

AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF NE WIN'S 1962 COUP D'ETAT IN BURMA

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นายโทรุ คาวาเบ้

วิทยานิพนธ์นี้เป็นส่วนหนึ่งของการศึกษาตามหลักสูตรปริญญาศิลปศาสตรมหาบัณฑิต

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โทรุ คาวาเบ้: การศึกษาเชิงวิเคราะห์การรัฐประหารปี 1962 ของเนวินในพม่า (AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF NE WIN'S 1962 COUP D'ETAT IN BURMA) อ. ที่ปรึกษาวิทยานิพนธ์หลัก:
น.ส. พรพิมล ตรีโชติ, 129 หน้า

เนวินทำการรัฐประหาร โดยใช้กองทัพยึดอำนาจทางการเมืองจากรัฐบาลพลเรือนในปี 1962 ในช่วงเวลานั้น ถือว่ามีความสำคัญยิ่งในประวัติศาสตร์สมัยใหม่ของพม่า เพราะเป็นจุดเริ่มต้นของการปกครองโดยกองทัพที่ยาวนานเกินกว่า 40 ปี เป็นผลให้เกิดการสูญเสียพื้นที่ทางการเมืองของผู้มีบทบาททางการเมืองคนอื่นๆ กระนั้นบรรดาธิบายต่อช่วงเวลาดังกล่าวยังคงไม่ชัดเจน และเต็มไปด้วยความสับสน มีความพยายามที่จะสร้างความชอบธรรมในกัการรัฐประหารปี 1962 โดยอ้างว่าเป็นการป้องกันความแตกแยกของสหภาพ แต่อย่างไรก็ตาม กองทัพก็ดูเหมือนจะรอจังหวะเข้ายึดอำนาจทางการเมืองอยู่แล้ว งานศึกษาของนักวิชาการบางคนก็พยายามจะชี้ถึงปัญหาความแตกแยกภายในกองทัพ อย่างไรก็ตาม บทบาทของเนวินกลับไม่มีความชัดเจนในกรอบการศึกษานั้น แม้ว่าเนวินเป็นคนเดียวที่สามารถนำการรัฐประหารนั้น ได้

วิทยานิพนธ์นี้ได้วิเคราะห์สาเหตุของการรัฐประหารจากแรงจูงใจส่วนตัว และเหตุผลเชิงโครงสร้าง ตลอดจนการจับประเด็นทางด้านกิจกรรมทางเศรษฐกิจของกองทัพทั้งก่อนและหลังการรัฐประหาร ซึ่งสัมพันธ์กับแนวคิดการแปรรูปกิจการให้เป็นของรัฐและการกวาดล้างของทหาร มากไปกว่านั้น เมื่อพิจารณาจากกระบวนการกวาดล้างดังกล่าว กลุ่มชนชั้นนำในกองทัพก็คือ กลุ่มที่มีบทบาททางการเมืองอย่างสูงยิ่ง นับตั้งแต่ยุคสงครามโลกครั้งที่สอง การวิเคราะห์กลไกของการรัฐประหารครั้งนี้จากบทบาทของตัวละครทางการเมือง แรงจูงใจ และโครงสร้างทางประวัติศาสตร์ โดยผู้เขียนพยายามหา “เชื้อ” ที่เป็นบ่อเกิดของการรัฐประหารในพม่า เพื่อที่จะหาแนวทางต่างๆ ในการป้องกัน โดยมีจุดยืนในการบริหารรัฐแบบมีเหตุผล

การรัฐประหารนี้ เป็นผลร่วมกันของแรงจูงใจส่วนตัวและเหตุผลเชิงโครงสร้าง ปัจจัยเหล่านั้นมีความสัมพันธ์และอิทธิพลต่อกันและกัน โดยการเปลี่ยนแปลงที่เกิดขึ้นได้นำมาสู่ความขัดแย้งอย่างฝังลึกต่อกลุ่มชาติพันธุ์ต่างๆ ในพม่า ซึ่งถูกกระตุ้นผ่านประเด็นทางศาสนาและแนวทางสหพันธรัฐ เพื่อแสวงหาหนทางหลุดพ้นจากสถานะสูญญากาศทางการเมือง อย่างไรก็ตาม กลุ่มแกนนำทหารก็มีความเชี่ยวชาญทางการเมืองและมีประสบการณ์ในการปฏิบัติการทางทหาร เพื่อใช้อำนาจรัฐจัดการกับกลุ่มต่อต้านที่เคลื่อนไหวเพื่อเรียกร้องให้เกิดการปลดปล่อยประเทศ

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ลายมือชื่อ อ.ที่ปรึกษาวิทยานิพนธ์หลัก.....

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Ne Win made military coup and usurped political power from civilian government in 1962. This coup and the period are significant in Myanmar's modern history because more than forty years of military rule starting from the year resulted in the loss of political space for other political actors. Explanations for this period are still in vagueness and filled with confusion. The coup in 1962 was tried to be legitimized by claiming that it was the means of preventing the breakup of the Union. However, the military seemed to wait for taking political power. Some scholar's works tried to point out the rift within the military, however, Ne Win's role is not clear in that framework even though he is the only person who could lead the coup d'état.

This thesis analyzed the causes of the coup from triggering motives and structural causes, in particular, focusing on the economic activities of the military before and after the coup related with the course of nationalization and the purge of an officer. Furthermore, the elite group of the military was examined with the pattern of purge as the group is the prominent political actor since War time Burma. Analyzing the mechanism of this coup with political actor, motives and historical structure, author tried to find 'genes' of coup d'état in Burma in order to have some hints for future prevention from the view point of rational state governance.

This coup d'état was the result of the combination of triggering motives and structural causes. Those factors are intertwined and influenced upon each other. Emotional upheaval of Burmese ethnic nationalism stimulated through religious and federal issues sought for direction to flow out under the circumstances of the political power vacuum. Significantly, core officers group was keen in politics to and had experience of military operations for taking state power in the resistance movement for her independence.

Field of Study: Southeast Asian Studies Student's Signature

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This research was interrupted for numerous times and long period, in particular, for my personal reasons. After my small family collapsed while in studying, all I had to do was to start again to stabilize my life before writing thesis. Furthermore, it was far difficult for me to find out my self-convinced conclusion for this study. It was the art, “vanitas” that finally hit me in Paris for the way to conclusion.

Finally, I would like to dedicate this study for the people, friends in Myanmar as the duty and petit contribution by one man who was born in Japan.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABPO	All Burma Peasant Organization
AFO	Anti-Fasist Organization
AFPFL	Anti Facist People's Freedom League
ANUO	Arakan National United Organization
AP	Associated Press
AYRG	Army Young (Officer's) Resistance Group
BEDC	Burma Economic Development Corporation
BIA	Burma Independence Army
BDA	Burma Defense Army
BNA	Burma National Army
BSPP	Burma Socialist Program Party
DSI	Defense Services Institute
FEER	Far Eastern Economic Review
FRUS	The Foreign Relation of the United States
KMT	Kuomintang
MPB	Military Preparations Bureau
NLD	National League for Democracy
NUF	National Unity Front
OTS	Officer Training School
PBF	Patriotic Burmese Forces
PCP	People's Comrade Party
PRC	People's Republic of China
PVO	People's Volunteer Organization
RC	Revolutionary Council
SLORC	State Law and Order Restoration Council
SUO	States Unity Organization

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

On March 2, 1962, Burma's Armed forces, led by General Ne Win, the commander in chief, staged the Coup D'état and taken over the rein of government of Burma¹. From 2 am to 6 am, it arrested and put under detention about 50 politicians including U Win Maung, the President, U Myint Thein, Chief of Supreme Court, U Nu, the Prime Minister, Sao Hkun Hkio, head of the Shan State and ethnic minority leaders. This is the moment of the beginning of military rule in Burma that lasts more than forty nine years until now. At 8: 45 am, General Ne Win announced his message and in the afternoon, 13:15, the formation of Revolutionary Council and Cabinet members was also announced through nation wide radio broadcast (MOFA 1962). Ne Win's statement is,

- I have to inform that the armed forces of the union have taken over the responsibility and the task of keeping the country's safety owing to greatly deteriorating conditions in the union.
- I appeal to all the people to carry on with their daily tasks as usual and to be in peace of mind and to have no fear or anxiety.

1. Country's name was changed to 'Myanmar' in 1989, however, 'Burma' was used until the time of this change in this thesis.

- I also wish the government servants to continue to attend to their duties without any interruption.
- I urge especially the education authorities and the students who are in the midst of their examinations to carry on with their tasks uninterrupted.
- I assure all the people that we shall exert our utmost efforts for the happiness and well-being of all the people of the union(Guardian 1962 March 3:1).

The first one, declaration on usurping power and the last one, promise for the future were the essence of this statement. His biographer states that only the historians may discover when Ne Win's deeply considered decision and notes on his decision making process in his question to his aide when they visited old city Pagan just before the coup, 'Is it better to leave this splendor – which must one day fall to dust – as a monument to one's memory, or to free men from the misery of want and hunger and give them full opportunity for material and spiritual fulfillment?'(Maung Maung 1969:291-2). Given these vague accounts, it is valuable to reconsider the fact of this coup d'état not only from their nominal account but the combination of components in historical perspective.

Firstly, this 1962 coup d'état occurred along with significant political changes in Burma. The first was 1958 when Ne Win ostensibly agreed to form caretaker Government being transferred political power from U Nu while it was defined as a coup d'état by most scholars. Many accounts agree that the 'anger' of military officers

was the cause for their pressure against U Nu though the role and reaction of Ne Win was not clear. The second change is the year of 1960 when Ne Win withdrew and returned political power to U Nu before the elections without intervening or cancelling it. On this military's withdraw from politics, negative result of public opinion survey was pointed out as one of the reasons for their withdrawal decision until now². Generally, it is said that they tasted how comfortable or profitable having positions in the government during the caretaker period but if so, it appears to be contradicted to the fact that it was Ne Win who decided to give the political power back to U Nu. And lastly, the change was 1962 when Ne Win decided to make a coup against U Nu. It is difficult to rationally explain 1962 Coup with former decision of withdrawal from politics as Ne Win could keep holding power. Or, was it just a miscalculation or did they have a detailed scenario? From above questions, there still remain several unsolved or contradicted issues in this period (See Table 1). Of significance in this thesis is that 1962 Coup is analyzed again with prior events to puzzle out this complexity.

1.2 Rational

Coup d'état sounds dismal, old fashioned or out of date in this 21st century world. Certainly, many coup d'état occurred in the third world countries in 1960s and 70' and this political phenomenon itself was analyzed and studied eagerly though they

²Callahan (2003), pp.195-6. It notes "it seems likely that the public's criticisms would have had a dampening effect on the army's enthusiasm about continuing in office".

were never in the mainstream of political science. It seems to be the reason for this minor position of the coup d'état study that it is the regime changes without taking constitutional measures and with the difficulties to gather enough evidence and correct data due to its secrecy.

On the other hand, the relation between politics and military is widely studied in light of democratization or civil-military relations. The aim of most of studies is to try to put military regime in the context of democratization process along with the hypothesis of political modernization. In this field, military's logic has been studied as the motives for their involvement into politics. Then now, coup d'état as a political phenomenon is persistent as it might be the means of usurpation of political power since ancient times in Europe. In particular, Southeast Asian countries, not only Myanmar but Thailand and the Philippines, had coup d'état or coup attempts even since 2006³.

From the facts above, one hypothesis is to be considered, in which some deep rooted factors under superficial power conflict are affecting this political phenomenon, other than discriminative simple conclusion of political backwardness without tight civilian control as indicated by scholars in former times. In other words, there should

3.Gray, Denis D (AP). 28 Feb, 2006. "Tumult in Thailand, Philippines, raises new questions about democracy in Southeast Asia". This story was written at the early stage of tidal current of change, however, did not miss the point by referring to "elite" as the key political actor by citing the comment from the Philippines. It says "We still have a rule of the jungle, we have democratic institution but the elite is not bound by them"

be historical causes or configuration of causes for the ‘survival’ of coup in those countries.

Given the fact that coup d’état has various types and scale, the 1962 Burma and regime change became the origin of continuous authoritarian military regime in her history and was definitive one until now. This coup changed the course of the state completely into the present direction and its impact still survives. The main theme of this thesis is to reconsider and analyze this 1962 coup in more theoretical manner by focusing structural causes and immediate factors. As noted on the unfamiliarity of coup d’état analysis in the main field of political science, though, some political scientists continue to make efforts to sort out tangled thread from several angles including democratization, international relations, patterns and probabilities and so on. By employing these theoretical new findings, the author tries to explain the 1962 coup synthetically by combining the factors considered as working for promoting coup d’état.

1.3 Objectives

The main objectives for this research are two, the reconsideration of the definitive 1962 coup d’état in the context of Myanmar’s modern history with identifying major factors for the coup and the analysis on political actors who are involved in this political change.

Against the backdrop of these two objectives, the author felt the necessity to reconsider this political phenomenon in historical context, not as an independent past incident. The historian's mind⁴ led the author to the understanding that the historical change could be traced within the aggregate of components under the necessary milieu, not only by sole hidden accidental factor. For, even the words of actors or statements alone do not represent the reality or the things that the words stand for. Furthermore, it was also realized by this author that the coup for establishing military regime should not to be employed any more if modern states and mankind stands at the principle on which her foundation of governance relies on rationality and philosophy rather than arbitrary violence⁵.

4. Le Roy Laurie (1981), pp.2-3 indicates extremely significant concept in various meanings. It warns the dangerousness of 'instant history', un-distanced narrative as 'the old medieval chronicles before the Gutenberg galaxy'. In essence, it puts significance on the attitude in which 'the events' sought to be located firmly within the context in order to gauge the impact of it in scientific sense by looking both backward and more especially forward in time. It further emphasizes the significance of attitude in its explanation that 'when such "things" as reflected in the archives are in part collective representations: since they have a basis in reality they cannot be reduced simply to the way in which people have spoken of them'.

5. This principle is drawn from the question in the discussion of 'Republic' by Plato. The physical time and distance in ancient Greek is quite far from 1960s Burma, however, the author believes that the core idea itself is not so far from Buddhism in Burma as the distance and time between the two. The discussion between Socrates and Glaucon reached to the mental parts of person's mind, being analogous to the social classes of the community. Socrates asked,

*'Since the rational part is wise and looks out for the whole of the mind,
isn't it right for it to rule, and for the passionate part to be subordinate
and its ally?'*

If an analysis through this research helps show any deep rooted factor for the coup and give any hint for preventative measures and the better future for any single person in Myanmar, the objectives of this thesis would be fully achieved.

1.4 Major arguments/Hypotheses

The major points of argument in this thesis are

The 1962 coup was the result of both structural causes embedded in political tradition and the immediate triggering causes.

Elite status of Ne Win and other Revolutionary Council members was one of the structural causes of this coup, along with her resistance history carried out by small military elite officer's group.

1.5 Methodology

This research heavily relies on documentary sources. Facing on the difficulties in collecting first hand data due to the period of half century ago, the author visited and took contact with a large number of libraries, Institutions and researchers, searching for

reliable data. Those libraries and Institutions are in Thailand, Japan, the US, Britain, Netherland and France⁶.

Diplomat's documents were also collected and used for analysis. Those are from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Foreign Office of UK and Foreign Relations of the United States. Furthermore, interviews were conducted to scholars on Burma who gave willing help for this research. However, the names of persons are withheld to avoid any implication, considering the socio-political situation in Myanmar.

1.6 Chapter breakdown

Chapter II

This chapter is on the conceptual framework of coup d'état analysis, starting from the definition of Coup with comparison of other forms of political means to promote regime change including revolution and civil war. As the theoretical methods for coup analysis, triggering motives and structural causes are explained in it with kinds of

6. Libraries and Institutes are Chulalongkorn University, Thammasart University, National library(Thailand), Kyoto University, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Osaka University, Institute of Developing Economies - Japan External Trade Organization, National Museum of Ethnology (Japan), Cornell University(the US), the National Archives(UK), International Institute of Social History(Netherlands) and Bibliothèque Saint-Genevieve(France, Paris).

political phenomenon in such framework. Moreover, it focuses on the theory of elite for actor-oriented analysis. By employing this theory, theoretical hypothesis is drawn in case of Burma as the transmission of state elite genes over generations.

Chapter III

Literature on 1962 coup d'état in Burma is reviewed in this Chapter. Generally, the analyses for this coup d'état are classified into four types. The most common is the searching for real motives of coup makers, the second is focusing on the historical stage of the state, and the third, being similar with the analytical framework in this, is to try to find the causes of coup in the combination of several layers. Last is on the military institution building process. This chapter notes these four kinds of present understanding on 1962 coup in Burma.

Chapter IV

For 'three-dimensional' approach to 1962 Coup, this chapter focuses on triggering motives before entering into structural causes in Chapter 5. As this kind of motives, military's economic activities in DSI are analyzed with U Nu's policies that had preventative effects on its expansion. Then, military's politicization process was analyzed in the process of 1958 coup plot in comparison with the theoretical framework of military as institution. Furthermore, the purge just one year before the Coup was reconsidered as having 'arousal effect' on the politicized military. In consequence, these triggering events

entangled in themselves and led to grave political incident overthrowing U Nu government.

Chapter V

As the structural causes of the coup, legitimacy decline gradually proceeded without serious consideration by political actors. In the end, the vacuum of political power was created along with the political struggle among political actors and U Nu alone was left after other competitor's falling out of political arena. The security decline closely related with the legitimacy decline as securing safety and order is under government responsibilities. Among others, of significance as structural causes is the Federal issue related with 1947 constitution. Shan and several other states kept asserting its position under Cold war international circumstances. Legitimacy decline with the union issue and external relations are all included into the structural causes of the coup with the historical memory of coup in Burma. This shared experience may have direct and indirect influence on mind of the nation.

Chapter VI

This chapter looks through the Revolutionary Council as an elite group and checks strategy for its survival as a ruling group as it is the actor of elite group that carries out the coup for seeking state power. Looking through the transformation process of the military elite group along with time line, it sought the patter of purge with a brief note of the relation of elite and gender for the future.

Chapter VII

As for the conclusion for the coup analysis, this chapter briefly looked back the discussion of former chapters and confirms the co conclusion for two hypotheses. Furthermore, it focuses on the impact of the coup and state course for development from the economic and political point of view.

CHAPTER II

Conceptual framework of coup d'état analysis

2.1 The Definition of Coup

In historical context, several methods have been employed to change the state regime without legal procedure. Revolution, civil war and coup are included in those means. Among them, coup is generally recognized as the one by which a whole state is put under the control with limited price and sacrifice

1. On the contrary, revolution requires mobilizing the mass under some clear ideological objectives and civil war tends to entail sacrifice of life including civilian. In this sense, revolution and civil war tend to leave painful outcome in the society with its political aim.

Generally, revolution is defined as the change in which former political system including power distribution is replaced by another one, accompanied with major social change. In this process, the power is seized through violent means although “that power is subsequently used to initiate major process of social reform”. In this definition, it is possible to include the coup d'état followed by one major social change into the definition

1. The characteristics of coup d'état is referred in various general sources. Above all, such characteristics are obviously seen in the “high return” for coup makers after the successful coup.

of revolution. However, there is not clear definition on the social change by revolution. For this reason, revolution is said to be an essentially-contested concept.

On the other hand, coup characteristics are mainly derived from its power change mechanism. As a result of a coup, the political power shifts from one group to another within the same political system. In short, the critical group of the state apparatus detaches the controlling power of the government from its remained body for their own sake (Luttwak 1979:27, Carlton 1997:7). The present ruling power itself or the outside power of the system rarely seizes it. It is the power shift that is not prompted by different stratum in the society. In considering aspects of coup, this power shift concept is significant and needs to be laid under other dimensions to focus clearly.

When one political phenomenon occurs, it is led by numerous significant outcomes and those are also composed of numerous small facts. It is the case even in our individual decision-making process in which our mind and feeling move toward the one direction under certain circumstances with many facts. In analyzing coup as a political phenomenon, this difficulty also arises. Not only the coup itself but motives of coup makers are also mixed and covered with many layers of facts that brought the outcome. As this difficulty is the reason for trying to put chosen facts rationally in this writing, several methods are cited below for the analyses in later chapters.

2.2 Cause of coup

The motives for making a coup are mainly assorted into several fields. Although it is conducted to their own advantage in essence as noted above, usually various reasons are revealed and announced after the incident. Carlton's assortment² is concise and could be easily developed for further analyses. In case of coup in 1962 by Revolutionary Council in Burma, 'reason for state' and 'ideological reason' is to be applied to. State reason is that the coup was carried out as it was necessary to remove the unsuitable state leader to avoid state crisis. Ideology for social change was also chanted in 1962, however, it is usual that there is not clear boundary between political philosophy and superficial justification for this claim.

Moreover, it is significant to put into consideration the background reason for occurrence of numerous coups in the world including Southeast Asian countries. This definitive factor promoting regime change led by a small group without legitimate procedure had been attributed to "the lack of political community"³ rather than economic or social backwardness. This community is to be explained as the one that is robust social

2. Carlton's are 1) Personal motives including revenge 2) Reasons for state 3) Nationalistic reasons against imperialism 4) Class struggle 5) The cause of liberation 6) Ideological including religious reasons. Among them, Personal motive deserves to be mentioned in the context of political assassination of Aung Sang.

3. See Lttwak's Preface. This community is said to foment legality, moral standard or social framework in the society. And it becomes possible for the coup maker to gain control of whole state by criticizing former regime without these norms and governance arising from it.

system or mechanism in judicial, bureaucracy, legislature rather than wayward individual decision. Similar with this 'community', the term of 'moral barrier' or 'mantle' ⁴are also used. This means that civilian society works as such barrier or mantle to protect civilian government supremacy. Surrounded by this barrier or mantle of community, the attempt of coercing unlawful government by military is regarded as unlawful usurpation.

Then, why do some countries lack this community, barrier or mantle? Several reasons are assumed for continuous gripping of political power without effective checking in certain number of countries. Cultural and traditional background should be considered in terms of history of each country. As with this point, the absence of the modern political community, it is claimed that ruling political power was handed over from colonial authorities after their independence⁵. The state mechanisms were put in the hand of political leaders in a sudden. Therefore, there was not organic nexus between native social culture and modern state mechanism.

Although it is too simple to attribute coup factor only to the absence of this political community or lack of resilient norms, seeking for this generalization is far

4. See Finer (1962) p.22, Nordlinger (1977) p.93. Finer sought the reason of this moral barrier in the advanced political culture that has stronger attachment to civilian institution than in a low political culture.

5. Luttwak's preface. According to it, the values and notions of political community should be reflected in the state mechanism. However, in some newly independent countries, only this powerful state mechanism was transferred without social norms formed in the community.

beyond the aim of this thesis. The author focuses on 1962 coup in Burma and tries to deepen the analyses of this phenomenon in this country.

2.3 Theory for coup analysis: triggering motives and structural causes

There are two types of methods to analyze coup as political phenomenon. The difference between them seems to be the extent on how large the phenomenon itself is exemplified for analyses. The first method tries to take almost the same size of picture as the one in the contemporary context by using the concept of motives and opportunities for coup. On the other hand, the second kind is like bird's eyes view or the analysis in the historical context because it approaches coup through triggering and structural causes rather than magnified specific factors. This chapter tries to clarify the second method as the theory to apply for this thesis by mixing some points of the first as the two shares some concepts and the second method might be more clearly delineated by comparing to the first.

The first method, motives and opportunities for coup, has been employed by many scholars since 1960s. According to Finer's explanation, opportunities were classified into three categories. Those are civilian dependence on the armed forces during the wartime, domestic crisis and military popularity. Military's popularity is so simple that wider range of factors could be considered. For example, Luttwak emphasizes three conditions as small number of elite politics, independence of foreign

power and concentration of political power. As mentioned above, this methodology appears to present preconditions for the successful coup as greatest common measure.

On the other hand, Belkin and Schofer exemplified the relations between triggering causes and structural causes for coup as the one between stressful event and cholesterol for heart attack. This analysis focuses on coup risk that is the reflection of triggering causes that precipitate coup, and structural and background causes like political culture or state-society relations. Based on this definition, structural causes tend to be deeply embedded in political system and change slowly whereas triggering causes is fickle but not precipitate coup in the absence of structural causes. As this concept is employed to calculate coup risks in the world by scoring each factor, it is not suitable to do the same calculation for the specific coup. However, it appears to be useful as a tool to analyze one coup incident by employing rational classification of coup causes.

Coup itself could be defined as the simple act that was purposefully undertaken to achieve consciously formulated goals, with an awareness of the possible costs and risk involved (Nordlinger 1977: 63). From this point, coup motives were largely condensed in military's corporate interest. This corporate interest is interpreted as coup motives or triggering causes when it comes to refer to two methods for coup analysis in this chapter.

The coincidence of corporate interest with the coup motive appears to arise of the ostensive correspondence between coup maker's public statement after the coup and their hidden motives. Although there is the disparity between them in general, coup makers themselves do not mind it because they tend to identify themselves or military as the nation itself or national interest. This mind set may well explain their justification of coup attempt as to save the country. In this context, personal interest was put aside as the one that is a close parallel with corporate interest and realized through the activation of corporate interest.

Though it claims that they acted on national interest, military's corporate interest could be classified into three categories, its budget, autonomy and absence of functional rivals (Ibid:65-78). Firstly, the budget as the coup motive to defend corporate interest was considered in two budgetary patterns. The civilian governments that reduced defense budget tend to be overthrown by military's coup and the new government installed by coup invariably increase military expenditures. As the result of these patterns, one aspect of coup motives is revealed as the one that many coup were the products of a conjunction of the officer's interest for budgetary support and the unwillingness of civilian governors to satisfy them. This budget reduction has another effect on military's independent position as defense institute. For, budget reduction has face slapping effect on military's pride because budget cut clearly shows that its political influence and influence are on the wane.

Secondly, other political interferences into military's autonomy tend to trigger adversary effects as the result of the invasion against military's corporate interest. Particularly, the policy of divide and rule through reshuffle or promotion intended by civilian government weaken military's hierarchical structure. Military's cohesiveness and its autonomy of defense strategy, educational programs for officers and the assignment of officers are eroded.

The third threat to the corporate interest is the establishment of militia that cast doubt to the military's adequacy and reliability as the defender of national security. Military's opposition to communism may reflect their fear for the replacement of the regular army with people's militia. However, in analyzing motives of coup, it should be noted that the threat of communism can be utilized as ostensive reason for keeping military's interests.

The second and third point, political reshuffle and the threat of militia are closely related with the power balance inside and outside of the military structure. And this power balance could lead to different outcomes. In other words, they work for promoting coup or as counter coup measures, depending on the conditions. While political intervention into military's autonomy invites strong reaction to the government at the first stage, successful creation of parallel unit stationed around the capital works for effective coup preventative measure. The existence of ground based parallel military prevents coup group from coming on the center of the regime. The

Republican Guard under Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the 3rd Armored Division in Syria are well known anti-coup divisions(Quinlivan 1999:141-8).

In addition, another kind of institution also works for and against military's corporate interest. It is the Security service that seems to be more significant for regime security than regular army itself. The Saudi Ministry of Interior has several security organs and Iraqi security agencies are said to be multiplied and constantly reshuffled for the security reasons(Ibid.148-151). In short, security agencies could become the double-edged sword both for regime and military. As this point has been proved in Burma and Myanmar's military history.

As the reason for focusing on military's corporate interest, Nordlinger points out the difficulties to show how and why various internal and external factors influenced to the decision making process. Related with these difficulties, less significance was put on the foreign interference for coup attempt without two cases in Guatemala and South Vietnam. Considering the coups in Cold War era, however, foreign countries involvement into coup attempts was seemingly significant factor to dismiss.

Although it is difficult to probe foreign power's involvement into the coup, it deserves to be taken into account in the case of 1962 Burma when Cuba and Laos were in critical situation under Kennedy administration. As this international situation was

not frequently mentioned in considering coup causes, this paper would like to include the foreign relations into one of the structural causes. This international security situation was big concern, at least, the new Burmese regime after the coup even for both super powers in Southeast Asia.

It is the structural factors that were more significant as triggering causes can not be the sole factor for successful coup. Among dozens of structural causes, this chapter adopts three of them, authoritarianism, the influence of recent coup and regime legitimacy. Although Belkin and Schofer extracted three main structural causes including the strength of civil society from twenty one factors (Belkin & Schofer 2003), the significance would be authoritarianism, the influence of recent coup and regime legitimacy rather than the strength of civil society.

There is one hypothesis that could be called as moral barrier or mantle. It means that strong civilian society may work as barrier or mantle to protect the ethics of civilian government supremacy. It appears to be true in one aspect as in the analysis by Finer(Finer 1962:110-139). In countries where attachment to civilian institutions is strong and pervasive, the attempt of the military to coerce the lawful government would be regarded as usurpation. However, it seems to be difficulties to compare the degree of civilian society. In this sense, this paper excludes the possibility of calculating the extent of how close the Burmese society is to western type of civilian

society. Moreover, Burmese military and officers have not highly respected for or paid much attention to domestic public opinion.

The coup is different from revolution because it is carried out not with mass attendance but by a group of military officers and the coup regime is formed not in accordance with democratic procedure but in forceful and unlawful manner. In this sense, the regime is not democratic but authoritative in nature. This rise and survival of authoritarianism have several structural causes. Among them, this thesis focuses on three general structural causes to apply for the cause of coup in Burma.

As noted, three structural causes are employed to analyze coup in this thesis. Among these three, authoritarianism, the influence of recent coup and regime legitimacy, authoritarianism also has several background causes. Firstly, one structural cause for authoritarianism is named as nationalism thesis⁶ as it tends to arise in multi-ethnic state to seek for national unity. The second type is related to socialism because post revolutionary transition to socialism also bears authoritarianism. Furthermore, authoritarianism has survived in pre-modern setting in the face of modernization or democratization. As for this condition, it tends to appeals to tradition, culture and religion in general.

6. Alamgir (1997). In analyzing the durability of military regime in Burma, the structural bases of Burma were classified into four, Modernization thesis, Capitalism thesis, Socialism thesis, Nationalism thesis.

On the second structural cause for this coup analysis, past coup experience, it is pointed out that the coup have a powerful impact by legitimizing extra-constitutional methods as acceptable mechanism for political transition. The author agrees on this point and focuses not only on short time influence but on historical impact on Burmese politics as there seems to be the countries that are too vulnerable to coups.

Thirdly, legitimacy is also the key structural cause for coup because regimes are formed and dissolved along with the changing degree of legitimacy and illegitimacy. When the majority of the population believes the government does have the right to govern, its legitimacy kept safe level but the government would lose enough legitimacy to govern when it does not. Then, the chief source of legitimacy is closely related with the type of legitimacy.

It is Max Weber who categorized the legitimacy into three main grounds, the rational, the traditional, and Charismatic grounds(Weber 1968:46-7). The first rational grounds mean that legality based on the pattern of normative rule that enables to issue order as legal authority. The second traditional grounds rest on the sanctity of tradition and third charismatic grounds have the source of authority in the sanctity or heroism of an individual person. Charismatic rule is, in essence, irrational, unsystematic and foreign to rule on the contrary to the rational and traditional grounds that follow the rule and precedence. The conspicuous difference among those three legitimacy grounds leads to the pattern of change. It is the shift in which charismatic authority only exists

at the beginning stage before it is transformed into rational or traditional or both mixed type of authority.

Therefore, legitimacy grounds changes gradually through mixed form of charisma and rational as in the case of Burmese government after the World War II. Additionally, those legitimacy grounds are affected by performance rate of the government. Continuous low performance rate erodes regime legitimacy grounds and transforms them into vulnerable structure to coup.

Generally, such performance failure is composed of three kinds of low quality governance. Government illegal actions, economic down turn and deteriorated security situation. Illegal action or accusation as illegal or unconstitutional acts invites military to take further steps when military has their motives to make unconstitutional coup on the ground that government does not pay respect for the rule under the law and constitution, too. Moreover, these illegal acts could provoke the resentment of non-elite mass. Economy record is also significant indicator for government performance because government is the last institution being responsible for country's economic record. Lastly, the preservation of order is also government responsibility. It is for this reason that the incident of violence could affect government legitimacy. In sum, government legitimacy is damaged when it can not fulfill its responsibilities in these three main fields.

To be sure, this performance rate issue looks like triggering causes, it has more significant meanings in the context of legitimacy as structural causes. It also should be noted that coup makers tend to justify their actions by claiming that government failed its performance. However, these statements do not reflect their real motives as few military governments change government performance after the seizure of power. In addition, they do not prepare their plan how to govern prior to coup operation. Therefore, performance failure leads to the loss of legitimacy and this legitimacy deflation facilitates military motives to be translated into coup attempts.

2.4 Elite analysis

The second theoretical framework for this thesis is closely related with the triggering motives for the coup. Along with the motives for the coup, military's corporate interest is significant in considering it as a social group. In addition to a case study of corporate interest, it would be possible to theoretically analyze its behavior by recognizing it as an elite group in the society, for the elite as the political actor does not behave against its objectives but pursues for its maximum interests.

As the definition of elite, the elite group is able to be structurally defined through its integral factors. Firstly, homogeneity is the dimension that is easily noticed in observing it. It is represented in the commonness in occupation, social status, education, ethnicity, religion and so on. Second dimension is dual or overlapping system. For instance, the officials in the socialist country also have positions in party apparatus. Third

is the communication network that maintains its cohesiveness. Structurally, the tie is said to be closely knitted and greatest at the top of the hierarchy while diffusing and dispersing at the lower level. That means elite personal communicates much more than does the population at large (Putnam1976:107-132). Dimension that is lastly noted as characteristic is value consensus among elite members. As they share common idea in theory and practice, there is an agreement on their policy choice and procedures.

In addition to the definition and internal characteristics on elite itself, its external relation is significant in analyzing their behavior. For, small core elite group seeks for its survival through its link with external social groups. Their relationship with external groups or actors could be analyzed in two directions, its vertical relation and lateral relation.

The vertical one is mainly the relation with the mass population. As it is impossible to keep controlling the mass only through coercive measures employed by a small group, they appeal to non-elite to seek for their support by means of some belief system or promoting distrust among them. However, other than means employed to gain support or agreement for its rule, legitimacy is the most fundamental factor to maintain its political influence. As noted above, sources of legitimacy are said to be three, traditional one, legal and rational one and charismatic one. Then, the core elite seek for the support of the mass based on its announcement being consistent with their legitimacy source.

The broad lateral relation is needed for keeping regime stability and its resilience. Although the core elite group is closed against external members, the elite frequently engage in coalitional relationship with various political partners. This behavior is particularly shed light in the context of recent new trend of authoritarianism in Southeast Asian countries. In this analysis, elite group is said to adjust itself to the political framework in a retractable manner (Case 2009). In other words, in facing social pressure, it reconfigure their relations for perpetuate their interest.

It is the political party that plays as a mediator or works as catalyst between elite and non-elite in considering their vertical relation with the mass as the external actor. In their lateral relation, the party is also significant in the context of durability of authoritarian regime as ruling party regulates elite conflict by binding self -interested leaders. Through this management process, it produces collective benefits for members that belong to it (Brownlee 2007:33,39,42).

In sum, the core elite that have its own characteristics survive by using a political party as a working organ, implementing vertical tactics and lateral tactics for its competitors and constituencies. The focus on elite in this thesis is rather the elite group itself than its strategy for survival by using political party mechanism. Compared to party-focus in the context of democratization process, this elite focus is actor-oriented analysis. From this angle, my second hypothesis for the coup analysis in Burma is that the centrifugal force works to select best gene in the elite group while the group tries to

survive by various policies based on its vertical and lateral relations. In the end, state elite gene is transmitted over generations.

2.5 Two theoretical frameworks

As the theoretical framework in this thesis, this chapter composed two from coup theories and elite theories. Those are,

- Coup occurs when certain socio-political conditions accords. Those conditions are classified into triggering causes and structural causes. Triggering causes are imminent institutional interests. Structural causes are past coup history, authoritarianism emanating from anti-colonialism and socialism settings, and the balance of legitimacy between present and former regimes.

- Core elite and its value in the form of groups or individuals survive over a long period through the process of expelling inner competitors, and building relations with the mass and other elites.

2:6 Conclusion

Among various phenomena in politics, coup d'état is one of the most striking incidents as an unknown group suddenly claims the collapse of the present government and their rule of state. The real causes or motives are always sought for every coup,

however, it is too difficult to know what was the whole picture of coup and exactly how it was organized and what are the exact reasons for it because coup d'état is the military operation organized and aimed at toppling the government under the highest level of secrecy.

On the other hand, moral aspect in the society has been pointed out as the cause of coup d'état in comparison with countries in which elections keep working as the means of transformation of political power. In short, coup d'état occurs in the countries that do not have civil society enough matured. Though it is true that most of the coup occurs in the countries that are called as developing countries, this civil society thesis is too simple and difficult to apply to all countries as the number of countries that have western notion of civil society is still limited despite of the level of economic development. In a sense, this thesis is to be regarded as the myth or over generalization.

Without knowing the deep seated motives of coup makers or depending on civil society thesis, what method should be taken for coup d'état analysis? It is easy to say that many factors worked in synthetic manner but at least functional mechanism needs to be elaborated in rational way rather than the result of disorderly mixture of facts. It is for this reasons that theoretical approach was analyzed from various angles and formulated in two layers approach.

As the first analytical framework, this thesis focuses on the combination of triggering motives and structural causes of coup d'état. Further, triggering motives are discussed in the field of military's autonomous interest, in particular, of its economic aspect. The institution in charge of military's economic activities was symbolic in case of Burma as it would be discussed and analyzed in chapter IV with other autonomous issues. Next, the structural causes were sought in the change of the state, the authoritarian tendency, experience in resistance operation and the degree of legitimacy and illegitimacy. The clarification is that historical coup d'état occurs in times of critical situation when the state has serious structural causes and triggering motives simultaneously.

Secondly, the theory was searched for elite and its survival strategy because the concept of elite is significant in analyzing coup makers. The elite group keeps its coherence and seeks for its relation in two directions, lateral and vertical in the society while keeping competitiveness of core of the core by pushing other members out of its sphere.

CHAPTER III

Present analyses and literature review on 1962 coup d'état in Burma

The military coup d'état in 1962 has been analyzed from various angles. However, due to the difficulties to find concrete evidence and recombine rational explanation, there still remain many mysteries and discrepancies among explanations. The main objective for this thesis is to try to combine factors for coup in a synthesized manner based on two hypotheses proposed in chapter II .

Although independent Burma experienced several coup d'état, the one in 1962 was definitive in considering later political outcomes brought by Ne Win regime. As long as the author read through related theses, the analyses for this coup d'état could be classified into mainly four types in general. The most common is the one that is searching for clue for real motives of coup makers. The second is focusing on the state itself, in which several theorists claim that the central state power was resurrected by this coup after the colonialism and its influence. And the third is similar with the analytical framework in this thesis, however, the facts and theories were not enough at that time. This tried to find the causes of coup in the combination of several layers. Lastly, the four shed light on the institution building process to find causes for intervention into politics.

As it focuses on military as institution, it is to be called as institution approach in this thesis. This chapter notes these four kinds of present understanding on 1962 coup in Burma before entering into analyses in the later chapters.

3.1 Motive approach

As motives of coup makers, the outline has been explained as the preventative measures for the break of the Union. Martin Smith's approach (Smith 1991:195-7) is clear from his words in which he explicitly says that it is unnecessary to look further than the words of coup leaders themselves although some historians and politician still look for other reasons for the coup from ideological, personal or economic view points. Firstly, he picked up the ethnic minority issue related with the demand of federalism as the motive for the coup by showing some words of coup makers. One phrase quoted from Ne Win's remarks made on the morning of the coup toward one minister is that Federalism is impossible, it will destroy the Union. Another is from Aung Gyi's comment as the one that says we had economic, religious and political crises with the issue of federalism as the most important for the coup.

Smith also focused on the claims made by Shan leaders as this federalism charges were just the excuse to cover the military's own interest. Thus, he made it clear that Ne Win and his army were anxious for more power after briefly having tasted their political power for caretaker government period. However, this discussion seems to be

not so significant as it might not be the single reason even if the military was so cautious to the federalism.

Just before the date of the coup, ethnic minority groups gathered in Rangoon to discuss on their option of leaving the Union in ten years based on the 1947 constitution. On this Federal issue, Davis Steinberg¹ referred it as the ostensible reason with another claim that the minority issue was not the real causes but simply excuses. Although it also adds the claim that the military just wanted national power, definitive motives were not found and any theory was not developed from this approach.

3.2 State approach

The state focus approach, the second one, is persuasive when the state is regarded as the main actor in historical context. In considering of the impact of the coup in the long period, this approach is quite significant. The focal point is how the state is influenced by the coup. Author is also interested in the pattern or perpetuity of the state, however, the focus in this thesis is the power shift mechanism inside of the state and its impact. The time frame of state approach is unexpectedly longer than the approach employed in this thesis.

1. See Steinberg (2010) p.60. His Burma (1982) also mentioned on this issue as “precipitating cause” with the preservation of military’s economic interests. This concept appears to be similar with triggering motives, however, it is better to classify into coup maker’s motives as it did not mention on other structural causes.

Robert Taylor is the historians and theorist who took this state approach and put significance on the historical lineage of the state dating back 600 to 1000 years. According to his division of historical periods of Burmese political history since late sixteen century, the year of 1962 constituted a watershed between the predominantly civilian government and the subsequent military dominance. And this short period was defined as the rare historical period when the dominant institution and individuals or groups whose careers are linked directly to the state could take action in order to reassert the position of the state². Consequently, the military officer group took an action of destruction and simultaneously construction to bring the new pattern of its relationship with society.

There is another approach on this state continuity as Taylor noted by citing Perlin's argument. While admitting his argument on 'non-official aspects of the economy and society', Taylor takes the position of weighting the state by claiming that the state shaped the relationship between itself and civil society through its continuous

2. The coincidence of military officer's position with the state position would be controversial point in considering legitimacy after military coup. Moreover, the sentiment representing officer's position had been regarded as the crossroads for the break of political intervention or the motive of the intervention. The argument over the word called as "professionalism" between Samuel P.Huntington and S.E.Finer is significant because Huntington theory claims that the professionalism works as decisive factor in keeping soldier out of politics against Finer's that sought the essence of professional sentiment in words of military officers. At first, in case of military officers, no resignation would be accepted in facing of war as they think orders are given directly from the state sovereign. This notion distinguishes the state and the government in power and leads to the invention of their own private notion of national interest.

administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive system. As the components of historical lineage of the state, state basic function like economic distribution system, maintenance of social order and elite perpetuation were proposed by Taylor. In conclusion for this discussion, state is defined as the determining partner.

Michael Aung-Thwin also sought the lineage in national ideology. The core of Aung-Thwin's hypothesis is that this collective psychological desire for establishing real independence denied colonial past by supporting the coup in 1962 silently (Aung-Thwin 1989). According to this theory, the majority Burmese accepted an ordered society that preserved tradition with recovering a lost identity by not opposing it. In other words, the country also needed uninterrupted time when some traditional values and the structural and ideological principles that shaped traditional Burmese society in the past could be resurrected. In sum, the nation chose to recover its own identity rather than survive by modernization. Additionally, Michael Aung-Thwin assumes that coup leaders thought that their self-reliance and self-sufficiency policy could be guaranteed by reintroducing certain values in pre-colonial Burmese society. His suggestion for the best solutions for state identity issue is a monarch system although he noted it as impossible for the lost of royal family.

As the backdrop of these psychological aspects of the society, it adds internal and external imminent situation. The most critical was the internal security issues. According to most account at that time, the immediate cause of the coup was believed

to be the threat, real or perceived, that the Shans and Kayahs were ready to secede from the nation. Moreover, Communist Party of Burma and Karen rebellion were also active. In this situation, the roles of civilian leaders have been limited for fourteen years after its independence. As the external factors, the region was in turbulent situation like the United States Marines land at Danang, Thailand and Philippines's inclination to the U.S.

The resurrection of traditional principles was also analyzed from three dimensions, economics, politics and society. In economic principles, Aung-Thwin's main focus is on the 'Burmese Way' rather than 'Socialism' because U Nu government also opted for socialist state with the policy of *Pyidawtha*, 'pleasant honorable country'. As the economic system after 1962 is regarded as the modern version of pre-1886 system rather than after 1948 system, Karl Polanyi's economic redistribution system was employed to underscore the one after 1962. In this model, zero growth is one of the primary goals in its self sufficient system although undesirable in market economy system. And, it is economic actor that closely related with the collective psychology on independence. Aung-Thwin linked the matter of economic actor to the matter of independence, citing Ne Win's remarks, 'independence without domestic economic control is not independence'.

In his view, the political system after 1962 also followed the tradition rather than the one after 1948. The government and the army also followed the tradition in

which social, political and governmental leadership comes from the military. The relations between government and agrarian class followed it. As this class is the main economic source for government, it obviously favored this class by giving priority in its policy than merchant or trading class.

Lastly, the society, Aung-Thwin concluded that the coup in 1962, their policies, and the results of events upheld the resurrection of tradition than the Westernizing trend after 1948. In particular, Burmese language reappeared as the main lingua franca in education or other cultural expressions. From these points, he concludes that the solution for the future also should be a genuinely 'independent' or following the form and norm of traditional state instead of directly linking Burma to the global world.

3.3 Structural approach

Although structural analysis is rare for the military coup in 1962 Burma, at least two short notes are taking this approach for this coup. Firstly, famous thesis on military politics by Finan³ is one though it is rather theoretical analysis on military's intervention into politics. It seems to be quite significant as its logical line of idea on 1958 and 1962 coup has significant implication for rational understanding on the power shift among actors in this period. The second one, Donnison, also tries to find the cause of the coup in

3. Finan op.cit. p 1. As mentioned in the book, the year of 1962 recorded a series of coups in the world and impressed the political tendency that military actively involves in politics as with the cases of Argentina, Lebanon, Portugal, Syria, Turkey, and Venezuela.

two layers as occasional reasons and deep seated reasons. Both were not fully developed as they might be too early for analysis with enough evidence, however, it also needs to be noted here.

Finer's method is similar with the latter institutional approach as it relies on military's view, however, it respects logical combination of causes as it is rather the theory commonly applicable. In it, military interventions are summarized in the structure, being composed of military's disposition and opportunity. The disposition is explained as being composed of conscious motives and a will to act.

The words of motives or a will do not have clear cut image due to their relation with psychology. Though, Finer used those categories in analyzing military's mind leading to intervention into politics. The motives were explained by citing various military decisions as national interests that military tends to identify it as their own and other sectional interests including class interest, regional interest, corporate interest, and individual self-interest. Additionally, on the matter of a will, mood, the self-important feeling and a morbidly high self-esteem are pointed out as the emotional aspects for military intervention. Furthermore, as the objective circumstances, the opportunity for intervention was closely looked through and described as the coincidence of civilian government's dependency on military authority and military's popularity.

As with the case of Burmese military intervention in 1958, Finer puts it in the case of no disposition to intervene but the opportunity for doing so. This understanding followed official explanation of power transfer from U Nu to Ne Win and is called as 'intervention by invitation' (Ibid : 84) . However, significant point is in the footnote as it arranged the facts on power transfer from 1958 to 1962 in order without guess or interpretation. It says the Home Minister certainly believes that 'the army was preparing a coup, General Ne Win denied, General Ne Win did, turn the government back to civilians, overthrew the civilian government'. Other than military's intention, this process of power transfer shows possibility of rational understanding for this disturbing period.

Donnison took this approach not in academic but in general way as he mentioned (Donnison 1970:11). Firstly, Shan situation in which Sawbwas demanded federalism was described just as occasional reason. On the contrary, disappointment or distrust for politicians was pointed out as the deep seated reasons. This disappointment was also mentioned by Shan author in the master thesis on Ne Win regime (Chao-Tzanghwe 1990). As the reasons for the coup in 1962, Chao-Tzang Yawngghwe generalized officer's view as their envy and disappointment at politicians by saying that the politicians had embraced the good life as big man in the capital, being lacking of direction and ideas. To attest this tendency, autobiographer's words were cited in this thesis as Ne Win felt that U Nu and top civilian leaders had compromised the revolution and socialism.

Donnison's analysis for politician was developed in the comparison between U Nu who had to fight for the survival for his government and Ne Win for the reason of preservation of the Union. The comparison is limited at this stage, however, it can be developed to the full discussion on legitimacy of regimes or the difference of their position as social elites. Such an analytical position is closer to this thesis than other three methods in this chapter.

3.4 Institution approach

In searching for causes of coup, this approach focused on the institutional building process of Burmese military. As the examples of this method, the works of Wiant and Callahan have abundant information and recomposed institutional developing process, though still leaving unsolved blanks of its history.

Firstly, according to Wiant, the political tradition of the military has been developed throughout its history (Wiant 1986). Its desire for the state fed by the military leaders was realized by the successful independence struggle against British and Japan, although the movement composed of broad political groups could not resolve their ideological difference. The military and politics were closely related throughout 1950, leaving 'porous wall between the military and political institutions'. It is significant that the military's Caretaker Government and '62 coup were legitimized by ambivalent reasons, the role of the guardian of the state keeping away from politics and the one of the inheritor of political revolution led by Aung San.

The historical background after independence formed military's another tradition, protecting and epitomizing national unity. The communists defected from the AFPFL and communist military officers also mutinied within the military. Karen started insurgency with Karen officers unit of the military. Furthermore, Shan state situation was deteriorated by the Chinese revolution. The Tatmadaw succeeded in controlling such critical situation until early 1950s, while strengthening its ability and power base through its reorganization under Ne Win's leadership.

The international situation and non-alignment foreign policy after independence demanded military to be self-reliant on its resource. British aid from the independence agreement was terminated and the U.S aid was also rejected while a fifth of government budget was spent on defense. The exceptions were U.S arms aid in 1958 and officers training in US and UK. On the other hand, Defense Service Institute (DSI) was founded in 1950-51 assuming the similar role as PX. This institute developed into the Burma Economic Development Corporation after it became independent from Ministry of Defense in 1961.

The political situation from 1958 to 1962 is blurred but indispensable to understand later development. According to Wiant, the split within the AFPFL was corresponded with the factionalism in the military. It was the anti U Nu officers who put pressure to make the coup in 1958 seeking for new civil military coalition. Ne Win

intervened this coup through negotiation with U Nu for the transfer of power and officers affirmed common goals of the military by declaring 'the National Ideology and the Role of the Defense Service' that aimed at three goals, the restoration of law and order, the implant of democracy, the establishment of socialist economy. This understanding of political split both in AFPFL and military is almost the same line with Callahan, along with the view on recovery of military's unity after power transfer from U Nu. Wiant also followed this split tendency of military's politics by reaching out to the disagreement between the political faction and army faction in 1970' BSPP era.

Two policies implemented during this period were significant because those are viewed as military's mass mobilization strategy against U Nu. The first was the formation of Kyant Khaing Yei Ahi phwei (National Solidarity Association) that organized 400,000 members down to the village level and the second was the 'Buddhism in Danger' campaign with the Buddhist Sangha ostensibly against the communist. Wiant concluded that it was Ne Win's decision that allowed the government to hold elections and the result of it dashed the hope of officers, seeking for coalition with U Nu's opponent in AFPFL. Ne Win came to terms with these officers by transferring two officers and had ten retired. The story after this seem to be inconsistent with the purge of officers because he claims that Ne Win was put pressure to overthrow U Nu although he was 'remained the faithful democrat'.

Interestingly, Wiant is not affirmative on the military's ideological continuity and its development before and after 1962 coup, rather being negative by saying that "there was little other consensus within the Revolutionary Council on either the goals of the Revolution or the means to achieve them. Appeals to unity by the Revolutionary Council following the takeover masked ideological disagreement among the senior coup officers" (Ibid 250). The Council released its fledgling ideology, 'Burmese Way to Socialism', two months after the coup. The publication was after the tenth Commander Officer's Council in which Ne Win requested them to pledge loyalty to the ideology by their signature. In this issue of revolutionary ideology, Wiant is keen on comparing it with the political reality after the coup. He emphasizes that the military should make it clear whether it would share its power with the people under whose name it claimed the aim of revolution, or withdraw the course of revolution.

As noted, Callahan also took the same course as Wiant, in deepening the analysis through archival research and interviews in early 1990's Myanmar. This outstanding research tried to explain the political unstableness from the late 1950' to 62 through power struggle among AFPFL with the tension between military field commanders and staff officers. And as the backdrop of this complicated process, it develops the view on military's historical change and expansion process on its role from institution building to the 'state builder'.

Callahan's research is quite significant in analyzing the two coups in 1958 and 1962 although the methodology for analysis is different from this thesis. Firstly, it precisely followed the record of commander officer's conference since 1950'. Through the records of the debate of the conference, it confirmed the tension between civilian politicians and military officer, particularly between U Nu-AFPFL Clean faction and AFPFL stable faction with field commanders. Additionally, related with this theory, several significant interviews were conducted to analyze 1958 coup as the examples of the divided relation between field commanders and staff officers. It revealed secret meetings attended by field officers(Callahan 2003:186).

On the other hand, Aung Gyi was put against the field commanders. This position is also based on the interview with them by quoting the remarks of Maung Maung,"I didn't want their coup. So we decided to make our coup" before the power transfer from U Nu to Ne Win in 1958. By following this remarks and reaction among them, it concludes that it was Maung Maung and Aung Gyi who was ultimately responsible for taking over power after their agreement with U Nu on September 26, though the role of Ne Win was as unclear as with the case of Wiant.

The evaluation on caretaker government period, after power transfer, is that staff officers were alleviated due to the expansion of their posts in the government. According to Callahan's archival research, among sixteen military officers seconded to Ministry of Labor, half of them were from field officers and half of them were from staff officer's

group. Throughout military's history since its foundation, it was the first time that these two groups of officers shared their career path. Additionally, although this period was described as the one when the institution builders consolidated their position as state builder, it should have had more significant meanings in the context of civil-military relations. For, the caretaker experience broke the barrier of civilian supremacy awareness in politics and showed it as real form. Other than the political impact of this period, the axis of field commanders and staff officers reemerged after returning governance to civilian government in 1960 as Callahan's interview unearthed the fact that secret discussion was held among field officers though the details had not been known yet.

Lastly, the most significance should be put on the purge of officers as it occurred just one year before the coup in March, 1962. The present understanding on this purge is blurred or does not have firm grounds. Though Wiant's conclusion was not so far from the official account, Maung Maung's simultaneous sack with ten colonels was related with coup conspiracy, Callahan developed her theory of axis of field commanders and staff officers in this issue, too. The tone is that the sack of Maung Maung was not related with other officer's as shown with different headlines both as "the purge of Maung Maung" and "the purge of the field commanders"(Ibid198-202) although this purge was announced on the same day.

As detailed analyses on this purge might be quite limited and this conclusion works as a pivot in a series of incidents in this period, discussing points deserve to be

confirmed here. At first, as the cause of Maung Maung's sack, two possibilities were proposed based on the information obtained from interview to his colleagues. The one is the fact that he was at logger heads with Director of Military Intelligence, Bo Lwin and his inclination to CIA. The second is his position against communism as did he convert to catholic according to Aung Gyi. From these facts, the reason for his sack was hypothesized as Ne Win's fear to the CIA backed coup against him. On the other hand, as the cause of field commander's purge, it concluded that field commander's conceit and their tension with staff officers invited Ne Win's intervention. This story is based on the information from the interview with one field commander, Col. Hla Maw(Ibid:201) and supported by later development of organizational reform of army in which the Northern and Southern command were abolished and taken over by smaller five division commands. Related with this conclusion, other hypotheses were noted for the process of this discussion. Those are their disobedience to Ne Win's order of non involvement for the 1960 election result, their coup plan against government and Ne Win, or their inclination to the West in the Cold War environment. Callahan's conclusions for the reasons of sack and purge are summarized in the same structural line as former incidents, the axis of tension between field officers and staff officers because Col. Maung Maung as the staff officer and field commanders were punished separately for different reasons at the same time.

This thesis would like to take the position of elite theory rather than institutional approach. The difference between elite thesis and institutional approach might be the

angle from which authors observe the phenomenon of split and combine within the group. In other this words, elite theory focuses on the continuity of lineage and the process of expelling unorthodox members. It is different from institutional view that opposite positions between two groups compete for its supremacy. The reason for taking this elite theory is the difficulty in explaining the final stage of 1962 coup and lacking of clear definition of Ne Win's position.

As noted by Callahan, the coup in 1962 was the military operation following the bureaucratized chain of command. Though Callahan added that coup in 1958 showed the limit in which it could not keep holding power for the long term and the military consolidated its unification until 1962 through fourteen years of internal power struggle, the tension thesis between field commanders and staff officers was repeatedly attributed to the cause of political disturbance including one year before the coup. Therefore, it is difficult to say rationally in this context that the definitive coup was carried out under completely united circumstances even after members of both factions were ousted simultaneously. The significance in this thesis is that this sack and purge needs to be placed in a different context from axis of tension between two groups.

3.5 Conclusion

The coup d'état analyses are not popular, rather rare for its difficulties in data collection though it gives grave impact on politics, economics, society and even her history. Burma is also the case of the scarcity of analysis even after the painstaking

efforts were continuously made by researchers and scholars. As the result of these valuable works limited, four types of analytical angles are proposed and summarized here.

Firstly, it is the motive approach that would face on the highest wall to move forward. The motive including psychological aspect as shown by Finer in the word of mood is always vague against the simplicity and clearness of coup maker's confident statement. Secondly, the state approach also still remains in the developing stage despite of excellent works by Taylor and Michael Aung-Twin because other social actors were out of its consideration or sealed off in the vague concept of "collective psychological desire". Thirdly, the institutional approach is noticeable in recent scholarly works based on military's institutional record with limitation.

Lastly, the structural approach takes analytical stance on coup d'état in the combination of occasional reasons and deep seated reasons as triggering motives and structural causes proposed in the former chapter. Further, the views of Shan scholars are worth to be noted as it is close to the angle of this approach. Both Chao Tzang Yawnghwe and Sai Aung Tun consider the change of military's institutional strength as the main cause of coup d'état by using the words of "the qualitative changes that had taken place at the Burmese power center"(Chao-Tzang Ygwngwhwe 1987:119) or "a strong and unified force and capable of staging coup"(Sai Aung Tun 2009:503). This analytical view point is close to the approach taken in this thesis.

CHAPTER IV

Triggering motives for 1962 Coup in Burma

This thesis approach to coup is not ‘two dimensional’ but rather ‘three-dimensional’ as it contains structural causes. As noted in the chapter II , the factors composing of coup incident are classified and put into the context of triggering motives and structural causes. This chapter tries to reconsider various political and social phenomena in 1950’ and 60’ Burma in the framework of triggering factors. Such explanation does not appear to have much differences from former analyses, however, theoretical reconsideration might show a clearer and more accurate structural picture on how each ‘gear’ engaged in and led to grave political incident overthrowing U Nu government.

4.1 Conflict of interest with military

As the defense budget shows the level of political influence of the armed forces¹ , Burmese military’s economic activities in 1950’ and 60’ were significant indicators for its

1.Nordlinger.op.cit.pp.67-70. It notes budgetary patterns on coup. The first is that the civilian government that reduced the proportion of the national budget assigned to military tends to be overthrown and secondly the new civilian government or military government that was installed by the officers invariably increased military expenditures. From these, it concludes that one of their chief motivations in taking power is to increase the defense budget, or at least to prevent budgetary reduction.

role and status in the society. Of importance is that not only the military concerns on their budget level but the fact that it was involved in economic activities as a state institution. It means that political interference into their economic activities could have invited their strong reaction against it. In fact, several theses note on military's economic activities in this period.

The most influential economic activity of Burmese military in this period is Defense Service Institute(DSI) . This became the first conglomerate in Burma soon after it started as military post exchange(Steinberg 2005:55) although the significance of DSI lies in the period of caretaker government period from 1958 to 1960. According to the chronicle 'Is Trust Vindicated' published by military's caretaker government in 1960, the DSI was organized in 1951 under the council composed of twelve senior officers of the Ministry of Defence. The objective of establishment was that the profits made by it were to be spent only for the welfare of the members of the Armed Forces(Vindicate 1960 : 223,228).

Under caretaker government, the DSI had fourteen boards comprised of 38 firms and five holding companies, which could be classified into four objectives. Those are 1)development of the national economy 2)lowering of prices and promoting welfare of the people 3)Expansion into new economic fields 4)Propagation of industrial and commercial knowledge. Significantly, several key state industries were included in these boards. Those are the international trade and industry for import and export, shipping

board(The Burma Five Star Line) that operated cargo service with Japan, UK, Europe and East Africa, Banking board(Ava Bank Ltd.) and food production board for meat, fish, poultry(Ibid).

The development of DSI had grave political impact on which the military expanded its autonomous ground into civilian fields through the gain of its own financial resources by engaging in economic activities other than depending on defense budget. This expansion of activities could have led to another interpretation of national defense and breaking the code of civilian control over defense institution. In addition, the DSI was granted tax exemptions and exemption from import duties after it was registered as a public corporation.

Notably, the military was well aware that their autonomous economic activities were lacking of legitimacy as the activity of state institution. For, it claims its development and expansion did follow constitution as the DSI was registered under the Burma Companies Act in 1958 based on the 1947 constitution. The section 42 of the 1947 constitution stipulates government's role as the one to give assistance to non-profit organizations along with socialist economic principles² although it became an empire that

².Vindicate(1960),p224. The section 42: 'The state shall direct its policy towards giving material assistance to economic organizations not working for private profit. Preference shall be given to co-operative and similar economic organizations'.

run a wide range of economic enterprises³. Therefore, the military paved the way for operating lawful autonomous revenue resource through constitutional loophole while it stays as a caretaker for civilian government.

While, it was U Nu who noticed DSI's economic potential and tried to transform it back to government control. And this political strategy definitely undermined the corporate interest of the military before the coup. In 1961, many enterprises under the DSI were handed over to the Burma Economic Development Corporation (BEDC) chaired by Brigadier Aung Gyi with the board of directors composed of three other officers and three civilians . Obviously, this organizational transformation had political implication. Butwell saw it as below.

The purpose of this organization was to take over most of the businesses operated by the Defense Service Institute....Nu's problem was to obtain the benefits of its experience and demonstrated competence without Army control of the economy...In December 1961, Nu proposed creating a second Economic Development Corporation staffed by members of the

³.Steinberg (2005). pp55,56. It emphasizes the impact of the success of DSI as the military's confidence that 'it could indeed run complex economic organizations and thus the economy of the country as a whole'.

Burmese civil service, which suggested that he might be moving gradually to reduce the Army's influence over its economy.⁴

Consequently, U Nu's policy toward Army's economic activities invited serious side effects. Firstly, his agreement on power transfer to caretaker government allowed the army to start expanding its economic activities through the loophole without the control of civilian government⁵. This expansion was viewed by them as a means of promising officer's future by securing a vast reservoir of jobs not only for military personnel but their family and relatives(Walinsky1962:261). Moreover, this huge revenue⁶ dramatically expanded the military's budgetary autonomy, though it was forced to rely on civilian government funding alone (Charney 2009:105) after the establishment of BEDC by U Nu. Therefore, the taking over of the DSI resulted in the decline of political influence of the military and severely hurt their pride⁷.

4.Butwell(1969). p229. Lissak(1976) also sees it as the measure to tighten civilian control over military's economic sector.

5.U Nu government might find the constitutional loophole as enterprises handed over to the BEDC were registered not as cooperatives but as private companies under the Companies Act. FORWARD vol. II ,No.4 (1963),p.4 has details of its process.

6. FORWARD vol. II ,No.4 (1963). p4. It says the BEDC had 39 enterprises dealing 79 different lines of business and employing 10,618 persons at the time when the Revolutionary Council made coup in 1962. It emphasizes that the total authorized capital of these firms stands at K80,555,976 and the subscribed capital at K16,894,000.

7.On October 20 in 1963, the dissolution of the BEDC and 42 firms under it was announced and all of its assets were transferred to the regime under Revolutionary Council. It was just one day after enterprise nationalization act was announced by them. FORWARD vol. II ,No.4 (1963) elaborated the

In light of interference to the military, U Nu made several critical decisions that opposed the development of military in December 1960. Firstly, the creation of an independent National Defense University from national university system was turned down and he also opposed the creation of Central Intelligence Organization. Added with military's corporate interest erosion by the establishment of BEDC in this period, it is not denied that U Nu's blocking policy against the institutional development had degraded its autonomous level⁸.

4.2 Political cleavages in military

Considering the coup in 1962 Burma as the unified military operation under the organizational chain of command, it is significant to try to identify factors that pushed them to choose war-like fighting operation that belongs to military's fundamental institutional roles closely related to its *raison d'être*. In addition to interests above, this topic focuses on military's autonomous 'nationalism' by following its organizational reaction and related remarks on military's internal situation.

reason for dissolution as its improperness functioning as private companies, being against the principle of "Burmese Way to Socialism". On the other hand, Lissak(1976) related this dissolution with the resignation of Brigadier Aung Gyi although he resigned in February 1963. Yet, this seems to have less possibility as Revolutionary Council appointed Colonel Kin Nyo as the head of BEDC just one month after the departure of Aung Gyi.

⁸Wiant(1986), p265. It notes that a number of U Nu's policies were viewed as a threat to the corporate interests of the Tatmadaw. Trager referred to these policies, too. See also Trager (1963) .p,313.

In theory, military institution is analyzed as being composed of governmental part, institutional part and the security community. The first component is defined as ‘the military as government’ in which staff officers involves in governmental activities, the second ‘the military as institution’ that includes officers engaging in training and bureaucratic assignment in the camp and the third one as the group involving in intelligence activities (Stepan 1988). Though the concept was employed to explain political change related with authoritarian military regimes in Brazil and Latin American countries, the basic concept is, in general, to be applied to transitional process of authoritarian regime.

In it, the configuration among those three components has been discussed in the context of democratization process, however, there exist cases in which conflicting configuration or division brought by sectoral cleavages in the institution works as the catalyst for the shift of political power. Other research from military’s angle claims the possibility of the institutional division as the motive for their power seizure and in fact there are cases in which such cause and result are confirmed. In case of 1960’ Burma, though those components are not clearly divided among them as some prime figures are overlapping, the outcome of political cleavages in the military institution is easily understood in the latter’s motive approach. As the cleavages are the reflection of the social structure, particularly in Burma, it is the division among political actors. Then, what factors decide whether the cleavages works as the one that encourages military’s

withdrawal or pushes it to the seizure of political power? The hint seems to lie in the definition of mood of the military. As Finer's definition, there exists a flash point (Finer, op.cit:63) on which military takes decisive action.

It is true that deepened politicization of the army could lead to institutional break down with inviting dis-function even facing on serious external threat. Usually this divided tendency could be observed in military reshuffle or their relation with politicians. The attempt of political control of officers through providing individual benefits through promotion or their external relations with political actors causes serious division among military officers and politicizes their behaviors seeking for their own benefit. The more politically oriented the officers' action is for their survival in the institution, the more damaged the institutional strength is under organizational command. This decline of institutional strength is perceived as the direct threat or attack against military discipline and hierarchy and explained as accompanying serious side effect of inspiring military's interventionist motives (Nordlinger, op.cit:71-5). Considering of this internal decay of military institution, the prescription for this ailment is easily prepared. The highest priority should be put on the preventative measures against break down by employing strategy of fighting against common external opponents .

Firstly, the political split inside of the Burmese military had symmetry with the AFPFL split in late 1950'. As analyzed in the next chapter, AFPFL had split into two major factions, the Stable AFPFL represented by Ba Swe, Kyaw Nyein and the Clean

AFPFL formed by U Nu and Tin Tun in 1958 after repeated splits since its foundation. Many records support the view that majority military officers felt sympathy to the Stable being opposed to U Nu⁹.

In light of discipline in the military institution, political division among officers clearly show such symptom. Other than political factors, historical record in Burma attributes this sectoral cleavages to politician's personal ties with some major military officers. For instance, Ba Swe(Stable AFPFL)'s brother-in-law is Colonel Kyi Win who is familiar with Brigadier Aung Shwe and Kyaw Nyein had closely tie with Major Tun Tin¹⁰.

These porous personal ties between political party and military might promote pro-Stable officers to act against the Clean AFPFL government without hesitation. Brigadier Aung Shwe(the commander), Colonel Kyi Win(CO at Kyauk Brigade Headquarters),Lt Colonel Chit Khaing(the GSO(1) under Aung Swe) held secret meeting at Mandalay just before the coup in 1958¹¹. Though it is unknown what was their exact

9. Wiant.op.cit,pp248-9. It also notes other officers who supported U Nu in their position as socialists. More interestingly, he observed Ne Win as a suppresser between them and preserved unity of the Tatmadaw through his negotiation for power transfer with U Nu.

10. MYANMAR POLITICS 1958-1962 VOL II (2007)pp.79-80. In such circumstances, it treats Ne Win as exception of supporter for the Stable, and classified Aung Gyi into them. However, it seems to have argument for this classification as other analyses put Aung Gyi as close to U Nu. See also Callahan,op.cit, p.183.

11. MYANMAR POLITICS 1958-1962 VOL II (2007)p.88 and Callahan,op.cit,p.186.

discussion even after Callahan's research, it is confirmed that the topic was on the coup against U Nu government. Significantly, Callahan defined them as 'field officers' against 'staff officers' inside of the military institution¹². Thus, this meeting clearly presents the development of military's politicization symptom as such 'field officers' trial to take political group action without the notice of the supreme commander, Ne Win.

On the other hand, 'staff officers' were not the exception of this politicization process. As the case of politicization of staff officers, the proposal made by U Nu is remarkable though it did not reach agreement. In early September 1958, 'staff officers' were proposed to form government with U Nu when Aung Gyi, Maung Maung and Tin Pe visited him to ease the tension between the Clean faction and military officers¹³. Given the fact that the military and U Nu finally reached agreement on constitutional

12. Over this secret meeting, Ne Win and Maung Maung's remarks appear to be significant considering the later political development. Although the position of Colonel Maung Maung is unclear, explanations coincide as the opposition of Ne Win against this plot. In particular, Ne Win is said to Maung Maung that the time is not proper while replied to the Stable by saying ' they could not do much. Wait and see their moves'. See MYANMAR p.88.

13. See Sein Win(1989).p.76. He notes this 6-man Inner Circle as an official coalition government composed of three army bosses and three from U Nu's faction. Callahan also confirmed this proposal by her interview to Aung Gyi and Maung Maung. Her version is that U Nu's appointment of three of them and General Ne Win as cabinet ministers. As the contrast to field officers, she notes, "This made me(Maung Maung) very angry. The field commanders would think we had been bribed by Nu". See Callahan pp.187, 254.

power transfer, it is easily assumed that such political attempts for infiltration into the military affairs would had been frequently attempted at any level of military institution.

Over the secret meeting of field commanders noted above, Myanmar's historical record has significant internal discussion inside of the army. It was on 20th September 1958 in Manung Maung's house on Inya road when he reported his meeting with coup plotting field commanders to Aung Gyi and Khin Nyo. Maung Maung's proposal was to make coup to avoid disintegration or split of Tatmadaw after his failure of persuading them to halt. This discussion was concluded in the rift between Maung Maung and Aung Gyi as the latter refused the plan and did not attend the next day meeting¹⁴. The significance is that even the staff officers did not reach agreement or any plan on staging coup just 6 days before final agreement with U Nu on power transfer. The whole picture of the coup in 1962 was still under the veil, however, this unpreparedness and inaccuracy in 1958 might show the fact that the institution still remain on the politicized stage without tightly controlled discipline under the command.

4:3 The purge as 'arousal effect'

The politicization process of the military institution continued intermittently throughout turbulent years until 1962 when it seized government itself by coup. The political tension among military officers was diffused temporarily during caretaker government (1958 -1960) due to the large expansion of governmental post , however, this

14.MYANMAR, pp92-93.

'fertile' ground had shrink along with its withdraw from government. Importantly, it was the year of 1961 under U Nu government formed following the election after caretaker government when the purge of Maung Maung and field commanders was announced. This incident had been argued from various angles related with coup plot, disobedience to Ne Win, Cold War circumstances (Callahan,op.cit:200) and U Nu's policy of Buddhism as state religion¹⁵. However, this thesis would like to read it in the context of military's politicization process and its arousal effect before staging coup in 1962.

As noted, the purge of officers has been analyzed by diplomats and scholars to gauge its implication or to search for the real causes. After the announcement in February 1961, Maung Maung, one regional commander and nine brigade commanders were transferred to military attaches, assigned to ambassador post or allowed to leave their positions. As Maung Maung was involved in counter intelligence activities as the director of military training and other significant activities, this purge was widely observed to predict the future course of the army leadership.

In light of later development to military coup, this purge has, at least, two aspects depending on the positions of decision-makers. Firstly, it was U Nu who was in charge of defense ministry under his government. Then, although this period was after Ne Win's

15. The handbook of Southeast Asia 1962, p230. Related to the constitutional amendment on Buddhism as state religion in August 1961, it assumed that the purge of Maung Maung and Aung Swe could be considered as having something to do with young officer's opposition to amendment, stemming from their policy that religion affects the discipline of army officers.

caretaker government, U Nu's approval as defense minister should be needed to make the reshuffle take into effect. In addition, among field commanders who were purged, there exist officers who made a plan to topple U Nu government in 1958 having tie with the Stable AFPFL leaders. In this sense, this purge is not against U Nu's political interests

Despite the fact above, it is too early to conclude that this purge was the product of U Nu's political interference into the military institution. It is true that the failure of Pyidaungsu government(1960-1962) was attributed to U Nu's inclination of political interference with all levels of the government despite his firm pledge at the Chamber of Deputies that the politicians would not interfere with the administrative institution¹⁶. However, it is also not necessarily true that he is the sole factor for politicization of institution. For, it is impossible to carry out the purge of strong field commanders without military's institutional decision as this heavy punishment could be turned down immediately or invite serious backlash (Callahan,op.cit:200). More significantly, the institutional politicization could works as the triggering factor for regime change.

On the other hand, from military supreme commander's view, the outcome of this purge might had the effect of complete penetration of order against any individual objections under the chain of command. Among purged field commanders, southern commander, Brig.Aung Shwe(former Northern commander) and 7 infantry Col Kyi Win

¹⁶.Butwell pp.244-245. Butwell's evaluation on U Nu is "As political leader of his country, he was genuinely successful until the spring of 1958... as chief governmental administrator, he was never a success". On U Nu's pledge, see Trager (1963) .p.309.

had been enough politicized to make their own plan of coup in 1958. Diplomatic record confirms of this ‘shake up’ as a successful measure in quelling the challenge to Ne Win’s leadership and coup plot¹⁷. Furthermore, these officers were known as ‘politically right’ , that is to say, staunch anti-Communists¹⁸.

As consequence, at least, this purge had ‘arousal effect’ inside of the institution. For, the purge is a clear example of the most severe punishment against any individual political activity inside of military institution. It is true that the tension among officers

¹⁷Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Volume XXIII Southeast Asia) , pp88-89. In the attached footnote on the memorandum from the assistant secretary of state for far eastern affairs to Secretary of State Rusk, several telegrams are recorded. Telegram 546 reported on February 8 1961 that “All except Maung Maung were planning to depose Ne Win, but he acted first. Maung Maung was not a coup plotter ; his opposition was over policy and his personality conflict with Ne Win”. Moreover, other telegrams 472 and 556 on February 10 summarized, ”Ne Win has acted with apparent success to quell incipient challenges to his leadership and to prevent possible attempt by army to take over government”.

Callahan deepened the research on the exclusion of Maung Maung from the coup plotting of field commanders. The hypotheses are Maung Maung’s conflict with Director of Military Intelligence Bo Lwin and Maung Maung’s anti-communism position in the environment of border agreement with China and foreign economic assistance. See Callahan ,op.cit, pp198-199.

¹⁸ In the interview to Myanmar scholar (2011 July), he made comment ‘My father had contact with some of them and my understanding is that they are “right” . Therefore, the “leftists” were pleased with the purge’ in the Cold War situation. See also Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Volume XXIII Southeast Asia). p,104. The memorandum after 1962 coup from the director far east region referred to the purge and described the all purged officers as “well known that many of these officers are staunch anti-Communists”.

was high throughout this period¹⁹, however, it is much more significant to interpret this purge as the one helping the recovery of monolithic structure by excluding officers who were affected not only by domestic but international political division at their level.

The re-organization of the command structure after the purge also needs to be read in this context. It abolished the powerful Northern and Southern commands and replaced them with five division commands (Maung Aung Myo 1998:25, Callahan, *op.cit*, 201). Certainly, it is still intended as the preventative measure against the tension between field staff and field commanders as the comment of a British Embassy observer²⁰. Nevertheless, considering the impact of the purge inside of the institution and the time frame until the coup in several months, the reshuffle and administrative change of command should have had more weight on the aspect of preparation for the future operation in Rangoon.

Monolithic institutional system of the military is indispensable in staging full-scale coup under a prepared plan with operational complexity and keeping complete

19. See Callahan's 'Army Reorganization', *op.cit*, pp, 201-2.

20. Quoted in Callahan, p. 202. It says, the reorganization gave the Ministry of Defence staff "tighter control over all military activities" by eliminating the powerful northern and southern commanders "who might (if disaffected) be in a strong position to stage a military coup".

secrecy to make the operation work in a sudden²¹. Viewing from this angle, the change of Southern command into Central command and the replacement of commander from Aung Shwe to Col.Sein Win have critical meaning. It is not uncommon that the preparatory timeframe for the coup is not identified due to its secrecy and lack of evidence despite of its significance. Therefore, careful consideration is needed for calculating coup time scale not only from reshuffle but from other angles including officer's and institutional ideological development, its experience as a caretaker administrator and so on so forth. However, this theme is suitable for the argument within the framework of the institutional approach for the military with having deep and accurate historical evidence on the operation.

4.4 Conclusion

Comparing to structural or deep seated causes, triggering causes are relatively easy to be noticed as the motives for the coup d'état being closely related with the interests of the military. In case of 1962 Burma, two analytical aspects for the analysis in triggering motives were focused in this chapter. Those are the conflict over the expansion of military's economic autonomous ground and the effect of institutional reaction against sectoral cleavages. Among other things, those two are extremely significant in terms of military's institutional interest as they had direct impact on its revenue source and internal control.

²¹. From personal discussion with Ukrist. He emphasizes the risk of sectoral cleavages in the military institution and notes significance of the reshuffle. Political intervention through pro-Thaksin class 10 members in Thai armed forces is analyzed in McCargo and Ukrist(2005).

As the prelude to military regime, the expansion of DSI had two clear effects. At first, it dramatically enlarged the fields of military's activities other than national defense. As declared in its objectives, it was founded for the aim of playing the part for the development of national economy. The expansion to key state industries was realized through the legalization of its activities through the loophole of 1947 constitution during the caretaker government period. Although U Nu tried to curtail its activities by setting up BEDC as Prime Minister after the elections, it might be too late to recover tight civilian control as its scale was large enough. U Nu's curtailing policy was also seen as his intervention into military's economic autonomous ground.

Military's internal political cleavages and the effect of purge were other direct motives for making military operation under the single command of Ne Win. As Burmese military was deeply involved in politics since its foundation of BIA as discussed in chapter V, its internal cleavage was noticed and researched in the institutional approach in the framework of tension between 'staff officers' and 'field officers'. By following the theoretical concept of military as government, institution and security community with the tension above, the sectoral behavior of field commanders and political negotiation by staff officers were examined for the evidence of the cleavages before caretaker government period. Though there are limited resources for the reasons of purge in 1961, it was based on the decision both of military and government. Considering the purge with reorganization of command structure, at

least, these had ‘arousal effect’ among military officers who were influenced by political cleavage atmosphere.

Triggering motives are imminent threats for military’s corporate interests, pushing it to make a final decision. In this sense, military’s autonomous ground is considered as being threatened before the years of coup d’état in the fields of its economic activities and internal governance.

Chapter V

Structural Causes for the Coup in 1962 Burma

In succession to triggering causes of Coup in the former chapter, this chapter examines structural causes of the Coup. Firstly, legitimacy decline of U Nu government is to be noticed by careful reading of political process in 1950'. In the end, the vacuum of political power emerged along with the political struggle among political actors and U Nu alone was left after other competitors fallen out of political arena. In addition to the power vacuum, the security decline related with the controversy over Buddhism as state religion also worked for the erosion of legitimacy ground of U Nu government. With the legitimacy decline of U Nu government, the Federal issue also had structural effect on regime change as this is closely related with the state formation and constitution. With other structural causes, the historical memory of 'coup' is of importance. The recent were their operations against Britain and their plot against Japanese military rule. Not only coup experience in a generation, experience in historical context should not be omitted as its memory transmits over generations in the form of political culture.

5.1 Waned legitimacy

5.1.1 Political power vacuum

Firstly, as the backdrop of the legitimacy decline of U Nu regime, the political process needs to be examined in which the political power vacuum was created at the last stage of a series of disruption of AFPFL. Although U Nu led his own political party, Pyidaungsu¹, after his triumph in 1960's elections, it is no doubt that U Nu's legitimacy shares the same source of legitimacy ground of AFPFL as it was the wide range of national coalition achieving state independence.

Initially, AFPFL is formed as AFO (Anti-Fascist Organization) in August 1944 and transformed into the AFPFL in May 1945. In Origin, it is to be traced back to the resistance movement against Japanese occupation, organized by Communist, Than Tun, however, it grew up to the single political command with the military wing of PVO (People's Volunteer Organization) organized by Aung San².

Throughout the negotiation process for independence, it was this organization that was chosen as the Burmese counterpart with which British government negotiates on Burma's independence. Thereafter, this organization occupied more than 90% seats in 1947 elections before establishing constitution. In sum, this is the sole political organization representing early independent Burma, having its legitimacy ground on

1. U Nu (1975), p.332. The clean AFPFL was named as the Pyidaungsu Party that means the Union in Burmese.

2. It is a loose coalitional front formed in 1955 to contest the 1956 elections against the AFPFL. It won 47 among 250 seats. It is not only composed of aboveground communist groups but also include light wing Justice party under U E Maung. See Becka (1995), p.148 and Jounstone (1963), p.121.

rationality through her independence rather than traditional ground before colonial period. In other words, it is the organization that founded ground base of independent Union after colonial state and Japanese occupation.

Secondly, the AFPFL was composed of several factions. In the political process until the collapse of it and political power vacuum, U Nu's relations with other factions and political actors are reviewed here. Those components are considered as the Socialist Party, Communist related party(NUF), and the army though it is outside of the league and other members of U Nu's faction.

Among anything else, U Nu's relations with Socialist group was the direct cause of the split and fall of the League. Leading members of this group were Thakin Mya who was assassinated with Aung San in 1947, Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein. This was the party formed as the opponent to the Communist party during independence movement period and turned into dominant group in the AFPFL after independence. The cause of the AFPFL's collapse can be traced back to the two factions in early 1950'. Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyien were considered as representing the 'educated' class holding ministries position of industries and cooperatives by promoting industrialization as they were from Rangoon university. While Thakin Tin and Thakin Kyaw Tun were the 'uneducated' in charge of ministries of agriculture and land nationalization, controlling All Burma Peasant Organization (ABPO)(Sein Win 1989:14-5).

This factional struggle within the AFPFL developed to the next stage of instability and political vacuum. At the initial stage of this internal conflict, U Nu was above those two factions and tried to rebuild party unification by resigning his premiership from June 1956 to March 1957 when Ba Swe took premiership and Kyaw Nyein became a deputy premier. However, as the result of undermining of U Nu's political leadership by the Kyaw Nyein's letter accusing U Nu and the closed meeting in which the plan for pushing U Nu to nominal position was discussed, U Nu made a decision to take side with 'uneducated' Tin-Tun faction. And this faction of U Nu-Tin-Tun was called as the Clean AFPFL against Ba Swe-Kyaw Nyien faction as the Stable AFPFL.

As the consequence of exacerbated factional relations, no confidence motion was submitted to the Parliament. Facing on this, U Nu sought alliance with the third parties, National Unity Front and Arakan National on United Organization (ANUO) as the Stable faction had the majority in the Chamber of Deputies. In the end, the motion was denied, being the majority 127 against the motion and 119 for the motion among 246 votes (Ibid:46, Butwell 1969:169). Considering a margin of only eight ballots, 44 votes of NUF for Nu-Tin side was decisive.

Before and after the vote, the Communist party side intensified its efforts to strengthen its political influence. The demands from the Communist side widely ranged from the release of all political prisoners to legalization of underground political

parties³. Indeed, ex-insurgents group came into the legal fold and formed People's Comrade Party (PCP) and it was legalized based in Rangoon. Furthermore, the demand for the legalization of the CPB Army was reported (Johnston 1963:125,129). Consequently, U Nu's strategy for political survival allied with NUF led to the expansion of Communist's demand in legal fold.

This expansion of Communist force in political field should have accompanied the reaction from the Army that had kept fighting in the field with them. The transfer of political power from U Nu to Ne Win in 1958 had the effect of oppressing the Communist after U Nu's alliance with them against no confidence motion though the 1958 coup plot per se was triggered through the politicization process in the army. In calculating the political power balance, the Ne Win's government successfully solved security issues and suppressed the expansion of CPB.

After having the military back to the barracks after caretaker government period based on the official agreement in 1958, U Nu successfully recovered his legitimacy by acquiring overwhelming majority support for his Clean AFPFL in the 1960' elections. On the other hand, the loss in these elections severely damaged the Stable AFPFL with the top leader's loss of Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein in succession for the Chamber of Deputies.

3. Johnstone(1963), p130. According to the letter of Than Tun to U Nu and the proposal of NUF, those are 1)free all political prisoners 2)repeal repressive laws 3)disband all pocket armies 4)legalize all political parties, including underground groups 5)give firm guarantees to wipe out all crimes committed during the course of the civil war.

As the Stable gained only 45 among 250 seats in the elections, this result was seen as the end of prominent leader's generation of the Stable and the return to the one party political system since the beginning of the Union⁴.

Given the former political process, the possibility of returning to the one party system was temporally expected or the political reality did not fully reflect the expectation expressed by constituencies. Nonetheless, political power vacuum emerged with the rapid decline of U Nu's performance rate and the newly created split in the party. After the elections, the Clean AFPFL started its new mandate under the new party name of the Union party, Pyidaungsu in Burmese. However, soon after that, it falls into the same pit as the AFPFL through the split into the two factions. One leading group was called as 'Thakin' in which the professional and uneducated socialist politicians like Thakin Tin belonged, and the other 'U-Bo's' being composed of two factions, U's of top professional party leaders and Bo's of former members of 'Thirty Comrades' formed before independence. Along with intensifying the rivalries between the two factions, U Nu revealed his intention of retirement of politics in 1964. It was in January 1962, two months before the coup when U Nu had stepped down as the Party President while remained as Prime Minister under the circumstances in which two factions competing for the dominance of the party's Executive Council. Although it was Thakin joined by Dr.E

4. Butwell & Von der Mehden (1960). It recorded the election results as "Clean" AFPFL and Allies won 168, "Stable" AFPFL and Allies 45, others 37. This result was seen as having the meaning of "a return to the one-party monopoly of power that characterized the more than ten years of AFPFL dominance which began in 1947."

Maung that U Nu seemed to give nod as party leadership, it was too weak as a political group to lead the country facing on numerous difficulties.

In the end, no political party with robust structure was left. Furthermore, any influential individual political actor was not left except for U Nu who kept lowest level of legitimacy since his political rise since the Union independence. After a series of falls of the Stable AFPFL, the Communist, U-Bo's of the Union Party, it is not difficult for anyone to intervene into this vacuum as no political actor had leadership to form legitimate alliance against an illegal power seeker.

5.1.2 Rise and fall of U Nu's legitimacy and security decline

U Nu himself was not a founder of AFPFL nor the leader who has overwhelming charismatic political power at the early stage. Although he was the president of the Rangoon University Student Union, the member of the *Do Bama Asi Ayon* and served as Minister of foreign Affairs under Dr. Ba Maw's government, he was not a major influential figure in AFPFL. According to Ba Swe, U Nu was "well behind Thakin Mya, and Thakin Mya was not even a close second to Aung San"(Butwell,op.cit:51). Despite of his position behind leading leadership at the early stage of the AFPFL soon after independence, U Nu gradually increased his political influence and start playing significant roles.

As the factors of his rise in the AFPFL, Butwell analyzed well from the angles of his relations with other political actors. Firstly, U Nu had personal tie with Communist members since prewar period. Among them were Thakin Than Tun, the founder and chairman of CPB and Thein Pe Myint, a Member of Parliament for the NUF both of whom were active in the *Do Bama Asi Ayon*. Though, the expulsion of CPB from AFPFL in October after its general strike and denounce of Aung San in October 1946 (Lintner 1990:10-1). CPB invited different outcome. As the second rising factor, U Nu developed his relation with Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein who organized the Socialist Party to counteract the communist by giving his blessing while keeping his position as an onlooker(Taylor 2008:140). Lastly, more than anything else, his relation with Aung San is the definitive factor in terms of his legitimacy. In particular, U Nu had played significant role at the last stage of independence as the lieutenant of Aung San. Not only had U Nu had personal tie with Aung San, he was directly involved in the process of achieving independence. After the agreement between Aung San, the President of AFPFL, and Clement Atlee, British Prime Minister, on January 27 1947, U Nu was elected as the President of Constituent Assembly. After the assassination of Aung San in July, official treaty was signed between Clement Atlee and U Nu, in which the Republic of the Union of Burma was recognized as a fully independent, sovereign state on 17 October 1947. Through the negotiation process, U Nu is said to have the opinion of complete withdrawal from the British Commonwealth for the reasons that any constitutional tie with United Kingdom would invite the split of AFPFL .

In addition to these manifold relations with other political actors and symbolic political role in her independence as a successor of Aung San that helped work as the rational ground of legitimacy, his own personal character effectively fermented charismatic ground for his legitimacy. Of significance among others is his religious belief and his policies for promoting Buddhism. As this evidence, U Nu himself is known as a devout Buddhist by taking vow of celibacy after independence and practicing meditation for four to five hours a day (Butwell, op.cit:62,67,68). As the government policy, the Vipassana meditation⁵ is promoted in nationwide and 207 meditation centers were founded by government aid until 1956 (U Nu 1957:113).

Conclusively speaking, U Nu's policies for religion worked as the double edge sword toward his legitimacy of Prime Minister. In other words, his legitimacy was supported and damaged by his policies based on his Buddhist belief as these policies invited serious security deterioration that severely undermined his government legitimacy, too. In particular, the policy for Buddhism as state religion is of extremely important as the turning point of his legitimacy and the result of watershed in her history

5. Ibid,p67-8. U Nu himself is explaining on this Vipassana meditation as below. This is the concise account on how to practice it by keep watching practitioner's mind objectively putting oneself in the position of a third party.

“What is...required is the sense of awareness at the first impact of sight, sound, scent, taste, touch and thought...if you apply a sense of awareness every time you see, or hear, or eat, or smell, or touch, or think, mental state of attachment or revulsion will not occur in you so long as that awareness lasts”.

from religious to secular trend seeking for authentic independent socialism(Eugene Smith 1965:283).

As the prelude for Buddhism as state religion policy, the Sixth Great Buddhist Council was held in Rangoon from May 1954 to May 1956. Though its implementation was entrusted to the Buddha Sasana Council (Ibid:158), holding of it is the government decision following traditional relations between state and religion in Theravada Buddhism as the primary object of holding a Buddhist Council is to purify the religious system through immoral monks and dispelling wrong views by re-edit the scripture, Pitaka. For two years, 2500 monks including other four countries, Cambodia, Ceylon, Laos and Thailand also attended for this re-edition process. U Nu's address at the end of the Council clearly indicates the government role as a protector of Buddhism⁶.

To be sure, the religious issue related with his Buddhism as the state religion policy had gave grave impact on with repeated power conflict in the AFPFL and the Union Party. Though U Nu took several preliminary steps for the Buddhism as the state religion, his statements during his elections campaign in 1959 was the key for the substantial action of its introduction. This declaration was made on September 26, 1959

6. U Nu(1955), pp,158-169. At the end of the address, U Nu announced, 'Revered Sirs, please give a righteous decision with regard to the good and correct form of Pitaka Scriptures, while the Union Government will protect you with legal authority. May I most respectfully request you, Revered Sir, who are virtuous, fond of discipline, well versed in the sacred scriptures and devoted to religious practices and who belong to the noble lineage of holy arahats, to give a recital of the Scriptures without any fear or hesitancy.'

just before the official start of the campaign, in which he stated that Buddhism becomes state religion had his party won the elections (Eugene Smith, op.cit:237). Though this pledge was not included in the manifesto due to the reason for possible interference with constitutional code, his campaign strongly indicated his close relation with Buddhism compared to opposition, the Stable AFPFL of socialists. Three main appeals of the Clean AFPFL were a Buddhist state, statehood possibility for Arakan and the criticism against Army and the Stable faction by using the term "facism"⁷.

As consequence, the implementation of Buddhism as state religion policy was Pandora's Box not only for U Nu but for the state itself, in particular, for security reasons. The elections result in 1960 in which U Nu's faction occupied overwhelmingly majority of seats made it inevitable for him to take the course of placing Buddhism on the state religion. It was on August 26, 1961 when the both houses of Parliament approved the third amendment constitution bill that has the section of Buddhism as the state religion⁸. Despite of the passage through Parliament, the bill invited controversy from various

7. Butwell & Mehden, op.cit, p.155. It also refers to ballot box of the Clean faction having traditional Buddhist color of deep yellow with the photograph of U Nu

8. Eugene Smith, op.cit., pp.329-331. The prime sections of the constitution (third amendment) act are noted here below.

2. In section 21 of the Constitution

(a) for subsection (1) the following shall be substituted as subsection (1), namely: "(1) Buddhism being the religion professed by the great majority of the citizens of the Union shall be the State religion

(b) after subsection (4) the following shall be inserted as subsection (5), namely: "(5) The Union Government shall render financial aid amounting to a minimum equal to .50 per cent of its annual current expenditure for matters connected with religions.

quarters. Firstly, religious minorities, Muslim and Christian officially opposed the bills and mass demonstration was planned whereas the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies issued an order banning demonstration nearby the Chamber during the session(Ibid : 253-263). Secondly, a writ of quo warranto and the injunction to stay pending against the third amendment bill was sought for the Supreme Court by Kachin, Karen, Chin and Kayah persons by claiming that it is against the section 21(4) , the abuse of religion for political purpose⁹ although this application was dismissed.

Furthermore, over the fourth amendment, the controversy over Buddhism as the state religion developed to the situation uncontrollable and led to serious security deterioration. This change of political atmosphere might rationally explain the reason for sudden change of state course from U Nu's triumph with legitimacy after elections to the coup by Ne Win when the legitimacy of U Nu government plunged at the lowest level. Along with the controversy over third amendment, U Nu government sought for other changes to take balance between Buddhism and other religions. Those include adding another provision to section 21, (6) ¹⁰to make it clear that non-Buddhist religions are also granted the state protection as Buddhism. Additionally, a proviso is also attached to

9. The Constitution section 21(4) accompanies punishment to the abuse as below.

The abuse of religion for political purpose is forbidden; and any act which intended or is likely to promote feelings of hatred, enmity or discord between racial or religious communities or sects is contrary to this Constitution and may be made punishable by law.

10. The section 21(6) : "The Union government shall protect the religions from all dangers including insult and false representation made by words either spoken or written or by other means". Eugene Smith, op.cit, p270.

section 20 in order to preserve the right to teach religion in Christian or Muslim schools under the condition¹¹. This fourth amendment was the last stroke to the controversy of Buddhism as state religion issue chiefly because it set fire on the opposition of Buddhist who is the majority of population.

The legitimacy of U Nu and security situation plummeted soon after the fourth amendment. Firstly, before the pass of the bill at the Parliament, the Union Sangha League, supporter for U Nu's Union Party, revealed its opposition to the fourth amendment bill as the amendment would nullify the effect of the third amendment by recognizing other religion's status equally. A rally was organized at the Shwedagon pagoda proceeding to the prime minister's residence and campaign started denouncing it as the damage to the Buddha Sasana.

Even worse, after the pass of the bill through the joint session of the Parliament, the opposition by monks turned to anti-Muslim riot. Protesting against the government permission of three Muslim mosques construction in the outskirts of Rangoon, monks occupied and demolished one of mosques and set fire other two. In the course of this

¹¹ The attached proviso initially proposed by the advisory committee was considered as a conditional clause to the right for teaching any religions in schools. The section 20 preserved the right to teach religion by saying, "All persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess and practice religion subject to public order, morality or health and to the other provisions of this Chapter". The attached proviso is added to it as the one, "Provided that no minor in school shall be taught any religion other than the religion other of his parents without the previous consent in writing of, his parents or guardian". See Eugene Smith, *op.cit*, pp.270-1 and Maung Maung(1961), p.260.

incident, two Buddhist and two Muslim died and several hundreds were arrested including 92 monks. The government and U Nu was strongly denounced after the incident as being responsible for the riot and resorted to brutal action to resolve it (Eugene Smith op.cit:269-280, Butwell, op.cit:225-6). More than anything else, legitimacy decline related to Buddhism that is the dominant religion in the society had enough effect for leaving political leadership to open anyone who wishes to usurp it. Thus, deteriorating security situation has possibility of allowing easy political intervention, appealing the restoration of order by security agencies. In addition, it was the military that opposed the third amendment for Buddhism as the state religion at this juncture (Eugene Smith op.cit:252, Butwell, op.cit:225).

5.2 War time operation seeking for state power and embryo of RC

Considering military's leaping process from the revolutionary army aiming for independence to a political power seeker staging coup in 1962, the institutional 'memory' is significant as the institution tends to make a same decision in the framework of its norm and tradition. In retrospect, fledgling Burmese military had two critical occasions in involving the activity of seeking state power through violent measure. The first is their struggle against colonialism and second is against fascism both in which military leadership played pivotal role as in 1962.

In general, Burmese Army has two traditions, emanating from British colonial army formed largely by Indians and ethnic minorities in colonial Burma and the

nationalist army that was formed to pursue independence from the Britain(Wiant,op.cit, 242). In the course of nationalist tradition, the origin is Burma Independence Army (BIA) that officially launched its activities in Bangkok in late 1941 after core members were trained in Hainan Island off Taiwan by Japanese military. After it marched into Rangoon in January 1942, this national force survived the turbulent period through organizational changes and gradually building up its corporate culture along with nationalism. It was in July 1942 when BIA was disorganized and Burma Defense Army (BDA) was newly formed only by several thousands of former BIA members having headquarters in central Pyinmana mainly because of security reasons after Japanese occupation of Burma. Under Dr.Ba Maw's government, this BDA was reorganized as Burma National Army (BNA) under the leadership of Aung San as Minister of Defense and Ne Win as Commander in Chief. However, due to the need for taking the status of British ally after the World War, BNA was transformed to Patriotic Burmese Forces (PBF) as a military force of the AFPFL, which is rather independent of either British or Japanese.

Whereas two other military institutions founded in this period are referred to contribute to forming Burmese military corporate identity(Callahan,op.cit), those he institutions also help work as the ground for forming anti-Japanese officer corps. Firstly, Officer's Training School(OTS) in Mingaladon had such an effect even after its foundation in 1942 under Japanese army leadership hoping to control of Burmese Army(Guyot 1966 : 321). In consequence, against its initial aim, it became the ground for forming anti-Japanese cadets in tightly knitted group (Callahan,op.cit:61). Second,

Military Preparations Bureau(MPB) formed in Rangoon for organizing troops under the direct control of Japanese military also became anti-Japanese operational ground where the Army Young Officer's Resistance Group(AYRG) was formed (Ibid: 63-5).

Throughout the changing and reforming process of military institution, nascent Burmese military had two crucial occasions for having practical operations for taking political power from states under colonialism and fascism. The first is the operation marching into Rangoon in 1942 and the second one is the activities led to the revolt against Japanese rule. The first operation was, first and foremost, the operation organized by BIA though Japan's Fifteenth Army simultaneously carried out its operation by taking different course from BIA to Rangoon. Of significance in this first BIA's operation is that six member's small group was formed in order to lead rioting groups inside of Burma(U Maun 1989 : 32, Callahan,op.cit :49-50). Ne Win was appointed as the head of this small group and received order on January 14, 1942 leaving for Burma and arrived in Rangoon on February 2, one month before the occupation of Rangoon. This group also set up military training point and organized guerilla force in Pegu still within the British controlling area¹².

Military's second operation against the state leadership started soon after Japanese occupation of Burma. Though the resistance movement under the name of the

12. Izumiya (1967), pp116, 147. Izumiya, a Japanese member of BIA and Minami-kaka, made comment on Ne Win's early arrival in Rangoon and his ability to organize guerilla force as one of the reasons for his strong leadership in RC after the War.

AFPFL was a broad coalition composed of the army, the communist and the socialist (Guyot,op.cit:362, Beck 1995:24), the preparation and action taken by the army is significant in terms of later coup as they had similar members and the experience of operation could be the source of the idea of depriving political power from another political actor even though it was in the War time. It was just before and after the nominal independence under Japanese military rule on the 1 August,1943 when the Army side took secret actions for resistance. Initially, preparatory actions seemed to be taken independently by top leadership, Aung San and new generation, the AYRG each. It goes without saying that final say was in the hand of Aung San, the War Minister as shown by the summons to several high ranking officers, Let Ya, Ne Win and Kyaw Zaw for the discussion of the timing of the resistance against Japanese in early 1943 after his return from Tokyo (Aung San Suu Kyi 1984:27). However, considering the coup planning and later hierarchical structure of the army, accounts of this AYRG are of significance. This ambitious group formed by 19 junior officers having Aung Gyi and Maung Maung in its leadership started its activity by distributing secret anti-Japanese pamphlet in October,1942 (Guyot,op.cit:364, Ba Than 1962 : 43-4). The second preparatory phase for the uprising was the establishment of two training centers. According to the account(U Maung Maung 1989 : 118), the first one was in the army's supply depot camp in Pegu where Ne Win, commander in chief of the Burma National Army(BNA), had its headquarters, and the second one was in the compound of Indian's business man's house in Rangoon. Then, it issued an order for simultaneous uprising fixing the date on 22nd

June, 1944¹³. More interestingly, in drawing this operation plan, it claims core members of the group succeeded in making contact with Ne Win asking for the stature of their leader before persuading unwilling Aung San (U Maung Maung, op.cit:118). This account indicates the gap between AYRG and Aung San, with its leader's suddenly being transferred to headquarters and asked to his order¹⁴. And, in the end, the meaning of this uprising was summarized by Ne Win who was then the Delta zone commander in his radio broadcast statement in which he claimed the successful resistance atoned the invitation of Japanese into Burma and 'Burmese army became not only the hope of the country but its very life and soul' (Guyot, op.cit:382-3).

5.3 Federal issue in structural context

In referring to the cause of the coup, the federal issue has been frequently noted as one of the primal causes. The reason for this frequency might be the coincidence of the timing between the Seminar on Federalism under U Nu government and the coup. In this sense, this issue ought to be classified into the triggering motive, however, the issue itself had less imminent security factors than other security issues like religious conflict. Rather, considering the process of the issue and discussion among actors, the structural change of the issue has influenced more upon the occurrence of coup in 1962. As the relation of the

¹³. Later, the ordered date for operation was postponed to 22nd July, 1944 by following the advice from Ne Win. See Ba Than, p47.

¹⁴. U Maung Maung (1989), p.124. This account on the discussion between AYRG and Aung San might be almost the same occasion with Aung San's stern reprimand to some young officers after they were identified as restive to him by known in opening up their communication letter. See Brigadier Maung Maung (1962), p67.

states and Burma proper has been controversial issue even in the Union now, this part briefly looks over the discussion in this period and sees surrounding circumstances of Shan state.

First and foremost, from Shan's view point, the time of early 1960' was gravely significant in considering the future of the State. So called Federal Movement had not started by accident but had to be initiated after the caretaker government of the military. It was States Unity Organization (SUO) represented by Sao Hkun Hkio in February, 1962 that successfully presented their view on Federalism accompanying constitutional amendment at the State Seminar on Federalism. The focal point of this argument is to clarify Burma proper as one State having equal status as other States and to set up Federal government for all States¹⁵. Though SUO was formed by Shan, Kayah, Kayin, Kachin, Mon, Rakhine and Chin representatives in June 1961 when All States Conference was held in the Taunggyi, the original demands date back to January 1961 when the resolution of Shan State Steering Committee for the Amendment to the Constitution was adopted. Therefore, this plan for constitutional amendment of SUO is to be understood as having its origin in Shan resolution¹⁶.

¹⁵The Guardian, January 22,1962. 'States Unity Organization submits fresh federal proposal'. Nation, J anuary 22,1962.'Sao Hkun Hkio's memorandum on Federal Constitution : It was never intended states should be vassals of centre'

¹⁶ Sai Aung Tun(2009),pp381,407. The resolution adopted by the steering committee is below.

1. Establishment of a Burmese State;
- 2.Assignment of equal power to both chambers of the Union parliament;

Shan side defines the Movement as the one seeking for equitable power balance between the ethnic Burmese and non-Burmese within the legal framework of constitutional amendment against the allegation of secession plot¹⁷. It points out the cause of this movement in claiming that the State needs control measure of defense to improve inability of Shan State government to improve the security situation, being noticed by the uprising in Tangyan, northern Shan state against the army's suppression.

3. Each state shall be represented by an equal number of representatives in the Chamber of Nationalities;

4. The following department shall be vested in the Central Union, and all other powers, rights, and entitlements shall be transferred to the states:

- (a) Foreign Relations
- (b) Union Defense
- (c) Union Finance
- (d) Coinage and Currency
- (e) Post and Telecommunications
- (f) Rail, Air, and Water Transport
- (g) Union Judiciary
- (h) Collection of Custom duties at Seaports

5. Union revenue shall be distributed equally.

17. However, as for the direction of this movement, the statement of U Htun Myint, the representative from Taunggyi at the Seminar, is quoted in the Military's Intelligence report. According to it, he said, 'The principle of a true federal union, now called the Shan Principle, is being presented and demanded in a family spirit. We are acting in a family and in a democratic manner. If we fail to achieve it by such means, we will inform the people of the Shan State that we will have to turn to the last resort: in accordance with the right granted in chapter(10) of the constitution, the Shan State would have to secede from the Union. ' See Sai Aung Tun(2009),pp.496-7.

All in all, the Shan side did not have the ‘qualitative change’ taking place at Burmese power center with declining U Nu and the rising of Burmese military force¹⁸.

On the other hand, for military side, it appears to be defiant enough for Shan to propose constitutional amendment. Moreover, the challenging proposal to Burma proper had the possibility of letting it turn into the opportunity for acquiring legitimacy ground of the military by suppressing it. In the first place, it was in April, 1959 under caretaker government of Ne Win when *Saopha* renounced their hereditary rights for their administration through constitutional amendment¹⁹. Then, in making the proposal, Sao Khun Hkio of SUO was also provocative on the secession right by calling for a Constitution under which all the States, among which Burma proper was also the one, were to be on equal status, enjoying full autonomous rights...and the right to secede from the Union vested in them (Guardian 1962 February 25:1). The statement also cited Pang Long agreement²⁰ before the promulgation of the constitution in 1948.

18. Chao-Tzang Yawngghwe (1987), pp. 119-120. On the Tangyan uprising in November, 1959, Lintner (1999) has deep and detailed account for this incident and its implications.

19. Saohpa side’s view is that the decision to renounce their traditional political power had already been made in 1952 on their own side. See Sain Aung Tun, op.cit, pp. 361, Chao Tzang Yawngghwe, op.cit, p. 146

20. The agreement approves full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas in principle. This was signed by the Shan, the Kachin Hills, and the Chin Hills under the Supreme Council of the United Hill Peoples in February 12, 1947.

It was not military but the political parties in Rangoon that showed opposition firstly to this proposal on the second day of the Seminar just a day before the coup²¹. This opposition meant that such a proposal was not acceptable in Burma proper at any rate and could even form emotional hostility, leading to the rise of strong nationalism. In the face of such circumstances, there would not have been much better time for the military to take action for attacking the proposal as a savior of the state expecting full legitimacy. The military strongly denounced this federal proposal soon after the coup as one of the reasons for staging coup²².

5.4 Conclusion

In the political phenomenon of coup d'état, various historical changes in politics and society are embedded. As these factors tend to affect deeply and slowly but as powerful historical force, those are called as structural causes. By following such general theory, those causes were sought in political power vacuum emerged after the repeated split of AFPFL, the rise and fall of U Nu's legitimacy, leading military officer's experience in resistance movement against colonialism and fascism, and federalism issue proposed by ethnic minorities. Consequently, the rhythm of historical

²¹. Nation. March 2, 1962. 'AFPFL and NUF oppose federation proposal'. The Guardian. March 2, 1962. 'AFPFL & NUF object to proposed federalism'.

²². Tony Escoda (AP). March 7. 'Why army took over, ousted Nu'. Brigadier Aung Gyi told a news conference "What happened in Laos could happen tomorrow" in a minority region like Shan state which had threaten to pull out of the Union on Burma. On the news conference, see also Sai Aung Tun, op.cit, p.491.

change of those factors fitted to the conditions on which coup d'état is to be made in highly successful rate.

The politics after her independence from Britain showed the falling process of the AFPFL into small pieces of factions. It was the result of this process that invited serious weakness of political leadership after the severe political competition among actors. In light of the root cause of the dissolution of AFPFL, its forming process should be taken into account as it was the national coalition for independence under the agreement among all political actors. However, this agreement was not so strong as continuously keeping them united after recovering her independence. Falling process was accelerated especially in late 1950' with repeated factional split.

Another factor for weakening political leadership is gradual erosion of U Nu's support base. He was not strong leader but built his own political ground through his relationship with other prominent leaders in the league. Among anything else, it was his relationship Aung San that pushes him up to the leading position throughout the process for her independence. In this sense, his support base was composed of both charismatic ground and rational ground. However, the policy of Buddhism as state religion changed the course of his leadership. Though his charismatic leadership was attributed to his strong Buddhism inclination, the policy of Buddhism as state religion had undermined both his charisma and rationality for governance. The constitution amendment led up to protest by religious minorities and further amendment to religious riot by Buddhist monks one after another.

Another actor that took caretaker position just before the coup was the military led by Ne Win. This institution was also involved in politics through the process of her independence under the leadership of Aung San. Significantly, elite members of this group played leading role for ousting foreign power, Britain and Japan. It is certainly true that secretive operations in resistance movement had them learnt how to organize and implement the operation plan to topple the central government. Undoubtedly officers saw the U Nu regime as lame duck.

Federal proposal by ethnic minorities had the possibility to change the relation between the government and States in the long run, however, the reaction from ethnic Burmese side was much larger than expected. This issue on the Union has historical aspect dating back to 1947 and the discussion in the Seminar was not so imminent as other political parties strongly opposed it. Rather, of significance was that this proposal made ethnic Burmese aware of its interest in comparison with the interests of ethnic minorities in the Union.

For above reasons, structural causes had the effect in three dimensions. Firstly, political power vacuum and legitimacy and illegitimacy of U Nu regime had left political leadership open to any competitor. Secondly, it was the military that was not affected by this political turmoil and kept institutional coherence having experience in military operation and in government as caretaker. Lastly, federal issue was likely the

catalyst for coup d'état as it strongly stimulated Burmese ethnic nationalism against Shan.

Chapter VI

RC as military elite: its strategy for survival

Having the backdrop of triggering motives and structural causes, it is the actor of elite group that carries out the coup for seeking state power. This chapter looks through the Revolutionary Council as an elite group and checks its strategy for survival as a ruling group. Considering the regimes in this region until now, the role of elite has been the key factor for regime analysis and its nature has been unyielding though elite is the product of its society and can not exist without other social groups. In this sense, this chapter puts the significance of political role of elite while analyzing the relation with other actors to understand the whole structure of governance and its strategy. Further, as the elite group transforms itself and changes along with time line, a brief note is added on the relation of state elite and gender.

6.1 RC as military elite with consecutive purge

At first, elite is to be defined as pattern setters or style setters in the whole society whether they stabilize the older order or transform it into the new one. As for the emerging process, it is said to emerge, in particular, when they perform important historical mission as it convinced themselves of their properness in performance and superiority (Encyclopedia). Given the fact that RC members kept staying in government

after the coup, this small group of seventeen members is considered as the core group of military regime after the coup.

The initial seventeen RC members who made the coup were are General Ne Win, Brigadier General Aung Gyi, Commander Than Pe, Brigadier General Tommy Clift, Brigadier General Tin Pe, Brigadier General San Yu, Brigadier General Sein Win, Colonel Thaung Kyi, Colonel Kyi Maung, Colonel Maung Shwe, Colonel Than Sein, Colonel Kyaw Soe, Colonel Saw Myint, Colonel Chit Myaing, Colonel Khin Nyo, Colonel Hla Han, Colonel Tan Yu Saing. Their military position appears to indicate the reason why these members were selected for Revolutionary Council.

The composition of RC members fits to the echelon of the military institution as it had vice chief of staffs from army, navy, air force and five field commanders. For this reason, this coup was organized and carried out in unity under the supreme command.

As noted in chapter II, the elite group has several factors for its integration. As the top military leadership, the RC had homogeneity, commonness in occupation and social status. They also kept government portfolio under caretaker and RC government in dual manner. They share same value, common and practice for many years through tough missions. The code of conduct of core group under Ne Win's leadership is noted as no interference of personal relationship into the performance duty, absolute obedience to order as men-at-arms in the 4th Burma Rifle (Maung Maung 1969:167). Under this strict

code, he did not hesitate to purge anyone despite the long personal tie between the members of the ruling group (Silverstein 1977: 92).

Though it is not certain from where his relentlessness and toughness come from, his experience in War might be one of the reasons for it. As noted in chapter V, Ne Win took charge of organizing rebel inside of Burma under still British control. On the required qualities for this mission and Ne Win, Mya Dong Nyo notes, “he must not reveal himself: he must be secretive and patient...That Bo Ne Win possessed all these qualifications was shown by his accomplishment”(Mya Doung Nyo 1992:112-3).

Interestingly enough, it was at least just two officers who could stay in the military throughout early BSPP priod (Table 3). More than ten initial RC members left the military until early 1970’ for various reasons except for one case of passing away. Most of them are considered to be purged because they left the military earlier senior members. In general, the announcement phrase of ‘permission for retirement’ strongly indicates the case of purge in Burmese military.

Next, watching through members of earlier military’s elite groups of AYRG and 4th Burma rifle in 1940’, some members are overlapping throughout the period since 1940’ to coup and afterward. It suggests the pattern in which only a few members survives the competition in each group, even for those who played nearly top leading

roles. As no one could survive in the core except for one top leader, the core of this elite group took the strategy for its survival by using centrifugal force of repeated purge.

6.2 Purge of Aung Gyi

RC was the Council led by Ne Win who was the chairman without vice chairman as noted above. This code is evidenced by the sack of Aung Gyi. In this respect, the purge of Aung Gyi shows clear competitiveness of its elite membership and the fact that the influential second rank officer can not survive in this elite group though this purge seemed to have another cause related with state economy system.

Firstly, Aung Gyi's profile is briefly summarized as below. In high school, Aung Gyi joined in the activities of People's Revolutionary Party that was later re-organized as the Socialist party of Burma. It was then when he met AFPFL leaders, Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyien. Led AYRG with Maung Maung, Aung Gyi was promoted to vice chief of staff when Ne Win became commanding officer in January 1948. This promotion is said to be pushed by Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyien considering Aung Gyi's younger age. Throughout later years, he appeared to keep strong backing from Socialist leaders of AFPFL among two other young military leaders, Tin Pe and Maung Maung. In 1959, he was promoted to Brigadier and began to join in foreign activities. He represented both DSI and BEDC under U Nu government. U Nu succeeded in getting cooperation from Aung Gyi after 1960 elections. Before his sudden retirement in February 1963, he also

played the role of spokesperson of RC and Minister for Trade and Development and Industry(MOFA 1961 et.al).

After Aung Gyi's purge, it was his rival Tin Pe who assumed leading role for national economy, however, he was also sacked after the collapse of national economy under the flag of Burmese Way to Socialism. As the cause of Purge, Chit Myaing notes, the Secretary of RC, Ko Ko said to him that he was told to issue orders that the Ne Win left Tin Pe and Aung Gyi as two vice chairman of the Council to represent him during his absence for his travel to Europe. Chit Myaing claims that the cliques emerged from that time within RC 1. However, this account is contradicted to Ne Win's remarks on foreign record. Ne Win showed his confidence of his rule six months after the coup and confirmed all affairs were left in charge of Aung Gyi during his travel. Until the day of the meeting with Prime Minister in UK, his decision for purge was not hinted at all in official manner ².

As a result, this purge also had the aspect of difference on economic policies among them. Aung Gyi tried to seek for developing industries while Tin Pe side took rigid nationalized economy policy. However, it was not Tin Pe but Ne Win who made decision of purge as he explained that Burma had to promote socialization process under the foreign

1. "In his own words Colonel Chit Myaing ' in Burma Debate.Jul/Aug 1997.

2 . FO 1962. The conversation record notes, "He had left affairs in Burma in charge of Brigadier Aung Gye(if that is how you spell his name)who was a very contempt officer,aged 39.General Ne Win had no fear about his being supplanted by any of his officers since they were all dedicated to the interest of Burma and without personal ambition. The Prime Minister at this point congratulated the General on his happy position".

dominated economy with powerful state though Aung Gyi claimed to take 'gradual progress' policy that had already failed (MOFA 1963). Of significance is that Tin Pe was also sacked and purged for the reasons of his mismanagement from the post of the Minister of the Trade Council in 1968 (Mya Maung 1991 : 118).

6.3 External relation of RC

As considering the strategy for elite group survival after the coup, it is significant to analyze their lateral relation with other political actors and vertical relation with mass determine its position in the society.

As their lateral relations with political parties, it should to be noted that it was NUF that approved the coup first after the meeting with Ne Win in its statement by saying that 'there was no other correct path' (Guardian 1962 March 6) though it soon changed its course and criticized RC. At least, this NUF approval worked as getting external support for the RC. On the other hand, RC took the course of the single political party system by founding the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). As this cadre political party was founded being based on the principle of centralism³, its mediate role with the mass was also expected.

³ The constitution of the Burma socialist Programme Party. 'Organizational Structure of the Cadre Party'

On their vertical relations, there were at least two mass organizations led by Burmese military before and after the 1962 coup until later BSPP period. The first mass organization emerged during caretaker government period was the National Solidarity Associations. Ostensively, this organization was formed for promoting cooperation to the police for crime prevention and keeping law and order, led by government leadership. The field of keeping law and order contains the system of the People's Reporters in which people inform illegal activities to the authority, in particular, activities related with insurgency⁴. As this association also had the aims for educating the people through its nationwide network, military's real intention was also assumed that it was the tool of keeping control of the mass and political opponents⁵.

Since the foundation of Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) as the cadre party in July 1962, the mass organizations are gradually taking shapes and started functioning as the elite party's constituencies. The military elite, in particular, put significance on two social groups, workers and peasants as their constituencies under the ideological flag of socialism. Firstly, the formation of People's Workers Council was proposed by the 13-point statement of BSPP government in 1962 and the preparatory committee was formed based on the decision of the BSPP Central Organizing Committee in January 1965 (Party Seminar 1965:57-8). After it was renamed as Asiayon in 1977, the organization had developed with having 1,845,182 members until 1985 (Taylor 1987:324).

⁴The National Solidarity Association was called as the *Kyant-khaingye Ahphwes* in Burmese. The nine months after ten years, pp.17-18, Vindicate(1960), p13.

⁵Butwell, op.cit, briefly notes this hidden purpose of this organization. See p.211.

Similarly, the formation of People's Peasant Council had started by following the statement of Ne Win made at the peasants' seminar that was held from December 1962 to January 1963(Party Seminar 1965: 58-9).This Council was also renamed as The Peasants' Asiayon and recorded 7,577,733 members in 1985(Taylor,op.cit). It was under the leadership of Ne Win that this organization achieved rapid expansion both for political and economical purposes. As a matter of fact, Ne Win stressed the importance of peasants' organization's role by saying, "In future, after the peasants' organization have been systematically formed, we hope to be more specific. If we are more specific about our needs and exportable surplus, we stand to benefit both in terms of money and market"(Address General Ne Win 1969: 5-6).

Viewing from elite analysis angle, these organization functioned for sustaining the influence of core elite group politically and economically for longer period. In the mean time, it also works in practical as Taylor noted that these mass organizations are the mediums for achieving their policy with popular support base, obviating and suppressing the demands stemming from spontaneous groups(Taylor,op.cit:323,325). As the strategies for survival of core elite group, Steinberg's findings are meaningful. It points out through the analysis of the National Solidarity Associations under caretaker government that the experience gained during this period might have influenced military's attempt to duplicate it later on a larger scale(Steinberg 2001:100). Guyot also hypothesized on the similarities of mass organizations formed under different governments and different times in Burma. Her hypothesis is that the National Solidarity Associations(Kyantkhaingye

Ahphwes) under caretaker government had strong resemblances with the National Service Organization (*Wundan*) in War time Burma under Ba Maw government(Guyot,op.cit: 302). If true, the relation between elite and mass through the state sponsored mass organization needs to be examined more precisely in the future, for such organization could work as the effective controlling body after the violent seizure of state power by a small number of coup makers.

The *Wundan*, at least, had three clear characteristics. The first one is its primary objectives covering a wide range of civil life from teaching citizens of their duties of the war effort, assistance to the police, reporting of strangers, suppression of rumors , prevention of sabotage and so on (Ibid:300). Secondly, it had direct tie with the government on its budget and man power as it had attendance of government officials on its event. Thirdly, as Guyot's note, this mass organization was organized not in Japanese but purely in Burmese way compared to other mass organizations under Japanese leadership. Guyot's emphasis is that the name of *Wundan* carries the connotation of service to monarchy and its nickname of *wa tat* evoke the legend of Bo Bo Aung(Ibid:301). In sum, The factors of its official objectives, the tie with government and roots in Burmese culture could had made it survive intermittently over several generations when in need of building facil relationship between state elite and mass.

6.4 A brief note on state elite and gender

On the condition elite is considered as the force that commences and controls society in which those groups keep seeking political power, it is necessary to note future possible elites who have legitimacy to represent the nation.

In terms of recent social change in Southeast Asia including Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines since 1980', author tentatively notes that woman's social position will add weight in future society of Myanmar though the society itself has aspects of preferring to keep its traditional tendency.

6.5 Conclusion

The members of RC in 1962 coup d'état were the core of the core members of the military institution without any disobedient factors. RC had its roots in the military activities in wartime and early independent Burma, especially the activities of AYRG and 4th Burma rifle. Given the position and role that the members of those group played for her independence, they were elite even in the military institution. As other elites, this small group also had the code of conduct. That is complete obedience to orders and kept centripetal force by purging its members except for the top leader, Ne Win. It was the council in form, however, even any second ranking officer could not survive the internal struggle until early 1970'. This mechanism of purge inside of this elite group might have it survive for so long under the same single leader.

The elite group takes survival strategy not only for internal control but also for external control. It is their lateral and vertical relations in the society that make it possible to keep its control under the limited numbers of elite members. In case of RC,

initially, it did not refuse even the positive reaction from communist side to keep strengthening its political power base soon after the coup. In addition, it transformed the RC into the cadre party, BSPP, while reaching out its hands to the mass by setting up organizations for workers and peasants. Those mass organizations organized by ruling elite in Burma were also the key for the controlling system of society as they had similarities with mass organizations under other historical time setting.

Chapter VII

Conclusion

7.1 Mechanism of Ne Win's 1962 coup d'état

The coup d'état in 1962 Burma was the result of the combination of triggering motives and structural causes and those factors are not isolated but intertwined and influenced upon each other. In conclusion, emotional upheaval of Burmese ethnic nationalism stimulated through religious and federal issues sought for direction to flow out under the circumstances of the political power vacuum. Significantly military officers were keen and had enough experience of military operations taking state power since War period. Thus, struggle for independence worked as significant structural settings for the military coup for their direct involvement in historical process.

As the triggering factors, the author examined the military's corporate interests in the activities of DSI. Moreover, it also focused on military officer's purge in 1961 as it had the 'arousal effect' among officers who were in political cleavages command and had paved the way for the coup. The structural causes, on the other hand, were the political power vacuum emerged from repeated factional division within AFPFL and the Unity party. The space emerged after the legitimacy decline was easily occupied by new political power after the coup. As the other structural causes, the changing relation

between state regime and religion with the deteriorated security situation and federal issue with demand of ethnic minorities were traced and analyzed in the relation with the gradual and rapid legitimacy decline of U Nu government.

Firstly, the collapse of political party centers and the balance through factional division had at least two significant effects. Throughout the fierce factional conflict among politicians and factions, the military officers themselves were also involved into their struggle with and without notice. Then, by following the pattern of coup, the military recovered its institutional chain of command by purging politically oriented officers. It was the power vacuum left no competent political group in the political arena. There exists only U Nu who had declared his retirement from politics in the near future. Such landscape seemed to be advantageous for military and coup makers.

Secondly, the strong ethnic Burmese nationalism was stimulated, awakened and amplified by overlapping structural causes. Those causes are the religious issue and ethnic minority's issue. U Nu's policy of Buddhism as the state religion had serious side effect, in particular, after acknowledging equal status to religious minorities to some extent with keeping the special place for Buddhism. Constitutional amendment for religious minorities drew strong emotional reaction from Buddhist quarters and led to the riot against Muslim Mosque by Buddhist monks. Looking from religious majority, Buddhist point of view, this policy change seems to be enough to lose his legitimacy that

was given by the 1960' elections. Hence, security situation under the U Nu government had extremely deteriorated, with eroding his legitimacy.

Likewise, federal movement was initiated and led by Shan leaders sought for their equal status by distinguishing federal government from Burma proper giving it an equal status with other States. From ethnic Burmese view point, this is the proposal that critically undermines their historically vested rights and interests of majority ethnic group. Although U Nu himself was against the secession in reality with keeping his neutral position officially*, his remarks had not negative sounds for this federal movement. For instance, the story of Miss Sandalwood stated by U Nu on the first day of the Seminar is suggestive in traditional way, however, it was not enough to prevent the rise of Burmese sentiment† . Thus, religious issue made it aware to the majority ethnic Burmese that the

*.Sai Aung Tun cited U Nu's comment in 1990 from the interview by Historical Department. According to it, U Nu's view withheld then was that secession right should be deleted from the constitution. It says, "Delete that chapter in the constitution which provide for the right of secession. Don't keep it. You keep asking for more power, saying that you were not given enough." See p.498.

†. The story of Miss Sandalwood is worth to be noted here for the analysis. It is from the Sunday Guardian, February 25,1962 . ' State Seminar Opens'.

"Once upon a time, in the country of Confusion, there were five men. Mr.Rheum hailed from the district of I-above-all; Mr.Oo-la-la from the district of I-the-boss; Mr.Fatso from I-the-topmost; Mr.La-de-da from I-the-king; Mr.Oom-pa-pa from the district of I-ride-my-own-horse. They studied under the University teacher Mr.Roughneck. Mr.Oo-la-la mastered sculpture; Mr.Fatso became a skill artist; Mr.La-de-da learnt how to put life into inanimate objects; Mr.Oom-pa-pa became skilled in archery. Mr.Rheum did not pick up any craft but given a block of sandalwood by the teacher Mr.Roughneck. On their way home, Mr.Oo-la-la fashioned a figure of a maiden out of

state needs to be led under the leadership of ethnic Burmese Buddhist. And this Burmese ethnic nationalism was also strongly reconfirmed at the seminar on federal issue before the ideological statement of Burmese Way to Socialism was announced by the Revolutionary Council after the coup.

Additionally, core elite and its value survives over a long period through the process of expelling inner competitors and it build relations with the mass and other actors. The small elite groups starting from AYRG and Ne Win in War time survived with changing its members and names even after the coup. At the same time, the core small elite sought for external relations with other social actors to keep their rule. Such external relation is composed of lateral and vertical relations with other political parties and social mass organizations. As evidence, in the case of RC, mass organizations were organized after the coup and it might have roots in similar organizations in caretaker government period and war time organizations. As the second theoretical framework, RC strategy for its

the sandalwood. Mr. Fatso painted it and to make it beautiful. Mr.La-de-la put life into it and when a handsome maiden was born, the five men began to grab her for his own. As they fought with each other a demon bird swooped down and picked up the maiden in its talons. Fortunately Mr.Oom-pa-pa, seizing his bow and arrow, killed the bird and brought the maiden down. Thereupon, Mr.La-de-da took back the life he had put into her, the artist scratched off the paint from the figure, the sculptor disfigured his work. Miss Sandalwood was reduced to a damaged piece of wood.”

“Let us not be like those five foolish men. We have the supreme power in our hands. Let us endeavor with our best resources so that the Union may not be disfigured by the marks of slavery because of our foolishness.”

survival was confirmed through the analysis of elite group itself and their external relations.

7.2 Impact of 1962 coup d'état on the course of state and its economy

The coup d'état in 1962 was a watershed of modern history in Burma and gave grave impact on its politics, economics and society. More than anything else, its economic system was changed into different one through the nationalization process under the flag of the Burmese Way to Socialism after the coup. In contrast, it was this economic policy that forced Ne Win to step down and admit the failure and faults of this 'revolution' quarter a century later. In terms of state economy, the 1962 coup had a devastating effect on it and people contrary to the promise of 'happiness and well-being of all the people of the Union'. In considering the state building process, it is no doubt that the coup consequently left huge negative impact.

As the prelude to a historical watershed, the expanding activities of DSI and BEDC had two possibilities. The expansion of DSI and BEDC into the field of key state industries under the market economy was extremely significant for the possible economic development through industrialization or state controlled economy through nationalization. Firstly, DSI dramatically enlarged the fields of military's activities other than national defense. As declared in its objectives, it was founded for the aim of playing the part for the development of national economy. Although U Nu tried to

curtail activities by setting up BEDC as controlling board in 1961, his curtailing policy had the effect of intervention into the military's economic autonomous ground.

The purge of Aung Gyi, the head of both organizations and Minister for Trade Development and Industry under RC, had pushed it to take the course of nationalization. Over this course of economic policy related with the purge of Aung Gyi, Ne Win himself made it clear that Burma needed to take the course of radical socialist economic policy for development as the economy had been dominated by foreigners (MOFA 1963). On the contrary, Aung Gyi claimed that Ne Win regime could not survive if it took the radical economic policy (Ibid). Then, the nationalization policy of private banks was announced soon after the purge of Aung Gyi with the statement that it was necessary for the State to transfer financial power into its own hands (Turnell 2009:225). As this result, the BEDC as a private company could no longer function after the nationalization of finance (FORWARD 1963 September 22:4). The economy fell in the hands of Ne Win regime.

It has not been clear when the radical economic policies were officially endorsed in the RC as nationalization process started soon after the purge of Aung Gyi. The announcement of the Burmese Way to Socialism in April 1962 was still not clear on the process for nationalization ‡. Official record of BSPP briefly notes it was

‡ It says, "All such national means of production will have to be owned by the State or cooperative societies or collective unions". Burmese Way to Socialism in socialist economy, 10.

Minister for Home Affairs and Immigration, Col. Kyaw Soe who led the process of drafting a blue print for national administration and security immediately after the coup(Party seminar 1965:Burmesese way to socialism).

Interestingly, it was in late 1980s that their positions showed the stark contrast over the state economic policies. Facing on economic crisis, Ne Win regime took two significant reform measures in September 1987. Those were the demonetization of three bank notes,K25,K35 and K75 and liberalization of rice and crops trade (Burma press summery, September 1987). It was in October 1987 when Ne Win declared the change of principles of economic policy while stressing that the one of the objectives of the 1962 coup was to get the economy back in the hands of Burmesese at the central committee of BSPP(Burma press summery, October 1987). On the other hand, in December 1988, Aung Gyi as the founder of the Union Nationals Democracy Party called for his economic policy by stating, ‘Economic concepts of previous governments starting with that of the AFPFL were narrow-minded, mean, departmentally unaccommodating, lustful for dominance and monopolistic on the part of the main State. They hardly wanted to develop industries in the constituent States’§.

§ .Speech delivered by U Aung Gyi, Executive Patron of the Union Nationals Democracy Party, at the signboard raising ceremony of the party on December 18, 1988 at 2/4 Shinsawpu Street, Rangoon.

As the result of this economy policy under the name of socialism, other economic sectors were ousted from the society. Though Ne Win claimed that the state economy had been dominated by foreigners, it is dubious whether the means of production and its income were distributed properly under the Burmese Way to Socialism. Rather, those were dominated by the state itself, the military regime. Along with the disbandment of political parties, press was replaced by state media after the coup. Companies including energy sector were nationalized under the name of the state, however, it is hardly easy to say that nationalization of the natural resources stimulated the domestic economy or brought higher standard of living. Workers and peasants were allowed to be registered under the state-sponsored mass organization instead of labor union led by socialist politicians of AFPFL. Thus, all social sectors were gradually replaced and dominated by the military officers.

Considering the later period, the roots of cause appear to be in Ne Win's statement that claimed the RC as the state itself. In other words, if more pragmatic approach for governance was taken by another pragmatist, the state could had take shorter way for development both in politics and economics. Myanmar scholar who kept watching politics points out the gravity of Ne Win's responsibility for the state and people. For him, politics under Ne Win's rule is much worse than next military regime that allowed plural political party system to some extent. (Interview to Myanmar scholar, July 2011).

In terms of political development, policies taken after this coup d'état were critically important for the course of state. Given the fact that the state leader is the one of the prime factors for political development, it was the setback that Ne Win gripped the handle of the state after U Nu. As his regime lacked rational ground for governance for it took its position by coup d'état, initial stage of its rule is characterized in its various attempts to seek for rational ground and stability for their rule. On the political aspect, ideological statements were revealed soon after the coup. The Burmese way to socialism, The constitution of the Burma socialist programme party, The system of correlation of man and his environment are those. In a broad sense, those are considered as a series of effort to turn its illegitimacy to legitimacy.

Of significance is that the socialism did not seem to be clearly defined as the state ideology. For instance, it defines the political leadership under BSPP as the one in which a socialist society could be achieved only by working people in comparison with communist party and social democratic party. The leadership under communist party was defined as the one of the party and socialist democratic party was under bourgeois parliamentarism(BSPP 1972). At least, it was not clear how to follow working people's will without having any representative system instead of military personnel. In fact, Ne Win himself revealed that he adopted the word of "socialism" after he could not find suitable term for the state (MOFA 1966).

7.3 Epilogue

As discussed in chapter I , the discussion continued between Socrates and Glaucon in the Plato's 'Republic'(Plato,op.cit) and tentative conclusion for political and personal troubles is revealed by Socrates.

'We've examined self-discipline, courage, and wisdom,' I said, 'and it occurs to me that this principle is what is left in the community, because it is the principle which makes it possible for all those other qualities to arise in the community, and it continued presence allows them to flourish in safety once they have arisen. And we did in fact say that if we found the other three, whatever was left would be morality.'

'Yes, that's necessarily so,' he said.

....

'When it comes to contributing to a community's goodness, then, there's apparently a close contest between the ability of everyone in a community to do their own job and its wisdom, self-discipline, and courage.'

'There certainly is' he said.

'And wouldn't you say that anything which rivals these qualities in contributing towards a community's goodness must be morality?'

'Absolutely'

'See if you also agree when you look at it from this point of view. Won't you be requiring the rulers to adjudicate when lawsuits occur in the community?'

'Of course.'

'And won't their most import aim in doing so be to ensure that people don't get hold of other people's property and aren't deprived of their own?'

'Yes'

'Because this is right?'

'Yes'

'So from this point of view too we are agreed that morality is keeping one's own property and keeping to one's own occupation'

'True.'

'See if you agree with me on this as well: if a joiner tried to do a shoemaker's job, or a shoemaker a carpenter's, or if they swapped tools or status, or even if the same person tried to do both jobs, with all the tools and so on of both jobs switched around, do you think that much harm would come to the community?'

'Not really,' he said.

'On the other hand, when someone whom nature has equipped to be an artisan or to work for money in some capacity or others gets so puffed up by his wealth or popularity or strength or some such factor that he tries to

enter the military class, or when a member of militia tries to enter the class of policy-makers and guardians when he's not qualified to do so, and they swap tools and status, or when a tries to do all these jobs simultaneously, then I'm sure you'll agree that these interchanges and intrusions are disastrous for the community'

'Absolutely'

The discussion reached to the point on the solution for political and personal troubles. Socrates came to his conclusion and made Glaucon surprised by proposing it,

' Unless community have philosophers as kings,' 'or the people who are currently called as kings and rulers practice philosophy with enough integrity – on other words, unless political power and philosophy coincide, and all the people with their diversity of talents who currently head in different doors shut firmly in their face – there can be no end to political troubles, my dear Glaucon, or even to human troubles in general, I'd say, and our theoretical constitution will be stillborn and will never see the light of day. Now you can appreciate what made me hesitate to speak before: I saw how very paradoxical it would sound, since it is difficult to realize that there is no other way for an individual or a community to achieve happiness.'

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX

TABLE 1 Political phases in early independent Burma until 1962 Coup

Period	Definition	Political power transition
1946/9 – 1949/3	The Search for a Party of National Unity I	
1949/4 – 1950/1	Government of National Emergency I	U Nu + Ne Win (As Deputy PM)
1950/1 – 1958/1	Government of Compromise (AFPFL)	U Nu → Ba Swe U Nu ← Ba Swe
1958/1 – 1958/6	Disruption	- Ba Swe Kyaw Nyein
1958/6 – 1958/10	Search for a Party of National Unity II	U Nu → Ne Win
1958/10 – 1960/2	Government of National Emergency II (Caretaker Government)	Election ← Ne Win (U Nu)
1960/3 – 1962/2	Government of Unity in Diversity	Purge of officers
1962/3 -	Army rule (RC)	U Nu → Ne Win

Note : Period and definition followed Tinker (1963) pp,112-5 and Yano (1968),pp.397-8.

TABLE 2 Relations of State Regime and Religion in Burma

Regime	Form (Year & Month)	Relation with religion
Aung San	Address at AFPFL (1946/1)	“We must draw a clear line between politics and religion, because the two are not one and the same thing. If we mix religion with politics, then we offend the spirit of religion itself.”
U Nu¹	Constitution (1948/1)	The State recognizes the special position of Buddhism as the faith professed by the great majority of the citizens of the Union (Section21(1))
U Nu	3rd amendment ² (1961/8)	Buddhism being the religion professed by the great majority of the citizens of the Union shall be the State religion. (Section21(1))
U Nu	4th amendment (1961/9)	The Union government shall protect the religions from all dangers including insult and false representation made by words either spoken or written or by other means. (Section 21(6))
Ne Win (RC)	The comment of Aung Gyi(1962/3) ³	“Freedom of religion is a necessity. We do not want to overemphasize one religion over the others”.
Ne Win (RC)	The Burmese way to Socialism(1962/4)	Attempts must be made by various correct methods to do away with bogus acts of charity and social work for vainglorious show, bogus piety and hypocritical religiosity,etc.,as well as to foster and applaud bona fide belief and practice of personal morals as taught by ethics and traditions of every religion and culture. We will resort to education, literature, fine arts, theatre, and cinema, etc, to bring into vogue the concept that serve other’s interests is to serve one’s own.

TABLE 2 (Continued) Relations of State Regime and Religion in Burma

Regime	Form (Year & Month)	Relation with religion
Ne Win (BSPP)	The system of Correlation (1963/1)	The philosophy of our party is a purely mundane and human doctrine. It is neither religious nor supernal. (V. Our attitude to our own ideology)
Ne Win (BSPP)	Constitution (1974)	Every citizen shall have the right to freely use one's language and literature follow one's customs, culture and traditions and profess the religion of his choice. (153(b)) Religion and religious organizations shall not be used for political purposes. Law shall be enacted to this effect. (156(c))

Source: From "Aung San of Burma" by Maung Maung, 1962, "Religion and Politics in Burma" by Donald Eugene Smith, 1965, "The Burmese Way to Socialism" by RC, 1962, "The System of Correlation of Man and his environment" by BSPP, 1963, "The Constitution of the Union of Burma" in 1974, and AP.

- Notes: 1. Aung San discussed state secularism with Ba Choe who claimed Buddhism as the state religion in drafting constitution just before they were assassinated on 19 July, 1947. See Maung Maung (1961), pp.96.
2. The first amendment was in 1951, the second in 1959.
3. AP, March 7, 1962.

TABLE 3 The Change of core military group members in Burma (1940s - early 70s)

AYRG	4th Burma Rifle	1961Purge	RC	Position before coup	Resignation etc
Overlapping members					
(Ne Win)	Ne Win		Ne Win	Chief of staff	
Maung Maung	Maung Maung	Maung Maung(Director,military training)			
Aung Gyi	Aung Gyi		Aung Gyi	Vice chief of staff(Army)	Resigned on 7-2-63
			Than Pe	Vice chief of staff(Navy)	Passed away in 5- 62
			Tommy Clift	Vice chief of staff(Air)	Resigned in 11- 64
	Tin Pe		Tin Pe	Chairman, State Timber Board	Resigned in 68(14-11-70)
			San Yu	Commander(North-West)	(Promoted to General in 72)
Aung Swe		Aung Swe(Southern Command)			
			Sein Win	Commander(Central)	Retired in 72
			Thaung Kyi	Commander(North-East)	
			Kyi Maung	Commander(South-West)	Retired on 12-3-63
			Maung Shwe	Commander(Eastern)	Retired & Arrested in 72
	Than Sein		Than Sein	Chief, Colonel Staff	Retired
	Kyo Soe		Kyaw Soe	Military Secretary	Retired
Tin Maung		Tin Maung(12 Infantry Brigade)			
			Saw Myint	Frontier Areas Admin.Officer	Withdrawal from duty on 18-8-64.Life sentence
			Chit Myaing	Vice-Quarter-Master-General	Dismissed on 31-3-64.Arrested
			Khin Nyo	Director,Military Training	Dismissed on 6-9-65
			Hla Han	Director, Medical Corps	Retired in 72
			Tan Yu Saing	Vice-Chief,Union Military Police	Retired on 26-10-70(68)

Source: Senior General Saw Maun's Addresses, Maung Maung(1969), Silverstein(1977), U Maung Maung(1989), Ba Than(1962), Callahan(2003).

BIOGRAPHY

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