



## CHAPTER FIVE

### THE PROOF

1. Is chapter three identical with chapter four? Is it the same as? Or is it approximately the same one?

2. Is chapter three an instance of chapter four? Or chapter four an instance of chapter three? Are chapter three and chapter four an instance of something which is in my head?

3. Can you construct it yourself? Is your construction the same as of me? Or is it approximately the same as?

4. This is the proof of the theory. Look and see! Think!

5.

To start with, it seems to me that an enterprise whose human character can be seen by all is preferable to one that looks 'objective', and impervious to human actions and wishes. The sciences, after all, are our own creation, including all the severe standards they seem to impose upon us. It is good to be constantly reminded of the fact. It is good to be constantly reminded of the fact that science as we know it today is not inescapable and that we may construct a world in which it plays no role whatever (such a world, I venture to suggest, would be more pleasant than the world we live in today). What better reminder is there than the realization that the choice between theories which are sufficiently general to provide as with a comprehensive world view and which are empirically disconnected may become a matter of taste? That the choice of our basic cosmology may become a matter of taste?" (Feyerabend 1981:160)

6.

The most important philosophical distinction at stake here, rests with the constructed use of "work of art" as a basic category-term and as a value expression in aesthetic judgments. Here, it is a basic category-term designed to help organize our entire way of speaking in the domain of aesthetics ; in

aesthetic judgements, it is a term in actual use within the domain blocked out. Clarifying these different uses requires, therefore, substantially distinct enterprises. Furthermore, with regard to defining "work of art" as a basic category for the field of aesthetic interest, it is logically possible to "look and see" and find that a definition by genus and difference actually accommodates the usual items to be considered, given a clear sense of the "special purpose" our definition is to serve, which purpose is provided by defining the aesthetic domain. (Margolis 1965:45-46)

If a definition serves a theoretical purpose, it is justified, so long as we keep Feyerabend's point in mind.

All that needs to be noted is that the request for a definition calls for an extensional limit fundamentally opposed to the tendency to extend terms to new and hitherto unincorporated items. (Ibid.:47)

This point well taken, we need only be prepared to modify or change our definitions. Why such theory such as Collingwood's accommodate this? When Margolis criticizes this theory,

The artist has, through whatever skill and effort, simply created his work. In this sense, whatever one does "expresses of one's own self." Since it may even be self-contradictory to deny that the work of art expresses the artist, the view is trivial. (Ibid.:43)

Notice his use of the term "work of art", is it the same as that of the theory he argues against? The view is not trivial because expressed emotion of that artist is not the total one but the peculiar emotion.

Now, see his definition "A work of art is an artifact considered with respect to its design. By "design", I have in mind only the artist's product considered as a set of materials organized in the certain way: to state how such materials are organized is to describe the design of some work." (Ibid.:44) This

is only a new definition, is it proof that another's definition a fault one? Is it proof that Collingwood's theory is fault?

Margolis seems to reject other theories by saying that they are inappropriate, but does not give clear reasons why they are. [See Margolis 1965]

7.

I should perhaps start with a criticism of a widely accepted theory of art: the theory that art is self-expression, or the expression of the artist's personality, or perhaps the expression of his emotions. (Croce and Collingwood are two of the many proponents of this theory. My own anti-essentialist point of view implies that what-is? questions like "What is art?" are never genuine problems.) My main criticism of this theory is simple: the expressionist theory of art is empty. For everything a man or an animal can do is (among other things) an expression of an internal state, of emotions, and of a personality. This is trivially true for all kinds of human and animal languages. It holds for the way a man or a lion walks, the way a man coughs or blows his nose, the way a man or a lion may look at you, or ignore you. It holds for the ways a bird builds its nest, a spider constructs its web and a man builds his house. In other words it is not a characteristic of art. For the same reason expressionist or emotive theories of language are trivial, uninformative, and useless. (Popper 1982:61-62)

This rejection of Collingwood's theory is alike Margolis's argument in (6). My answer is the same, that Collingwood's theory is not trivial. An expression of the artist's internal state of mind, accordingly to this theory, has particular character. This act is not an informative act in the sense that expresses some states of mind which we know beforehand. But an act of exploration of this artist's emotions, he/she is trying to find out what these emotions are. Then, in some sense, it is an informative act, in the sense that this artist informs him/herself as he/she is conscious of what kind this expressed emotion is. Ex post facto, that description can, then, give information is possible. In other words, it is a

characteristic of art, as distinguishing from craft. Then Popper's argument is irrelevant. This theory is useful in explaining or can be applied to explain the nature of artistic activity, the role of creation in this activity.

Any kind of selection, any decision to express this emotion and not that, is inartistic not in the sense that it damages the perfect sincerity which distinguishes good art from bad, but in the sense that it represents a further process of a non-artistic kind, carried out when the work of expression proper is already complete. For until that work is complete one does not know what emotions one feels; and is therefore not in a position to pick and choose, and give one of them preferential treatment. (Collingwood n.d.:115)

