

THE UDD MOVEMENT AND POLITICAL REFORM DISCOURSE: THE  
DESECURITIZATION OF THAI POLITICS WITHIN THE PUBLIC RELATION  
DEPARTMENT ENGLISH WEBSITE

Mr. Alan Wihlborg Andersen

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of Master of Arts Program in International Development Studies  
Faculty of Political Science  
Chulalongkorn University  
Academic Year 2011  
Copyright of Chulalongkorn University

บทคัดย่อและแฟ้มข้อมูลฉบับเต็มของวิทยานิพนธ์ตั้งแต่ปีการศึกษา 2554 ที่ให้บริการในคลังปัญญาจุฬาฯ (CUIR)  
เป็นแฟ้มข้อมูลของนิสิตเจ้าของวิทยานิพนธ์ที่ส่งผ่านทางบัณฑิตวิทยาลัย

The abstract and full text of theses from the academic year 2011 in Chulalongkorn University Intellectual Repository (CUIR)  
are the thesis authors' files submitted through the Graduate School.

ขบวนการ นปช. และวาทกรรมการปฏิรูปการเมือง : การลดประเด็นความมั่นคงของการเมืองไทย  
ในเว็บไซต์ภาษาอังกฤษของกรมประชาสัมพันธ์

นายอรุณ วิลบอร์ก แอนเดอเซ็น

วิทยานิพนธ์นี้เป็นส่วนหนึ่งของการศึกษาตามหลักสูตรปริญญาศิลปศาสตรมหาบัณฑิต  
สาขาวิชาการพัฒนาระหว่างประเทศ  
คณะรัฐศาสตร์ จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย  
ปีการศึกษา 2554  
ลิขสิทธิ์ของจุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

Thesis Title	THE UDD MOVEMENT AND POLITICAL REFORM DISCOURSE: THE DESECURITIZATION OF THAI POLITICS WITHIN THE PUBLIC RELATIONS DEPARTMENT ENGLISH WEBSITE?
By	Mr. Alan Wihlborg Andersen
Field of Study	International Development Studies
Thesis Advisor	Associate Professor Soravis Jayanama

---

Accepted by the Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University in  
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Master's Degree

..... Dean of the Faculty of Political Science  
(Professor Supachai Yavaprabhas, Ph.D.)

THESIS COMMITTEE

..... Chairman  
(Associate Professor Vira Somboon, Ph.D.)

..... Thesis Advisor  
(Associate Professor Soravis Jayanama)

..... External Examiner  
(Assistant Professor Asawin Nedpogaeo, Ph.D.)

อรรัญ วิลบอร์ค แอนเดอเซิน: ขบวนการ นปช. และวาทกรรมการปฏิรูปการเมือง : การลดประเด็นความมั่นคงของการเมืองไทยในเว็บไซต์ภาษาอังกฤษของกรมประชาสัมพันธ์ (THE UDD MOVEMENT AND POLITICAL REFORM DISCOURSE: THE DESECURITIZATION OF THAI POLITICS WITHIN THE PUBLIC RELATIONS DEPARTMENT ENGLISH WEBSITE) อ. ที่ปรึกษา  
วิทยานิพนธ์หลัก: รศ.สรวิศ ชัยนาม, 61 หน้า.

ได้ปรากฏข้อถกเถียงขึ้นต่อประเด็นที่ว่าแนวคิดจากสำนักโคเปนเฮเกนและทฤษฎีการทำให้เป็นเรื่องความมั่นคง (securitization) นั้นโดยมากแล้วได้ถูกนำไปใช้หรือถูกเชื่อมโยงเข้ากับประเด็นเรื่องความมั่นคงแบบแนวคิดตะวันตกในกรอบของความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างประเทศ อาทิเช่น เรื่องการอพยพย้ายถิ่นที่อยู่ การค้ายาเสพติด ปัญหาโลกร้อน และสงครามปราบปรามการก่อการร้ายระดับโลก เป็นต้น ข้อวิพากษ์วิจารณ์จำนวนมากต่อเรื่องนี้ได้มุ่งไปที่แนวทางการศึกษาที่ยึดเอายุโรปเป็นศูนย์กลาง อย่างไรก็ตาม แม้ว่าจะมีการวิพากษ์วิจารณ์ดังกล่าว การทำให้เป็นเรื่องความมั่นคงก็ได้เริ่มเป็นที่ยอมรับมากขึ้นนอกยุโรปตะวันตก วิทยานิพนธ์ฉบับนี้พยายามที่จะพิจารณาว่าทฤษฎีการทำให้เป็นเรื่องความมั่นคงนี้ได้ถูกนำมาใช้ในบริบทของประเทศไทยอย่างไรบ้าง การเคลื่อนไหวทางการเมืองต่างๆในประเทศไทย (กลุ่มเสื้อเหลือง , เสื้อแดง, เสื้อหลากสี) ก็ยังคงเป็นประเด็นข้อถกเถียงของสาธารณชนทั่วไปและเป็นวาระทางการเมืองตั้งแต่ปี 2005 เป็นต้นมา ดังนั้น งานศึกษาชิ้นนี้จึงมุ่งศึกษาประเด็นการทำให้เรื่องการเคลื่อนไหวทางการเมืองของคนเสื้อแดงนั้น ไม่เป็นเรื่องความมั่นคง (desecuritization) ในสื่อทางการเมืองหรือไม่ในช่วงหลังจากที่การประท้วงใช้ความรุนแรงในเดือนพฤษภาคม 2010 ไปจนถึงช่วงปลายเดือนกันยายน 2011 การศึกษานี้ได้มุ่งไปที่การทำให้เป็นเรื่องความมั่นคง/การทำให้ไม่เป็นเรื่องความมั่นคงนั้นส่งผลกระทบต่อสิทธิมนุษยชนอย่างไร โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งเมื่อเทียบกับการที่ประเทศไทยเข้าร่วมในกติการะหว่างประเทศว่าด้วยสิทธิพลเมืองและสิทธิทางการเมืองหลังจากช่วงที่มีการประท้วงด้วยเงื่อนไขเวลาทางการศึกษาที่จำเพาะนี้เอง งานวิจัยนี้จึงมุ่งที่จะแสดงถึงข้อเปรียบเทียบและข้อแตกต่างระหว่างรัฐบาลอภิสิทธิ์และรัฐบาลยิ่งลักษณ์ ดังนั้น กรณีศึกษานี้จึงเป็นกรณีทดสอบเรื่องข้อสมมติฐานที่สำคัญของทฤษฎีการทำให้เป็นเรื่องความมั่นคงต่อเรื่องของพลวัตและตรรกะทางการเมืองและความมั่นคง อีกทั้งยังนำเสนอมุมมองความขัดแย้งทางการเมืองซึ่งดำเนินอยู่ของประเทศไทยและพัฒนาการของความขัดแย้งดังกล่าวในลักษณะที่แตกต่างออกไป

สาขาวิชา การพัฒนาระหว่างประเทศ... ลายมือชื่อนิลิต .....  
ปีการศึกษา 2554 ..... ลายมือชื่อ.ที่ปรึกษาวิทยานิพนธ์หลัก.....

# # 5381021124: MAJOR: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES  
KEY WORD: SECURITIZATION / DESECURITIZATION / UDD / HUMAN  
RIGHTS / SPEECH ACT / THAINESS / UNITY

ALAN WIHLBORG ANDERSEN: THE UDD MOVEMENT AND  
POLITICAL REFORM DISCOURSE: THE DESECURITIZATION OF  
THAI POLITICS WITHIN THE PUBLIC RELATIONS DEPARTMENT  
ENGLISH WEBSITE?. ADVISOR: SORAVIS JAYANAMA, 61 pp.

Arguably, the Copenhagen School and the theory of Securitization has mainly been applied or linked to western driven security issues within International Relations such as immigration, drug trafficking, global warming, global war on terror amongst others. As such, much criticism has been directed towards its Eurocentric upbringings. However, despite these comments, securitization has also started to gain its presence outside of western Europe. This paper attempts to gauge as to how might the theory be applied in the context of Thailand. Political movements (Yellow, Red, Multicolour) in Thailand have remained a fixture in public debate and on the political agenda since 2005. The paper investigates if there has been a Desecuritization of the Red Shirt movement within official media between the end of the violent demonstrations of May 2010 to the end of September 2011. As such, it focuses on how securitization/desecuritization has affected human rights, specifically vis-a-vis Thailand's adherence to the ICCPR during the post protest period. Given the specific time period of the study, the paper aims to draw comparisons as well as contrasts between the Abhisit and Yingluck administration. As such, the case remains both a test case to the Securitization theory's underlining assumptions on political and security dynamics and logics as well as to provide a different angle to Thailand's ongoing political conflict and its development.

Field of Study: International

Development Studies

Academic Year 2011-----

Student's Signature: .....

Advisor's Signature: .....

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

Firstly, I would like to extend my thanks and appreciation to my thesis committee members, Ajarn Soravis, Ajarn Vira and Ajarn Asawin. Their belief in this project served as an inspiration and motivation for me. Their ability to remain flexible under certain time constraints has also allowed my academic interests to be fully satisfied in this project.

Furthermore, I would like to extend a special thanks to my thesis supervisor, Ajarn Soravis. His advice, contribution, and quick replies have been invaluable and have helped in making this project possible.

Lastly, I would like to thank my parents. Without their strong and continuous support/encouragement, this project would not have materialized. They have both provided me with the moral support needed as well as provided a listening ear in times of need.

## CONTENTS

	PAGE
ABSTRACT IN THAI .....	IV
ABSTRACT IN ENGLISH.....	V
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	VI
CONTENTS.....	VII
LIST OF FIGURES.....	IX
ABBREVIATIONS.....	X
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION .....	1
RESEARCH QUESTION.....	3
OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH.....	4
RESEARCH METHODS/METHODOLOGY .....	4
RESEARCH ETHICS.....	6
SCOPE OF STUDY .....	7
SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH.....	7
CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW .....	8
POLITICAL MOVEMENTS - THE CONFLICT AND THE TWO SIDES.....	8
THAINESS AND OTHERNESS.....	13
SECURITIZATION – WIDENING THE DEBATE.....	15
THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL .....	16
DESECURITIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THAILAND .....	18
CHAPTER III ANALYSIS .....	20
CONTENT ANALYSIS.....	20
DISCOURSE ON SECURITY OF THE UDD MOVEMENT.....	22
CHAPTER IV CONCLUSION.....	38
REFERENCES.....	40
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	49
APPENDICES .....	50
APPENDIX A CODING SCHEME.....	51
APPENDIX B OVERVIEW OF ARTICLES FOUND UNDER THE SEARCH CRITERIA .....	53

	PAGE
APPENDIX C PIE CHARTS OF ABHSIT AND YINGLUCK .....	54
APPENDIX D SECURITIZATING AND DESECURITIZING STATEMENTS (OVERVIEW).....	55
BIOGRAPHY .....	56



## LIST OF FIGURES

	PAGE
Figure 3.1 Securitized/Desecuritizing Statements Over Time .....	19

## ABBREVIATIONS

AHRC	Asian Human Rights Commission
CRES	Committee on the Resolution of the Emergency Situation
CoS	Copenhagen School
GWoT	Global War on Terror
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ISA	Internal Security Act
PAD	People's Alliance For Democracy
PRD	Public Relations Department
PPP	People's Power Party
TRT	Thai Rak Thai Party
UDD	United Front For Democracy Against Dictatorship
UN	United Nations
WEF	World Economic Forum

## CHAPTER I

### Introduction

Linkages between media studies and the constructivist notion of security, have already been established in the form of peace media studies in conflict transformation as well as the issues of media diffusion and the global war on terror are among other issues researched within political communication. Generally, it may be considered that the ability of the media to shape and influence the opinion of the general public remains an extensive and well-studied topic. Furthermore, people do not only gain information about certain issues of public affairs from the news media, but they also acquire information about the importance which one or a number of issues carry in the news. As such, one theoretical staple in media studies is the issue of salience of particular issues or the ability of the media to set the public affairs agenda. Another is the issue of framing. The distinction, according to McCombs in Maher, between agenda setting and framing is that in agenda setting, it tells us "*what to think about*" while through framing a specific media tells us "*how to think about it*" (2003: p. 88). In terms of security from a constructivist point of view, the issue of an existential or imminent threat to the security of an object is in the construction of that threat. As such, real or not, an objective security threat is not the issue. When viewed from the theory of Securitization, the issues are either elevated and turned into existential threats or downgraded to normal political procedures either in the form of speech act or they are not mentioned. As a conduit as well as an actor, the media both provides the medium and the translations through which speeches and statements are disseminated.

Since the coup in 2006, Thailand has experienced annulment of a general election, the disqualification of two democratically elected parties, mass demonstrations, political violence/terrorism, military crackdowns, evocation of special decrees and emergency laws, among others. This has subsequently put strain on its adherence to democratic principles as well as limited the participation and

civil/political rights and freedoms of its citizens. Furthermore, one distinct aspect of the recent events is that a number of the measures that have been used to handle and deal with the crisis have arguably been outside the realms of normal political procedures as they have been linked to issues of national security and societal security. Another aspect is the state and government justification of all these interventions and actions. This has led this paper to consider the Theory of Securitization as a possible narrative to account and analyze the events.

Furthermore, the theory also presents an opportunity to further investigate into issues of human rights within the context of Thailand. As part of the alternative approach to development, human rights among other variables have become important indicators in determining the political and societal development of a nation-state. Since the coup in 2006, Thailand's adherence to its international human rights commitments have particularly been raised by the international community. International NGOs such as Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International among others have raised question in regards to Thai governments', and state institutions respect for human rights, particularly political and civil rights. For example, according to Freedom House's freedom index (2011), which is known for its attempts to rank and assign scores a country's civil and political rights status, Thailand received a score of 3 (where 7 represents the most repressive while 1 represents the most free) for political rights and 3 (out of a possible 7) for civil rights in 2006. As such, in 2006 Thailand was rated as a "*free*" country. This assessment came prior to the coup in 2006 (Freedom House 2011). However, after the coup, Freedom House downgraded Thailand's overall rating from "*free*" to "*not free*" in 2007 (Freedom House 2011). Its political and civil rights scores were dropped to 7 and 4. This placed Thailand's political rights status at the same level as North Korea and Iran. In 2008, Thailand's status was raised to "*partially free*" however since then (2009-2011), Thailand has remained consistently placed as a "*partially free*" country (Freedom House 2011). The Theory of Securitization and Desecuritization presents itself with an opportunity to further contextualize and investigate the connection between the government's rhetoric and adherence to human rights principles. Specifically, the theory investigates special provisions and their justification or evocation. The invocation/use of these provisions are not only indicators of

audience's acceptance of the securitizing/desecuritizing moves but also deals with when the state legitimizes or discontinues in justifying the derogation of human rights.

This paper argues that since the end of the UDD protests in March-May 2010, there has been a process of desecuritizing of the UDD Movement (from May 2010 to September 2011). The focus is however if this has led to a successful desecuritization of the UDD movement? As such, in order to investigate whether there is an occurrence of desecuritization, this paper will focus on official media, namely press releases and news articles published by the Public Relations Department in order to compare the two governments of the Abhisit and the Yingluck administration. As such the research question is

Research Question:

*To what extent has there been a de-securitization since the end of the Red Shirt movement demonstrations in May 2010?*

Consequently, there exist certain assumptions, contextual issues and theoretical underpinnings within the research question, which need to be clarified. In terms of assumptions and theories, the paper uses the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory in order to investigate how the UDD has been desecuritized in the official media. The question however remains if there was a prior securitization of the issue. Providing a comprehensive investigation into the occurrence of this remains outside the scope of this paper. However, excluding a speech act analysis, the general indications of a successful securitization are the granting and use of emergency powers/laws/measures, as well as little to no immediate political opposition against the use/implementation of them. Before and during the protests, two specific provisions have created some controversy since they were evoked during and after the demonstrations-riots. These two provisions include the State of Emergency Decree and the Internal Security Act (ISA). The nature of these provisions was to grant the authorities the power to detain individuals without charge, censor information and suppress freedom of expression, among others.

### Objectives of the Research:

- To address the issue of threat creation and use of the media
- To highlight and provide a detailed description of the conflicting sides.
- To address and discuss the appropriateness of the securitization theory in the context of Thailand and its ongoing political conflict.
- To demonstrate how the theory of securitization and desecuritization can be used in the context of Thailand's political conflict
- To investigate the effects of securitization/desecuritization on human rights
- To investigate which government was successful (if at all) in desecuritizing the UDD movement

### Research Methods/Methodology:

The main focus of this non-experimental study is to initially conduct a content analysis of the articles gathered from the Public Relations Department's homepage. According to Berg, content analysis is a "*careful, detailed, systematic examination and interpretation of a particular body of material in an effort to identify patterns, themes, biases and meanings*" (2007: p. 338). By initially conducting a quantitative content analysis, it is considered the simplest way to reduce and quantify the material into more manageable information. This information can then be analyzed more easily. Furthermore, this method does not depart from other previous related studies in the field. The content analysis was conducted by initially constructing and using a coding scheme (see Appendix 1). This was done in order to extract information relevant to answer the research question. The questions in the coding scheme were formulated based on previous research papers on the theory as well as by using existing literature on the Thai political context. Questions 1-5 enables the paper to place data longitudinally (between the Abhisit and Yingluck governments) while questions 6-10 attempts to identify the degrees of securitization and desecuritization statements. As regards to questions 6-10, each statement is treated as a binary variable and is assigned the code of 1 (exist) or 0 (non exist) per article. For example "*Minister Satit further reaffirmed that the Government was determined to restore normalcy to society and would take necessary measure to minimize losses*" (PRD

2010) would be coded 1 for question 6 on the coding scheme. Another example would be “*As for the policy of reconciliation and harmonization, Prime Minister Yingluck reiterated that she would like to see this policy implemented, saying that she was willing to give cooperation to all MPs.*” (PRD 2011). This statement would be coded 1 for question 9 on the coding scheme. The successfulness of a content analysis is the ability of the coder to judge the arguments and categorize them consistently.

Regarding the selection of sources for the study, in performing their speech acts securitizing actors can include politicians, media journalists, spokespersons, etc... Since the research question relates to the desecuritization of the Red Shirt movement as well as other political movements by the Abhisit and Yingluck governments, a government media source was selected. In this case, the Public Relations Department’s website, which is under the control of the Office of the Prime Minister, was used as a source, as it was both accessible and did not require text translations, thereby forgoing reliability issues. In its Inside site, which focuses on political and economic issues on the government agenda, the researcher found 825 articles within the selected time period from the 19<sup>th</sup> of May 2010 to the 29<sup>th</sup> of September 2011. These articles were subsequently purged of duplicates and irrelevant articles. It needs to be mentioned that during the data collection period, articles on the PRD website remains accessible for a year. However after this specific timeframe, the articles on the PRD are no longer accessible for the public viewing or for research purposes. This was found out after contacting the PRD, where access to their archive was denied to the researcher.

With respect to the specific search criteria used, articles were considered relevant based on whether their primary discussion included issues of political reform, Red Shirt/UDD movement, and/or government political policies pertaining to domestic issues. Articles that were omitted included announcements of awards, announcements of diplomatic appointments, announcements of ceremonies/festivals, announcements on public health issues, announcements of issues pertaining to the Southern insurgency, announcements on issues pertaining to external relations, announcements concerning issues of industry, production, economic forecasts, and governments economic policies. This resulted in 129 articles being ‘code-able’. The

data was subsequently inputted onto an Excel spreadsheet, which enabled the analysis to be carried out.

However, the type of content analysis, which is mentioned and detailed above, only captures the number of reiterations of statements of ideas across time and categorizes them accordingly. As such, it provides a more quantitative longitudinal study of the security discourse, in regards to the protesters, yet does not provide a connection between these exchanges of communication and the social/political context that happens around them. As such, the second component of this study is to conduct a qualitative analysis or discourse analysis regarding the protesters/UDD movement and the securitization/desecuritization process. Here, emphasis does not only lie in reforms to either reduce or promote civil and political rights, but also focuses on the social and political disparities and the extent to which these grievances have been addressed by the government. This is done in order to further gauge the extent of the desecuritization of the protesters and the UDD movement by the two governments.

#### Research Ethics:

From a methods point of view, one of the strengths of using content analysis is that it utilizes unobtrusive measures in gathering its data (Babble 2008). In this case, the study uses text or published press releases and news articles from the Public Relations Department's website for its analysis. Unlike behavioral research, which require certain ethical considerations such as if the study should be overt or covert, informed or implied consent, the process of gathering the data does not affect the subject being studied. As such, the same standard of ethical consideration cannot be applied. However, there are a number of general questions, which can be posed. For example, how does the paper/study affect its readers, as well as how does the findings affect the researcher. In order to mitigate adverse effects on potential readers and the researcher, the researcher has opted to increase the number of peer reviews carried out during the writing process. This should guarantee some exposure of the topics discussed in the paper before they are disseminated to a wider audience.



### Scope Of Study:

As mentioned above, the study has not included what can be hypothesized as a prior securitization of the UDD movement. Furthermore, other limitations include that the study only focuses on one official media source, namely articles and press statement/releases that have been published by the Thai Public Relations Department. As such, this allows the study to only focus on how the state, its institutions and the two governments have framed the issue of the UDD movement vis-à-vis security. The study does not investigate how other media sources, such as newspapers, television stations/channels and other news agencies/outlets have framed the issue. Furthermore, unlike other research papers, this study will limit itself to the domestic level. Given the time, and length of the study, it was not possible to elevate the level of analysis above the national level.

### Significance Of Research:

The Theory of Securitization/Desecuritization remains quite limitedly used outside the Europe-American academic sphere. Furthermore, studies that have applied or used the theory have also predominately centered on Western driven issues. Although, it has gained some relevancy outside of Europe and the US in relations to the recent Global War on Terror (GWOt) hereunder also in regards to Thailand's Southern insurgency, this issue has mainly been securitized by the West (specifically the US after the September 9<sup>th</sup> terrorist acts in 2001). As such, the theory remains quite sparsely used in the case of English based studies on Thailand's domestic politics, political conflict, and security.

## CHAPTER II

### Literature Review

#### Political Movements - The Conflict And The Two Sides:

At the center of the alternative approach to development lie such concepts as democracy, empowerment, and participation (Thomas 2008: p. 478-479). They represent a departure from traditional notions of economic growth and development as they lead communities to challenge entrenched political structures within formal democracy. As such, they remain more homegrown. Protest movements represent a struggle for a greater stake and representation of interests on issues/policies, which affect their communities.

With reference to Thailand, during the general election of February 2005, the country seemed democratically stable. The Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT) succeeded in producing an unprecedented landslide election victory gaining approximately 19 million votes compared to the Democrat's 7 million votes (O'Connor 2007). This gave the incumbent TRT party 376 seats of the total 500 seats in the House of Representatives (O'Connor 2007). However, a year later, in March 2006, this stable façade of Thailand's democracy had all evaporated. Massive protest rallies staged by the PAD (People's Alliance for Democracy – Yellow Shirts) demanded Thaksin and his TRT party to step down due to corruption allegations. Thaksin responded to this with snap elections in April, which were boycotted by the main opposition parties. Six months after the elections, a coup d'état was staged by the military while Thaksin was attending a United Nations conference in New York. After the transition of the military appointed interim government to electoral democracy, Thaksin/TRT's proxy party, the People Power Party (PPP) and proxy Prime Ministers (Samak Sundaravej and later Somchai Wongsawat) were subsequently chosen. This resulted in further street protests organized by the PAD, which culminated with the November 2008 takeover of the two international airports by PAD supporters.

This led to the formation of the coalition government headed by the ‘Oxford educated’ Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva, in what became known as the “*silent coup*” (Bell 2008). Counter to the PAD movement, the UDD (United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship/Red Shirt Movement), who had called for protests since the 2006 military coup, stopped its rallies during 2007 due to the winning of the PPP at the ballot boxes. Yet, with the rise of the PAD and the takeover of the international airports, the UDD continued with its call for protests in 2008. Most noticeable of these protests were the ones at the ASEAN Summit in Pattaya in 2009 and the March to May 2010 protests in Bangkok. Yet clashes had also erupted between PAD and UDD supporters, most noticeably on 24<sup>th</sup> of July 2008, where then pro-government (UDD) supporters clashed with anti-government (PAD) supporters in Udon Thani province resulting in one anti-government protester being killed while wounding more than 20 (HRW 2008).

From the 12<sup>th</sup> of March to 19<sup>th</sup> of May 2010, UDD supporters led large-scale protests in the center of Bangkok against the Abhisit government demanding snap elections. These protests turned violent during early April following the Phan Fah incident where the Thai government sent in troops to evict the protesters from the government quarters. During the rest of April, negotiations and clashes continued. The military became reluctant to use the necessary force to suppress the protests given the presence of Black Shirts and armed Red Shirt guards (Ockey 2010). Since the consolidation of the protests was centered in the Ratchaprasong area in the main business/shopping district of Bangkok, pressure was also mounting on the government. In the beginning of May, the government offered the protesters a compromise. This included the dissolution of parliament in four months and early elections in November 2010. This would also allow the government enough time to issue the promotion list for the military. However, disunity was also setting in among the ranks of the UDD/Red Shirts hindering prospects of possibly negotiating a compromise. The final crack down on the protests around the Ratchaprasong area was sparked by the assassination of General Khattiya on the 17<sup>th</sup> of May. On the 19<sup>th</sup> of May, the military moved in. By the end of the operation, some 80 civilians were dead, over 2100 individuals were injured, and buildings were set ablaze by the militant elements within the protesters (Ockey 2010).

The two conflicting sides in Thailand's Red and Yellow shirt dispute can generally be considered as representing two fronts. At best, it seems that the former Abhisit government and its supporters represents the keepers of the status quo, the conservatives, royalist, and the established elites. The UDD, however, consists of not only pro-Thaksin supporter groups, most of whom are from the rural areas of Thailand's North and Northeastern regions, but also anti-coup supporters and reformists. Yet considering the demographics of the two sides, which is also apparent in the recent general election in July 2011, the conflict also metastasized into an issue of class. In this regard, discourses concerning the conflict could be categorized into two debates where the conflict is both an intra-elite dispute and a social division conflict. As Pye and Schaffar (2008) highlighted at an initial review, the coup in 2006 started with an intra-elite dispute. Pye and Schaffar (2008) furthermore note that this was particularly encapsulated with the description of the personal feuds between Sonthi Limthongkul and Thaksin. McCargo who has coined the term "*Network Monarchy*" also provides a detailed description of this dispute between Thaksin and Sonthi (2005: p. 499). McCargo characterizes Sonthi Limthongkul as a "*professional self-promoter*" media mogul (2008: p. 8). Sonthi was a former friend of Thaksin who ultimately fell out of favor with Thaksin. According to McCargo (2009), the feud was caused by Thaksin denying Sonthi his wish to control a major television station. This personal dispute came to a head when Sonthi was fired from *Muangthai raisapda* (Thailand Weekly), a popular political talk show (McCargo, 2009; Nelson, 2007). As such, the issue between Thaksin and Sonthi had initially to do with media access, yet escalated into mobilizing movements (McCargo, 2009). As Ukrist (2008) notes, the transition from individual feud to movement came in the form of slogans such as "*We will fight for the King*" (2008: p. 131). This also transformed the dispute into a broader ideological one. Yet in linking the Thaksin and Sonthi dispute to a wider intra-elite dispute, Pavin elaborates that Thailand's established elites have had a tradition for using the "*unity*" discourse to quash what they saw as disunity or political dissidence (2010: p. 333). Pavin notes that the use of "*unity ... signals the quality of oneness, sameness, and agreement*" (2010: p. 333). With the monopolization of the electoral system, Thaksin and his supporters were beginning to erode this status quo. This has also resonated with Hewison's (2008) account, where

he points out that the arrangements for the coup were made by a network close to the Monarchy. McCargo (2005) has also termed this as a royalist network or “*network Monarchy*” (2005: p. 499). As such, the main focus of these analyses has been on the key power holders close to the Palace against Thaksin and his supporters who represent the new Sino-Thai globalist. Arguably, this has to do with an underlying account of Thai politics that ultimately, political clout rests with key movers within the royalist network and the new business elites.

Running parallel to the above-mentioned discourse are the more general issues of social and class divisions in the Thai society. As noted by McCargo (2010), Thailand has been living with contradictions, which were brought up to a boil with the protests. As an initial reference point, in 2001, Thaksin Shinawatra and the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) initiated some of Thailand’s most progressive redistributive policies. These included, among others, the universal health care scheme, the village development fund, and the micro credit loans for farmers. According to Thitinan, these policies and the political activism garnered by his party captured the “*hearts and minds of Thailand’s rural majority*” and led the TRT party to win two election victories, making the TRT party the political party juggernaut compared to the second largest party, the opposition Democrat Party (Prachathipat) (2008: p. 142). As such, the victory of Thaksin and the TRT party does not only represent a victory of a political party, but also represents a particular departure from previous parties/government policies, which have traditionally been Bangkok-centered. Yet Ockey (2010) has mentioned as well that the divisions run much deeper and even divide communities and families. Ockey however also concedes that the broader divisions between the urban/middle classes and the rural/poor are an “*accurate*” characterization (2010: p. 8). He further points out the distinction that it is not only a class issue (middle classes vs. poor based on income) but a social/geographical (urban vs. rural) one as well (Ockey 2010). Furthermore, according to Funatsu and Kagoya (2003), for example the analyses of the Thai middle classes have traditionally been stereotyped and tended to focus on a particular group within the middle classes. As noted by Funatsu and Kagoya, this middle class has in the past maintained great political clout as it is characterized as being an “*extra-parliamentary*” entity and consists “*of homogeneous urban-based elites*” with high educational backgrounds

from Bangkok (2003: p. 260). This is also noted in Thitinan's article, where he characterizes Thaksin's critics as among others "*the Bangkok based urban elites (comprising the car- and home-owning middle classes in and around the city of ten million)*" (2008: p. 143). Thitinan (2008) further notes that the PAD protests contain the same elements as the protests back in 1992 during the Bloody May Massacre which were staged by the middle classes, linking it to Funatsu and Kagoya's (2003) interpretations as well. As Pye and Schaffar note, the anti-Thaksin movement has been "*loosely lumped together with "the urban elite"*" (2008: p. 39). Although it would be incorrect to claim that the anti-Thaksin PAD movement represents only the Bangkok-based upper middle class, yet this generalization has been dotted across the academic literature in describing the opposition to Thaksin.

As such, Thaksin may best be described as a catalyst to the conflict. By politicizing and implementing populist policies, he sparked greater participation and empowered the rural masses. By tapping into this constituency, he found political support and the political legitimacy that came with it. However, what made the coup in 2006 acceptable for the middle classes was that during the Thaksin administration, the middle classes began to resist Thaksin's economic policies, as well as his policies in dealing with the Southern insurgency and his war on drugs, due to the allegations of corruption and human rights violations. According to Ockey the resistance was capped until the economy slowed in 2005, after which "*policy corruption*" emerged (2010: p. 12).

When Thaksin began to censor the media for being critical of the government, this produced a backlash among the middle classes (Ockey 2010). Furthermore, the populist policies, which had garnered massive support for Thaksin among the poor, were increasingly seen as irresponsible among the middle classes (Ockey 2010). As such, the middle classes saw the poor as being bought off through populist policies and vote buying, which left them with little option but to overthrow the government (Ockey 2010). This has also given rise to a particular condescending notion of the poor and the rural population. As Ockey (2010) notes, for the Yellow Shirts who consisted mostly of the middle classes, the poor were being deceived and bought off by Thaksin. In Anek Laothamatas's (1996) *A Tale of Two Democracies*, Anek describes the scenario of the rural population electing corrupt prime ministers, while

the urban population oust them in return. As such, Thailand's class analyses seem increasingly mixed between social/geographical divisions (urban and rural) and class division (elites, middle classes vs. poor). Thitinan (2008) highlights the likely outcomes of Thai democracy placing them into three available paths.

The first outcome is that Thai democracy succumbs to the established elites' demands and continues to work from the 2007 Constitution. That is to further strengthen the "*holy trinity*" of the Thai state, which comprises the Monarchy, the military and the bureaucracy (Thitinan 2008: p. 140). This argument points to the "*network Monarchy*" winning over the new elites, which includes Thaksin and his followers (McCargo 2005: p. 499).

The other is the reversal of this outcome, where Thaksin and his supporters win over the "*network Monarchy*" (Thitinan 2008; McCargo 2005: p. 499). This entails likely amendments to the current Constitution in the form of reinstating similar elements of the 1997 People's Constitution, which favored the new business groups who had monopolized power through elections during Thaksin's administration (Thitinan 2008; McCargo 2005).

The third outcome is the people based or bottom up approach, which focuses on the social bases of the conflict and envisages Thai democracy without the monopolization of politics by the elite groups.

Arguably, the first two accounts implicitly focus on the likely outcomes of an intra-elite conflict, thereby a solution among the elites. The third account however rests on the ability of the social classes/groups to reach common ground. This links Thai class groups where moderation and the middle ground will have to be gained in order to solve the crisis.

#### Thainess and Otherness:

However, the politicization of class, which started during the Thaksin administration and the social division as described in the above section is not the only tool being used by academics as well as by political leaders in describing the social/political divisions or '*double standards*'. Preceding the violent street protests of May 2010, changes to the national Thai identity/Thai nationhood and the concept of

national unity has also been raised by academics as an important element in the discussion.

As mentioned in the above section, “*unity*” in the Thai sense denotes several things such as “*sameness*” “*oneness*” (Pavin 2010, p. 333). According to Pavin, it is “*antithetical*” to such concepts as diversity and pluralism (2010: p. 333). Yet unity has in the past promoted the political status quo and has remained a staple political discourse used by the traditional elites to stabilize the political climate. In instances such as during the Cold War of the 1970s and 1980s, it provided political stability and consolidated political power in an era where Thai leaders found themselves surrounded by an upsurge of communist states in the region (Pavin 2010). In this sense, it further helped in providing the necessary environment for Thailand to continue developing itself as a capitalist, market-based economy.

However, the question remains as to how has the call for national unity been linked to being “*Un-thai*” or “*Un-thainess*” in the case of the Red Shirts? According to Poowin (2010) and Pavin (2010), there have been attempts during the previous Abhisit government to merge the two concepts together i.e. unity and Thainess. Poowin (2010) and Pavin (2010) further explains that by merging the two, those who were found to be creating disunity were also considered as being Un-thai. As such, being Un-thai is also an expression of otherness, an outsider. Arguably, considering individuals as Un-thai becomes problematic for the reason that they are also perceived as not following the triad national ideology of Nation, Religion and Monarchy (Poowin 2010; Connor 2008).

However “*Thainess*” remains also a problematic concept to define (Poowin 2010: p. 245). According to Thongchai Winichakul (2004), a leading Thai historian, who noted that “*Thainess*” has never been clearly defined, it is through “*negative identification*” or by defining ‘the others’, that “*Thainess*” has been defined (p. 5-6).

In linking this debate to the theory of securitization, a call for national unity represents a powerful political tool for Thai politicians to use in silencing political opponents. By merging unity with Thainess, it seems that this also has the potential to be taken as a threat against the prevailing national ideology. As such, it could be considered as an act of securitizing the debate, as it elevates to an issue outside the realms of normal politics.



One clear manifestation of the unity debate can be found in terms of calls for unity and identifying Thainess and Un-thainess in speeches. However, arguably another component of the unity debate relates to the use of Thailand's particular strict lese majeste laws in quashing critics or individuals who defames the Monarchy. With the current widening of the interpretation of the lese majeste laws, and the subsequent increase in the frequency of court cases, convictions, and increase in the severity of sentences, it has prompted human rights advocates, such as Freedom House and Amnesty International, to call for a reform of the laws. One noticeable issue is the use of these laws as a political tool. This was made apparent with the dispute between Sonthi Limthongkul and Thaksin Shinawatra back in 2005 in which both individuals filed lese majeste cases against each other. However, since this is being linked to Thailand's national security, the issue of lese majeste arguably represents provisions which move issues concerning defaming the Monarchy above normal political procedures. Arguably, in terms of securitization and lese majeste, lese majeste further consolidates powers within one particular political community while decreasing it in the other.

#### Securitization – Widening The Debate:

In terms of Securitization, it remains a relatively young theory to trace. As mentioned above, the traditional notion in security studies have solely been linked to the protection/security of the state and its institutions against military threats. However, the end of the Cold War initiated a re-evaluation of this notion of security. Particularly, during the era of the Cold War, dissatisfaction grew with the sole intense focus on military and the nuclear obsession. Consequently, it created a division between those who favoured the traditionalist approach and those who were advocating a widening of the discussion within security studies to also encompass other non-military issues.

Stimulated by the economic and environmental agendas in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as the identity and transnational crime agendas during the 1990s, the new issue-driven security agenda also caused a reaction against it, although, some traditionalists accepted the idea of broader definition in terms of security, as intra-state wars increased in the late 1980s. However, traditionalists pointed out that

security should be flexible only to the point where issues concerning security can be linked to the threat or the use of force between two or more political actors. Stephen Walt (1991), a proponent of the traditionalist agenda, mounted a strong argument against widening the agenda beyond the use of force. Particularly, Walt (1991) claimed that by encompassing issues outside the strict military domain, it risked eroding the intellectual coherency of the security concept (Stephen Walt 1991). As such, solutions to this new security agenda would be hard to come by, if it was to be widened. Proponents of widening the security agenda have not been specifically able to answer this critique. However the problem remains that with the transformation of the political and security landscape since the Cold War, focusing solely on military threats remains too narrow an approach and does not allow other issues the level of importance/attention necessary to solve them as well. Within the widening of the security agenda, it has produced such paradigms and concepts as human security, societal security, and cooperative security among others.

#### The Copenhagen School:

One of the more successful redefinitions and conceptualizations of security is Copenhagen School's (CoS) Securitization Theory. As proponents of constructivism IR CoS considers that any emerging security issue might not necessarily be "*because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such*" (Buzan et. al. 1998: p. 24). As such, the interest of the study is not in considering the real threat, but the construct of the threat. Furthermore, Securitization or the process of successfully securitising an issue can be considered to exist on the extreme end of a political act spectrum. The process of successfully securitizing an issue elevates it above politics. The question is as such "*When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed?*" (Buzan et. al. 1998: p. 25). Securitising an issue brings immediacy to an issue by presenting it as an existential threat which requires emergency measures and justifies actions that are outside the rules of normal political procedures (Buzan et. al. 1998: p. 24). The dynamics of it is that there are referent objects, which are "*things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival*" which are

securitized (Buzan et. al. 1998: p. 36). When considering referent objects, mostly it refers to the state, however it could also be society, communities, identities, or even ideologies. However, the question remains as to how are issues dramatized to such an extent that they become securitised? Since the theory is not concerned with real threats, but only in the construct of the threat, the process involves the “*speech act*” (Buzan et. al. 1998: p. 26). First proposed by John Austin (1962), the concept of a speech act suggests that by uttering, it shapes actions. By saying something is of a security concern, it is considered that something is getting done (Buzan et. al. 1998). As such, the speech act has a performative function. However, securitization, as a specific kind of speech act, does not mean that by saying ‘*security*’, we have successfully securitized an issue. This depends on the context and may implicitly rather than explicitly be expressed. Furthermore, presenting a discourse, which identifies an existential threat against a referent object, does not mean that it will be considered as such. Part of this process is utterance, the other is in the acceptance of that statement by its audience. There are three components to successful securitization: “*existential threats, emergency actions, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules*” those are the construct of the threat, the immediate actions taken and the acceptance of the action by the audience (Buzan et. al. 1998: p. 26).

However, the issue of desecuritization as opposed to securitization is a less explored part of the general theory of Securitization. Particularly Hansen (2011) mentions a hierarchical status of security/securitization, referring to the existences of desecuritization as a supplement to securitization. In this vein, desecuritization remains as a fill-in of the gaps in the Securitization Theory. The theoretical inferiority is also linked to the fact that desecuritization does not work at the same level as securitization does. As Hansen (2010) notes one cannot desecuritize an issue by declaring the issue is no longer a threat to society. This would use the same sort of dynamics and logics as security/securitization uses. This is also mentioned by Roe (2004: p. 290) who considers the aim of desecuritization is “*asecurity*”, where neither security language nor its logic applies. On its basic level desecuritization happens when an issue is moved out of the security agenda and is not defined in security terms (explicitly or implicitly). As such, it is a normalisation process where the legitimizing

and enacting or evoking of special provisions/actions is discontinued. According to Wæver (2000), there are three characteristics/options for desecuritization to take place. One is that issues are no longer mentioned in security terms. Secondly, issues, which are already securitized, are managed and avoid security dilemmas or other vicious cycles. Lastly, the issue is brought “*back to normal politics*” (Wæver 2000: p. 253). As such, desecuritization takes away the transformative function which securitization has. It is as such rhetoric intended for de-escalating the conflict.

According to Hansen (2011), who investigates into the use of the theory, desecuritization can be categorized into four distinct theorisations or interpretations of the Securitization Theory. With regards to this, they can be considered as modes of desecuritization. The initial categorization sees desecuritization through the use of *détente*. This is particularly linked to the theory’s traditional meaning as well as what it was originally intended for. Desecuritization through this interpretation involves a relatively slow process of moving the issue (explicitly) out of the security discourse, which facilitates a less confrontational “*political form of engagement*” (Hansen 2011: p. 15). The gist of this interpretation is what Wæver, in Hansen (2011), referred as “*change through stabilisation*” (p. 15). The second is “*Replacement*”, which theorises desecuritization as a combination of moves where one issue moves out of the security discourse and another moves in to replace it (Hansen 2011: p. 17). The third is “*Re-articulation*” where desecuritization removes a security issue by offering a political solution (Hansen 2011: p. 18). The fourth is “*silencing*” where issues disappear or discontinue within the security discourse (Hansen 2011: p. 20).

#### Desecuritization In The Context Of Thailand:

Like its opposite, there are also similar issues which desecuritization suffers from since it is part of the overall Securitization Theory. According to Wilkinson (2007), these can be placed into two concerns. Namely, the general concern that theories, which are developed within the Euro-American academic sphere, do not reflect the conditions in the non-Western world, given its specific socio-historical context. Because of that certain logics and predetermined assumptions are made in order for securitization to take place, these logics also depend on Western prescribed


notions on society and political systems. For example, from a societal aspect, in a Western context, society is considered as a unitary actor, strong and robust, while in non-Western states, this notion of society may not fall true. Secondly, it is argued that the theory excessively depends on a speech act taking place. In order for there to be a securitization, politicians or the ones who are securitizing an issue need to be able to state what they are thinking and that these statements are available to be disseminated. However as Buzan et. al (1998) also mentions then "*places do exist where secrecy or violation of rights is the rule and where security arguments are not needed to legitimize such acts....*" (p. 24-25). While securitization and desecuritization is able to deal with the official line, such as speeches and official press releases, it is however unable to provide an analysis of the informal politics and their specific dynamics in a society. With reference to Thailand, securitization or desecuritization is not able to investigate into issues of patronage(ism) or cronyism which is prevalent within such political communities. As such, informal regime behaviour is not part of the securitization/desecuritization story plot and needs to be included some other way.

## Chapter III

### Analysis:

#### Content Analysis:

Chart 3.1



Preliminary findings suggest that overall there exists a higher mean of desecuritizing statements throughout the duration of the study (14.35 per month) when compared to securitizing statements (5.82 per month). Mainly, these desecuritizing moves came from top politicians in the government, namely the prime minister, deputy prime minister as well as from government spokespeople, military officials and other officials from the CRES. Out of the 317 statements found in the 129 articles, which were coded, 66.56% of these statements were either recorded as medium or strong desecuritizing statements as opposed to 31.23%, which were either recorded as strong or medium securitizing statements. Furthermore, approximately 2.21% were recorded as neutral statements.

The period from the 19<sup>th</sup> of May to 31<sup>st</sup> of May 2010 represents a specific outlier in the data set in terms of a higher number of securitizing statements when compared to the average occurrence in the rest of studied period. Given that the

Abhisit government needed to outright suppress the protesters as well as justify the use of force, this result was not surprising. Furthermore, there existed a high number of desecuritizing statements during the months of June 2010, May and July 2011. During the month of June 2010, it seems that the government mainly published proposals for political reforms and called on national reconciliation. As such, this included issues of media reforms, constitutional amendments, and general national reconciliation plans. This increased the number of desecuritizing statements during that month.

Also, during the month of May 2011, a total of eight articles were found where desecuritizing statements occurred. The reason for the high number of desecuritizing statements and the high number of articles, which were captured during that month, was due to the fact that the date for the elections was finally set for the 3<sup>rd</sup> of July 2011. Furthermore, the government also emphasized its reconciliation plan following the start of the election campaign.

The reason why the number of desecuritizing were particularly high in July 2011 was due to the announcement of the election winners as well as the announcement of the six-party coalition in which the coalition outlined its aims and goals once in government.

When considering the differences between the statements issued during the Abhisit and the Yingluck administrations, preliminary findings suggest that changes in the number of securitizing/desecuritizing statements did occur. However, the month of May 2010 does particularly skew the data. With the month of May included, there was a higher mean of 1.84 securitizing statements per article during the Abhisit administration when compared to the mean of 1.50 securitizing statements during the Yingluck administration. Without the month of May, the mean of securitizing statements issued by the Abhisit administration was at 1.48 per article. In terms of the number of desecuritizing statements that were recorded, there was a higher mean value during the Abhisit administration when compared to the Yingluck administration. If the month of May 2010 is included, the mean value for desecuritizing statements during the Abhisit administration would be at 2.03. However excluding the month of May, recorded desecuritizing statements during the

Abhisit administration is higher with a mean of 2.12. Compared to the Yingluck administration, the mean value for desecuritizing statements per article is at 1.82.

Arguably, it may be suggested that a greater emphasis of desecuritizing the Red Shirt/UDD was placed in the Abhisit administration, while the Yingluck administration did not show the same level of emphasis. As such, it might be stated that there was a relationship between the increased number of recorded desecuritizing statements and the period that led up to the general election of July 3/beginning of the Yingluck administration period. Furthermore, the findings would also suggest that there was a relationship between a government whose term where violence was present and the occurrence of strong securitizing statements. Particularly, it was observed that strong securitizing statements were only recorded within the month of May 2010. For a more detailed overview of the various recorded statements, please see Appendix 4.

#### Discourse on Security of the UDD Movement:

Although the quantitative analysis captures part of the extent of the desecuritizing picture, yet in order to provide a more in-dept analysis of the particular transitions and nuances in terms of the desecuritization narrative of the UDD movement, a qualitative side is provided in the section below. Initially, the extent of the desecuritization of the UDD can be divided into a series or phases of desecuritizing moves, as the situation progressed after the end of the protests in May 2010. Nevertheless, these phases/stages also overlapped each other and as such should not be viewed as mutually exclusive.

Following the violent end of the protests, the government initially portrayed the violence of the protests as acts of terrorism. However they also attempted to separate the good protesters with genuine demands from the violent elements in the protest. This then progressed into a desecuritizing move where national reconciliation, rehabilitation and normalcy were emphasized. This focus on reconciliation was then followed by an emphasis on the process of building a better democracy and the guaranteeing of the rule of law. The democracy stage was subsequently followed by a phase with focus on constitutional amendments. This then led to a pre-election period where emphasis also shifted back towards focusing on social/economic policies and



reconciliatory efforts initiated by the Abhisit government. Finally, in the two months (August and September) of the Yingluck government, the issue of national unity was again reasserted.

Starting out with the end of the operation to suppress and evict the protesters from the Ratchaprasong area on 19<sup>th</sup> of May 2010, the Abhisit administration portrayed the end stage of the protests as terrorism. As the violence spread to other areas of the city as well as the subsequent setting banks, police stations and department stores on fire, the distinction between good protesters and the more violent elements in the protesters became increasingly difficult for the government to keep separate in its narrative. This consolidation of the government's threat narrative as well as the pointing out of the referent object (namely society and the state) and the securitizing actor (government) provided the legitimacy for its actions during the crackdown. The portrayal of the protesters as having degenerated into acts of terrorism particularly manifested itself during a CRES briefing to the foreign diplomatic corps and the press on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of May after the end of violence. In a statement, CRES spokesperson and Army Colonel, Sansern Kaewkamnerd noted, "*...that the Red Shirt protests had escalated into full-fledged terrorism*" (PRD 2010a). He further justified this claim by stating that "*... widespread arson attacks...*" had occurred after the UDD leaders had announced the end to the protests (PRD 2010a). Furthermore, reference was also made towards the protesters'/terrorists' use of "*weapons of war*" (PRD 2010a). This further legitimized and justified the government's use of live bullets to suppress the threat posed by the protests that had escalated into acts of terrorism (PRD 2010a).

However, this clear manifestation of the threat narrative where terrorism and protests were subsequently linked without the separation between good and bad protesters only presented itself in one article during the entire data collection. Before this, during and after this briefing, the government seemed to have gone to great lengths to separate the UDD protesters, who ended the protests with genuine demands for reform, from the "*armed-elements infiltrated among the protestors*" (PRD 2010b). For example, according to a statement which was issued on the 19<sup>th</sup> of May concerning the matter of cordoning off the protest area (during the military crackdown), Colonel Sansern reiterated the CRES' "*concern over terrorist elements*

*infiltrating inside the protest area, trying to endanger the lives of innocent protesters, emergency medical service (EMS) teams and the press*” (PRD 2010 ‘Officers’ Task is to cordon off the protest area, not to harm people’). In an article afterwards, it was stated that according to CRES findings, “*many weapons seized from the protesters and from their protest sites between March 12 and May 19, 2010 showed that there were terrorists among the UDD demonstrators*” (PRD 2010l). Consequently, the move after to separate the two elements from each other in the government’s overall narrative could also be seen as an initial stage in preparation for the normalcy/reconciliation discussion.

As part of the general transition from strong securitizing statements to medium securitizing statements, efforts were also made as regards to re-asserting Thailand’s adherence to international human rights conventions as well as to invite public scrutiny and transparency. This came in response to concerns expressed by NGOs such as Human Rights Watch (see PRD 2010c) as well as the foreign media (see PRD 2010d) who had been particularly targeted by the government to have misrepresented and misunderstood the conflict in general. Specifically, it was emphasized that the use of the Emergency Decree followed international standards, as it was part of the government’s prerogatives/discretion in re-establishing public order/security in accordance with the derogative of certain rights within the ICCPR. According to Director-General of the Department of Information and Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Vimon Kidchob, “*Thailand [had] been transparent about the exercise of its right of derogative under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in light of the declaration of a severe emergency situation in certain parts of the country*” (PRD 2010c). This statement came in response to concerns expressed by Amnesty International (PRD 2010, ‘Thailand Refutes Amnesty International’s Allegation; PRD 2010c). In a statement issued on 17 May 2010, Amnesty International claimed Thai security forces were “*deliberately firing live ammunition at unarmed people*” (Amnesty International 2010). In one of its reports in May 2010, Human Rights Watch also questioned Thailand’s adherence to the ICCPR. It cautioned and noted “*...that certain fundamental provisions of the ICCPR such as the right to life and freedom from torture or ill-treatment, and freedom of thought, may in no circumstances be restricted.*” (HRW 2010).

The general transition to start reconciliation talks also coincided with the revocation and lifting of curfews and the emergency decree in the provinces where it had been invoked. The normalcy/reconciliation move began to gain traction by the end of May and the beginning of June 2010. For example, the government announced the subsequent lifting of curfews in Bangkok and 24 provinces on the 31<sup>st</sup> of May (PRD 2010n). However, the emergency decree remained in place in a number of provinces until it was subsequently lifted on the 21<sup>st</sup> of December (PRD, ‘Emergency Decree lifted in the Four Remaining Provinces’).

Part of the Abhisit administration’s aim to create medium to long-term social and political stability after the protests was to introduce a reconciliatory stage. However, the successfulness of this phase in regards to desecuritization remains to some extent questionable as well. Specifically, the reconciliation plan can be considered as reform talk, hereby the emphasis was in “*reform*”, which was subsequently captured in the quantitative analysis section as a desecuritizing move. Yet, this reform talk also consisted of a series of both manifested and latent securitizing and desecuritizing statements/messages. Arguably, from a qualitative side, a reconciliation plan within the desecuritizing narrative can be viewed as an attempt by the Abhisit administration to meet the protesters/UDD movement supporters half way. In regards to the National Reconciliation Plan, the Plan consisted of five points. These are:

- *“To uphold and protect the Monarchy – which is a unifying force among Thai people – from being violated or drawn into political conflicts*
- *To resolve fundamental problems of social justice systematically and with participation by all sectors of society*
- *To ensure that the media can operate freely and constructively and not be misused to create conflict or hatred*
- *To establish facts about violent incidents through setting up of an independent commission to investigate all violent incidents and deaths that took place to seek the truth and ensure justice for all concerned*
- *To establish mutually acceptable political rules by putting issues, including certain provisions of the constitution or laws seen as unfair, on the table and setting up a mechanism to solicit views from all sides to bring about justice for*

*those involved in the political conflict, so that these issues would no longer lead to rejection of the political process and conflict in the future”*

(PRD 2010m)

The first point could be considered as a securitizing statement as it names a referent object, namely the protection of Monarchy, as the number one goal of the state and society in order to forge reconciliation. Given the context, the latent message behind this point is considered as an extension of the unity narrative. Particularly point one considers the Monarchy as the “*unifying force among Thai people*” (PRD 2010m). As such, the Monarchy remains the important factor which holds Thai society together.

Furthermore, clearer manifestations of the unity narrative also emerge or were linked to in the other five-point elements of the reconciliation plan. For example, the media reforms, which were intended to improve the media in being better able to disseminate correct information was also integrated as part of the unity narrative. For example, in a statement issued by Minister to the Prime Minister’s Office on the 4<sup>th</sup> of June, Satit Wongnongtaey who oversaw the Abhisit administration’s media policy expresses that “*the media reform plan would touch on such issues as constructive media, which would help create unity and promote better understanding among the people of the whole country*” (PRD 2010o). As such, in establishing constructive media, “*unity*” would be created (PRD 2010o). Arguably, one of the issues relating to the Abhisit administration establishing a constructive media relates to the UDD movement’s wide use of media, such as community radio as well as PTV satellite station, to disseminate information and political discussions. Particularly McCargo (2010) notes the UDD movements’ protests were not spontaneous events of people outpouring their resentment against the established Thai aristocratic classes regardless of the issue that protesters wore T-shirts proclaiming themselves as “*prai*” (McCargo 2010: p. 9). He (2010) notes the importance of UDD movement’s use of community radio stations and the PTV satellite station in order to galvanize its loose network of supporters into supporting Thaksin and pro-Thaksin political parties.

On the other hand, forms of desecuritizing statements were also integrated in the reconciliation plan, in regards to the point of addressing the economic and social disparities as well as political reforms. As regards to the economic and social disparities and the promise of meeting the genuine demands/grievances of the

protesters this appeared in both latent and manifested messages in the data. For example, the Abhisit administration had already pointed out by the 31<sup>st</sup> of May, that the national budget for 2011 would be set at 2.07 trillion baht. The emphasis of this budget would be placed on reducing the social disparities that had “*accumulated over a long period of time*” (PRD 2010f). According to the Abhisit administration, other initiatives were also been drawn up and implemented to further “*social justice*” (PRD 2010f). For example the government had “*entrusted state financial institutions with providing opportunities for low-income earners to have greater access to financial resources*” (PRD 2010f). Another initiative that was also emphasized with the aim of “*...reduce social disparities and income gaps...*”, was the bill which the government had approved that would establish the National Savings Fund (PRD 2010f). It was emphasized that the National Savings Fund would benefit 24 million people who were outside the social security system (PRD 2010f). It was also followed by further positive comments that the government had particularly “*improved the living conditions of people engaged in agriculture through income guarantees and investment in water source development under the “Thailand: Investing from Strength to Strength” program*” as well as “*...provided the people with equal educational opportunities*” (PRD 2010f).

Another example was the setting up of guidelines by the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives for providing farmers with greater opportunities (PRD 2010g). This policy of providing greater welfare and social security as well as provide greater protection against land eviction (the reason behind the Farmland Protection Act) by ensuring that farmlands would not be used for other purposes, was yet another move to appease major groups within the Red Shirt/UDD movement.

As part of a general push for engaging with citizens and for a more participatory national reform process, the government introduced for example the *Six Days, 63 million Ideas: Joining Hands in Moving Thailand Forward* initiative. The aim of the initiative was to enable citizens to contribute and voice their opinions and grievances directly to the government. As noted by Abhisit in the article, the “*in-call program for “donation of ideas” was ... aimed at raising public awareness of participation in the reform process and promoting the sense of belonging to the country*” (PRD 2010p). Arguably, the initiative was setup in order to heed public

frustration on social/structural issues. The successfulness of this initiative remains debatable, as it was open for six days only (between 1<sup>st</sup> to 6<sup>th</sup> of July). Furthermore, this public relations event came in the aftermath of a poor public opinion score, which the reconciliation plan got. Particularly, on the 20<sup>th</sup> of June, a Suan Dusit (2010) poll concluded that one third or the majority of respondents doubted the implementation and that the reconciliation plan and the social/political changes, which it promised to introduce, would succeed.

The Abhisit administration's transition to emphasize democratic principles and values came as an extension of the reconciliation plan (political reform). That was particularly to include a more egalitarian message in the reconciliation plan. Part of the protesters' demands during the demonstrations in March to May 2010 were for the government to dissolve parliament and issue laws that would bring about snap elections. According to Brungs (2010), who raises question about the independency of the UDD movement, the issue of genuine demands for democratic reforms from UDD movements and its supporters were contestable as well. The connection between the UDD movement and the timing of the March protests together with the Shinawatra family's court case, which saw the seizure of 46.37 billion baht from the 76.6 billion baht in frozen assets in February 2010 brought considerable scrutiny in terms of the independence of the protesters' demands from the Shinawatra's legal dispute. However, on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of May, the demands of the protesters were consequently met with a compromise by the government during the protests, which assured that early elections would be held by the government on the 14<sup>th</sup> of November of the same year provided that the protesters would return home. However, due to additional demands that were made by the UDD leadership, a compromise was not reached between the protesters and the Abhisit administration. After the violent end to the protests, and the censure debate in parliament, which key government ministers/members survived (including among others Abhisit, Korn, and Suthep), the Abhisit administration introduced a desecuritizing move of "*building a stronger democracy*" or "*Making [Thailand's] Democracy Work*" as both an appeasement for the protesters and as a means to improve confidence of both the international community and foreign investors that the government would continue its adherence to abide by democratic principles (PRD 2010h; PRD 2010i). Arguably, the move came as a result of

amounting pressure from outside as well as pressure from within the country following the censure debate against the Abhisit administration in the House of Representative on 31<sup>st</sup> of May to 1<sup>st</sup> of June. Due to that this move was not only targeting the domestic supporters/protesters, but also the international community and foreign investors, the successfulness of this move remains debatable as well. During the studied period, this phase was initiated with a speech made by the Finance Minister, Korn Chatikavanji, on the 26<sup>th</sup> of May 2010, who reflected on Thailand's "*Demo-Crazy*" (PRD 2010i). Towards the end of the article, the Finance Minister was noted as saying that people believed "*... the five-point plan would help ensure that Thai society [could] work together under a new social contract; a contract that [would] allow Thai citizens to be able to agree to disagree*" (PRD 2010i)

However, a large part of the democracy phase within the desecuritizing narrative was emphasized later in 2010 after discussions on how to guarantee the safety of journalists working in Thailand, the scraping of an independent regulatory body that would oversee the media, and the revocation of emergency decrees in a number of provinces where the emergency decree had been enforced. As part of its efforts to portray that the political reform process was inclusive and participatory (as part of a participatory national reform process), as well as to further disarm the UDD movement, an initiative/campaign "*Three Days, Creativity, a Strong Democracy*" was set up to seek public opinion by the committee that would draft the constitutional amendments (PRD 2010j). This initiative came after the Abhisit administration reiterated that there existed a discrepancy between understandings of democracy. Particularly, it was stated that "*wisdom*" was an important and necessary factor in order to move Thailand forward in its reconciliation process and democracy (PRD 2010j). Criticism from the press had been growing at that time for the slow inroads/progress made by the government in relation to its National Reconciliation Plan.

Another example of this democracy phase/desecuritizing move, was in a press release made concerning a speech made by the prime minister who pointed towards six areas, which needed to be address in order to improve "*the quality of Thai society and democracy*" (PRD 2010q). These points included "*...social stability...*", "*...human security...*", "*social inequality*", "*...abuse of power...*", "*...empowerment*

*of civil society...*”, “*...compassion and harmonization...*” (PRD 2010q). It needs to be mentioned that in these particularly instance, unity did not manifest itself within the article as well as speech.

As regards to the general focus on constitutional amendments during the month of November 2010 to March 2011, this also was a part of a desecuritizing move by the government. Specifically, since the 2007 Constitution was drafted by the military and was passed through a national referendum with a narrow margin, the mandate held by the constitution has been a contentious issue since its establishment. This was in no small part due to how the constitution was drafted and how it was passed with the banning of campaigns against it. In the initial months after the end of the protests in May 2010, the need for amending the constitution in general was framed by the government as part of the political reform process in the national reconciliation plan and part of its aim to address the genuine grievances of the people (PRD 2010k). However three areas, which were part of the initial proposal put forth by the Reconciliation Committee for Political Reform and Study on Constitution Amendment, were subsequently withheld due to the fact that agreements could not be reached between the governing coalition parties and the opposition parties. These areas included amendments to Articles 237, 111 to 121, and 266 in the constitution. Particularly, amendment to Article 237 which calls for the dissolution of a party if one of its leaders/executives have been found guilty of electoral fraud, was considered as a controversial or “*sensitive issue*” (Jantima 2011: p. 22). Prior proposals and moves to amend the constitution and the article had already been considered in the previous year by the Abhisit administration as well as by the previous PPP government. While the Abhisit government did not gain any ground up until after the protests, the former PPP administration however ended in protests by the PAD, which subsequently led to the dissolution of the PPP party under which the article (237) was used to dissolve the party.

Furthermore, another controversial issue was the change in the electoral rules specifically concerning the party-list and constituency system composition. The amendments to Articles 93-98 would increase the total number of MPs from 480 to 500 as well as change the constituency system from multi-member to single member constituency (Simpeng 2011). It also changed the distribution of MPs seats from the



constituency system to the party-list. Particularly, the MPs from the party list was to be increased from 80 to 125 and MPs from the constituency system was to be reduced from 400 to 375. According to Hicken (2011), the changes to Articles 93-98 favored the Democrat party due to voters' increased intra-party loyalty in the previous years. It was forecast that the changes would consolidate the votes thereby giving advantage to the larger parties (namely Pheu Thai and the Democrats) while leaving the smaller parties at a disadvantage (Hicken 2011; Simpeng 2011).<sup>1</sup>

During the election phase, the Abhisit government (between March – July 2011), also shifted the desecuritizing narrative back towards focusing on national reconciliation, specifically in terms of reforming the economic and social disparities (see PRD 2011a; PRD 2011b). However, other areas were also being addressed during the election period. Particularly, the technical aspect of the new election procedures and the government support for strengthening human rights, specifically rights to freedom of speech and expression (PRD 2011c).

Furthermore, in terms of the threat narrative, references to the unity narrative did occur during the months of March to July 2011. This might have strengthened the Democrat party's voter base, which had primarily been the middle class and the established/royalist supporters. However arguably there was also growing pressure on the Abhisit administration to address the growing number of lese majeste cases being brought before the courts. The administration tried to counter growing criticism by proposing to set up an advisory panel in order to help police and the public prosecutor in screening the cases based on merits and relevancy (PRD 2011c). Consequently, it was not surprising to see a higher number of desecuritizing statements between March to July 2011 than during the other months within the time period. As such, focus on successful economic and social policies/reforms was specifically emphasized during this period by the Abhisit administration.

It can be considered that the Abhisit administration was unsuccessful in desecuritizing the UDD movement during its term. Specifically, the occurrence of the unity narrative in the press releases as well as in the reconciliation plan were

---

<sup>1</sup> Observers also confirmed this assumption. According to Thitinan (2011) who noted after the elections in July 2011 that the party system had gravitated towards a two party system.

particularly damaging to the UDD desecuritization process. Furthermore, the constitutional amendments that were accepted by the Cabinet seem to have done little in easing the pressure for future amendments of the constitution.

The election victory of the Pheu Thai party should have reduced the focus on the threat narrative after the government transition. However, the threat narrative still continued during the Yingluck administration (up till September 2011). This manifested itself for example in forms of pledges where the prime minister stated that she would “*work to the best of her ability and with honesty to bring about national unity and reconciliation*” (PRD 2011d). With regards to changes of laws on lese majeste, the Yingluck government has also continued to reaffirm its commitment to protect the Monarchy. For example, in an article which outlined the new government’s policies, the Yingluck administration stressed that the government “*would adhere to a democratic administration with His Majesty the King as head of the state and that it would protect the institution of the monarchy*” (PRD 2011e).

Furthermore, unity was also stressed by the Yingluck administration. For example, upon briefing the diplomatic corps, Prime Minister Yingluck reaffirmed that the “*Government [would] also work tirelessly to foster cooperation from all sides in order to bring back unity to society. Without unity... Thailand could not hope to prosper as a nation. With unity, the country would be able to move forward to new horizons*” (PRD 2011f). While unity manifested itself clearly within this statement, this statement also happens to be where “*unity*” was used and reiterated the most. This is not surprising as there is a particular need for confirmation and assertion that Pheu Thai adheres to the established norms on this issue. Three days prior to the elections, the Thai Army Chief General Prayuth Chan-Orcha stated that the military had no intention of staging another coup no matter which side won in the general election (Bangkok Post 2011).

As such, successful desecuritization of the UDD movement did not occur during the time period of the study. Even with the election win of the Pheu Thai party, which saw UDD leaders elected as MPs under the Pheu Thai party, the UDD movement still remains very much talked about in security terms. Arguably, there may not exist a security dilemma between the Yingluck government and the UDD

movement as there previously did during the Abhisit government. However, this has not influenced how the UDD movement is still being considered in security terms.

However, politics has returned to normalcy after the protests. Curfews and the use of the emergency laws and special provisions have also been reduced and discontinued since the end of the protests (except for Southern border provinces of Thailand). However, what remains is the rapid increase in lese majeste cases being brought before the courts. With the current Yingluck government set to outdo the Abhisit government, in terms of number of new cases being brought to the courts, it remains up to discussion if these should be considered as special provisions or not. Arguably, in relations to how the Securitization and Desecuritization Theory influences human rights, the theory is particularly attentive towards tracing both the use of special provisions and the use of securitizing/desecuritizing statements in order to consider whether a successful desecuritization/securitization takes place. However, more desecuritizing than securitizing statements and the evocation of special provisions does not mean a marked increase in human rights standards in the case of Thailand. Particularly, as mentioned above, there was no reevaluation in terms of how international NGOs would rank human rights practices in Thailand. Furthermore, the declining human rights situation in Thailand has also caught the attention of the United Nations. For example, the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, Frank La Rue, has called for amendments on the lese majeste laws (AHRC 2011).

With regards to the continuation of the threat narrative, it may also be considered as an issue of rhetorical entrapment. Particularly, the Yingluck administration inherited an institutionalized securitized issue i.e. the UDD movement. This argument is particularly strengthened when considered in light of the National Reconciliation Plan and how the threat narrative was incorporated into the plan. Further recourse may also be found in neo-institutionalist theories where norms and issues become institutionalized to an extent where they gain inertia and are set on a specific determined path (path dependency). As such, it remains difficult for the administration to discontinue, or change paths set in motion by the previous administration.

However, considering how the desecuritizing statements have remained at a similar level between the Abhisit and the Yingluck government, concerns have also

been raised if the PRD's English website is specifically a conduit for the incumbent parties or if the media source remains to a greater extent independent from the domestic political affairs/climate and is as such an actor under itself? Specifically, considering the political context and the affiliations between the Pheu Thai party and the UDD movement, it could have been expected that the new Yingluck administration would have shown a marked increase in desecuritizing statements of the UDD movement when compared to the PRD articles during the Abhisit administration. Furthermore, it was also expected that there would be more securitizing statements than desecuritizing statements during the Abhisit administration. As such, the PRD site would have been more in line with the preferences of the incumbent party. This specific notion questions the legitimacy of the PRD's English website as it is intended for international consumption. Similarly, levels of desecuritizing statements would suggest that the media source by default intends to paint a favorable picture of Thailand, as a democratic state which is guided by rule of law and is currently undergoing transition, no matter which administration it is under. As such, it might be argued that securitization/desecuritization of the UDD movement takes place in another media source, which is preferable and accessible for domestic consumption. However, completely divorcing the PRD English news source from the domestic political events, realities, party preferences would also arguably entail not accepting the initial findings of the study, that there was a high frequency of strong to medium securitizing statements found in the initial month of May 2010. Particularly if the English news source was completely divorced from the domestic political realities, it would have arguably portrayed the issues as mere disturbances or not mentioned them all together. However in these articles, it did not portray Thailand as a democratic, reconciliatory or peaceful society. Rather "*live firing zones*", "*chaos*", "*setting buildings*" were used to depict the state which Bangkok/Thailand was in at the end of May. As such, it could be considered that the PRD English website might consist of a mix of interests due to that this source is not specifically targeted for domestic consumption. In order to further investigate and develop this assumption/hypothesis, access to the months prior, which led up to the end of the protests on the 19<sup>th</sup> of May is needed.

In relation to Hansen's (2011) theorizations of the desecuritization and the four different modes of desecuritization narratives, it might also be considered as to what kind of desecuritizing process the UDD movement is currently undergoing? As such do they follow the distinct paths of what Hansen (2011) described as "*change through stabilization*", "*replacement*", "*rearticulation*" and "*silencing*" (Hansen 2011: p. 15, 17, 18, 20)? Although the political conflict has not yet been resolved and though considering the UDD movement as desecuritized is not possible, it might however be analytically profitable to point out some traits which are in line with a few of the four types of desecuritizing moves.

Initially *change through stabilisation* follows a specific logic of moving out of security slowly. This also requires that parties to the conflict recognize each other as legitimate players to the conflict. In light of the above section where the legitimacy of the UDD movement was initially questioned although not explicitly but implicit due to its close affiliation with the Shinawatra family's court case and the financial support which the movement received from Thaksin during the demonstration, it might be considered that the success of fulfilling this initial criteria remains up for debate (Brungs 2010). Particularly it was noted by Nelson (2011) that opponents of the UDD movement saw the movement as "*a creature of Thaksin, who allegedly pulled all the strings and financed the movement*" (p. 16). However, according to findings of the paper, there had also been an aim by the Abhisit administration during its term to separate and address the genuine grievances of the protesters. What sparked the protests from the UDD movement side was the illegitimacy of the Abhisit government. Because of that the legitimacy of the Abhisit government did not rest on general election winnings and principle of popular sovereignty but on a special vote within the parliament, this was also the basis for the initial protests. However, considering the current trend of desecuritizing and securitizing moves, the acceptance of the Pheu Thai party, and the general move of issuing desecuritizing statements rather than securitizing can be considered as an effort of '*détente*' (understood as the easing of tension in a domestic context) by the establishment.

With regards to whether the desecuritizing moves of the UDD movement follows a trajectory which is similar to the logics and dynamics as described by Hansen's (2011) *replacement* concept then this would need to be compatible with a

combination of issues being moved and replaced within the UDD movement – security discourse. While one issue is moved out of security another is to take its place. The question, which needs to be addressed, is if the UDD movement’s legitimate claims were being replaced with other issues being brought up by the Abhisit and the Yingluck administration? Particularly, it can be argued that the Abhisit administration was highlighting its initiatives to engage with the Thai people in the reform process. This was also captured in the above section, which focuses on the aim of the Abhisit’s participatory reconciliation plan. This has to be contrasted with the protests, which ended in violence. As such, the administration arguably wanted to portray itself as a more legitimate alternative than the violent elements of the UDD by involving the people in its reconciliation process.

With respect to Hansen’s (2011) third concept of *rearticulation*, the issue is removed from the security discourse by “*actively offering a political solution to the threats, dangers, and grievances in question*” (p. 18). As such this involves more political engagement than replacement or change through stabilisation, by suggesting concrete political solutions. This remains compatible with the case of the UDD movement to a certain point. It might be suggested that the National Reconciliation Plan was a concrete political solution offered by the Abhisit administration. However was it the solution that desecuritized the UDD movement? As mentioned above, the National Reconciliation Plan only posed as a halfway solution to the problem. Particularly, the general election win of the Pheu Thai party as well as the latent securitizing statement incorporated in the National Reconciliation Plan has not removed the UDD movement as a security issue. Furthermore the rearticulation concept paints an optimistic picture for finding a grand bargain/solution which both sides would be willing to accept. According to Hansen (2011), one of the criteria for reaching such a solution within rearticulation is for there to be no conflict looming in the background. In this regard, it seems that in the context of the Thailand, it does not particularly follow this concept.

Lastly, “*silencing*” considers that issues can disappear or fail to be registered in security terms (Hansen 2011). In this scenario, the UDD movement would cease to be mentioned (explicitly or implicitly) in security terms. As such, the issue drops from securitized to depoliticized. In light of these criteria, the UDD movement remains

securitized even with a change in government from Abhisit to Yingluck as also mentioned in the above sections.

Particularly, it seems that the first two concepts or modes of desecuritization, i.e. change through stabilisation and replacement remains arguably more compatible to the case of UDD movement than rearticulation and silencing. The last two remains too drastic to fit within the current context and findings of the paper. However, it must also be mentioned that the situation is still evolving and as such this evaluation needs to be taken up when the conflict is resolved and when a successful desecuritization of a the UDD movement can be found.

## Chapter IV

### Conclusion

In general, Securitization Theory provides a multilevel framework for empirically investigating and analyzing security. This should of course be very welcomed by scholars, researchers and master students alike who may find extra analytical utility in applying the theory to specific issues. In this sense, the Securitization Theory produces a quite compelling narrative of the circumstances in Thailand given its ability to focus on any issue in terms of its latent and manifested security meanings. As such, it is a flexible theory. The theory does not come without its critics as well. In the case of Thailand's complex on-going political, social conflict and crisis, wholesale acceptance of this theory is not possible, at least in the eyes of this particular researcher/master student.

Firstly, as stated above, securitization/desecuritization is an analytical tool, which can be applied to messages that are published or disseminated to the public. This limits the theory to only a number of sources, which it can be applied to. Moreover, in the context of Thailand, informal connections and institutions remain pervasive and are important attributing factors for accounting and understanding the dynamics and logics behind the political/security context. As such, the theory remains limited in terms of being able to provide additional analytical insights into these events.

A second limitation when applying the theory of securitization and desecuritization is that it is a theoretical tool for the analysis of security policies. Against concepts such as human security or human rights based approach, which are concept for setting policy-making agendas, securitization and desecurtization are not able to provide such advice. It is as such not able to give specific policy recommendations, as the theory is only capable of describing issues from a certain logic and dynamics. In the context of the political situation between the government and the UDD or other political protest groups, it does not make forecast, predictions or mention the options available to politicians or policy-makers in resolving the



dispute/conflict. However, a way of resolving this issue might be to incorporate a focus on peace media projects as part of the research agenda. Securitization theory remains analytically strong in focusing specifically on security policies/rhetoric and its links to laws/special emergency provisions. As such, it could be used to measure the effectiveness of peace media projects. In this sense, as a recommendation for future studies on the topic, it might be analytically profitable in producing empirical findings and provide an analysis on the effectiveness of the reconciliation plan – media reform - constructive media policies.

Furthermore, the Securitization Theory does not set particular thresholds for when issues become securitized/desecuritized. With respect to previous studies, thresholds for slight to strong securitization/desecuritization have been set in order to consider the degrees to securitization/desecuritization taking place.

According to Mieß's (2010) study which focuses on securitizing/desecuritized moves in the US and German press, the issue of establishing a possible threshold for when issues became securitized/desecuritized was considered at greater lengths. For example, the study refers to media, which feature 33% securitizing moves in a particular media to be slightly securitized while 66% were regarded as strongly securitized (MeiB 2010). However according to Wilkinson's (2007) paper, the issue of a possible threshold was not considered. This paper has set a successful desecuritization of the UDD movement at the level of where there is complete cessation of security terms being used against the UDD movement. Reviewing the findings of this paper, because the unity narrative was consolidated/integrated as part of the national reconciliation narrative, made it increasingly difficult to prove that a successful desecuritization took place after the Yingluck government took office.

Also a more general question may be applied as to how conscious are Thai politicians and public officials in choosing their words and statements? Such an investigation requires additional research methods in order to investigate this aspect.

## References

- Amnesty International. Thai military must halt reckless use of lethal Force. Amnesty International [Online]. 2010. Available from: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/thai-military-must-halt-reckless-use-lethal-force-2010-05-18> [November 2011]
- Asian Human Rights Commission. THAILAND: AHRC strongly backs UN call on lese-majeste. AHRC [Online]. 2011. Available from: <http://www.humanrights.asia/news/press-releases/AHRC-PRL-039-2011> [January 2012]
- Austin, J. L. How To Do Things with Words. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1975.
- Bell, T. Thai army to 'help voters love' the government. The Telegraph [Online]. 2008. Available from: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/thailand/3831672/Thai-army-to-help-voters-love-the-government.html> [December 2011].
- Berg, B. L. Qualitative research methods for the social sciences. New York, NY: Allyn & Bacon. 2009.
- Brungs, M. Thailand: No Longer the Land of Smiles? Programme Paper, Chatham House [Online]. 2010. Available from: [http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Asia/0810pp\\_brungs.pdf](http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Asia/0810pp_brungs.pdf) [January 2012]
- Bunyavejchewin, P. Constructing the 'Red' Otherness: The Role and Implications of Thainess on Polarised Politics. Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies [Online]. 2010. Available from: [http://www.seas.at/aseas/3\\_2/ASEAS\\_3\\_2\\_A7.pdf](http://www.seas.at/aseas/3_2/ASEAS_3_2_A7.pdf) [November 2011]
- Buzan, B., Wæver, O., De Wilde, J. Security: A New Framework For Analysis. United Kingdom, London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc. 1998.
- Chachavalpongpun, P. Thai Democracy: Recessed, Regressed,

- Repressed? A Future For Democracy [Online]. 2011. Available from:  
[http://www.kasyp.net/fileadmin/kasyp\\_files/Documents/reused/Panorama02-2010\\_Interactive3.pdf#page=42](http://www.kasyp.net/fileadmin/kasyp_files/Documents/reused/Panorama02-2010_Interactive3.pdf#page=42) [January 2012]
- Connor, M. K. Democracy and National Identity in Thailand. London: Routledge. 2007.
- Freedom House. Map of Press Freedom. Freedom House [Online]. 2011. Available from:  
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2009> [November 2011].
- Forsyth, T. Thailand's Red Shirt protests: popular movement or dangerous street theatre? Social Movement Studies [Online]. 2010. Available from:  
<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/30644/> [November 2011]
- Funatsu, T. and Kagoya K. The Middle Classes in Thailand: The Rise of the Urban Intellectual Elite and Their Social Consciousness. The Developing Economies [Online]. 2003. Available from:  
[http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Periodicals/De/pdf/03\\_02\\_07.pdf](http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Periodicals/De/pdf/03_02_07.pdf) [October 2011]
- Hansen, L. Reconstructing desecuritisation: the normative-political in the Copenhagen School and direction for how to apply it. Review of International Studies [Online]. 2011. Available from:  
<http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8444336> [January 2012]
- Hewison, K. Review: Red vs. Yellow. Volume 1: Thailand's Crisis of Identity. Journal of Contemporary Asia [Online]. 2010. Available from:  
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00472331003798558> [December 2011]
- Hicken, A. Late to the Party Institutional Reform and the Development of Partisanship in Thailand. Ruling Politics Conference - Harvard University [Online]. 2011. Available from:  
[http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/ruling\\_politics/files/hickenharvard.pdf](http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/ruling_politics/files/hickenharvard.pdf) [January 2012]
- Thailand: Protest Groups and Government

- Should Reject Political Violence. Human Rights Watch [Online]. 2008. Available from: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/12/03/thailand-protest-groups-and-government-should-reject-political-violence> [29 2011]
- Human Rights Watch. Descent into Chaos. Human Rights Watch [Online]. 2010. Available from: <http://www.hrw.org/node/98399/section/2> [December 2011]
- Kheokao, J., Public Opinion of the Thai on the Amendment of the 2007 Constitution of Thailand. World Association for Public Opinion Research [Online]. 2011. Available from: <http://wapor.unl.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Kehokao.pdf> [January 2012]
- Laothamatas, A. A Tale of Two Democracies: Conflicting Perceptions of Elections and Democracy in Thailand. In R.H. Taylor (ed.), The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia, pp. 201-224. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1996.
- Maisrikrod, S. Learning from the 19 September coup: advancing Thai-style democracy? Southeast Asian Affairs [Online]. 2011. Available from: <http://eprints.jcu.edu.au/4950/> [December 2011]
- Maisrikrod, S. Civil society, accountability and governance in Thailand: a dim case of participatory democracy. In T. Chong (ed.), Globalization and its Counter-forces in Southeast Asia, pp. 97-118. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 2008.
- Meiß, C. The Discourse On Security – A Comparative Analysis TV-Newscast and the Diffusion of Perspectives in the United States and Germany. 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference of the ECPR [Online]. 2010. Available from: [http://stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/Miess\\_Discourse\\_on\\_Security\\_SGIR.pdf](http://stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/Miess_Discourse_on_Security_SGIR.pdf) [10 2011]
- McCargo, D. Thailand's Twin Fires. Survival [Online]. 2010. Available from: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2010.506815> [December 2011]
- McCargo, D. Thai Politics as Reality TV. The Journal of Asian Studies [Online]. 2009. Available from: <http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/Staff/thai-politics-as-reality-tv-2009.pdf> [December 2011]

- McCargo, D. Network Monarchy and legitimacy crises in Thailand. The Pacific Review [Online]. 2005. Available from:  
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09512740500338937> [December 2011]
- McCargo, D. Politics and the Press in Thailand. Bangkok: Garuda Press. 2002.
- McCargo, D. The International Media and the Domestic Political Coverage of the Thai Press. Modern Asian Studies [Online]. 1999. Available from:  
<http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=21626&jid=ASS&volumeId=33&issueId=03&aid=21625> [November 2011]
- Nostitz, N. Red vs. Yellow: Thailand's crisis of identity. Bangkok: White Lotus. 2009.
- Ockey, J. Red Democracy, Yellow Democracy: Political Conflict in Thailand. New Zealand International Review [Online]. 2010. Available from:  
<http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=fc36f52c-a23b-46ba-944d-980c7aa874c8%40sessionmgr110&vid=2&hid=123> [November 2011]
- Ockey, J. Change and Continuity in the Thai Political Party System. Asian Survey [Online]. 2003. Available from:  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/10.1525/as.2003.43.4.663.pdf?acceptTC=true> [November 2011]
- Phatharathanaunth, S. The Thai Rak Thai party and election in North-eastern Thailand. Journal of Contemporary Asia [Online]. 2008. Available from: <http://www.sameskybooks.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/02/j-of-contem-asia-2008-somchai-phatharathananunth-the-thai-rak-thai-party-and-elections-in-north-eastern-thailand.pdf> [November 2011]
- Pongsudhirak, T. Thailand Since the Coup. Journal of Democracy [Online]. 2008. Available from:  
<http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/Pongsudhirak-19-4.pdf> [November 2011]
- Pongsudhirak, T. 2003. Thailand: Democratic Authoritarianism. Southeast Asian

Affairs [Online]. 2003. Available from:

[http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/southeast\\_asian\\_affairs/v2003/2003.thitinan.pdf](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/southeast_asian_affairs/v2003/2003.thitinan.pdf)  
[November 2011]

Public Relations Department. Government to push for the

Implementation on all Policy Promises. The Thai Government Public Relations Department [Online]. 2011. Available from:

[http://thailand.prd.go.th/view\\_inside.php?id=5831](http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_inside.php?id=5831) [December 2011]

Public Relations Department. Structural Reforms in the Drive for National

Reconciliation. The Thai Government Public Relations Department [Online].

2011a. Available from: [http://thailand.prd.go.th/view\\_inside.php?id=5557](http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_inside.php?id=5557) [10  
2011]

Public Relations Department. Administrative Reform through Decentralization and

Community Empowerment. The Thai Government Public Relations Department [Online]. 2011b. Available from:

[http://thailand.prd.go.th/view\\_inside.php?id=5589](http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_inside.php?id=5589) [October 2011]

Public Relations Department. Ensuring the Right to Freedom of Speech and

Expression. The Thai Government Public Relations Department [Online].

2011c. Available: [http://thailand.prd.go.th/view\\_inside.php?id=5666](http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_inside.php?id=5666) [October  
2011]

Public Relations Department. New Prime Minister Wishing to See National Unity

and Reconciliation. The Thai Government Public Relations Department  
[Online]. 2011d. Available from:

[http://thailand.prd.go.th/view\\_inside.php?id=5798](http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_inside.php?id=5798) [October 2011]

Public Relations Department. Government to Push for the Implementation of all

Policy Promises. The Thai Government Public Relations Department [Online].

2011e. Available from: [http://thailand.prd.go.th/view\\_inside.php?id=5831](http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_inside.php?id=5831)  
[October 2011]

Public Relations Department. Government to bring back Political, Economic, and

Social Stability. The Thai Government Public Relations Department [Online].

2011 f. Available from: [http://thailand.prd.go.th/view\\_inside.php?id=5854](http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_inside.php?id=5854)  
[October 2011]

Public Relations Department. Government to Negotiate Once Protest Ends. The Thai

- Government Public Relations Department [Online]. 2010. Available from:  
[http://thailand.prd.go.th/view\\_inside.php?id=5019](http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_inside.php?id=5019) [October 2011]
- Public Relations Department. Briefing for Members of the Diplomatic Corps and Press on the weapons seized in Protest Area. The Thai Government Public Relations Department [Online]. 2010a. Available from:  
[http://thailand.prd.go.th/view\\_inside.php?id=5033](http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_inside.php?id=5033) [October 2010]
- Public Relations Department. Thailand Refutes Amnesty International's Allegation. The Thai Government Public Relations Department [Online]. 2010b. Available from: [http://thailand.prd.go.th/view\\_inside.php?id=5025](http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_inside.php?id=5025) [October 2011]
- Public Relations Department. Thailand Explains to Human Rights Watch Its Inquiry into Recent Political Violence. The Thai Government Public Relations Department [Online]. 2010c. Available from:  
[http://thailand.prd.go.th/view\\_inside.php?id=5055](http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_inside.php?id=5055) [October 2011]
- Public Relations Department. International Community and Foreign Media Provided with Better Understanding of Thailand's Situation. The Thai Government Public Relations Department [Online]. 2010d. Available from:  
[http://thailand.prd.go.th/view\\_inside.php?id=5044](http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_inside.php?id=5044) [October 2011]
- Public Relations Department. Progress Made on the Government's Reconciliation Plan. The Thai Government Public Relations Department [Online]. 2010e. Available from: [http://thailand.prd.go.th/view\\_inside.php?id=5070](http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_inside.php?id=5070) [October 2011]
- Public Relations Department. Reduction of Social Disparities: An Objective of the 2011 National Budget. The Thai Government Public Relations Department [Online]. 2010f. Available from:  
[http://thailand.prd.go.th/view\\_inside.php?id=5053](http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_inside.php?id=5053) [October 2011]
- Public Relations Department. Greater Opportunities to be Provided for Farmers in Response to the Reconciliation Roadmap. The Thai Government Public Relations Department [Online]. 2010g. Available from:  
[http://thailand.prd.go.th/view\\_inside.php?id=5060](http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_inside.php?id=5060) [November 2011]
- Public Relations Department. Prime Minister Confident about Building a Stronger

- Democracy for Thailand. The Thai Government Public Relations Department [Online]. 2010h. Available from:  
[http://thailand.prd.go.th/view\\_inside.php?id=5270](http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_inside.php?id=5270) [October 2011]
- Public Relations Department. Thailand Committed to Making Its Democracy Work. The Thai Government Public Relations Department [Online]. 2010i. Available from: [http://thailand.prd.go.th/view\\_inside.php?id=5046](http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_inside.php?id=5046) [October 2011]
- Public Relations Department. Knowledge and Wisdom Cited as Necessary for Thailand's Reconciliation Process. The Thai Government Public Relations Department [Online]. 2010j. Available from:  
[http://thailand.prd.go.th/view\\_inside.php?id=5302](http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_inside.php?id=5302) [October 2010]
- Public Relations Department. Progress on Political Reform and Constitutional Amendments. The Thai Government Public Relations Department [Online]. 2010k. Available from: [http://thailand.prd.go.th/view\\_inside.php?id=5107](http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_inside.php?id=5107) [October 2011]
- Public Relations Department. International Community and foreign media provided with better understanding of Thailand's situation. The Thai Government Public Relations Department [Online]. 2010l. Available from:  
[http://thailand.prd.go.th/view\\_inside.php?id=5044](http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_inside.php?id=5044) [October 2011]
- Public Relations Department. National Reconciliation Plan: The Priority in the Government Agenda. The Thai Government Public Relations Department [Online]. 2010m. Available from:  
<http://thailand.prd.go.th/ebook/review/content.php?chapterID=96> [January 2012]
- Public Relations Department. Media Reform for Reconciliation in Thai Society. The Thai Government Public Relations Department [Online]. 2010o. Available from: [http://thailand.prd.go.th/view\\_inside.php?id=5065](http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_inside.php?id=5065) [October 2011]
- Public Relations Department. Public Opinions on National Reform. The Thai Government Public Relations Department [Online]. 2010p. Available from:  
[http://thailand.prd.go.th/view\\_inside.php?id=5131](http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_inside.php?id=5131) [October 2011]
- Public Relations Department. Striving to Improve the Quality of Thai Society and Democracy. The Thai Government Public Relations Department [Online]. 2010q. Available from:



- [http://thailand.prd.go.th/democracy/view\\_democracy.php?id=5341](http://thailand.prd.go.th/democracy/view_democracy.php?id=5341) [October 2011]
- Pye, O. and Schaffar, W. The 2006 anti-Thaksin movement in Thailand: An analysis. Journal of Contemporary Asia [Online]. 2007. Available from: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00472330701651945> [November 2011]
- Roe, P. Securitization of Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization. Security Dialogue [Online]. 2004. Available from: <http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/35/3/279.full.pdf+html> [November 2011]
- Simpeng, S. Thailand's electoral rules. New Mandala: New perspective on mainland Southeast Asia [Online]. 2011. Available from: <http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2011/05/30/thailands-electoral-rules/> [January 2012]
- Suan Dusit. Poll: Thai politics remains unaltered after recent political Violence. National News Bureau of Thailand Public Relations Department [Online]. 2010. Available from: <http://thainews.prd.go.th/en/news.php?id=255306200002> [January 2012]
- The Nation. No intention to stage coup: army chief. Nation Multimedia [Online]. 2011. Available from: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2011/06/30/national/No-intention-to-stage-coup-army-chief-30159132.html> [January 2012]
- Thomas, C. Poverty, development, and hunger. In J. Baylis, , S. Smith, , and P. Owen (ed.), The Globalization Of World Politics, pp. 559-581. Oxford: Oxford University. 2008.
- Thongchai, W. Siam mapped: A history of the geo-body of a nation. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2004.
- Walt, S. M. The Renaissance of Security Studies. International Studies Quarterly [Online]. 1991. Available from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2600471.pdf?acceptTC=true> [December 2011]
- Wilkinson, C. The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe?. Security Dialogue [Online]. 2007. Available from: <http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/38/1/5.full.pdf+html> [November 2011]

Wæver, O. The EU as a security actor: Reflections from a pessimistic constructivist on post-sovereign security orders. In Kelstrip, M. W. (ed.), International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community, pp. 205-225. London: Routledge, 2000.

## Bibliography

- Babbie, E. The Practice of Social Research. Belmont: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2010.
- Dressel, B. Judicialization of politics or politicization of the judiciary? Considerations from recent events in Thailand. The Pacific Review [Online]. 2010. Available from:  
[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1957925](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1957925) [12 2011]
- Eagleton, T. Why Marx Was Right. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2011.
- Glassman, J. Cracking Hegemony in Thailand: Gramsci, Bourdieu and the Dialectics of Rebellion. Journal of Contemporary Asia [Online]. 2011. Available from:  
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00472336.2011.530035>  
[October 2011]
- Phongpaichit, p. and Baker, C. Thaksin's populism. Journal of Contemporary Asia [Online]. 2007. Available from:  
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00472330701651960>  
[November 2011]
- Pongsudhirak, T. Thailand's Media: Whose Watchdog. In: K. Hewison (ed.). Political Change in Thailand, pp. 217-232. London: Routledge, 1997.
- Somvichian, K. "The Oyster and the Shell": Thai Bureaucrats in Politics. Asian Survey [Online]. 1978. Available from:  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2643561.pdf> [January 2011]

## APPENDICES

## Appendix A: Coding Scheme

### What year?

1. 2010
2. 2011

### 3. Month?

### During what administration?


4. Abhisit
5. Yingluck

### Levels of securitizing statements



6. Was there strong securitizing statement (SUPPRESSION)
  - a. Elevating the situation to pose as direct existential threat to the survival of the referent object (incumbent party/government, institutions, state and/or people/society)
  - b. Reference national security (the use of extraordinary war time powers) and/or the authorization of armed force to suppress dissidents/terrorist elements.
7. Was there medium securitizing statement (NECESSITY)
  - a. Declaring measures (special provisions/use of force) necessary to obstruct further acts of violence or terrorism. Justification for upholding/sustaining/evoking the emergency laws.
  - b. Calls for national unity
8. Was there neutral statement (PROS AND CONS)
  - a. A statement includes pro and con in context of suppressing civil/political rights
  - b. Reference to violence and civil/political rights in one statement and/or reference to different positions on the issue
9. Was there medium desecuritizing statement (RELAXATION OF LAWS)

- a. Suggests relaxation of laws and amendments
  - b. States the call for review of political institutions or implementation of political reform, democratization, decentralization and/or national reconciliations
10. Was there strong desecuritizing statement (MEANS UNLAWFUL)
- a. Declaring of means as unlawful or in contrast to human rights
  - b. Reference to infringement of civil liberties and the need to secure them as the first aim of the state.

## Appendix B: Overview of articles found under the search criteria



Appendix C: Pie Charts of Abhisit and Yingluck





## Appendix D: Securitized and desecuritized statements (Overview)

Months	Strong securitizing Statements	Medium securitizing statements	Neutral	Medium desecuritized statement	Strong desecuritized statements
<b>May-10</b>	9	35	2	15	0
(%)	(100%)	(38.8%)	(28.6%)	(7.2%)	(0%)
<b>Jun-10</b>	0	15	3	37	0
(%)	(0%)	(16%)	(42.9%)	(17.7%)	(0%)
<b>Jul-10</b>	0	8	0	18	0
(%)	(0%)	8.8	(0%)	(8.6%)	(0%)
<b>Aug-10</b>	0	1	0	10	0
(%)	(0%)	(1.1%)	(0%)	(4.8%)	(0%)
<b>Sep-10</b>	0	1	0	5	0
(%)	(0%)	(1.1%)	(0%)	(2.4%)	(0%)
<b>Oct-10</b>	0	0	1	10	0
(%)	(0%)	(0%)	(14.3%)	(4.8%)	(0%)
<b>Nov-10</b>	0	3	0	6	0
(%)	(0%)	(3.3%)	(0%)	(2.9%)	(0%)
<b>Dec-10</b>	0	3	1	17	2
(%)	(0%)	(3.3%)	(14.3%)	(8.1%)	(100%)
<b>Jan-11</b>	0	1	0	4	0
(%)	(0%)	(1.1%)	(0%)	(1.9%)	(0%)
<b>Feb-11</b>	0	6	0	4	0
(%)	(0%)	(6.6%)	(0%)	(1.9%)	(0%)
<b>Mar-11</b>	0	2	0	15	0
(%)	(0%)	(2.2%)	(0%)	(7.2%)	(0%)
<b>Apr-11</b>	0	0	0	6	0
(%)	(0%)	(0%)	(0%)	(2.9%)	(0%)
<b>May-11</b>	0	4	0	20	0
(%)	(0%)	(4.4%)	(0%)	(9.6%)	(0%)

<b>Months</b>	<b>Strong securitizing Statements</b>	<b>Medium securitizing statements</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Medium desecuritizing statement</b>	<b>Strong desecuritizing statements</b>
<b>Jun-11</b>	0	0	0	4	0
<b>(%)</b>	(0%)	(0%)	(0%)	(1.9%)	(0%)
<b>Jul-11</b>	0	2	0	20	0
<b>(%)</b>	(0%)	(2.2%)	(0%)	(9.6%)	(0%)
<b>Aug-11</b>	0	3	0	12	0
<b>(%)</b>	(0%)	(3.3%)	(0%)	(5.7%)	(0%)
<b>Sep-11</b>	0	6	0	8	0
<b>(%)</b>	(0%)	(6.6%)	(0%)	(3.8%)	(0%)

## Biography

Alan Wihlborg Andersen was born in 1985 in Bangkok, Thailand. He obtained his Bachelor of Science degree in Public Administration with Specialization in EU Studies from Roskilde University, Denmark in 2009. He further obtained a Master of Science degree in International Public Policy from the University College London (UCL), United Kingdom, in 2011 and is in the process of graduating with a Master of Arts degree in International Development Studies from Chulalongkorn University, Thailand.

He has worked as an administrative assistant at the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) from March to August 2009. Furthermore, he has also worked for the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) as a warehouse assistant during summer breaks.