a constructive role with regards to the Korean peninsula and has been an active participant of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) summit of heads of state and government. Moreover, Beijing's approach towards the South China Sea dispute has been tempered since the Mischief Reef incident.<sup>52</sup> The element of control in China's foreign policy since the mid-1990s can be explained by its desire to improve relations with Southeast Asian nations in light of its complicated ties with the United States and Japan.

It is clear that after the Cold War, China is a rising power whose interests are not clearly defined and whose longer-term ambitions remain vague. From any perspective, the ARF's fate is critically dependent on the attitude and behavior of China. What China expects from multilateralism may be quite different from what the rest of the region expects from Chinese participation in multilateralism.<sup>53</sup> Beijing was willing to support an informal and flexible security dialogue sponsored by middle

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<sup>18</sup> Ralf Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF*, p.161.

<sup>53</sup> G.V.C. Naidu, "Multilateralism and Regional Security : Can the ASEAN Regional Forum Really Make a Difference?", *Asia Pacific Issues* 45,(August 2000): 4.

powers that did not represent a potential threat to its security interests. China's support for the ARF presumably is based at least in part on the calculation that the U.S.-led alliance system is primarily aimed at China, and that the best way to reduce the significance of American bilateral arrangements is to promote multilateralism as an alternative.<sup>54</sup> China regarded the ARF as an instrument of opposing a new U.S. policy of containment.

Moreover, China has tried to improve relations with Southeast Asian States through the ARF. China understands well that if it does not support the Forum, it stands to lose a great deal. The political environment in Southeast Asia had demonstrated the fact that regional multilateralism is an inevitable process and that non-participation could be more risky than involvement.<sup>55</sup> What's more, China could not afford to be left out of a multilateral security forum that included the most significant regional states. Despite its initial suspicion, the PRC would quickly learn to use the ARF to its advantages.<sup>56</sup>

China's attitude toward the ARF has come a long way, from total reluctance to cautious support. China's participation has been conditioned on the assurance that Taiwan will not become a member of the ARF and that Taiwan will be treated as an internal Chinese matter. From the beginning it has been clear that China did not want the ARF to evolve into a conflict resolution mechanism. China has expressed strong reservations about the Forum moving on to the next stage, preventive diplomacy.<sup>57</sup> A key factor motivating China's reluctance to underwrite norm identification and

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Cameron J. Hill and William T. Tow, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: Material and Ideational Dynamics," in *Reconfiguring East Asia: Regional Institutions and Organizations after the Crisis*, p. 171.

<sup>56</sup> Ralf Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF*, p. 117.

<sup>57</sup> G.V.C. Naidu, "Multilateralism and Regional Security: Can the ASEAN Regional Forum Really Make a Difference?," *Asia Pacific Issues* 45, (August 2000): 5.

implementation through the ARF is its view that such cooperative processes could undermine its capacity to continue to engage in military modernization and constrain its weapons development and power projection programs.<sup>58</sup>

The initiative to move beyond the promotion of confidence-building measures has not been well received by China, In contrast to CBMs, preventive diplomacy focuses on specific security issues and has been understood by some as a more threatening form of cooperative security. The PRC rejects constraining measures and wants the ARF to remain diplomatic instrument focusing on dialogue and consultation. Refusing to discuss the question of Taiwan, it is also unlikely that Beijing will ever accept the implementation of preventive diplomacy measures for the South China Sea.



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<sup>58</sup> Cameron J.Hill and William T. Tow, “The ASEAN Regional Forum : Material and Ideational Dynamics,” in *Reconfiguring East Asia : Regional Institutions and Organizations after the Crisis*, p.171.

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **THE UNITED STATES' PARTICIPATION IN THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM**

The establishment of the ARF was also dependent on the participation of the United States, the strongest power in the Asia Pacific. At the end of the Cold War, the United States had been unwilling to support multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific, as it feared that a multilateral security structure might undermine its bilateral arrangements with regional actors. However, with the changing security atmosphere in Asia-Pacific, the U.S. foreign policy had realized the importance of engaging in the region in order to preserve its interests and status as a guarantor of the regional order. Especially post-September 11<sup>th</sup>, following the discovery of terrorist networks linked to Al-Qaeda has aroused American attention to the Southeast Asia.

#### **4.1 The United States in the Asia-Pacific after Cold War**

The end of the Soviet Union and its replacement with a weaker and poorer Russian federation automatically left the United States as the sole remaining power in the Asia-Pacific region. When the Cold War was over it was clear from an American perspective that any new world order would have to be built along the lines of U.S. supremacy and thereby mirroring abroad American values and beliefs as well as institutionalizing many of the features of the U.S. political system and domestic experience. However, multilateral institution-building in the Pacific Rim was clearly not on Washington's foreign policy agenda when the new international order loomed large on the horizon in 1989. Unlike the other three strategic spheres of U.S. interest, Latin America, Europe and the Persian Gulf, Washington's relations with East Asia had been short of institutionalized cooperation schemes in the late 1980s. It is clear that makers of foreign policy perceived the Asia-Pacific area as doing well (implying

that the region could at that time live on their own and it was not worth enough for the United States to get fully involved as the Vietnam War had given a big lesson for Washington.) and did not see the need for new collaborative initiatives. In addition, there was a strong argument for the Bush administration not pushing for multilateralism. President Bush believed that the U.S. as a superpower would risk weakening its position of supremacy by too openly opting for multilateral arrangements which lack open American leadership. Bush administration preferred to manage U.S. foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific on the basis of a flexible bilateralism.<sup>59</sup> This multilateralism would include U.S. leadership and the strengthening of existing alliances among a few close friends, thus fit the types of hegemonic and concert-type-cooperation, but not the form of open dialogue cooperation as being put forward by Asia-Pacific middle powers.

### Southeast Asia

Indeed, the U.S. focuses on Southeast Asia was at its height during the Cold War, when the central policy goal was to contain Soviet and Chinese expansion in the region and halt the fall of “dominos” to communism. However, the U.S. attention to Southeast Asia dropped after American’s disengagement from the Vietnam War in the early 1970s. Still, Washington was careful to maintain its alliance with Thailand and the Philippines while it strengthened military cooperation with Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia. With the end of Cold War in the early 1990s, U.S. policy in Southeast Asia drifted further as the threat perception continued to decline. U.S. security concerns were focused farther north, on the Taiwan Straits and the Korean peninsular, and westward, on the Kashmir conflict and growing nuclear capability in India and

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<sup>59</sup> Jörn Dosch, “Asia-Pacific Multilateralism and the Role of the United States,” in *International Relations in the Asia-Pacific: New Patterns of Power, Interest, and Cooperation*, p.101.

Pakistan.<sup>60</sup> Seeming to lose cohesion and lacking an ongoing central conflict, Southeast Asia had become a backwater in U.S. policy by the mid 1990s. For most of the decade American policy toward Southeast Asia was ad-hoc and intensely bilateral, despite rhetorical support for ASEAN. Although the United States supported the expansion of ASEAN with the exception of Burma's admission, U.S. relations with the "new four" were considerably more constrained than with the original members<sup>61</sup>. It is undoubtedly clear that U.S. policy in Southeast Asia remained highly fragmented. This problem along with the Washington debate on the "Asian Values" style might hinder the development of the ASEAN-led first and only security forum in the Asia-Pacific.

#### 4.1.1 The Characteristics of U.S. foreign policy in Asia-Pacific

Any pattern of U.S. foreign policy related to Asia-Pacific is affected by two structural factors deeply rooted in history. The first is the claim to U.S. primacy in international relations, the second the perception of the Pacific Ocean as a neutral zone of American influence. The U.S. claim to global leadership or primacy which materializes in worldwide, sometimes aggressive promotion of democracy, human rights and market economy is typically justified on "parochial, special rights grounds".<sup>62</sup> These perceived rights are embedded in the strong belief in exceptionalism and moralism. The mysticized concept of 'manifest destiny' best expresses this belief. Henry Kissinger explained the essence of exceptionalism.

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., p.55.

<sup>62</sup> Davis Bobrow, "Hegemonic Management: the US in the Asia-Pacific," *The Pacific Review* 12, 2 : 173-197. Cited in Jorn Dosch, "Asia-Pacific Multilateralism and the Role of the United States," in *International Relations in the Asia-Pacific: New Patterns of Power, Interest, and Cooperation*, p. 100.

“Through out history, we have sought to define and justify our foreign policy in terms of principle. We have never seen ourselves as just another nation state pursuing selfish aims. We have always stood for something beyond ourselves – a beacon to the oppressed from other lands, from the settlers to the refugees from Indochina. This conviction of our uniqueness contributed to our unity, a powerful force.”<sup>63</sup>

The U.S. exceptionalism in treaties and multilateral settings illustrates the concerns that Asian and other states have about the dependability and benign character of the United States internationally. The notion of “White Men Burden” did not disappear after the colonial period. It transformed more profoundly and more complicatedly into American foreign policies and justified the role of the United States as a world leader whose power is more and more increasing, especially after the incident of September 11.

The American hegemonic role can also be seen in the United States defense review of 1992 which had made clear that the United States was not like other powers. It had wider international responsibilities, and these required a force structure capable of ensuring its continued dominance in the world-- not just to deter likely enemies, but also to send an unambiguously clear message to more friendly regional players that the United States would not countenance any challenge to its hegemony. Much might have changed since the fall of Berlin Wall and the end of the USSR, but one thing had not: the American urge to remain number one.<sup>64</sup> The United States is also the only major power that defines its political as well as its economic interests in global terms. In this sense, it qualifies as the lone superpower in the post-Cold War era.

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<sup>63</sup> Henry A. Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy* (n.p.:1977), p.200. Cited in Jorn Dosch, “Asia-Pacific Multilateralism and the Role of the United States,” in *International Relations in the Asia-Pacific: New Patterns of Power, Interest, and Cooperation*, p. 101.

<sup>64</sup> Michael Cox, “American Power Before and After 11 September: Dizzy with Success?” *International Affairs* 78, 2 (2002): 269.



## 4.2 The United States and the ARF from 1994 to 2000

The United States has joined the ASEAN Regional Forum since 1994. However, its purposes on this security cooperation remains unclear and doubtful. Some criticized the U.S. of giving more importance to the problems in the North Asia (China, Taiwan, North Korea) and neglecting the informal security problems in the Southeast Asia. It is clear that the ARF was useful in providing Washington with a springboard for informal dialogue with Beijing and Pyongyang. However, ASEAN itself became more diffuse in American eyes when it incorporated Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma, and Southeast Asia as a regional concept became more difficult to grasp.<sup>65</sup>

At the end of the Cold War, the United States was reluctant to support multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. This position had changed by the end of the Bush Administration. In an article published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1991, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker had referred to three pillars for regional security and prosperity, namely economic integration, democratization and a new defense structure.<sup>66</sup> Elected in November 1992, U.S. President Bill Clinton welcomed the establishment of a multilateral security forum. Initially, President Bill Clinton's administration was wary of the prospect that the forum would play a crucial role in regional security. Hence, it could undermine U.S. military alliances with Japan, South Korea and other countries in the region. But that view has changed, as Washington has realized that the forum can help draw former Cold War adversaries, like China, Russia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and now North Korea, into discussions on easing

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<sup>65</sup> Catharin Dalpino, "Southeast Asia," in *America's Role in Asia: American Views* (California: The Asia Foundation, 2004), pp. 54-5.

<sup>66</sup> Ralf Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF*, p.116.

tensions in East Asia without threatening the alliance system with the United States at its center.

The structural setting in the Asia-Pacific changed significantly under the Clinton presidency. The growing economy of most Asian countries especially China and Japan, as well as the increasing anti-American sentiment had made many foreign policy actors in Washington perceive the need for new mechanism to cope with the new challenges. The United States views the multilateral security dialogue as a means of complementing its bilateral arrangements with regional states. For example, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher affirmed at the ASEAN-PMC held in Singapore in July 1993 that while alliances and bilateral defense relationships will remain the cornerstone of American strategy in Southeast Asia, the Clinton Administration welcomes multilateral security consultations – especially within the framework of the PMC. American's reliance on bilateral security structures has been further demonstrated since the creation of the ARF. The joint U.S. Japanese Declaration of April 1996 on regional security and subsequent provision for new guidelines confirmed the post-Cold War significance of the Mutual Security Treaty.<sup>67</sup>

Washington sees ARF as a diplomatic instrument to complement U.S. bilateral security relations and to convince regional allies to take a more active part in their own security.<sup>68</sup> Under the Clinton administration, U.S. policy toward the ARF has increasingly reflected a desire to attain a 'multifaceted' approach to Asia Pacific security based on the need to develop 'new mechanisms to manage emerging concerns' and recognition of 'the role of dialogue in sharing information and

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid, p.123.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid, p.116.

resolving disputes'.<sup>69</sup> Moreover, an American leadership role directed toward strengthening the ARF is constrained by two key factors; the Washington has made clear again and again that multilateralism would supplement basic U.S. policy and not supplant it.<sup>70</sup> Another factor is Washington's heightened concerns regarding China's emerging strategic posture. Chinese actions in the disputed Spratly Islands and its increasing bellicosity toward Taiwan since 1996 have undoubtedly intensified U.S. apprehension regarding China's intentions in the region.<sup>71</sup>

The decision to join the ARF reflected the adoption of a wait-and-see attitude rather than an investment in alternative models for the organization of security.<sup>72</sup> Although the U.S. did not initiate regional security dialogue, Washington has never been a passive member. The global attention accompanying Asia-Pacific multilateralism in the first half of the 1990s was primarily due to Washing's enthusiasm and articulated expectations towards multilateral cooperation. There are several reasons why the U.S. had shifted its position to support multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific, that is: Firstly, Washington promotes multilateralism as a general vehicle to secure American Primacy. Secondly, building multilateralism can contribute to long-term stability and order in the area. In particular, the U.S. saw the opportunity of creating a vehicle to encourage dialogue between South Korea and Japan in the absence of any suitable bilateral forum. Thirdly, Washington saw the ARF as a suitable instrument to support existing elements of U.S. security relations with its Asian partners. Fourthly, ARF were perceived as appropriate mechanism for

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<sup>69</sup> New York Times 1 April 1993, Cited in Cameron J. Hill and William T. Tow, "The ASEAN Regional Forum : Material and Ideational Dynamics," in *Reconfiguring East Asia : Regional Institutions and Organizations after the Crisis*, p.168.

<sup>70</sup> G.V.C. Naidu. "Multilateralism and Regional Security : Can the ASEAN Regional Forum Really Make a Difference?"

<sup>71</sup> Cameron J. Hill and William T. Tow, "The ASEAN Regional Forum : Material and Ideational Dynamics," in *Reconfiguring East Asia : Regional Institutions and Organizations after the Crisis*, p.169.

<sup>72</sup> Kay Moller, "ASEAN and the United States: For Want of Alternatives," in *International Relations in the Asia-Pacific: New Patterns of Power, Interest, and Cooperation*, p.165.

the transport of American values and beliefs, human rights for instance. Finally, ARF provided the opportunity for high-ranking bilateral side meetings. The years 1993 to 1995 can be considered the peak of American enthusiasm for Asia-Pacific multilateralism.

### **4.3 The United States and the ARF from 2001 to present**

The post September 11 strategic landscape compounds the challenges facing the ARF. The ongoing U.S.-led campaign against terrorism has brought the ASEAN region “back on America’s radar scope.” But this does not necessarily imply greater U.S. support for the ARF. Nor is it clear that the George W. Bush Administration views the forum as essential to its war on terror. Most ASEAN countries complain and are worried that signs of growing appreciation for multilateralism in East Asia by the Clinton Administration have now begun to disappear under President Bush Administration. Since September 11, the U.S. preference for unilateralism is seen to have grown stronger. Already there are hints of disenchantment in Washington over the ARF. For example, The ARF barely merited a mention in the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review 2001<sup>73</sup> and was conspicuously missing in the National Security Strategy (NSS) for 2002.

Although the role of the ARF seemed to be less important for the American policymaker, the U.S. remained its active participation. In fact, the ARF still served some of the U.S. concerns in the Asia-Pacific. The ARF meetings, conducted at various leadership levels throughout the year, have provided a useful multilateral venue to underscore key U.S. regional political and security concerns. The U.S.

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<sup>73</sup> Amitav Acharya et al, *A New Agenda for the ASEAN Regional Forum* (Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2002), p. 15.

worked with other participants to keep the major focus of discussion at ARF meetings on the threat posed by the North Korean nuclear weapons program, nonproliferation, counterterrorism, maritime security, and political repression in Burma. North Korea, which participates sporadically in the ARF, found itself isolated at the 2003 ARF Ministerial in Phnom Penh; its nuclear program was criticized in the Chairman's statement. The Korean peninsula issue continued to be the great concern during the subsequent year and the ARF repeatedly voiced support for the Six-Party Talks.<sup>74</sup>

In June 2004, ARF Ministers approved the U.S.-initiated Chairman's Statement on Nonproliferation, the first such ARF document on that topic. The statement will help the U.S. to enlist regional cooperation on nonproliferation issues of greatest concern. For Washington, it is significant that the ARF, as the Asia-Pacific region's main political and security body, has expressed unambiguous support for the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Consequently both the U.S. and China have proposed ARF workshops on aspects of WMD proliferation.

Moreover, The ARF has been a useful mechanism for supplementing U.S. efforts to enhance maritime security in the Malacca Straits. Step one was the U.S.-drafted ARF Chairman's statement on sea piracy and maritime security that ministers approved in Phnom Penh in 2003. Since then, the U.S. has used the opportunities offered by the various ARF meetings to brief diplomats and defense officials on its own regional maritime security plans.<sup>75</sup> The U.S. has moved forward with other concerns in ARF events on the operational elements of regional maritime security. For example, the U.S. conducted an ARF workshop on regional maritime security co-

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<sup>74</sup> Charles I. Cohen, "The ASEAN Regional Forum," *Mcgill International Review* (spring 2005): 49.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid*, p.50.

sponsored by Malaysia and Indonesia in September 2004 and with Singapore in March 2005. Maritime security is proving to be an example of the ARF's budding ability to go beyond the talk shop and the building of "political will" to actual operational exercises.

#### **4.4 ARF as a Low-Stakes Arena**

In the post-Cold War period and in the face of a rising China, U.S. East Asia strategy has been geared towards retaining the American preponderance of power. Thus, the U.S. has pursued a strategy of containment and deterrence centre upon the regional bilateral alliance structure. Multilateral institutions have been treated as a supplementary means of supporting the secondary strategy of engaging with China. However, the ARF is not viewed as one of the important institutions through which to fulfill this supplementary aim. Because the ARF has lacked the coherence, institutional framework, competence and authority to resolve key regional issues, thus it is seen as a low-stakes arena by Washington. Given the traditional leadership role assigned to the politically and economically weak ASEAN states, as well as the strong and often contentious foreign policy perspectives of some of the larger ARF participating states, the body's capacity to move beyond meetings and confidence building measures to preventive diplomacy and dispute resolution is quite circumscribed.<sup>76</sup>

While U.S. enthusiasm for multilateralism has clearly grown since the ARF's creation, American commitment to the Forum clearly needs to be displayed more consistently. Moreover, U.S. commitment to its bilateral relationships could present problems for the development of multilateral security arrangements in the region,

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid., p.49.

because alliance systems are not necessarily compatible with multilateral approaches. For this reason, the U.S. and some others in the region would likely resist any evolution in regional multilateral institutions that appeared to threaten the alliance system. Thus, the more successful the ARF is in pursuing its more ambitious goals, the more tension it may generate between multilateralism and the alliance system. This could pose a major obstacle to the forum's success.<sup>77</sup>

The U.S. would prefer that the ARF develop problem-solving mechanisms. Its members should engage in frank and constructive exchange of views, even to the extent of the ARF moving from discussing international security in general to more specific bilateral issues as and when the need arises. Despite the frustration in ARF's slow progress, the U.S. participation in the ARF may be crucial in boosting the legitimacy of American security interests in the region, thus helping to safeguard U.S. preponderance. The ARF provides an outstanding opportunity for U.S. policymakers to advance important national interests in such areas as terrorism, piracy, reform of the Indonesian military, North Korean refugees, and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.<sup>78</sup> While there is little likelihood that major problems will be fully resolved during the ARF, it is important that the United States take the opportunity to assert its positions strongly, either publicly in open session or confidentially to ARF partners as appropriate.

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<sup>77</sup> G.V.C. Naidu, "Multilateralism and Regional Security : Can the ASEAN Regional Forum Really Make a Difference?", p. 4.

<sup>78</sup> Dana R. Dillon et al, "ASEAN Region Forum: Promoting U.S. Interest." Available from: <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/BG1659.cfm>[2004, September 12]

## CHAPTER V

### SINO-U.S. RELATIONS IN THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM

Throughout much of the post-Cold War period, the dynamics of the Sino-U.S. relationship have been a critical factor in Southeast Asian states' foreign policies. Southeast Asia has traditionally been a site of great power competition for regional dominance. To manage this competition and to enhance their own subregional autonomy, the member states of ASEAN engaged in a number of regional institutions building initiatives during the early 1990s. There was a speculation that by creating the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN could become the hub of a nascent regional security community.<sup>79</sup> However, following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the prospect that ASEAN could act as an autonomous entity to mitigate Sino-U.S. geopolitical pressures seemed increasingly tenuous. Weakened by political and economic instability, intra-regional disputes and a simultaneous expansion of its membership, ASEAN has come to question its own identity. This has only further undermined the development of the ARF.

#### 5.1 Sino-U.S. Strategic Balance

The ARF is now facing a major test. The relationships between member states are changing. Sino-U.S. geopolitical competition in the region is increasing which could be seen from China's attempts to gain support for its "new security concept" and U.S. efforts to secure additional access and infrastructure agreements along the

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<sup>79</sup> Shannon Tow, "Southeast Asia in the Sino-U.S. Strategic Balance," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 26, 3 (2004): 435.



“East Asian littoral.”<sup>80</sup> The April 2001 EP3 incident was seen as a sign of growing tension between China and the U.S. The mid-August 2001 dispatch of two U.S. carrier battle groups to conduct an exercise in the South China Sea, reportedly to highlight the right to free navigation in the contested area and also to signal concern about Chinese military exercises, raised further alarms.<sup>81</sup> This new U.S. approach to China promised to complicate U.S.-Southeast Asia relations for a number of reasons. First, Southeast Asians feared increased Chinese militarization in response to the Bush administration’s push for missile defense, increased arm sales to Taiwan, and sharp criticism of China’s human rights and proliferation violations. Such a development would be aimed not only at overwhelming U.S. missile defense and “defending” Taiwan, but applicable to aggression on disputed South China Sea claims.

Second, a tougher approach to China by the U.S. would lead Beijing to reverse its emerging accommodative approach and interrupt normalizing Southeast Asia-China ties. By 2001 China had made considerable headway in its “smile diplomacy”<sup>82</sup> campaign to win government and public support in Southeast Asia., mostly in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis that began in 1997. Third, from Southeast Asia’s perspective, the U.S. emphasis on China’s military threats was misplaced. In their view, the main immediate challenge posed by China is to the economic health of their countries.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Simon W. Sheldon., “New Military Cooperation but Continuing Political Tension.” Cited in Satu P. Limaye, “Minding the Gaps: the Bush Administration and US-Southeast Asia Relations,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 26, 1 (2004); 87.

<sup>82</sup> Satu P. Limaye, “Minding the Gaps: the Bush Administration and US-Southeast Asia Relations,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, pp. 87-8.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

The United States sees itself as an assertive power for the good in the world. Implicitly, the U.S. questions whether China can or should play the same role. But the changing political atmosphere showed the possibility that the role of the United States as a hegemon will increasingly be challenged by a rising China, especially if China maintains an economic growth rate of 8-10% per annum. Already Chinese capability in manufacturing runs the gamut from low skill, labor intensive manufacturing of textiles and garments to high skills, capital intensive wafer fabrication. Chinese military capabilities and political influence are likely to increase as rapid economic development occurs.

Moreover, the fact that China is a declared nuclear power deeply concerns Washington. China's weapons may not threaten the United States directly, but they do threaten China's neighbors and could complicate U.S. decisions to help defend those neighbors.<sup>84</sup> China is also modernizing its conventional capabilities. It has 2.2 million men under arms and is reconfiguring its forces to deploy rapidly and fight wars of shorter duration along and beyond its border. The most ominous buildup is taking place in the area of the Taiwan Strait. As of 2001, China has deployed three hundred ballistic missiles on its side of the strait and was adding fifty missiles more per year. It has also strengthened its army and naval forces in the area. Although China still lacks important assets such as intelligence, air refueling and amphibious equipment to conduct an invasion of Taiwan, Washington is concerned about the possibility of China gaining overwhelming advantage over Taiwan in the near future.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Henry R. Nau, *At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy* (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 2002), p.169.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.169-170.

This “China’s threat” not only worries Washington, but also heightens great concern and tension in its neighbor countries. Taiwan is the most incendiary issue in Asia because it threatens to bring the two nuclear powers in the region, China and the United States, into direct confrontation. In order to avoid a collision course with rising Chinese power, Washington has to bridge the security gap with China through multilateral security process in the ARF. The Forum serves the enormously important function of building political confidence and trust in Asia, as the Helsinki process did during the emergence of détente in Europe.<sup>86</sup>

Another aspect of Sino-U.S. strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific is that there are dramatic shifts in public opinion throughout many Asian societies in favor of China over America. Many Southeast Asian governments are frustrated by Washington’s focus on the war on terrorism in the region, to the exclusion of regional concerns. There is a growing anti-American sentiment in the region. This anti-Americanism developed in response to the perception that the U.S. is pursuing unilateralist policies without taking into consideration the impact of its actions on other countries, especially in a highly Muslim-populated areas such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the southern of the Philippines and Thailand. There is concern in Asia that if this trend escalates, the U.S. may respond by taking a more isolationist posture in pursuing its foreign policy goals.<sup>87</sup>

However, not only the growing anti-American sentiment but also the success of China’s “charm offensive” throughout Asia<sup>88</sup> has demonstrated the dramatic shift in

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid., p.178.

<sup>87</sup> Kim Kyung-won, Tommy Koh and Farooq Sobha, “American’s Role in Asia in 2004: An Overview,” in *America’s role in Asia: Asian Views*, 8.

<sup>88</sup> David Shambaugh, “Beijing Charms its Neighbors,” *International Herald Tribune* May 14, 2005. Available from: <http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/13/opinion/edshambaugh.php> [2005, August 10]

Asian public opinion to favor PRC. China's increased economic power and these changing perceptions have prompted countries along China's periphery to readjust their relations with Beijing. As China's influence continues to grow, many of these countries look to Beijing for regional leadership or, at a minimum, take into account China's interests and concerns in their decision-making. China's new proactive regional posture is reflected in virtually all policy spheres: political, economic and military. China's growing engagement with the Asian region is perhaps most evident in the economic domain.

In the security sphere, there is still considerable anxiety about the pace and scope of China's military modernization program, and about Beijing's refusal to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. Yet in recent years Beijing has become much more sensitive to these regional concerns and has worked hard to mitigate them. China has been able to offset concerns about its build up against Taiwan with a series of confidence-building measures of four principal types<sup>89</sup>: First is bilateral security dialogues initiated with several neighboring countries. Second is the military exchange including joint naval exercises. Third is the increased military transparency, as demonstrated by its publication of several defense reports and invitations to observe Chinese military exercises. Fourth is the increased participation in the ARF, which Beijing sees as a potential catalyst for establishing a regional cooperative security community. Beijing has found the ARF useful in articulating its own security perspectives and reassuring its neighbors about its strategic intentions.

Apart from the Taiwan issue, China also uses the ARF process as a means of deriving a resolution to the South China Sea conflicts. China firmly rejected the idea of addressing the competing claims of the protagonists through the Forum, arguing

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<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

that dispute resolution should rest on bilateral negotiations. Beijing is especially concerned that any effort to address territorial issues through the Forum would allow excessive U.S. influence on such matters and result in explicit American support for other claimants.<sup>90</sup> These reasons explain China's reluctance for moving the ARF beyond confidence - building measures process. At the most fundamental level, if the ARF aim is to create certain basic rules of the game, and if China perceives that its freedom of action to defend its interests is constrained by multilateralism, this could lead to serious problems and might hinder the Forum from its development. China's support is almost a prerequisite to the advancement of the ARF. Furthermore, although the member states of ASEAN may prefer to deal with China as a group, it is upon their bilateral relations regimes that they will ultimately have to rely.<sup>91</sup> This means China's policy toward security in Asia Pacific will be both bilateral and multilateral as long as China benefits from it.

## 5.2 Asia-Pacific Security after 9/11

The most profound and abrupt shift in U.S. relations with the Asia Pacific was caused by the events of September 11, 2001. The staggering human toll of nearly 3,000 people at the World Trade Center alone includes nationals from eighty-six nation states and territories. Washington's retaliation on a broad global front in a war against international terrorism is a watershed that marks the end of the Cold War and Post-Cold War eras. Terrorism with a global reach seems to have emerged as the primary reference point in U.S. foreign policy. The ramifications of 9/11 have registered among both friends and adversaries, as President George W. Bush has

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<sup>90</sup> Cameron J.Hill and William T. Tow, "The ASEAN Regional Forum : Material and Ideational Dynamics," in *Reconfiguring East Asia : Regional Institutions and Organizations after the Crisis*, p.172.

<sup>91</sup> Martin Stuart-Fox, "Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture in Shaping Future Relations." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 26-1, 2004: 136.

drawn a sharp line in the sand between those countries that are with us and those that are with the terrorists in the war against terrorism.

Washington's efforts at coalition building abroad have been complicated by the diversity of security and domestic interests on the part of its friend, allies, potential strategic competitors, and even detractors. Nowhere is this diversity more sharply reflected than in Asia-Pacific, despite the common, indeed almost universal, sense of outrage against what transpired on September 11.<sup>92</sup> This incident placed the Asia-Pacific region in a new context as a "second front" in the war against terrorism. President Bush's June graduation address to the cadets at West Point has attracted attention mainly because it is the fullest articulation, so far, of the new strategic doctrine of pre-emption. The radical idea being touted by the White House and Pentagon is that the United States has the right to use military force against any state that is seen as hostile or makes moves to acquire weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, biological or chemical. What is certain is the new approach to the use of international force beneath the banner of counterterrorism and in the domestic climate of fervent nationalism that has existed since September 11<sup>93</sup>.

Before 9/11, many security analysts in the United States had lamented that Washington was neglecting Southeast Asia in its strategic agenda. Since the end of the Vietnam War, the United States has failed to formulate a clear and coherent strategy to guide its engagement with Southeast Asia at various levels. Since 9/11, the United States seemingly has realized its blunder of neglecting Southeast Asia in its strategic agenda. Thus, the United States has decided to bring Southeast Asia back onto its strategic radar and declared the region as a second front in the war on

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<sup>92</sup> Chin Kin Wah, "Major-Power Relations in Post 9-11 Asia Pacific," in *Coping with 9-11: Asian Perspectives on Global and Regional Order*, ed. Han Sung-Joo, 2003. Available from: [http://www.jcie.or.jp/thinknet/pdfs/9-11\\_chin.pdf](http://www.jcie.or.jp/thinknet/pdfs/9-11_chin.pdf) [2005, August 10]

<sup>93</sup> Richard Falk, "The New Bush Doctrine." In The Nation, July 15, 2002.

terrorism. The region has again received U.S. attention, and Asian governments have generally been quick to align their interests and agendas to those of the United States.

The war on terrorism brought new templates to U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. In the first months after September 11<sup>th</sup>, the initial focus was on Al Qaeda, but in late 2001 the arrest of operatives of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia, uncovered a broadening regional base for Islamic extremism. U.S. counter-terrorism policy in Southeast Asia began a series of joint exercises with its allies (Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). However, it was soon apparent that terrorism is less a military problem and more a complex set of political, social and economic issues. Intelligence and law enforcement are key elements in fighting terrorism, and the United States placed new emphasis on these sectors in Southeast Asian countries.<sup>94</sup> The war against terrorism also reordered country priorities in U.S. policy in Southeast Asia, moving those with majority or significant Muslim populations to the top. Consequently, the war leads to the growing anti-American feeling in some countries like Indonesia, which has the most Muslim population in the world, also in Malaysia, which unwillingly welcomed the American hegemonic role, and other parts like the southern of Thailand and China.

The terror attacks on September 11 and Beijing's anti-terrorism efforts have to some extent contributed to a more cooperative and constructive relationship. Yet, September 11 has also reinforced a unilateralist U.S. foreign policy. The PRC is still therefore deeply concerned about the U.S. unipolar status that derives from its growing preponderance in military power, as indicated once again by the war in Afghanistan.<sup>95</sup> The war on terrorism also had the effect of moving U.S.-China

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<sup>94</sup> Catharin Dalphino, "Southeast Asia," in *America's Role in Asia: American Views*, p. 58-9.

<sup>95</sup> Ralf Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF*, p. 125.

tensions off the centre of the Asia-Pacific security agenda. A more accommodative tone in U.S.-China relations had begun soon after the resolution of the EP3 incident involving the collision between a Chinese jet fighter and a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance plane, but it took the September 11 attacks and U.S. overtures to China and its unobstructive response to push accommodation further. The Bush administration also appeared to have a more relaxed attitude about China's role in the region.<sup>96</sup>

Nevertheless, the aftermath of 9/11 has greatly disturbed China's strategic in Southeast Asia. The American-led war on terrorism has unleashed some "strategic losses, shocks, and reverses" in China core strategic interests in Southeast Asia. The return of the United States to Southeast Asia is also causing security anxieties in China because of the perception that American intentions in the war on terror in Southeast Asia aim not only to destroy terrorism in the region but also to strategically encircle China. The American attitudes towards the war against terrorism obviously upsets Beijing. The American grand strategy which is considered to be a blueprint of world domination could be seen in "the National Security Strategy of the United States of America" in 2002<sup>97</sup>. This strategy, in Beijing's view, clearly determined to pressure China either with political means or military forces.

Since 9/11, China has reportedly changed its security calculus and been forced to reevaluate its geopolitical position vis-a-vis its relations with the United States and with the claimant states in the South China Sea. In response to the shifting strategic landscape in Southeast Asia, Beijing reportedly has been launching an uncharacteristically concerted diplomatic effort toward its neighbors. More immediate considerations also preoccupy Beijing. With roughly 19 million Muslims in China,

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<sup>96</sup> Satu P. Limaye, "Minding the Gaps: the Bush Administration and US-Southeast Asia Relations," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, p. 88.

<sup>97</sup> President George W. bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America" (Washington D.C.: the White House, September 2002).



Beijing is anxious not to be seen as participating in a clash of civilizations. This internal security fear is mirrored externally, with so many Muslim states to its vast, sparsely populated and vulnerable west. China is also becoming increasingly dependent upon oil supplies from abroad (30.1 percent dependent in 2000, and an anticipated dependence of 60 percent in 2020).<sup>98</sup> The Middle East is particularly important, accounting for 60 to 70 percent of China's crude oil imports, and so, quite predictably, Beijing is reluctant to alienate the major oil supplying counties or see the price of crude oil jump because of instability.<sup>99</sup>

Although 9/11 heavily affected the security architecture of the region, the event does not alter Southeast Asian perceptions of the rise of China, however. Southeast Asia continues to view China as a serious partner for regional growth and prosperity despite the existence of some irritants in the area of territorial and border disputes. Various confidence-building initiatives are now in place between China and Southeast Asia to enhance their relations in the aftermath of 9/11.

What worries Southeast Asia is the negative reaction of major powers on the rise of China and the impact of 9/11 on major-power rivalries in the region. Moreover, 9/11 has not altered the security fundamentals in Asia affecting Southeast Asia. The security problems in the Taiwan Straits, Korean Peninsula, and the South China Sea persist. These problems continue to encumber Southeast Asia with security dilemmas, making the region highly vulnerable to major-power politics.<sup>100</sup> Yet it should be noted that Southeast Asia has always been held hostage to the power politics of major powers. Southeast Asia has been one of the principal fulcrums of major-power

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<sup>98</sup> David M. Lampton, "Small Mercies: China and America after 9/11." Available from: <http://nixoncenter.org/publications/articles/TNIwint0102dml.pdf> [2005, August 10]

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> Rommel C. Banlaoi, "Southeast Asian Perspectives on the Rise of China: Regional Security after 9/11." Available from: <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawg/Parameters/03summer/banlaoi.pdf> [2005, August 8]

rivalries in Asia, and the emerging security landscape unleashed by 9/11 intensified this situation. Major powers are using the war on terrorism in Southeast Asia as an excuse for their active military engagements in the region to prepare for any military contingencies in the Taiwan Straits, Korean Peninsula, and South China Sea. In this rivalry, Southeast Asian countries are put in a “strategic dilemma” in managing their relations with the major powers while these powers especially the United States and the PRC are using balance of power factors in calculating their stakes in the region.

To balance the reestablished presence of the United States in the region since 9/11, China is seeking warmer ties in Southeast Asia and is coming up with its own plan to cultivate close ties with all the ASEAN countries. China also has begun to invest "more aggressively in Southeast Asia," because economic opportunities "have opened up after 9/11<sup>101</sup>." China is using its economic instrument of national power to shore up its diplomacy in Southeast Asia and to balance the preponderant military power of the United States in the region. China also has intensified its defense and military diplomacy, as indicated in its 2002 Defense White Paper.

### 5.2.1 Cooperation against Terrorism

The Asian reactions of U.S. 9/11 policy: with us or against us are not uniform. Some states are staunch U.S. supporters and have been proactive in their own domestic fight against terrorism. Others have been ambivalent and even reticent in their responses, preoccupied with their own domestic power politics. For the majority of Asian States, despite some negative public opinion in many societies and perhaps private doubts, anti-Americanism has not been entrenched as state opinion. Asian

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<sup>101</sup> Leonard Andaya, "Impact of 9/11 on Southeast Asia One Year After" Available from: [http://www.globalhawaii.org/PDFf9\\_11.html](http://www.globalhawaii.org/PDFf9_11.html). [2005, August 8]

leaders have instead responded quite promptly, whether as true allies or opportunistic ambulance chasers, to align their own agenda with that of the United States.<sup>102</sup> However, in multilateral level, Asian countries have given more cooperation against international terrorism. After the September 11 attacks, ASEAN expressed full sympathy for the U.S. and has been helpful to the U.S. in its global campaign against terrorism which can be seen in *2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism*<sup>103</sup>. The Ninth ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in July 2002 welcomed the establishment of *Inter-sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (ISM on CT-TC)*. The meeting emphasized the need for the ARF to find ways and means to cooperate further in the fight against terrorism. In this regards, the ARF participants recognized the importance of adding value to the collective and concerted global campaign against terrorism.<sup>104</sup> It is also in the area of low, non-conventional security (not just combating terrorism but also in dealing with cross-border crime, drug trafficking, human trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, cyber crime, and piracy –some of which activities might also be linked to terrorism) that the scope for collaboration among the great powers, and between them and other regional states, has widened considerably since 9/11. This includes intelligence exchanges, cooperation between internal-security agencies and police forces, as well as financial surveillance of suspected terrorist networks. In July 2002, the United States and ASEAN signed a *Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism* which provided for intelligence exchange, blocking of terrorist funds, and tightening of border controls. Responding to American suggestions, China signed a joint declaration with ASEAN in November 2002 on cooperation in the area of non-traditional security. However, consideration should be given to how such efforts could

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<sup>102</sup> Simon S.C. Tay. "Asia and the United States after 9/11: Primacy and Partnership in the Pacific," *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 28:1 (Winter 2004): 122.

<sup>103</sup> more information in Appendix B

<sup>104</sup> The ARF Ministers reaffirmed the principles outlined in the relevant UNSC Resolutions related to the Prevention and Suppression of Terrorist Acts (UNSC Resolution 1373). Cited in ASEAN Secretariat, "Matrix of ASEAN Regional Forum Decisions and Status 1994-2004," p.26-7.

be further entrenched within Asia-Pacific multilateral cooperative security framework like the ASEAN Regional Forum which is acquiring a counter-terrorism security agenda. The ARF may achieve some success on the international terrorism issues but in the longer run, the questions, concerns and complaints lay in the future role of the United States. Firstly, allies and friends with differing interests will be inclined to ask how the United States is likely to match its rhetoric with action over the longer term. The tendency in U.S. foreign policy, driven by a single-issue only—war on terrorism—at global level will complicate the management of regional order. Secondly, regarding the fact that the ARF consists of many Asian-Pacific countries, including the Muslim-majority ones, the question is that by giving support to the US in the war against terrorism, how could these governments avoid being viewed as a supporter to an anti-Islamic crusade? Moreover with the terrorism as a single and most important issue in the eyes of Washington, other non-traditional security problems might be undermined and was unlikely to resolve soon.

The third and may be the most important concern, the 9/11 attacks changed the major power relations in Asia-Pacific. It may be asked whether the changing atmosphere merely reflects a temporary conjunction of interests rather than a fundamental transformation of such interests and whether 9/11 were a defining moment in the evolving major-power relations in the region, what events might follow? Those who have observed the past swings in Sino-U.S. relations cannot fail to notice that deeply embedded structural elements in the relationship include the Taiwan issue., human rights, and missile defense, which controversy over the proposed TWD system China has had the greatest difficulty in accepting.<sup>105</sup> Although

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<sup>105</sup> Beijing has been much exercised over U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, especially in the form of land- and sea-based theater missile systems that could undermine China's ability to maintain political and military pressure on Taiwan. Consequently, China has increased the number of short-range ballistic missiles, estimated to total around 350, deployed along its southeast coast facing Taiwan. Cited in Chin Kin Wah, "Major-Power Relations in Post 9/11 Asia Pacific." Ibid.

Beijing joined the coalition against terrorism, it remains deeply skeptical of U.S. intentions in Central and South Asia. It fears that the U.S. are gaining regional influence at China's expense, and it views the U.S. encouragement of a Japanese military role in counter-terrorism as support for Japanese rearmament—something the Chinese firmly opposed.<sup>106</sup>

The long shadow of a rising power which is China falls not only on the sole remaining superpower, but also on Japan, which is perceived to be—by some—a power in decline. The ghosts of Japan's militaristic past will not be easily exercised from the Chinese mindset. Beijing concerned about the revival of militarism in Japan, including Japan's joint research with the United States on ballistic-missile defense. The tension in Sino-Japanese relations had aroused in April 2005, violent protests broke out across China after Tokyo approved a new textbook that many Chinese believe glosses over Japan's wartime role. The next month, Vice Premier Wu Yi of China abruptly canceled an appointment with Japan's Prime Minister, Koizumi. Chinese officials later signaled that the snub was intended to convey displeasure at the Japanese leader's visits to the Yasukuni shrine, a Shinto memorial to the country's war dead that also enshrines some of its top war criminals.<sup>107</sup> Many Chinese refuse to accept Koizumi's explanation that he goes to Yasukuni to pray for peace and that his visits are purely personal.

While both sides bicker about the past, it is looming competition between the two assertive powers that lies behind much of the recent tension. China's rise is coinciding with Japan's desire to play a greater role in world affairs. In Beijing, there

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<sup>106</sup> George Tenet, "Worldwide Threat: Converging Dangers in a Post 9/11 World." Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (6 February 2002). Available from: <http://www.ciponline.org/columbia/02020603.html>. 2005, August 12]

<sup>107</sup>David Lague, "In China, Tensions Inflammate Festering War Wounds," International Herald Tribune (15 August 2005). Available from: <http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/08/14/news/vj-china.php>

is rising unease over Japan's ambitions as Tokyo presses for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and, with U.S. backing, seeks to revise its pacifist constitution. As both sides seek greater military power, competition for energy and resources also looms as a potential source of friction. Like Japan, China is heavily dependent on imported energy and raw materials to feed its manufacturing economy. In July, there was an indication of the sensitivity when China lodged an angry diplomatic protest after Japan approved a trial oil extraction from an oil and gas field in a disputed area of the East China Sea.

As tension with Tokyo mounts, there is no doubt that Beijing is exploiting the memory of Japan's aggression as it seeks to foster nationalism in place of its largely defunct Communist ideology. According to July reports in the official media, China's top leaders, including President Hu Jintao, have ordered a threefold increase in the exhibition area at the memorial honoring the victims of the Nanjing massacre in 1937, widely regarded as the single most brutal Japanese atrocity in the conflict.<sup>108</sup> All the reasons above have pointed the increasing security tensions between major powers in the region which may affect the development of security cooperation especially in the ASEAN Region Forum.

In the aftermath of 9/11 the United States has been a major beneficiary of improved relations with many countries especially China. However, the Iraq war is a stark reminder of the awesome might of the sole remaining superpower. China will explore the leeway for maneuverability in its diplomatic-strategic space, at times seeking alignment between itself and other lesser powers for want of some balancing factor. In such a context “multilateralism” and “support for the United Nations” become code words for common opposition to America’s unilateralist impulse.<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> Chin Kin Wah, Ibid.

Within the hierarchy of powers in Asia Pacific, the United States remains preeminent. Its centrality in the regional security architecture is underscored not only by its formal alliances with South Korea and Japan, but also the network of less formal and looser security arrangements with lesser powers such as Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines, and even less obtrusive arrangements with Malaysia and Indonesia. In the longer run, however, the United States will increasingly have to take cognizance of the rising power of China and the declining power of Japan, its major ally in Asia.



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## **CHAPTER VI**

### **CONCLUSION**

Since its formation in 1994, ASEAN Regional Forum or ARF has encountered some limitations and difficulties. Some criticize ARF as an ineffectual talk shop and how it never has acquired any teeth because Washington neglected it. And for Beijing, the ARF does not provide sufficient incentive to encourage China to move from confidence-building measure process. However, it still serves some of its purposes. It is a regime for cooperative security operated as diplomatic instruments to avoid the recurrence of conflict. It is the only regional forum which discusses sensitive regional issues. Although there has been little progress in some issues, a process has begun which would have unthinkable a decade ago.

The formation of the ARF involved power balancing considerations. The balance of power between China and the US has played an important part in this regime for cooperative security and would influence the development process of the forum. The management of the Sino-US relationship as well as China's relationship with its neighbors will be critical to security in the Asia-Pacific in the years ahead. Despite the significance of China's regional rise, it is premature to conclude that the Asian regional system has come to be dominated by Beijing. China shares the regional stage with the United States, Japan, ASEAN and increasingly India. The U.S. remains the region's most powerful actor, although its power and influence are neither unconstrained nor uncontested. Thus, the balance of power factor will continue to be the key factor in shaping regional security in the Asia-Pacific and might determine to forum's success in the future. Nevertheless, Southeast Asia will have little control



from the overarching Asia-Pacific regional balance. This is a situation the leaders of most Southeast Asian, especially ASEAN states desperately want to avoid.<sup>110</sup>

The ARF would continue to have a useful role so long as it remains in the interests of all members, and especially the major powers of the Asia Pacific, to be engaged in cooperative security in this manner. The great powers will continue to be the key players in shaping regional security in the Asia Pacific. The effective crafting of Sino-American relations is a challenge that the entire Asia-Pacific region is obliged to follow with the greatest of attention. Despite its limitations and difficulties, ARF fulfills a useful function simply in bringing the major actors in the Asia Pacific together. Given the many territorial and political disputes that characterize the region, ARF may be a realistically modest way of approaching some of these problems.<sup>111</sup> However, the ARF cannot be realistically expected to play an important role in shaping a new regional order if it remains merely a consultative forum. To be credible forum, it will need to show tangible progress and begin addressing the challenges it faces. Only then will it achieve its goal as the first security cooperation in Asia Pacific.

## 6.1 Problems and Prospects

It is clear that the establishment of the ARF was influenced by balance of power practices. These practices should be understood as constraining power through political means within the cooperative process rather than a reliance on traditional military tactics.<sup>112</sup> Nevertheless, the dynamics of power politics among great powers

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<sup>110</sup> Mohammed Ayoob, "Interstate Conflict and Regional Insecurity," in *The Third World Security Predicament* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p.61.

<sup>111</sup> Shaun Narine, "ASEAN and the ARF : The Limits of the "ASEAN Way" in *Asian Survey*, 17-10, 1997: 978.

<sup>112</sup> Ralf Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF*, p. 117.

could have negative effect to the growth of ARF. One of the important issues is Taiwan. The United States has a vested interest in the promotion of democracy and human rights, while China considers this to be interference in China's internal affairs. The 1996 events in the Taiwan Straits were also a reminder of the inability of the ARF to confront a major crisis.

Not only Taiwan issue, the Forum's failure to respond to crisis situations such as the recent violence in East Timor and the earlier Asian financial crisis has dulled enthusiasm for the ARF. Obviously, the ARF played no role in the 1999 East Timor crisis. The ASEAN members looked on the East Timor situation as the internal problem of a fellow member, and ASEAN's longstanding operating principles proscribed interference. This affects highly in the ARF's creditability.

The problems also exist within the ARF's function and duty itself. Many actors in the Asia-Pacific may have dreamed about a new regional order based on highly institutionalized multilateral arrangement replacing once and forever the old strategies of containment, balance of power considerations and static bilateral alliances. In reality however, open dialogue cooperation has never really exceeded the stage of providing a loose framework for an exchange of ideas.<sup>113</sup> The Forum is based on an ASEAN model of cooperative security. ASEAN has promoted within the ARF its own practices of self-restraint and consensus building and favored an informal security dialogue over legally binding confidence measures. In short, ASEAN has tried to extend its 'ASEAN Way' to the rest of the region. However, the progress has been slow and limited. The ARF has so far led to the implementation of few concrete confidence-building measures. With the Chinese reluctance, the ARF still has a long

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<sup>113</sup> Jörn Dosch and Manfred Mols, *International Relations in the Asia-Pacific: New Patterns of Power, Interest, and Cooperation*, p.107.

way to move beyond Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution process. Partly due to the limits of multilateralism as a constraining factor on the PRC, various ASEAN states have continued to depend on bilateral relations with external players to ensure their security.<sup>114</sup> ARF framework is also proved to be unsuitable for addressing security issues in Northeast Asia. ASEAN's mode of conflict avoidance is not applicable to the Taiwan question and the Korean peninsula, which require tangible solutions. And hence these will need to be dealt with outside the ARF.

The ARF also suffers from structural limitations that affect its development. It has a large membership that confines its capacity to maintain internal coherence and develop code of conduct. Yet, finding a general agreement on common objectives is a troubling matter, as deep divisions exist between the participants.<sup>115</sup> Finally, some participants may not appreciate ASEAN's leading position in the ARF in the longer run. ASEAN's leadership has led to a concentration on Southeast Asian issues. A continued ASEAN sponsorship may cast doubt upon the relevance of the ARF with the reference to Northeast Asian security issues. For all these reasons, the ARF has so far been unable to make any moves in Asia-Pacific security and it still has to reconcile the tensions between multilateral and bilateral relationships.

Over the longer term, the ideal is to create an Asia-Pacific Community, in which the ARF not only promotes and strengthens confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy, but also functions as a conflict-resolution mechanism. This could become a building block for a new international order.

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<sup>114</sup> Ralf Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF*, p.122.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid, p.37-38.

## 6.2 Research Limitations

There are a few limitations in this study.

1. Although the ARF has established since 1994, the related researches, journals and books about the ARF are limited, compared to other Asia-Pacific cooperation such as ASEAN.

2. This study aims at the role of the United States and China in the ARF. The main actors are only the two countries and ASEAN, therefore the role of other powers in the Asia-Pacific such as Japan, Russia, Australia and India might be left out from the study although these countries contributed their part in the regional security cooperation more or less.



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## APPENDICES

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## Appendix A

### **Declaration of ASEAN Concord Indonesia, 24 February 1976**

#### **Preamble**

The President of the Republic of Indonesia, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore and the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand :

**REAFFIRM** their commitment to the Declarations of Bandung, Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur, and the Charter of the United Nations;

**ENDEAVOUR** to promote peace, progress, prosperity and the welfare of the peoples of member states;

**UNDERTAKE** to consolidate the achievements of ASEAN and expand ASEAN cooperation in the economic, social, cultural and political fields;

#### **DO HEREBY DECLARE:**

ASEAN cooperation shall take into account, among others, the following objectives and principles in the pursuit of political stability :

1. The stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region is an essential contribution to international peace and security. Each member state resolves to eliminate threats posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening national and ASEAN resilience.
2. Member states, individually and collectively, shall take active steps for the early establishment of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality.
3. The elimination of poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy is a primary concern of member states. They shall therefore intensify cooperation in economic and social development, with particular emphasis on the promotion of social justice and on the improvement of the living standards of their peoples.
4. Natural disasters and other major calamities can retard the pace of development of member states. They shall extend, within their capabilities, assistance for relief of member states in distress.
5. Member states shall take cooperative action in their national and regional development programmes, utilizing as far as possible the resources available in the ASEAN region to broaden the complementarity of their respective economies.
6. Member states, in the spirit of ASEAN solidarity, shall rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences.
7. Member states shall strive, individually and collectively, to create conditions

conducive to the promotion of peaceful cooperation among the nations of Southeast Asia on the basis of mutual respect and mutual benefit.

8. Member states shall vigorously develop an awareness of regional identity and exert all efforts to create a strong ASEAN community, respected by all and respecting all nations on the basis of mutually advantageous relationships, and in accordance with the principles of selfdetermination, sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of nations.

### **AND DO HEREBY ADOPT**

The following programme of action as a framework for ASEAN cooperation.

#### **A. POLITICAL**

1. Meeting of the Heads of Government of the member states as and when necessary.
2. Signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.
3. Settlement of intra-regional disputes by peaceful means as soon as possible.
4. Immediate consideration of initial steps towards recognition of and respect for the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality wherever possible.
5. Improvement of ASEAN machinery to strengthen political cooperation.
6. Study on how to develop judicial cooperation including the possibility of an ASEAN Extradition Treaty.
7. Strengthening of political solidarity by promoting the harmonization of views, coordinating position and, where possible and desirable, taking common actions.

#### **B. ECONOMIC**

1. Cooperation on Basic Commodities, particularly Food and Energy
  - i) Member states shall assist each other by according priority to the supply of the individual country's needs in critical circumstances, and priority to the acquisition of exports from member states, in respect of basic commodities, particularly food and energy.
  - ii) Member states shall also intensify cooperation in the production of basic commodities particularly food and energy in the individual member states of the region.
2. Industrial Cooperation
  - i) Member states shall cooperate to establish large-scale ASEAN industrial plants particularly to meet regional requirements of essential commodities.
  - ii) Priority shall be given to projects which utilize the available materials in the

member states, contribute to the increase of food production, increase foreign exchange earnings or save foreign exchange and create employment.

### 3. Cooperation in Trade

- i) Member states shall cooperate in the fields of trade in order to promote development and growth of new production and trade and to improve the trade structures of individual states and among countries of ASEAN conducive to further development and to safeguard and increase their foreign exchange earnings and reserves.
- ii) Member states shall progress towards the establishment of preferential trading arrangements as a long term objective on a basis deemed to be at any particular time appropriate through rounds of negotiations subject to the unanimous agreement of member states.
- iii) The expansion of trade among member states shall be facilitated through cooperation on basic commodities, particularly in food and energy and through cooperation in ASEAN industrial projects.
- iv) Member states shall accelerate joint efforts to improve access to markets outside ASEAN for their raw material and finished products by seeking the elimination of all trade barriers in those markets, developing new usage for these products and in adopting common approaches and actions in dealing with regional groupings and individual economic powers.
- v) Such efforts shall also lead to cooperation in the field of technology and production methods in order to increase the production and to improve the quality of export products, as well as to develop new export products with a view to diversifying exports.

### 4. Joint Approach to International Commodity Problems and Other World Economic Problems

- i) The principle of ASEAN cooperation on trade shall also be reflected on a priority basis in joint approaches to international commodity problems and other world economic problems such as the reform of international trading system, the reform on international monetary system and transfer of real resources, in the United Nations and other relevant multilateral fora, with a view to contributing to the establishment of the New International Economic Order.
- ii) Member states shall give priority to the stabilisation and increase of export earnings of those commodities produced and exported by them through commodity agreements including bufferstock schemes and other means.

### 5 . Machinery for Economic Cooperation

Ministerial meetings on economic matters shall be held regularly or as deemed necessary in order to :

- i) formulate recommendations for the consideration of Governments of member states for the strengthening of ASEAN economic cooperation;

ii) review the coordination and implementation of agreed ASEAN programmes and projects on economic cooperation;

iii) exchange views and consult on national development plans and policies as a step towards harmonizing regional development; and

iv) perform such other relevant functions as agreed upon by the member Governments.

### **C. SOCIAL**

1. Cooperation in the field of social development, with emphasis on the well being of the low-income group and of the rural population, through the expansion of opportunities for productive employment with fair remuneration.

2. Support for the active involvement of all sectors and levels of the ASEAN communities, particularly the women and youth, in development efforts.

3. Intensification and expansion of existing cooperation in meeting the problems of population growth in the ASEAN region, and where possible, formulation of new strategies in collaboration with appropriate international agencies.

4. Intensification of cooperation among members states as well as with the relevant international bodies in the prevention and eradication of the abuse of narcotics and the illegal trafficking of drugs.

### **D. CULTURAL AND INFORMATION**

1. Introduction of the study of ASEAN, its member states and their national languages as part of the curricula of schools and other institutions of learning in the member states.

2. Support of ASEAN scholars, writers, artists and mass media representatives to enable them to play an active role in fostering a sense of regional identity and fellowship.

3. Promotion of Southeast Asian studies through closer collaboration among national institutes.

### **E. SECURITY**

Continuation of cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis between the member states in security matters in accordance with their mutual needs and interests.

### **F. IMPROVEMENT OF ASEAN MACHINERY**

1. Signing of the Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat.

2. Regular review of the ASEAN organizational structure with a view to improving its effectiveness.

3. Study of the desirability of a new constitutional framework for ASEAN.

DONE, at Denpasar, Bali, this Twenty-Fourth Day of February in the year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Six.

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## **APPENDIX B**

### **DECLARATION OF ASEAN CONCORD II (BALI CONCORD II)**

The Sultan of Brunei Darussalam, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia, the President of the Republic of Indonesia, the Prime Minister of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, the Prime Minister of the Union of Myanmar, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam;

**RECALLING** the Declaration of ASEAN Concord adopted in this historic place of Bali, Indonesia in 1976, the Leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) expressed satisfaction with the overall progress made in the region;

**NOTING** in particular the expansion of ASEAN to ten countries in Southeast Asia, the deepening of regional economic integration and the impending accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) by States outside Southeast Asia;

**CONSCIOUS** of the need to further consolidate and enhance the achievements of ASEAN as a dynamic, resilient, and cohesive regional association for the well being of its member states and people as well as the need to further strengthen the Association's guidelines in achieving a more coherent and clearer path for cooperation between and among them;

**REAFFIRMING** their commitment to the principles enshrined in the ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok, 1967), the Declaration on Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (Kuala Lumpur, 1971), the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Bali, 1976), the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (Bali, 1976), and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (Bangkok, 1995);

**COGNIZANT** that the future of ASEAN cooperation is guided by the ASEAN Vision 2020, the Hanoi Plan of Action (1999-2004), and its succeeding Plans of Action, the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), and the Roadmap for the Integration of ASEAN (RIA);

**CONFIRMING** further that ASEAN Member Countries share primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability in the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manner in order to preserve their national interest in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples;

**REAFFIRMING** the fundamental importance of adhering to the principle of non-interference and consensus in ASEAN cooperation;

**REITERATING** that the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) is an effective code of conduct for relations among governments and peoples;



**RECOGNIZING** that sustainable economic development requires a secure political environment based on a strong foundation of mutual interests generated by economic cooperation and political solidarity;

**COGNIZANT** of the interdependence of the ASEAN economies and the need for ASEAN member countries to adopt “Prosper Thy Neighbour” policies in order to ensure the long-term vibrancy and prosperity of the ASEAN region;

**REITERATING** the importance of rules-based multilateral trading system that is equitable and that contributes towards the pursuit of development;

**REAFFIRMING** that ASEAN is a concert of Southeast Asian nations, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies, committed to upholding cultural diversity and social harmony;

**DO HEREBY DECLARE THAT:**

1. An ASEAN Community shall be established comprising three pillars, namely political and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation that are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and shared prosperity in the region;
2. ASEAN shall continue its efforts to ensure closer and mutually beneficial integration among its member states and among their peoples, and to promote regional peace and stability, security, development and prosperity with a view to realizing an ASEAN Community that is open, dynamic and resilient;
3. ASEAN shall respond to the new dynamics within the respective ASEAN Member Countries and shall urgently and effectively address the challenge of translating ASEAN cultural diversities and different economic levels into equitable development opportunity and prosperity, in an environment of solidarity, regional resilience and harmony;
4. ASEAN shall nurture common values, such as habit of consultation to discuss political issues and the willingness to share information on matters of common concern, such as environmental degradation, maritime security cooperation, the enhancement of defense cooperation among ASEAN countries, develop a set of socio-political values and principles, and resolve to settle long-standing disputes through peaceful means;
5. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) is the key code of conduct governing relations between states and a diplomatic instrument for the promotion of peace and stability in the region;
6. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) shall remain the primary forum in enhancing political and security cooperation in the Asia Pacific region, as well as the pivot in building peace and stability in the region. ASEAN shall enhance its role in further advancing the stages of cooperation within the ARF to ensure the security of the Asia Pacific region;

7. ASEAN is committed to deepening and broadening its internal economic integration and linkages with the world economy to realize an ASEAN Economic Community through a bold, pragmatic and unified strategy;

8. ASEAN shall further build on the momentum already gained in the ASEAN+3 process so as to further draw synergies through broader and deeper cooperation in various areas;

9. ASEAN shall build upon opportunities for mutually beneficial regional integration arising from its existing initiatives and those with partners, through enhanced trade and investment links as well as through IAI process and the RIA;

10. ASEAN shall continue to foster a community of caring societies and promote a common regional identity;

**DO HEREBY ADOPT:**

The framework to achieve a dynamic, cohesive, resilient and integrated ASEAN Community:

**A. ASEAN SECURITY COMMUNITY (ASC)**

1. The ASEAN Security Community is envisaged to bring ASEAN's political and security cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment. The ASEAN Security Community members shall rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences and regard their security as fundamentally linked to one another and bound by geographic location, common vision and objectives.

2. The ASEAN Security Community, recognizing the sovereign right of the member countries to pursue their individual foreign policies and defense arrangements and taking into account the strong interconnections among political, economic and social realities, subscribes to the principle of comprehensive security as having broad political, economic, social and cultural aspects in consonance with the ASEAN Vision 2020 rather than to a defense pact, military alliance or a joint foreign policy.

3. ASEAN shall continue to promote regional solidarity and cooperation. Member Countries shall exercise their rights to lead their national existence free from outside interference in their internal affairs.

4. The ASEAN Security Community shall abide by the UN Charter and other principles of international law and uphold ASEAN's principles of non-interference, consensus-based decision-making, national and regional resilience, respect for national sovereignty, the renunciation of the threat or the use of force, and peaceful settlement of differences and disputes.

5. Maritime issues and concerns are transboundary in nature, and therefore shall be addressed regionally in holistic, integrated and comprehensive manner. Maritime cooperation between and among ASEAN member countries shall contribute to the evolution of the ASEAN Security Community.

6. Existing ASEAN political instruments such as the Declaration on ZOPFAN, the TAC, and the SEANWFZ Treaty shall continue to play a pivotal role in the area of confidence building measures, preventive diplomacy and the approaches to conflict resolution.
7. The High Council of the TAC shall be the important component in the ASEAN Security Community since it reflects ASEAN's commitment to resolve all differences, disputes and conflicts peacefully.
8. The ASEAN Security Community shall contribute to further promoting peace and security in the wider Asia Pacific region and reflect ASEAN's determination to move forward at a pace comfortable to all. In this regard, the ARF shall remain the main forum for regional security dialogue, with ASEAN as the primary driving force.
9. The ASEAN Security Community is open and outward looking in respect of actively engaging ASEAN's friends and Dialogue Partners to promote peace and stability in the region, and shall build on the ARF to facilitate consultation and cooperation between ASEAN and its friends and Partners on regional security matters.
10. The ASEAN Security Community shall fully utilize the existing institutions and mechanisms within ASEAN with a view to strengthening national and regional capacities to counter terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking in persons and other transnational crimes; and shall work to ensure that the Southeast Asian Region remains free of all weapons of mass destruction. It shall enable ASEAN to demonstrate a greater capacity and responsibility of being the primary driving force of the ARF.
11. The ASEAN Security Community shall explore enhanced cooperation with the United Nations as well as other international and regional bodies for the maintenance of international peace and security.
12. ASEAN shall explore innovative ways to increase its security and establish modalities for the ASEAN Security Community, which include, inter alia, the following elements: norms-setting, conflict prevention, approaches to conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building.

## **B. ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (AEC)**

1. The ASEAN Economic Community is the realisation of the end-goal of economic integration as outlined in the ASEAN Vision 2020, to create a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN economic region in which there is a free flow of goods, services, investment and a freer flow of capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities in year 2020.
2. The ASEAN Economic Community is based on a convergence of interests among ASEAN members to deepen and broaden economic integration efforts through existing and new initiatives with clear timelines.
3. The ASEAN Economic Community shall establish ASEAN as a single market and production base, turning the diversity that characterises the region into opportunities for business complementation making the ASEAN a more dynamic and stronger segment of the global supply chain. ASEAN's strategy shall consist of the integration

of ASEAN and enhancing ASEAN's economic competitiveness. In moving towards the ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN shall, inter alia, institute new mechanisms and measures to strengthen the implementation of its existing economic initiatives including the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) and ASEAN Investment Area (AIA); accelerate regional integration in the priority sectors; facilitate movement of business persons, skilled labour and talents; and strengthen the institutional mechanisms of ASEAN, including the improvement of the existing ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism to ensure expeditious and legally binding resolution of any economic disputes. As a first step towards the realization of the ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN shall implement the recommendations of the **High Level Task Force on ASEAN Economic Integration as annexed.**

4. The ASEAN Economic Community shall ensure that deepening and broadening integration of ASEAN shall be accompanied by technical and development cooperation in order to address the development divide and accelerate the economic integration of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam through IAI and RIA so that the benefits of ASEAN integration are shared and enable all ASEAN Member Countries to move forward in a unified manner.

5. The realization of a fully integrated economic community requires implementation of both liberalization and cooperation measures. There is a need to enhance cooperation and integration activities in other areas. These will involve, among others, human resources development and capacity building; recognition of educational qualifications; closer consultation on macroeconomic and financial policies; trade financing measures; enhanced infrastructure and communications connectivity; development of electronic transactions through e-ASEAN; integrating industries across the region to promote regional sourcing; and enhancing private sector involvement.

### **C. ASEAN SOCIO-CULTURAL COMMUNITY (ASCC)**

1. The ASEAN Socio-cultural Community, in consonance with the goal set by ASEAN Vision 2020, envisages a Southeast Asia bonded together in partnership as a community of caring societies.

2. In line with the programme of action set by the 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord, the Community shall foster cooperation in social development aimed at raising the standard of living of disadvantaged groups and the rural population, and shall seek the active involvement of all sectors of society, in particular women, youth, and local communities.

3. ASEAN shall ensure that its work force shall be prepared for, and benefit from, economic integration by investing more resources for basic and higher education, training, science and technology development, job creation, and social protection. The development and enhancement of human resources is a key strategy for employment generation, alleviating poverty and socio-economic disparities, and ensuring economic growth with equity. ASEAN shall continue existing efforts to promote regional mobility and mutual recognition of professional credentials, talents, and skills development.


4. ASEAN shall further intensify cooperation in the area of public health, including in the prevention and control of infectious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS and SARS, and

support joint regional actions to increase access to affordable medicines. The security of the Community is enhanced when poverty and diseases are held in check, and the peoples of ASEAN are assured of adequate health care.

5. The Community shall nurture talent and promote interaction among ASEAN scholars, writers, artists and media practitioners to help preserve and promote ASEAN's diverse cultural heritage while fostering regional identity as well as cultivating people's awareness of ASEAN.

6. The Community shall intensify cooperation in addressing problems associated with population growth, unemployment, environmental degradation and transboundary pollution as well as disaster management in the region to enable individual members to fully realize their development potentials and to enhance the mutual ASEAN spirit.

We hereby pledge to our peoples our resolve and commitment to bring the ASEAN Community into reality and, for this purpose, task the concerned Ministers to implement this Declaration.



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## APPENDIX C

### **2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism Bandar Seri Begawan, 5 November 2001**

We, the Heads of State/Government of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) gathered in Bandar Seri Begawan for the Seventh ASEAN Summit,

Recalling the agreement among Heads of State/Government during the Second Informal Summit in December 1997 in Kuala Lumpur to take firm and stern measures to combat transnational crime,

Reaffirming our primary responsibility in ensuring the peaceful and progressive development of our respective countries and our region,

Deeply concerned over the formidable challenge posed by terrorism to regional and international peace and stability as well as to economic development,

Underlining the importance of strengthening regional and international cooperation in meeting the challenges confronting us,

Do hereby,

*Unequivocally* condemn in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks in New York City, Washington DC and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001 and consider such acts as an attack against humanity and an assault on all of us;

*Extend* our deepest sympathy and condolences to the people and Government of the United States of America and the families of the victims from nations all around the world, including those of our nationals;

*View* acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed wherever, whenever and by whomsoever, as a profound threat to international peace and security which require concerted action to protect and defend all peoples and the peace and security of the world;

*Reject* any attempt to link terrorism with any religion or race;

*Believe* terrorism to be a direct challenge to the attainment of peace, progress and prosperity of ASEAN and the realisation of ASEAN Vision 2020;

*Commit* to counter, prevent and suppress all forms of terrorist acts in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and other international law, especially taking into account the importance of all relevant UN resolutions;

*Ensure* that, in observing the above, all cooperative efforts to combat terrorism at the regional level shall consider joint practical counter-terrorism measures in line with specific circumstances in the region and in each member country;

*Recommit* ourselves to pursue effective policies and strategies aimed at enhancing the well-being of our people, which will be our national contribution in the fight against terrorism;

*Note* that, towards this end, ASEAN had established a regional framework for fighting transnational crime and adopted an ASEAN Plan of Action that outlines a cohesive regional strategy to prevent, control and neutralise transnational crime;

*Approve* fully the initiatives of the Third ASEAN Ministers Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) held in October 2001 to focus on terrorism and deal effectively with the issue at all levels and endorse the convening of an Ad Hoc Experts Group Meeting and special sessions of the SOMTC and AMMTC that will focus on terrorism;

*Warmly* welcome Malaysia's offer to host the Special AMMTC on issues of terrorism in April 2002. This meeting would represent a significant step by ASEAN to the United Nations' call to enhance coordination of national, sub-regional and international efforts to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security;


*In strengthening* further ASEAN's counter-terrorism efforts, we task our Ministers concerned to follow-up on the implementation of this declaration to advance ASEAN's efforts to fight terrorism by undertaking the following additional practical measures.

1. Review and strengthen our national mechanisms to combat terrorism;
2. Call for the early signing/ratification of or accession to all relevant anti-terrorist conventions including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism;
3. Deepen cooperation among our front-line law enforcement agencies in combatting terrorism and sharing "best practices";
4. Study relevant international conventions on terrorism with the view to integrating them with ASEAN mechanisms on combating international terrorism;
5. Enhance information/intelligence exchange to facilitate the flow of information, in particular, on terrorists and terrorist organisations, their movement and funding, and any other information needed to protect lives, property and the security of all modes of travel;
6. Strengthen existing cooperation and coordination between the AMMTC and other relevant ASEAN bodies in countering, preventing and suppressing all forms of terrorists acts. Particular attention would be paid to finding ways to combat terrorist organisations, support infrastructure and funding and bringing the perpetrators to justice;
7. Develop regional capacity building programmes to enhance existing capabilities of ASEAN member countries to investigate, detect, monitor and report on terrorist acts;

8. Discuss and explore practical ideas and initiatives to increase ASEAN's role in and involvement with the international community including extra-regional partners within existing frameworks such as the ASEAN + 3, the ASEAN Dialogue Partners and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), to make the fight against terrorism a truly regional and global endeavour;
9. Strengthen cooperation at bilateral, regional and international levels in combating terrorism in a comprehensive manner and affirm that at the international level the United Nations should play a major role in this regard.

We, the Leaders of ASEAN, pledge to remain seized with the matter, and call on other regions and countries to work with ASEAN in the global struggle against terrorism.

Adopted this Fifth Day of November 2001 in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam.



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## **APPENDIX D**

### **The ASEAN Regional Forum : A Concept Paper**

#### **Introduction**

1. The Asia-Pacific region is experiencing an unprecedented period of peace and prosperity. For the first time in a century or more, the guns are virtually silent. There is a growing trend among the states in the region to enhance dialogue on political and security cooperation. The Asia-Pacific is also the most dynamic region of the world in terms of economic growth. The centre of the world's economic gravity is shifting into the region. The main challenge of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is to sustain and enhance this peace and prosperity.

2. This is not an easy challenge. The region has experienced some of the most disastrous wars of the twentieth century. It is also a remarkably diverse region where big and small countries co-exist. They differ significantly in levels of development. There are cultural, ethnic, religious and historical differences to overcome. Habits of cooperation are not deep-seated in some parts of the region.

3. ASEAN has a pivotal role to play in the ARF. It has a demonstrable record of enhancing regional cooperation in the most diverse sub-region of the Asia-Pacific. It has also fostered habits of cooperation and provided the catalyst for encouraging regional cooperation in the wider Asia-Pacific region. The annual ASEAN Ministerial Meetings have contributed significantly to the positive regional environment today. There would be great hope for the Asia-Pacific if the whole region could emulate ASEAN's record of enhancing the peace and prosperity of its participants.

4. Although ASEAN has undertaken the obligation to be the primary driving force of the ARF, a successful ARF requires the active participation and cooperation of all participants. ASEAN must always be sensitive to and take into account the interests and concerns of all ARF participants.

#### **The Challenges**

5. To successfully preserve and enhance the peace and prosperity of the region, the ARF must dispassionately analyse the key challenges facing the region. Firstly, it should acknowledge that periods of rapid economic growth are often accompanied by significant shifts in power relations. This can lead to conflict. The ARF will have to carefully manage these transitions to preserve the peace. Secondly, the region is remarkably diverse. The ARF should recognise and accept the different approaches to peace and security and try to forge a consensual approach to security issues. Thirdly, the region has a residue unresolved territorial and other differences. Any one of these could spark conflagration that could undermine the peace and prosperity of the region. Over time, the ARF will have to gradually defuse these potential problems.

6. It would be unwise for a young and fragile process like the ARF to tackle all these challenges simultaneously. A gradual evolutionary approach is required. This evolution can take place in three stages:

Stage I : Promotion of Confidence-Building Measures

Stage II: Development of Preventive Diplomacy Mechanisms

Stage III: Development of Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms

7. The participants of the first ARF Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok in July 1994 agreed on "the need to develop a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations for the Asia-Pacific region". In its initial phase, the ARF should therefore concentrate on enhancing, the trust and confidence amongst participants and thereby foster a regional environment conducive to maintaining the peace and prosperity of the region.

### **Stage I: Promotion of Confidence-Building Measures**

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8. In promoting confidence-building measures, the ARF may adopt two complementary approaches. The first approach derives from ASEAN's experience, which provides a valuable and proven guide for the ARF. ASEAN has succeeded in reducing, tensions among, its member states, promoting region cooperation and creating a regional climate conducive to peace and prosperity without the implementation of explicit confidence-building measures, achieving conditions approximating those envisaged in the Declaration of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). The concepts of ZOPFAN and its essential component, the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (SEANFWZ), are significantly contributing to regional peace and stability. ASEAN's well established practices of consultation and consensus (*musyawarah* and *mufakat*) have been significantly enhanced by the regular exchanges of high-level visits among ASEAN countries. This pattern of regular visits has effectively developed into a preventive diplomacy channel. In the Asian context, there is some merit to the ASEAN approach. It emphasises the need to develop trust and confidence among neighbouring states.

9. The principles of good neighbourliness, which are elaborated in the concept of ZOPFAN, are enshrined in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). One simple concrete way of expanding the ASEAN experience is to encourage the ARF participants to associate themselves with the TAC. It is significant that the first ARF meeting in Bangkok agreed to "endorse the purposes and principles of ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia as a code of conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic instrument for regional confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and political and security cooperation."

10. The second approach is the implementation of concrete confidence-building measures. The first ARF meeting, in Bangkok entrusted the next Chairman of the ARF, Brunei Darussalam, to study all the ideas presented by ARF participants and to also study other relevant internationally recognised norms, principles and practices. After extensive consultations, the ASEAN countries have prepared two lists of confidence-building measures. The first list (Annex A) spells out measures which can be explored and implemented by ARF participants in the immediate future. The second list (Annex B) is an indicative list of other proposals which can be explored over the medium and long-term by ARF participants and also considered in the immediate future by the Track Two process. These lists include possible preventive

diplomacy and other measures.

11. Given the delicate nature of many of the subjects being considered by the ARF, there is merit in moving the ARF process along two tracks. Track One activities will be carried out by governments. Track Two activities will be carried out by strategic institutes and non-government organisations in the region, such as ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP. To be meaningful and relevant, the Track Two activities may focus, as much as possible, on the current concerns of the ARF. The synergy between the two tracks would contribute greatly to confidence-building measures in the region. Over time, these Track Two activities should result in the creation of a sense of community among participants of those activities.

### **Moving Beyond Stage 1**

12. There remains a residue of unresolved territorial and other disputes that could be sources of tension or conflict. If the ARF is to become, over time, a meaningful vehicle to enhance the peace and prosperity of the region, it will have to demonstrate that it is a relevant instrument to be used in the event that a crisis or problem emerges. The ARF meeting in Bangkok demonstrated this by taking a stand on the Korean issue at the very first meeting. This was a signal that the ARF is ready to address any challenge to the peace and security of the region.

13. Over time, the ARF must develop its own mechanisms to carry preventive diplomacy and conflict-resolution. In doing so, the ARF will unique challenges. There are no established roads or procedures for it to follow. Without a high degree of confidence among ARF participants, it is unlikely that they will agree to the establishment of mechanisms which are perceived to be intrusive and/or autonomous. This is a political reality the ARF should recognise. However, it would be useful in the initial phase for the Track Two process to consider and investigate a variety of preventive diplomacy and conflict-resolution mechanisms. A good start was made with the three workshops organised by International Studies Centre (Thailand) and Institute of Policy Studies (Singapore) on ASEAN-UN Cooperation for Peace and Preventive Diplomacy, and the Indonesia-sponsored series off workshops on the South China Sea.

### **Stage II: Development of Preventive Diplomacy**

14. Preventive diplomacy would be a natural follow-up to confidence building measures. Some suggestions for preventive diplomacy measures are spelled out in Annexes A and B.

### **Stage III: Conflict Resolution**

15. It is not envisaged that the ARF would establish mechanisms conflict resolution in the immediate future. The establishment of such mechanisms is an eventual goal that ARF participants should pursue as they proceed to develop the ARF as a vehicle for promoting regional peace and stability.

## **Organisation of ARF activities**

16. There shall be an annual ARF Ministerial Meeting, in an ASEAN capital just after the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. The host country will chair the meeting. The incoming Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee will chair all inter-sessional Track One activities of the ARF.

17. The ARF shall be apprised of all Track Two activities through the current Chairman of the Track One activities, who will be the main link between Track One and Track Two activities.

18. In the initial phase of the ARF no institutionalisation is expected. Nor should a Secretariat be established in the near future. ASEAN shall be the repository of all ARF documents and information and provide the necessary support to sustain ARF activities.

19. The participants of the ARF comprise the ASEAN member states, the observers, and consultative and dialogue partners of ASEAN. Applications to participate in the ARF shall be submitted to the Chairman of the ARF who will then consult the other ARF participants.

20. The rules of procedure of ARF meetings shall be based on prevailing, ASEAN norms and practices. Decisions should be made by consensus after careful and extensive consultations. No voting will take place. In accordance with prevailing ASEAN practices, the Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee shall provide the secretarial support and coordinate ARF activities.

21. The ARF should also progress at a pace comfortable to all participants. The ARF should not move "too fast for those who want to go slow and not too slow for those who want to go fast".

## **Conclusion**

22. ARF participants should not assume that the success of the ARF can be taken for granted. ASEAN's experience shows that success is a result of hard work and careful adherence to the rule of consensus. ARF participants will have to work equally hard and be equally sensitive to ensure that the ARF process stays on track.

23. The ARF must be accepted as a "sui generis" Organisation. It has no established precedents to follow. A great deal of innovation and ingenuity will be required to keep the ARF moving forward while at the same time ensure that it enjoys the support of its diverse participants. This is a major challenge both for the ASEAN countries and other ARF participants. The UN Secretary-General's "Agenda for Peace" has recognised that "just as no two regions or situations are the same, so the design of cooperative work and its division of labour must adjust to the realities of each case with flexibility and creativity".

## **APPENDIX E**

### **CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT THE FIRST MEETING OF THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM**

**Bangkok, 25 July 1994**

1. The First Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was held in Bangkok on 25 July 1994 in accordance with the 1992 Singapore Declaration of the Fourth ASEAN Summit, whereby the ASEAN Heads of State and Government proclaimed their intent to intensify ASEAN's external dialogues in political and security matters as a means of building cooperative ties with states in the Asia-Pacific region.
2. Attending the Meeting were the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN, ASEAN's Dialogue Partners, ASEAN's Consultative Partners, and ASEAN's Observers or their representatives.' The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, served as Chairman of the Meeting.
3. Being the first time ever that high-ranking representatives from the majority of states in the Asia-Pacific region came to specifically discuss political and security cooperation issues, the Meeting was considered a historic event for the region. More importantly, the Meeting signified the opening of a new chapter of peace, stability and cooperation for Southeast Asia.
4. The participants of the Meeting held a productive exchange of views on the current political and security situation in the Asia-Pacific region, recognizing that developments in one part of the region could have an impact on the security of the region as whole. It was agreed that, as a high-level consultative forum, the ARF had enabled the countries in the Asia-Pacific region to foster the habit of constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern. In this respect, the ARF would be in a position to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.
5. Bearing in mind the importance of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the maintenance of international peace and security, the Meeting welcomed the continuation of US-DPRK negotiation and endorsed the early resumption of inter-Korean dialogue.
6. The Meeting agreed to:
  - convene the ARF on an annual basis and hold the second meeting in Brunei Darussalam in 1995; and
  - endorse the purposes and principles of ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, as a code of conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic instrument for regional confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and political and security cooperation.

7. The Meeting also agreed to entrust the next Chairman of the ARF Brunei Darussalam, working in consultation with ARF participants a appropriate, to:

- collate and study all papers and ideas raised during the ARF Senior Officials Meeting and the ARF in Bangkok for submission to the second ARF through the second ARF-SOM, both of which to be held in Brunei Darussalam. Ideas which might be the subjects of such further study including confidence and security building, nuclear non-proliferation, peacekeeping cooperation including regional peacekeeping training centre, exchanges of non classified military information, maritime security issues, and preventive diplomacy;
- study the comprehensive concept of security, including its economic and social aspects, as it pertains to the Asia-Pacific region;
- study other relevant internationally recognized norms and principles pertaining to international and regional political and security cooperation for their possible contribution to regional political and security cooperation;
- promote the eventual participation of all ARF countries in the UN Conventional Arms Register; and
- convene, if necessary, informal meetings of officials to study all relevant papers and suggestions to move the ARF process forward.

8. Recognizing the need to develop a more predictable constructive pattern of relationships for the Asia-Pacific region, the Meeting expressed its firm conviction to continue to work towards the strengths and the enhancement of political and security cooperation within the region as a means of ensuring a lasting peace, stability, and prosperity for the region and its peoples.

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#### Note

ASEAN consists of Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. ASEAN's Dialogue Partners are: Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, and the United States. ASEAN's Consultative Partners are China and Russia. And, ASEAN's Observers are Laos, Papua New Guinea, and Vietnam.

## **APPENDIX F**

### **CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT THE SECOND MEETING OF THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM**

**Brunei Darussalam, 1 August 1995**

1. The Second ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was held on 1 August 1995 in Bandar Seri Begawan. The Meeting was chaired by His Royal Highness Prince Mohamed Bolkiah, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brunei Darussalam.
2. The Forum was attended by all ARF participants. The Secretary-General of ASEAN was also present.
3. The Ministers welcomed Cambodia to the ARF.
4. The Ministers expressed their satisfaction at the level of stability in the Asia Pacific Region. They noted the ways in which cooperative relationships were developing constructively. In this regard, the Ministers noted the many positive steps taken since the first ARF in Bangkok in July 1994, particularly those which built confidence and created greater transparency. In this respect, they noted the participants' willingness to address substantive security issues in a spirit of mutual respect, equality and cooperation.
5. The Ministers expressed their appreciation for the consultations conducted by the Chairman of ARF, Brunei Darussalam, with ARF participants to obtain their views in preparation for the ARF. Based on the inputs and proposals, ASEAN has produced "The ASEAN Regional Forum - A Concept Paper", as annexed.
6. The Ministers considered and endorsed the Report of the Chairman of the ARF-SOM. In particular, they adopted the following proposals in the context of the Concept Paper:

#### **A. GOALS AND EXPECTATIONS**

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- The ARF participants shall continue to work closely to ensure and preserve the current environment of peace, prosperity and stability in the Asia Pacific;
- The ARF shall continue to be a forum for open dialogue and consultation on regional political and security issues, to discuss and reconcile the differing views between ARF participants in order to reduce the risk to security; and
- The ARF recognises that the concept of comprehensive security includes not only military aspects but also political, economic, social and other issues.

#### **B. METHOD AND APPROACH**

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- A successful-ARF requires the active, full and equal participation and cooperation of all participants. However, ASEAN undertakes the obligation to be the primary driving force;
  - The ARF process shall move at a pace comfortable to all participants;
  - The approach shall be evolutionary, taking place in three broad stages, namely the promotion of confidence building, development of preventive diplomacy and elaboration of approaches to conflicts. The ARF process is now at Stage I, and shall continue to discuss means of implementing confidence building. Stage II, particularly where the subject matter overlap, can proceed in tandem with Stage I. Discussions will continue regarding the incorporation of elaboration of approaches to conflicts, as an eventual goal, into the ARF process.
  - Decisions of the ARF shall be made through consensus after careful and extensive consultations among all participants.

### **C. PARTICIPATION**

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- The participants of the ARF comprise ASEAN Member States, Observers, Consultative and Dialogue Partners of ASEAN. Any new application should be submitted to the Chairman of the ARF who will then consult the other ARF participants; and
- To request the next Chairman, to study the question of future participation and develop the criteria for the consideration of the Third ARF through the ARF-SOM.

### **D. ORGANISATION OF THE ARF**

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- There shall be an annual ARF in the context of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Ministerial Conferences to be preceded by ARF-SOM;
- The ARF process would move along two tracks. Track one activities will be carried out by ARF governments. Track Two activities shall be carried out by strategic institutes and relevant non-governmental organisations to which all ARF participants should be eligible. To be meaningful and relevant, the ARF Chairman shall ensure that Track Two activities as indicated in ANNEX B result from full consultations with all ARF participants; and
- The ARF shall be apprised of all Track One and Track Two activities through the current Chairman of the ARF, who will be the main link between Track One and Track Two.

### **E. IMPLEMENTATION OF IDEAS AND PROPOSALS**

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- In order to assist the Chairman of the ARF-SOM to consider and make recommendations to the ARF on the implementation of the proposals agreed



by the ARF participants as indicated in ANNEX A of the Concept Paper, the following shall be convened at the inter-governmental level:

1. Inter-sessional Support Group (ISG) on Confidence Building, in particular, dialogue on security perceptions and defence policy papers; and
2. Inter-sessional Meetings (ISMs) on Cooperative Activities including inter-alia, Peacekeeping.

- ISG and ISMs shall be governed the following by guidelines:

1. ISG and ISMs shall be co-chaired by ASEAN and non-ASEAN participants;
2. ISG and ISMs shall be held in between ARF-SOMS; and
3. Findings of the ISG and ISMs shall be presented to the ARF-SOM in Indonesia in 1996. The possible continuation of the mandate of the ISG and ISMs shall be reviewed at that time.

7. In this regard the Ministers agreed that Indonesia would co-chair the ISGs on CBMs with Japan; Malaysia would co-chair the ISMs on Peacekeeping Operations with Canada; and Singapore would co-chair the ISMs Seminar on Search and Rescue Coordination and Cooperation with the United States.

8. The Ministers also agreed on the following:

- to encourage all ARF countries to enhance their dialogues and consultations on political and security cooperation including exchanges on security perceptions on a bilateral, sub-regional and regional basis;
- for the ARF countries to submit to the ARF or ARF-SOM, on a voluntary basis, an annual statement of their defence policy;
- on the benefits of increased high level contacts and exchanges between military academies, staff colleges and training; and
- to take note of the increased participation in the UN conventional Arms Register since the first ARF and encourage those not yet participating to soon do so.

9. The Ministers expressed the view that their endorsement of such specific ideas and proposals provided sufficient direction for the ARF process at this stage. They also reaffirmed their belief that the Asia Pacific Region-currently had an historically unprecedented opportunity to establish and consolidate long term conditions for peace and stability.

10. The Ministers also received the reports of the following seminars on Building of Confidence and Trust in the Asia Pacific, held in November 1994 in Canberra, Australia; Seminar on Peacekeeping: Challenges and opportunities for the ASEAN Regional Forum, held in March 1995 in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam ; Seminar on Preventive Diplomacy, held in May 1995, Seoul, Republic of Korea. They commended the hosts and sponsors of those seminars for their efforts and agreed that the arrangements under the Track Two process should continue. They also noted the Russian offer to host a Track Two seminar in Spring of 1996 on the proposed Principles of Security an Stability in the Asia-Pacific : Region. They also commended bilateral and multilateral, governmental and on-governmental consultations and

seminars in the Asia Pacific region including the Indonesian Workshop (co-sponsored by Canada) series on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea as a useful means of enhancing dialogue and cooperation.

11. Noting the overall stable environment and many areas of ongoing regional cooperation, the Ministers exchanged views on regional security issues, and highlighted the following:

- expressed concern on overlapping sovereignty claims in the region. They encouraged all claimants to reaffirm their commitment to the principles contained in relevant international laws and convention, and the ASEAN's 1992 Declaration on the South China Sea;
- recognized that the Korean Peninsula issue has a direct bearing on peace and security in the Asia-Pacific. They welcomed the recent US-DPRK talks held in Kuala Lumpur and expressed the hope that this would lead to the full implementation of the Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994. The Ministers urged the resumption of dialogue between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and believed that it would assist in the successful implementation of the Agreed Framework and the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The ministers also recognised the importance which international support for the Korean Peninsula. The Ministers also recognised the importance which international support for the Korean Peninsula Energy Organisation (KEDO) has for the implementation of the Agreed Framework;
- expressed their support for the efforts of the Royal Government of Cambodia to achieve security, promote national stability and economic recovery; and
- emphasised the importance of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in promoting regional peace and stability. They welcomed the commitment by all parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to conclude a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by 1996. Those countries who plan to conduct further nuclear tests were called upon by all other ARF member states to bring immediate end to such testing. They also endorsed the nuclear-weapon free zones, such as the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, in strengthening the international non-proliferation regime and expressed the hope that all nuclear weapon states would in the very near future adhere to the relevant Protocols. They noted with satisfaction the progress made towards the establishment of the South East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and encouraged further consultations on this issue with those states that would be significantly affected by the establishment of the zone.

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