



CHAPTER TWO

IN DEFENCE OF COLLINGWOOD'S THEORY OF ART

The main propositions forming the theory I defend and hold in this chapter are the following :

The assumptions I accept from Collingwood's theory are,

(1) The work of art is a creation of the mind of the artist. This is its origin.

(2) Its outcome can be merely imaginary or also have its material instantiation, the bodily work, accordingly to the artist intention.

(3) If it is to be a public object, this requires some media, mode of existence, which others can observe.

(4) This public body is necessary to make it possible for others to experience that creation in the artist's head.

(5) Such that is written or printed on music-paper isn't the true work, in the sense that, it is only something which, under the appropriate circumstance, will enable others (or that artist himself when this one has forgotten it) to construct the tune, as the case of music, for themselves in their own heads.

(6) This something are only such as a notation from which that unembodied creation in the artist's mind can be reconstruct in the mind of a person who studies them.

(7) Only Ex post facto can we describe what kind it is which is expressed.

The proposition I suggest as an extension of the above are the following :

(8) This publicly body, the material instantiation, if its success as the observer can transmit the artist's creation to be his/her creation in one ownself is according to the creator or the observer. In the case of the creator, it's based on his/her ability to produce the material instantiation, that other ones, the observers, can use this instantiation as the media to recreate the genuine work.

(9) No matter there really are the cases that someone write the great poems, works of art, by not having any skill or prerequisite knowledge, or not. In many cases the help of skill or prerequisite knowledge is necessary as warrant of the success of producing the material instantiation. As e.g., the improvisation of musical instruments by each musician takes a crucial role in Jazz performance. Those who acquaint with Jazz know that such a spontaneity in performing those musicians' ability coming from long training of playing those musical instruments. (See other example in page 31)

(10) Then, the first condition: the necessity of the mode of existence, the publicly body. The private works in the mind of the artist, without their material instantiation, is unknown by another people. The publicly body, the material instantiation, is necessarily as the one that another people can use as media to seek the way to the genuine work.

(11) When this material instantiation is produced, the creator transposes to posit in this bodily object. The author-positing-in the work is what we can trace from the media, and the first author is now the observer as another people.

1.

The argument, familiar from Croce and Collingwood, may be given in the following form: a mental state and its expression are not two phenomena, but rather two aspects of a single process. When I say that a work of art expresses a particular feeling, for example, I am not asserting that there is a relation between the work of art and something else. Likewise, when I say that someone understands the particular feeling of a work of art (its particular quality of sadness, say), then there can be no expression of this understanding other than a close attention to, or involvement with, that particular work of art. Any other way of identifying the process of understanding would have the consequence that the work of art, which is the expression of this understanding, is only contingently connected with it. Any generalized description of the experience, which would allow us to say that it could be felt towards some other work of art, would not be a description of what it is to grasp or understand the emotional quality of that particular work of art, and hence would not be a description of anything that could be called recognizing the work's aesthetic quality. . . Perhaps the most impressive statement of it is due to Collingwood, who argued that there must be a distinction of kind between art and craft. For art is an end, not a means, and can only be appreciated as an autonomous activity with no rationale external to itself. It does not, for example, refer beyond itself, to objects or states of mind that are separately identifiable. Nor is it an expression of any state of mind that is already identified, since expression in such a case would have an external end, namely, the expression of that identifiable state of mind. (Scruton 1974: 79)

In Collingwood's words "the mean-and-end, or technique, terminology too is inapplicable.", because it's terminology of craft. [See his distinguishing between art and craft in Collingwood n.d. : chapter 2]

There is certainly here a directed process: an effort, that is, directed upon a certain end; but the end is not something

foreseen and preconceived, to which appropriate means can be thought out in the light of our knowledge of its special character. Expression is an activity of which there can be no technique. (Ibid. : 111)

This 'technique' means skill, a certain specialized one, like craftsmanship, but distinct according to the kind of craft.

In so far as expression occurs in art it is essentially opposed to description: it gives us the particularity and not the generality of states of mind. In a similar way, we may argue that our feeling towards art find their principal and central expression in the appreciation of art, and cannot be identified separately. Extended in this way, the objection argues from the necessary connection between emotion and expression to the necessary connection between emotion and object, exactly as the previous objection, and so arrives at a similar conclusion. (Scruton 1974: 79 - 80)

In Collingwood's words "we cannot say what 'emotion' is, except that we mean by it the kind of thing which, on the kind of occasion we are talking about, is expressed." (Collingwood n.d. : 152). Here he wants to say that expressing an emotion is not the same thing as describing it. [See Ibid.:111-115]

a) In the act of expression an emotion, the artist does not know what kind this emotion is, he/she only conscious of having an emotion, perturbation.

b) He/She tries to do something which we called expressing him/herself, i.e. such as speaking "Oh! I feel... but don't know what." or cursing, but not describe what kind it is.

c) When his/her emotion is expressed, and he/she conscious the nature of the emotion, his/her mind is somehow lightened and eased, as if the sense of oppression has vanished.



Then we can label that emotion ex post facto as what kind it is, such as comic, tragic. Describe it as such kind of emotion. This is one sense of Collingwood's theory of expression. Another sense is this:

Expression, on the contrary, individualizes. The anger which I feel here and now, with a certain person, for a certain cause, is no doubt an instance of anger, and in describing it as anger one is telling truth about it; but it is much more than mere anger: it is a peculiar anger, not quite like any anger that ever felt before, and probably not quite like any anger I shall ever feel again. To become fully conscious of it means becoming conscious of it not merely as an instance of anger, but as this quite peculiar anger. (Ibid.: 112-113)

Only in this sense that describing a thing is to call it a thing of such and such a kind opposed to 'the particularity of an expression'. We are to have the same feeling the artist expressed. [See Ibid.:112-115, generalization as description]

But its tenor is in fact very different, since it is based on the view that to attempt an independent description of aesthetic appreciation is, in fact, to mistake the whole nature of appreciation. Appreciation is essentially tied to the particular circumstances in which it finds expression. Wittgenstein, rehearsing the objection, argues somewhat as follow: if someone says that a work of art expresses a feeling of a certain kind, then this suggests that we could identify and describe the feeling in question. But if this were so, we could think of some other way of expressing the feeling which would serve just as well. But this would permit an experimental approach to works of art, which is quite different from our present and accepted modes of aesthetic interest: we do not look beyond the music to something that the music is not. In a similar way, to think that the experience of music can be independently described, to think that it is a replica of some other experience, is to give the music itself a purely instrumental role in appreciation. (Scruton 1974:80)

The ambiguity here lies on the word 'music'. Accordingly to Collingwood, "a work of art proper is a total activity which the person enjoying it apprehends, or is conscious of, by the use of his imagination." (Collingwood n.d.: 151) this is conclusion of what he called the work of art as imaginary object. A work of art proper is something imagined, in music - imagined tune. Now you must distinguish between: (a) that imagined tune. The 'real' work of art. (b) The perceived structures of bodily of a work of art, a pattern or a system of relations between the various noises we hear. A work of art falsely so called. (c) That material instantiation of a work of art, the thing actually perceived by the senses. Noise, sound. Which did Scruton's using of the word 'music' means? According to Collingwood: (a) the music to which we listen is not the heard sound, but that sound as amended in various ways by the listener's imagination. (b) The imagination with which we listen to music is on another level and something more complex, than any inward ear. It is an imagined experience of total activity. (Listening is not the same thing as hearing.) For centuries many have mistakenly thought that painting was a visual art. Then he explains the case of Cezanne, and we can apply his explanation to modern art too, "What he experiences does not consist of what he sees. It does not even consist of this as modified, supplemented, and expurgated by the work of the visual imagination." (Ibid : 146) It belong to 'touch', not merely belongs to sight alone.



When Mr. Berenson speaks of tactile values, he is not thinking of things like the texture of fur and cloth, the cool roughness of bark, the smoothness or grittiness of a stone, and other qualities which things exhibit to our sensitive finger-tips. As his own statements abundantly show, he is thinking, or thinking in the main, of distance and space and mass: not of touch sensations, but a motor sensations such as we experience by using our muscles and moving our limbs. But these are not actual motor sensations, they are imaginary motor sensations. In order to enjoy them when looking at a Masaccio we need not walk straight through the picture, or even stride about the gallery; what we are doing is to imagine ourselves as moving in these ways. In short: what we get from looking at a picture is not merely the experience of seeing, or even partly seeing and partly imagining, certain visible objects; it is also, and in Mr. Berenson's opinion more importantly, the imaginary experience of certain complicated muscular movements. (Ibid.:142)

Collingwood also said that experiencing a work of art has two parts:

(a) a specialized sensuous experience, an experience of seeing or hearing as the case may be. (b) A non-specialized imaginative experience that

...involving not only elements homogeneous, after their imaginary fashion, with those which make up the specialized sensuous experience, but others heterogeneous with them. So remote is this imaginative experience from the specialism of its sensuous basis, that we may go so far as to call it an imaginative experience of total activity. (Ibid.:148)

That 'bodily' object, that experience of it is only counterfeit work of art, the 'real' one is in the head of that artist, This is not verbal quibble. Their ontological status are different. Collingwood is not against describing the experience of the 'real' work of art, but it must ex post facto not be as any kind of emotion in general. According to his theory the audience who can share that experience has an active role, to recreate it as the creative artist has done. He/She is the recreator him/herself. (Imagine someone argues that there is such a case as that describing is impossible, supposed

that the creator don't know to include it in what categories, because he/she has partial information about kind of emotion, but conscious that it expressed such a kind, and unoppressed, this case not against Collingwood's thesis)

When I say that the first movement of Tchaikovsky's Sixth Symphony expresses a particular feeling, or that I read towards it in a particular way, then I might be using the term 'particular' intransitively, so as to forbid the question 'What feeling?' or 'What way?'. In this sense 'particular' means something like 'particular', and is being used simply to impose on a mental state the strong criterion of identity. (Scruton 1974:81)

This he refers to Collingwood's words 'this quite peculiar anger.' In that context (Collingwood n.d.:150-151) Collingwood wants to tell us that "To describe a thing is to call it a thing of such and such a kind: to bring it under a conception, to classify it. Expression, on the contrary, individualized." (Ibid.:112), means the act of expression, at that moment, we are not concerned with its general nature, what kind it is. The act of creating is the act of expression. It is not a product of 'offspring' by having pre-notion, a conception, as classifying as such and such, which is the way of craft, that is not art proper. Then it is not something an instance of such any kind that we want to produce, but it can of course be included into such a kind ex post facto, after the expression, consciousness of what is expressed. If this artist does not want to describe or analyse what he/she expresses, that's no problem. Scruton see also this point.

Kennick tries also to argue that Collingwood's thesis is paradoxical: "(1) a 'real' tune or picture not only is not, but can not be, a work of art. Is this not contrary to what we ordinarily believe and say?" (Kennick 1964:143) His using of the "real" tune

here means the tune, the noises-in-arrangement that we heard. This is no problem. Collingwood can answer that our ordinary belief on this point is a confusion, between work of art proper and work of art falsely so called. It is a confusion of a 'real' object of attention and its material instantiation. His second charge is to ask for observable data that be relevant to the correction of the mistaken so called it bodily object to be a real one. This he miss the explaining of the theory on "what is expression?" and "what is imagination?" He argued that,

Futher, if this is an empirical mistake, then it must at least be possible for a "real" picture to be a work of art. If I can mistakenly suppose that a tower is round when in fact it is square, it must be possible for the tower to be round rather than square. But on Collingwood's view it is impossible for a "real" picture to be a work of art. (Ibid.:143)

That a "real" picture is possible to be a work of art is right in some sense. According to the theory, this artifact is made to serve a certain purpose, as to inform others or remind the artist one ownself of his imaginative creation at all. It's a fabrication. The ability to do it is a specialized form of skill, differing accordingly to the kind. Remember that skill is ability of craft. In the cases that the artist create his/her works of art and does not want to communicate this to anyone (Why do you think that there are merely nine Symphonies in Beethoven's head? His last year, he was deaf.), then it exists only in his/her head. The right of argument is on this account: when a work takes a public form the creator is shifting to another level, as a way of communicating of helping the observer to recreate the work. A work can be publicly expressed or observed or not. Either case is based on either the creator or the observer. As of the creator, it's based on success

to express his feeling in the embodiment of the imaginary work to publicly observable. For the observer, it's based on that one's ability in recreating the work, and on his requisite knowledge such as known to read the notation of music. This is why training of ability in skill or given information to be requisite knowledge is useful, though the skills and knowledge may be of a different sort for the recreator. It's not sufficient for the observer to recreate but a precondition that one can create. If the observer do not know anything before, such as what kind poem is alike, there may be no soil for one to grow one's own offspring. This's my construction of Collingwood's argument to defend that charge. Kennick's example is of misdescription or of confusion of two objects of the same sort, a mistake in categories, between the mental entity and the empirical data then he is simply working off the different assumption than that is of Collingwood. It is not the empirical problem of whether the tower is round or square, but the categorical mistake between the tower or not the tower.

Thirdly, he argued that if a Milton or a Raphael does not embody the imaginary one, could either a poet or a painter.

It is not clear what Collingwood's answer to these questions would be. If he says "yes", then a man can be a painter even if he never paints a picture or causes one to be painted. But if he says "No; Milton would not have been a poet or Raphael a painter, but both of them would still have been artists", then a man can be an artist without being a poet, or a painter, or a composer, etc. This is like saying that something can be an animal without being any kind or species of animal. (Kennick 1964:143)

In some sense Collingwood's answer can be "yes", (I propound it already.) This is the sense that: One can be a poet but no one know him/her as a poet. It is her/his intention to want anyone

know his/ her work, by make it publicly observable. But is this the case of a man who has no ability to make it to be an actually object to be perceived one, "No" can be an answer. That a man can be an artist without being a poet,..etc. If set of species of animal has this possibility, it's included in its concept to be set as such. The meaning of species of animal included that possibility. Then Kennick's analogy is irrelevance. (As of Collingwood's concept the boundary between science and art is disappear, not on area of context, but on the act of creating. We can call Einstein as an scientific artist, distinguishing from craftsmanship scientist.) Now I shall propound this before discussing another Kennick's argument: (a) heard the noise made by musicians is in way rather like the thinking we have to do when we hear the noises made, such as by a lecturer lecturing on a scientific subject. (b) The noises are meant to assist us in achieving what he assumes to be our purpose in coming to hear him lecture, that is, thinking this same scientific thesis for our own. (c) The lecture collected of scientific thought related to those noises in such a way that audience who thinks as well, not merely hears, becomes able to think these thought for one own. Kennick argues that

To make up a tune, or to reconstruct one in imagination, is simply to make up, or to reconstruct, a series of notes or tones, but somehow behind it. Hence, reconstruction brings one no closer to the music than hearing it. The theory requires that the tune that is played be the same one the composer made up, which in turn must be the same one the listener reconstructs. That is, there can be only a numerical difference between them, like the difference between two copies of the same book; if they differ significantly in any other way, we are faced with the puzzle posed in the preceding paragraph. But if the tune that is played is the same as the others, why can we not dispense with the others and simply listen intelligently to the tune that is played? (Ibid.:144)

I don't know why Kennick neglects cautiously reading of Collingwood's text. I quote from his text:

This suggests that what we get out of a work of art is always divisible into two parts. (1) There is a specialized sensuous experience, an experience of seeing or hearing as the case may be. (2) There is also a non-specialized imaginative experience, involving not only elements homogeneous, after their imaginary fashion, with those which make up the specialized sensuous experience, but others heterogeneous with them. So remote is this imaginative experience from the specialism of its sensuous basis, that we may go so far as to call it an imaginative experience of total activity. (Collingwood n.d.:147-148)

Clearly, Kennick himself looks the square tower to be the round one. He completely neglects distinction between the 'sensuous basis' and the 'imaginative experience', and confuses between the media, that material instantiation, and the genuine work, the experience which we can reconstruct in our minds. The media, a series of notes and tones, is necessarily because without it we can not reconstruct the genuine work, the same experience as that of the author but this material instantiation is as the guide-line for the audience to seek the way to reconstruct that artist's experience. Kennick's 'the preceding paragraph' is:

Suppose that the tune the composer made up in his head is not the one he wrote—he was distracted and set down something different. To listen intelligently when it is played, must I imagine precisely what the composer had in his head? If this were possible, could it count as listening intelligently to the tune played? (Kennick 1964:144)

As I have said already, a work can be publicly success as the embodiment of the artist's imaginary total experience to publicly observable or not, either case is based on either the creator or the observer. If this creator is unsuccessful in making the material instantiation which the observer can use this media to seek way to the genuine



work, then the observer cannot reconstruct the same work as of the creator. My theory is this: From the trace of that media, the observer who has ability to help him/her to recreate the work, can create a work of the author-positing-in the bodily work, this author is not necessarily the same as that first author who made the bodily work. Speaking more strictly, this bodily work, the material instantiation, is necessarily as the media for the observer to seek the way to recreate the genuine work, the 'real' author-positing-in the bodily work. We can't count as listening intelligently to the tune played, even when the first author was distracted and set down something different. But using the tune as media for listening intelligently to the 'real' tune. If we can reconstruct the same experience as that of the 'first' composer, even the bodily work doesn't give way to this experience, it's our failure to recreate the author-positing-in-the bodily work's experience and accidentally recreate the same experience as of that 'first' author. According to my theory when the bodily work is outcome, this bodily work and its author-positing-in is significant. Supposed that we find a work that we can't know who is its creator. My theory is this: the author-positing-in this work is the source of references. His last argument:

Does the appreciation of art require imagination in the way he suggest? And even if it does, does this imply that a work of art is an imaginary object? Or need terms be redefined to make it one? (Kennick 1964:144)

According to the theory it requires imagination in the way as he suggests. Then it implies as such. (By the nature of any theories, it is normative, isn't it? Think of Quine's words:

Everything to which we concede existence is a posit from the standpoint of a description of the theory-building process, and

simultaneously real from the standpoint of the theory that is being built. Nor let us look down on the standpoint of the theory as make-believe, for we can never do better than occupy the standpoint of some theory or other, the best we can muster at time. (Quine 1960:22)

I argue that theory of art has this nature, No innocence eyes on this account too. We all are bound with some theories. Theory-laden takes crucial role in our perception of the 'world') If the terms can use least problematic, redefined is in the limited area, such as some misguided terminology, if it is to be found.

2. In review, the main propositions forming the theory are:

The assumptions I accept from Collingwood's theory are,

(1) The work of art is a creation of the mind of the artist. This is its origin.

(2) Its outcome can be merely imaginary or also have its material instantiation, the bodily work, accordingly to the artist intention.

(3) If it is to be a public object, this requires some media, mode of existence, which others can observe.

(4) This public body is necessary to make it possible for others to experience that creation in the artist's head.

(5) Such that is written or printed on music-paper is not the true work, in the sense that, it is only something which, under the appropriate circumstance, will enable others (or that artist oneself when this one has forgotten it) to construct the tune, as the case of music, for themselves in their own heads.

(6) This something are only such as a notation from which that unembodied creation in the artist's mind can be reconstruct in the mind of a person who studies them.

(7) Only Ex post facto can we describe what kind it is which is expressed.

My suggested propositions extending the above are :

(8) This publicly body, the material instantiation, if its success as the observer can transmit the artist's creation to be his/her creation in one ownself is according to the creator or the observer. In the case of the creator, it's based on his/her ability to produce the material instantiation, that other ones, the observers, can use this instantiation as the media to recreate the genuine work.

(9) No matter there really are the cases that someone write the great poems, works of art, by not having any skill or prerequisite knowledge, or not. In many cases the help of skill or prerequisite knowledge is necessary as warrant of the success of producing the material instantiation. For example, yesterday I went to see the chinese opera "The White Snake". There were many scenes that the actors' performance must perform by the help of gymnastic, which requires skill in training. The appropriateness of using such a skill made the performance work well, the too-much using made the work of art lost, by merely arousing the audience's pleasure. Long training in skill until this skill is the artist's spontaneity when he/she wants to express his/her emotions and makes them to be public property, it becomes his/her natural ability that he/she

can spontaneously do or perform as such. In the case of the observer it is based on his/her ability to recreate the genuine work. In many cases some prerequisite knowledge is required, e.g. such as the knowledge about what symphony is.

(10) Then, the first condition: the necessity of the mode of existence, the publicly body. The private works in the mind of the artist, without their material instantiation, is unknown by another people. The publicly body, the material instantiation, is necessarily as the one that another people can use as media to seek the way to the genuine work.

(11) When this material instantiation is produced, the creator transposes to posit in this bodily object. The author-positing-in the work is what we can trace from the media, and the first author is now the observer as another people.

You can call it, that something, a symbol system, or using Goodman's terminology, nonverbal language. Goodman's book, *The Language of Art*, the seeking varieties and functions of symbol by systematic inquiry, the structures of appearance, is this Ex post facto activity. (See chapter one) These two theories, Collingwood and Goodman, can reach in some points touch each other. And their conclusions reach the same one that art and science are not alien to each other. Scientific theory, such as Einstein's, can be called as a work of art. [His theory of relativity is formulated with the help of geometry. The matter of which geometry treats is first defined by the axioms. "These axioms are free creations of the human mind." (Einstein 1981:63)] Goodman argued that the experience of

contemplation of both science and art the same one. [see, Goodman 1976] This doesn't mean that Collingwood's theory are identical with Goodman's. The surprising is that there theory leads to the same conclusion that: science and art can be distinguished on the area of concerning. It's not alien each other. Practice in both area requires skill and some foreknowledge, each according to each case, but merely skill is not enough.

Collingwood's theory, then, while it enables us to distinguish between the artist and the craftsman (in his sense)-e.g. the builder who builds to specifications and the sculptor who does not- it fails entirely to provide a criterion for distinguishing great works of art from artistic failures. Indeed, it fails to distinguish the artist from the creative mathematician, the scientific theorist, and the puzzle-solver, none of whom (in their characteristic activities) can "see the end in the beginning" any more than the artist can do so. The artist is (though it is not helpful to say so) one who creates good works of art; and for them to be good works of art it is in no way necessary for any single kind of process to be involved in their criterion. (Hospers 1971:71)

Collingwood can and indeed he does, provide a criterion for distinguishing great works of art from artistic failures. I shall explain this criterion later. The artist is not one who creates works of art. In Collingwood's theory works of art can be good or bad, as the artists. Lastly, as I propound already, it's success for this theory to dissolve the boundary between science and art, as an alien one. Therefore, Hospers charged it to be fall to distinguish the artist from other creators, is irrelevance, this theory already don't want to do as such.

Chapter three and four is my theory.