

MILITARY BROTHELS (*IANJO*) IN DUTCH EAST INDIES (DEI)  
UNDER JAPANESE OCCUPATION 1942 - 1945



บทคัดย่อและแฟ้มข้อมูลฉบับเต็มของวิทยานิพนธ์ตั้งแต่ปีการศึกษา 2554 ที่ให้บริการในคลังปัญญาจุฬาฯ (CUIR)  
เป็นแฟ้มข้อมูลของนิสิตเจ้าของวิทยานิพนธ์ ที่ส่งผ่านทางบัณฑิตวิทยาลัย

The abstract and full text of theses from the academic year 2011 in Chulalongkorn University Intellectual Repository (CUIR)  
are the thesis authors' files submitted through the University Graduate School.

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of Master of Arts Program in Southeast Asian Studies  
(Interdisciplinary Program)  
Graduate School  
Chulalongkorn University  
Academic Year 2014

Copyright of Chulalongkorn University

สถานบริการทางเพศของทหารญี่ปุ่นในอินเดียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ในช่วงปี 1942-1945



วิทยานิพนธ์นี้เป็นส่วนหนึ่งของการศึกษาตามหลักสูตรปริญญาศิลปศาสตรมหาบัณฑิต

สาขาวิชาเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ศึกษา (สหสาขาวิชา)

บัณฑิตวิทยาลัย จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

ปีการศึกษา 2557

ลิขสิทธิ์ของจุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

Thesis Title	MILITARY BROTHELS ( <i>IANJO</i> ) IN DUTCH EAST INDIES (DEI) UNDER JAPANESE OCCUPATION 1942 - 1945
By	Miss Maya Dania
Field of Study	Southeast Asian Studies
Thesis Advisor	Wasana Wongsurawat, Ph.D.
Thesis Co-Advisor	Associate Professor Suwanna Sathanand

---

Accepted by the Graduate School, Chulalongkorn University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Master's Degree

.....Dean of the Graduate School  
(Associate Professor Sunait Chutintaranond, Ph.D.)

THESIS COMMITTEE

.....Chairman  
(Associate Professor Withaya Sucharithanarugse, Ph.D.)

.....Thesis Advisor  
(Wasana Wongsurawat, Ph.D.)

.....Thesis Co-Advisor  
(Associate Professor Suwanna Sathanand)

.....External Examiner  
(Suphatmet Yunyasit, Ph.D.)

มายา ดาเนีย : สถานบริการทางเพศของทหารญี่ปุ่นในอินเดียนตะวันออกของดัตช์ในช่วงปี 1942-1945 (MILITARY BROTHELS (IANJO) IN DUTCH EAST INDIES (DEI) UNDER JAPANESE OCCUPATION 1942 - 1945) อ.ที่ปรึกษาวิทยานิพนธ์หลัก: ดร. วาสนา วงศ์สุรวัฒน์, อ.ที่ปรึกษาวิทยานิพนธ์ร่วม: รศ. ดร. สุวรรณภา สถาอนันท์, 162 หน้า.

จุกุน อีอันฟู หรือ นางบำเรอกองทัพ เป็นศัพท์ที่ทางการญี่ปุ่นใช้เรียกระบบทาสทางเพศที่กองทัพญี่ปุ่นใช้ในระหว่างสงครามมหาเอเซียบูรพา (ทศวรรษที่ 2480) ระบบดังกล่าวถูกสถาปนาขึ้นใน *อีอันโจ* หรือสถานบริการทางเพศของทหารญี่ปุ่นเพื่อสนองความต้องการทางเพศของทหารญี่ปุ่นในเอเซียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้โดยเฉพาะในอินเดียนตะวันออกของดัตช์ (ปัจจุบันคือประเทศอินโดนีเซีย) ระบบนี้ได้ถูกนำมาใช้ในการยึดครองของญี่ปุ่นตั้งแต่ปี พ.ศ. 2485 - 2488

งานวิจัยชิ้นนี้มุ่งอธิบายภูมิหลังความเป็นมาที่นำมาสู่การสถาปนา *อีอันโจ* ในดินแดนเอเซียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ของดัตช์ และศึกษาแนวทางการดำเนินการของ *อีอันโจ* ของญี่ปุ่นในภูมิภาคนี้ในระหว่างระยะเวลาดังกล่าวข้างต้น ผลการวิจัยบ่งชี้ว่า *อีอันโจ* หรือสถานบริการทางเพศของทหารญี่ปุ่นจัดตั้งขึ้นในเอเซียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ของดัตช์เป็นครั้งแรกตามคำขอของผู้มีอำนาจในกองทัพญี่ปุ่นเนื่องเพราะสาเหตุหลายประการด้วยกัน ในเอเซียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ของดัตช์มี *อีอันโจ* กระจายอยู่ในทุกๆ เกาะที่กองทัพญี่ปุ่นได้เข้ายึดครอง แต่ที่พบอย่างหนาแน่นที่สุดคือบนเกาะชวาและบอร์เนียวซึ่งเป็นเกาะที่มีทรัพยากรธรรมชาติและมนุษย์อยู่มากที่สุดซึ่งเป็นสิ่งที่ญี่ปุ่นจำเป็นต้องใช้เพื่อขับเคลื่อนสู่ความสำเร็จในสงคราม เด็กหญิงที่ถูกนำมาบริการในพื้นที่เหล่านี้ถูกบังคับมาในรูปแบบต่างๆ ทั้งเกลี้ยกล่อม กัดค้น ตลอดจนจนถึงการใช้ความรุนแรงขึ้นใจ

ผู้รอดชีวิตจาก *อีอันโจ* ในอินโดนีเซียถูกชุมชนท้องถิ่นรังเกียจและถูกละเมิดสิทธิในหลายๆ ด้าน อาทิ การศึกษา, ความสัมพันธ์ทางสังคม ตลอดจนจ้างงาน ในระดับนโยบายของรัฐนั้นผู้รอดชีวิตจากการเป็น *จุกุน อีอันโจ* ในอินโดนีเซียไม่เคยได้รับค่าเสียหายหรือแม้แต่ได้รับการยอมรับว่าเป็นเหยื่อสงคราม ภายใต้คำสั่งของศาลยุติธรรมระหว่างประเทศรัฐบาลญี่ปุ่นได้จัดตั้งกองทุนสตรีแห่งเอเซียขึ้นเพื่อแก้ไขปัญหา แต่ก็ไม่เคยยอมรับหรือขอภัยอย่างเป็นทางการต่อการใช้งาน *จุกุน อีอันฟู* ในระหว่างสงคราม เงินค่าชดเชยได้ถูกส่งมอบให้รัฐบาลอินโดนีเซียในรูปแบบความร่วมมือทางการเมืองระหว่างสองรัฐบาล กองทุนสตรีเอเซียเป็นองค์กรผู้จัดการใช้เงินดังกล่าวเพื่อสร้างและซ่อมบำรุงศูนย์บริการทางสังคมแก่ผู้สูงอายุในหลายจังหวัดในอินโดนีเซีย

สาขาวิชา เอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ศึกษา

ปีการศึกษา 2557

ลายมือชื่อนิสิต .....

ลายมือชื่อ อ.ที่ปรึกษาหลัก .....

ลายมือชื่อ อ.ที่ปรึกษาร่วม .....

# # 5687637120 : MAJOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

KEYWORDS: MILITARY BROTHELS / DUTCH EAST INDIES / JAPANESE / WAR / WOMEN

MAYA DANIA: MILITARY BROTHELS (*IANJO*) IN DUTCH EAST INDIES (DEI) UNDER JAPANESE OCCUPATION 1942 - 1945. ADVISOR: WASANA WONGSURAWAT, Ph.D., CO-ADVISOR: ASSOC. PROF. SUWANNA SATHAANAND, 162 pp.

Jugun ianfu or military comfort women is a euphemism term offered by the Japanese to name a military sex slave system during the Japanese involvement in Asia Pacific War 1930's – 1940's. The system was built inside the so-called ianjo or military brothels to provide sexual gratification for the Japanese soldiers. In Southeast Asia, particularly in Dutch East Indies (called Indonesia in the modern day), the system was applied during the Japanese annexation on this region in 1942-1945.

This research particularly aims to explain the backgrounds for the Japanese military personnel in establishing *ianjo* in DEI during 1942-1945 and also to describe the operation of the Japanese's *ianjo* in DEI during that period of time. The research has found that the *ianjo* or comfort stations were first established in DEI at the request of the Japanese military authorities due to various reasons. In DEI, the location of *ianjo* was scattered in islands that the Japanese army invaded to, however, most of *ianjo* was found in Java and Borneo Island as the two islands provided natural resources and human mobilization that the Japanese needed to support their war efforts. Most girls were recruited with both soft and hard coercion.

In Indonesia, the *ianjo* survivors were rejected by the local communities and thus their rights were violated in many sectors, like in education, social relationship, as well as employment. In the government level, the survivors of *jugun ianfu* in Indonesia even had never been compensated or even considered as war victims. The Japanese government, under international court, established Asian Women's Fund to re-dress the issue, but has never publicly admitted and apologized for the presence of *jugun ianfu*. The money was delivered to the Indonesian government as a form of political bilateral cooperation between two governments and the money, managed by the Asian Women's Funds, was spent in constructing and rehabilitating social service houses for elderly in Indonesia.

Field of Study: Southeast Asian Studies

Student's Signature .....

Academic Year: 2014

Advisor's Signature .....

Co-Advisor's Signature .....

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis is dedicated to all women who unfairly lost their dignity.

No woman should ever suffer at the hands of men.

Enough is enough.

No words can describe how grateful I am to be supported by:

my supportive advisor, Wasana Wongsurawat, Ph.D

and my honorable co-advisor. Assoc. Prof. Suwanna Satha-Anand

My everything, Mom and Dad. Thank you for believing in me.

My spirit and greatest wings, Nurish.

My laughter and shelter, Siti.

My deep gratitude to the chairman and the external committee,

Assoc. Prof. Withaya Sucharithanarugse, Ph.D and

Ms. Suphatmet Yunyasit, Ph.D

To all teachers in Chulalongkorn University.

To my sisters, brothers, best friends in SEA Studies Program, CU

Mommy Linda, Sandra, Chrissy, Jenny, Dustiny, Nan Oo, Oom, and all.

United Nations of Development Program (UNDP) – Bangkok,

The Ambassador of The Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia,

Family of the Indonesian Students Association in Thailand (PERMITHA),

and ASEAN Community Division 2014,

And finally, thank you for all people whom I cannot mention in this list.

## CONTENTS

	Page
THAI ABSTRACT .....	iv
ENGLISH ABSTRACT .....	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	vi
CONTENTS .....	vii
LIST OF TABLES .....	x
LIST OF PICTURES .....	xi
LIST OF GRAPHS .....	xii
LIST OF MAPS .....	xiii
CHAPTER I : Introduction .....	1
I. Background .....	1
II. Rationale .....	8
III. Research Questions .....	11
IV. Objectives of Research .....	12
V. Major Arguments .....	13
VI. Research Methods .....	13
VII. Research Scope .....	15
VIII. Conceptual Framework .....	15
IX. Significance of Research .....	16
X. Literature Review .....	17
CHAPTER II : Archipelago Profile in the Early 20th Century .....	23
I. The Landscape .....	23
A. Geographical Setting .....	23

	Page
B. Colonial Administrative Setting.....	26
1. Java Island .....	31
2. Borneo Island .....	35
II. The People.....	40
A. Java Island.....	47
B. Borneo Island .....	51
CHAPTER III : Japan Military Invasion to Dutch East Indies 1942 – 1945.....	56
I. Global Casualties: World Wars and Asia.....	56
II. Japan Military Operation in the DEI .....	61
III. Japan Military Policies in DEI .....	69
CHAPTER IV : Japanese Military Brothels (lanjo) in the Dutch East Indies .....	74
I. The Existence of lanjo in DEI.....	74
A. Documents of Evidence.....	74
B. lanjo in Java and Borneo Island.....	82
II. Mechanism in Operating lanjo.....	86
III. The Women Inside lanjo .....	91
CHAPTER V : Indonesian Jugun lanfu in the Postwar Era .....	98
I. International Post-war Reaction.....	98
II. Local Narration of DEI Women Survivors .....	102
III. Indonesian-Japanese Government Attitude.....	111
A. Chronology of Handling Indonesian Jugun lanfu Survivors.....	114
B. The Distribution of the Money .....	126
CHAPTER VI : Conclusion.....	131



	Page
REFERENCES .....	137
APPENDIX.....	151
1. The 12 official documents from the Japanese Army.....	151
2. The 8 official memoirs from the Japanese Army.....	152
3. The 2 recorded testimony of witnesses and 2 evidences of the survivors.....	154
4. The testimony of the survivors .....	155
5. Special Documents to Establish <i>Ianjo</i> .....	155
6. Special Documents to Manage <i>Ianjo</i> .....	159
VITA.....	162



## LIST OF TABLES

	Page
Table 1	Population Statistics.....42
Table 2	Ethnic Population of Some of the Principal Towns in 1905.....43
Table 3	Regional Census of the Dutch East Indies in 1930.....46
Table 4	Population in Java in 1915 per Town.....48
Table 5	Population of the Natives in Java region in 1930.....49
Table 6	Native Population in Main Towns Borneo in 1905.....52
Table 7	Ethnic Population in Borneo in 1930's.....53
Table 8	<i>Ianjo</i> and Dutch Internees.....94



## LIST OF PICTURES

	Page
Picture 1	Former <i>Ianjo</i> in Java Island (Semarang, Semarang Kurabu).....84
Picture 2	Former <i>Ianjo</i> in Java Island (Semarang, Hotel Du Pavillion).....84
Picture 3	Former <i>Ianjo</i> and <i>Ianfu</i> in Java Island (Cimahi).....84
Picture 4	Former <i>Ianjo</i> in Java Island (Simpang Street) .....85
Picture 5	Former <i>Ianjo</i> in Java Island (Place of Dutch Internment).....85
Picture 6	Papak Building in Java Island.....85
Picture 7	Asrama Telawang.....86
Picture 8	Documented announcement and propaganda.....88
Picture 9	Four Javanese Women testified in Tokyo People’s Tribunal .....97
Picture 10	Japanese military men involved in <i>jugun ianfu</i> .....100
Picture 11	Drawings from Filipino <i>jugun ianfu</i> survivors.....101
Picture 12	A book that compiles Mardiyem’s profile and testimony.....102
Picture 13	Ema’s profile from Hilde Janssen’s photo exhibition.....106
Picture 14	The Book Cover.....109
Picture 15	Arrival of the Allied war crimes investigation team in Namlea.....112

## LIST OF GRAPHS

	Page
Graph 1      Recapitulation of construction of social service for elderly during 1998 – 2008.....	128
Graph 2      Cost of construction of social service for elderly during 1998 – 2008 (in million rupiahs).....	129



## LIST OF MAPS

	Page
Map 1 DEI in 1940's.....	24
Map 2 Java in DEI.....	31
Map 3 Borneo in DEI.....	36
Map 4 Java and Borneo Island.....	83
Map 5 Buru Island in Indonesian Archipelago.....	108



## CHAPTER I : Introduction

### I. Background

In Southeast Asia countries, women's rights are still becoming a major issue. Even the term of human rights must be applied equally to all human beings, in reality, women's rights is generally less respected than those of men in term of custom and traditions. Religion and domestic laws can also discriminate against women, making them more vulnerable to any violence and reducing their opportunities and access to any resources and services, which often results in a lower quality of life. A report from the United Nations, taken from an official document of The United Nations Women for Southeast Asia titled "UN Women Issue Briefs on Women's Human Rights in the ASEAN Region", stated that violence against women in Southeast Asia is widespread in various forms across the ASEAN member countries. It occurs at all levels – in the family, the community, the society, cross-regionally and trans-nationally. It takes physical, psychological and economic forms, from domestic violence, trafficking, rape and sexual assault, to sexual harassment, forced/child marriage, bride kidnapping, bride price, son preference, sex-selective abortions and other forms. According to WHO (July 2007) on defining the definition and scope of the problem, violence against women and girls is a major health and

human rights issue, as at least one in five of the world's female population has been physically or sexually abused by a man or men at some time in their life.

Started in early 20<sup>th</sup> century, particularly in 1993, the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, the 1994 World Conference on Population in and Development, and the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, scholars and activists, especially those working in so-called developing nations, have come increasingly to view violence against women as a human rights issue rather than merely a criminal justice or a public health issue. This movement was somehow influencing the way of Southeast Asian people perceiving violence against women as well. In addition to recognizing the debilitating effects of physical and sexual violence perpetrated against women by private actors, such as partners or family members in their homes, or by acquaintances and strangers in the community, this perception focuses attention on violence perpetrated against women by soldiers during times of war and internal conflicts; sexual assaults perpetrated against women in state custody by law enforcement personnel; rapes perpetrated against women in refugee camps by other refugees, local police, and/or military personnel; the trafficking of women for sexual exploitation or for menial labour; and harmful traditional practices, such as forced, marriages, genital cutting, honour crimes, suttee (Tjaden, 2005; see also Human Rights Watch, 1999).

Violence perpetrated against women by soldiers during times of war and internal conflicts occurred in Southeast Asia, mostly during World War II, as Japan

were confident that they would conquer East and Southeast Asia region and fought all European power and gain control over these regions. During the Japanese occupation in Indonesia, women were also organized to actively support wars committed by the Japanese. As Blackburn (2004: 21) noted, women organization, *Fujinkai* was established as official women's organizations to support the Japanese war effort. Its frontline activities included first aid, communal kitchen (*dapur umum*), and sewing uniforms. On the home front they tended crops, wove yarn, popularized a simple lifestyle, and ran literacy campaigns, social welfare, and health care (Ishaya, 1993: 51-53; Suryochondro, 1984: 134). Membership of *Fujinkai* was compulsory for wives of the civil servants. This brought women of different classes and educational backgrounds into community work for the first time (Blackburn, *loc.cit*). However, according to Martyn (2005: 45) women often tried to choose non-sexual work for the Japanese to avoid being sent to the brothels. Women also feared the sexualized roles promoted by the Japanese, including the comfort women system of forced prostitution. Stories circulated among local people that were women abducted from riverbanks and gang-raped in the forest. This made people hid their daughters or forced them to marry so the Japanese would not take them.

According to Yuki Tanaka (1996: 95), on the advice of its military leaders, Japan established a system of military brothels called "comfort stations" (*ianjo*) throughout Asia, including in the Dutch East Indies. From Reyes and Jacobs' investigation (2011: 189; see also Mckellar, 2011: 189), it is stated that various



estimates put in figure excess of 200,000 women from throughout Asia under the Japanese military occupation, including from South Korea, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Burma, and the Pasific Islands. These women, aged between eleven up to early twenties were forced or trapped into *ianjo*, were systematically raped, forced to service from thirty to seventy soldiers a day, violently attacked and abused, and rarely allowed to leave. It is estimated that only a third of the victims to survive. Most of them were killed, systematically executed, forced to commit suicide with the Japanese retreat or when they got back home, or by sickness (Schaffer and Smith, 2004: 126-8).

The Japanese established *ianjo* in almost all islands in the Dutch East Indies region where the Japanese troops came to seize during their invasion of the Southeast Asia region. After the war was over, the Japanese abandoned the *ianjo* and up to the present day, the existence of *ianjo* was hardly exposed in contemporary Indonesia. After Japanese annexation of Indonesia ended, the *Jugun Ianfu* survivors were silent for decades. The first exposure of *ianjo* was conducted in 1948 when Batavia (now Jakarta) hosted public trials concerning the sexual internment of Dutch women. The significant issue of re-opening the Japanese military comfort women issue was in 1992 as one Japanese historian, Yoshimi Yoshiaki, published her findings on the Japanese national military defence department to the mass media on January 12, 1993, generating world-wide public anger towards Japan. Responding to the public's pressure, Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary, Yohei Kono, uttered his personal

apology towards South Korean women (Lee, 1997: 521-523). Up to the present day, the Japanese government still neither admitted responsibility for creating the comfort station system nor given compensation directly to former comfort women in Java Island, Indonesia. According to a report investigation of a national magazine, Tempo Indonesia in March 2005, in 2001, the compensation money from Japan was given to the United Nations and controlled under Asian's Women Fund. To Indonesia, the compensation money was given to the Ministry of Social Affairs, but the money has never been given personally to the survivors. The Government built retirement houses in some areas in Java islands instead. Consequently, the Indonesian government, unlike the South Korean government, has never addressed this issue formally and directly to the Japanese government to the present day.

After more than 50 years of silence, four Indonesian women finally showed their courage as they travelled to Tokyo to share their witness testimony and give evidences at the Women's International War Crimes Tribunal, an international public hearing about Japanese military personnel's sexual violence during their occupation in Asian countries. It is not merely the money that these women were after, but they fought for an apology from the Japanese government and recognition from society that had been rejecting and treating them offensively after they returned home as *jugun ianfu* survivors.

In the post-war period, the economic and political situation in Indonesia was progressively repaired, but not for the *jugun ianfu* survivors. Instead, most of them lived under social and political oppression. I lived in a close neighbourhood with one of the survivor, who has now passed away, Mardiyem, in Yogyakarta city, Indonesia. In her testimony, she expressed her deep sadness as her society, for decades, stigmatized her as a prostitute and thus, she was isolated from the society, and had to live in poverty and sickness without having any chances to re-build her life. She did not even get any support from the Indonesian government as they have been showing their alignment position with the Japanese government.

While I find it hard to access data on Indonesian *jugun ianfu* in Indonesia, I went to Tokyo on September 2014 to have more access to the testimonies and evidence from the local museum in Waseda University called Women's Active Museum on War and Peace (WAM). The museum preserves the documents and material evidence of the brutality of Japanese imperialism in Asia. I also went to meet a Professor of Cultural Anthropology in Osaka, Dr. Makoto Koike, who has been living for 25 years in Indonesia, and received his personal opinion as a Japanese scholar and an Indonesianist. From Indonesia, I collected the government document of the report on the handling of *ex-jugun ianfu* by Indonesian government with Asian Women's Fund along with political and financial agreement between the two governments.

I am interested in conducting a research about women narration in the war period in Southeast Asia as I perceived how the impact of the sexual violence occurred during the wartime might affect local women greatly even in the post-war era. Especially for the *jugun ianfu* survivor, after they experienced the most horrible experience in their life, their society considered them to be contaminated and dirty and thus they do not have any meaning anymore within the society. In the post-war period, the economic and political situation in Indonesia was progressively repaired, but not for the *jugun ianfu* survivors. Instead, most of them lived under social and political oppression. Even based on the Indonesian government's report, the government still mentions the *jugun ianfu* survivors as "perempuan penghibur" or the prostitute, in which the position of the survivors has never been a sexual victim to be protected.

For decades, Indonesian society has been culturally tolerating of sexual violence against women, particularly in this research, to the *ex-jugun ianfu* survivors. In Indonesia, a woman is commonly symbolized as Jasmine flower that also served as the Indonesia's National Flower. Jasmine flower has white colour to represent purity. It is not, then, a surprise if Indonesian society puts virginity seal in the highest standard to measure women's morality. As the consequence, this analogy has frequently led to social tolerance of rape culture. In many cases of rape, the women usually hold double burdens: first, society will blame them for attracting men to commit rape and second, the women will also be condemned as being "used" and

“second hand” (in Bahasa: *perempuan bekas*) for not being pure and fresh anymore. After a woman lost her virginity due to rape, society usually calls her “bunga layu” or the withered flower, and consequently, she would also lose her dignity in society.

## II. Rationale

After the Asia Pasific war was over, the Japanese left *jugun ianfu* in their *ianjo* in the Dutch East Indies. In some cases, when Japanese military bases were bombed by *Sekutu* (allies), most *jugun ianfu* girls escaped. In some cases, most of the girls were died due to hunger and illness, often from broken bones or internal injuries from brutal beatings. There were also testaments (Global Review, 2010) that some girls were killed, forced to commit suicide, by the Japanese soldiers as the soldiers committed *hara-kiri* (disembowelment). Some survivors returned to their hometown, burdened with social stigma and pressure. It was commonly stated that the *jugun ianfu* survivors were dirty prostitutes and should not be allowed to stay in the village. Being isolated by local society, most of the survivors were living in poverty, excluded by their community, and experienced physical sufferings. In more specific way, many women were killed during the military operations as the *ianjo* were built near the front lines. Others died during distant travels under wartime conditions. Death also occurred due to lack of or inappropriate medical care, such as from ill-performed abortions.

Since this was considered a war crime, Japan was forced by the international court to pay a settlement to compensate several women exploited as sex slaves during World War II. This relatively small settlement came by way of a judicial decree. Japan's parliament, the Diet, has provided for community rehabilitation through the Asian Women's Fund. The Diet has not issued an apology (though several prime ministers have), the question arises as to whether the Asian Women's Fund constitutes a reparation or a settlement. The Japanese government itself has never openly admitted responsibility for the *jugun ianfu* system and only some representatives have uttered apologies.

According to Parker and Chew (1999: 95), documents reveal three types of facilities for sex slaves committed by the Japanese Imperial Army. The first were those directly run by Japanese military authorities. The second were run by civilians but essentially set up and controlled by Japanese military authorities. Finally the third types of facility were mainly private facilities but with some priority for military use. Despite these differences, there were common characteristics among those three facilities types. First, the facilities were under strict control of the Japanese armies which helped to establish and to manage these facilities and helped to recruit sex slaves. Second, the facilities were used exclusively by Japanese soldiers and army civilian employees. Third, the facilities had to obtain a permit from the army and accept its support and control in all procedures. Lastly, all facilities followed written regulations created by the Japanese Army.

In Indonesia, the existence of the comfort women operation was first exposed in 1948 when Batavia (now Jakarta) hosted public trials concerning the sexual internment of Dutch women. However, a special court for Indonesian local women has never been committed, even after in 1990, forty-five years after the end of World War II, among all Japanese officials, only Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi personally offered an apology for the acts perpetrated by the military against the comfort women (Brooke, 1999: 87). In addition, Brooke stated that, in general, Japan merely approached re-dress to compensate the *jugun ianfu* survivors in Indonesia. By the establishment of the Asian Women's Fund, on March 1996, Japan contributed 221 million yen (\$ 4.8 million) to the fund which was supposed to represent the Japanese people's feelings of apology and remorse. The form of re-dress was community rehabilitation. Rather than paying compensation to individual victims, redress money is used to improve conditions for all women.

On March 25, 1997, a MoU was agreed and signed between the government of Indonesia, represented by the Ministry of Social Affairs with the government of Japan, represented by the Asian Women's Fund (AWF), which is in principle the government of Japan was coordinative and reported to the Indonesian president on behalf of *jugun ianfu* issue. The money was then allocated to build guesthouses in 69 *Tresna Werda* Social Institutions (PSTW) in the form of the construction of 61 PSTWs and the renovation of 8 PSTWs (Prasetiaju, 2010). Nevertheless, the next issue resurfaced in March 2007 when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe issued a controversial

statement to refute the involvement of Japanese military in the sexual slavery system. Hicks (in Brooks, 1999) reminds us that historically, women throughout Asia were accorded a low ranking *de jure*. It is commonly viewed that rape and sexual abuse were perceived as an inevitable part of the wartime experience. In addition, the women who had suffered were mostly from poor families with little influence over the ruling elite. More significantly, few women were willing to come forward because of the cultural shame attached to their sexual experience in a society that prized chastity. For all these reasons, the comfort women issue was still ignored in post-war treaty negotiations. In Indonesia, some demands are now delivered to the current Japanese government related to the *jugun ianfu* issue. First, the Japanese government should formally recognize and apologize that the *jugun ianfu* system was in practice a sexual slavery action that was deliberately implemented by the Japanese during 1942-1945. Second, the dark history of *jugun ianfu* should be put into the school curriculum in both countries, Indonesia and Japan, so that the younger generation will know the truth of history. Finally, the *jugun ianfu* survivors should be compensated as the victims of war in personal support.

### III. Research Questions

This research proposes two general questions as the main focus:

1. Why did the Japanese establish *ianjo* in Dutch East Indies during 1942-1945?
2. How did the Japanese operate *ianjo* in Dutch East Indies during 1942-1945?



Further detailed questions for this research are composed as below:

1. What were the events that served as an impetus towards the coming of the Japanese to Dutch East Indies (DEI) in 1942?
2. How did the Japanese organize labor force in DEI during 1942 – 1945?
3. What were social and political settings for *ianjo* establishment in DEI?
4. Where did the Japanese build *ianjo* in DEI?
5. How were the conditions of *ianjo* in DEI?
6. What were the ethnicities of the women who employed in *ianjo*?
7. How were the *jugun ianfu* treated inside *ianjo*?
8. How did the local people respond to the presence of *ianjo* and *jugun ianfu*?

#### IV. Objectives of Research

The main goals of this research are to explain the backgrounds for the Japanese in establishing *ianjo* in DEI during 1942-1945 and also to describe the operation of the Japanese's *ianjo* in DEI during that period of time. Thus, in order to address the main goal of my work, I have the following objectives:

- to highlight events that served as an impetus towards the coming of the Japanese to Dutch East Indies in 1942,
- to explicate the politics of labor forces in DEI during 1942 – 1945,
- to analyze the social and political setting for *ianjo* establishment in DEI during 1942 – 1945.

## V. Major Arguments

During the Japanese occupation in Dutch East Indies in 1942 until 1945, many *ianjo* had been established as the place for military men to relieve their sexual desire. The Japanese were really involved in the establishment of *ianjo* in DEI, especially in Java and Borneo Islands. In each island, *ianjo* shared similar characteristics in the way the Japanese operated the place (women inside *ianjo* must have their name changed into Japanese names, undergo reproductive treatments, and were forced to do sexual service without payment or limitation of hours), but had different characteristics in the ethnicity of the women who were employed as *jugun ianfu* inside the *ianjo* (in Java, most of women who were employed in *ianjo* were Javanese and Dutch women, while in Borneo, Chinese women were the majority in the *ianjo*). In the post-war era, the Japanese intentionally abandoned the *ianjo*, and thus the presence of *jugun ianfu* were never admitted.

## VI. Research Methods

This research applies historical methods that cover some stages, starting from selecting topics, collecting and verifying data, interpreting, analysing, and writing a systematic research. In collecting data, heuristic method is applied to gather materials. In the first step, investigation for primary data is conducted by exploring archives of two islands in Dutch East Indies (Java and Borneo), which are mostly located in the National Archives of Indonesia in Jakarta. Data are also explored from

archives of *Australian War Memorial (AWM)*, and KITLV journals via online. A visit to Women Active Museum for War and Peace (WAM) in Tokyo, Japan, has also been done to collect pictures and legal documents from People's Tribunal in 2000. I also visited the library of the United Nations ESCAP in Bangkok Regional Hub Office to find literatures on the role of UN in handling the *jugun ianfu* as women rights issues in Indonesia. For secondary data, some books, articles, and journals taken from libraries and online archives are also collected, as well as conducting interview from people who live near the abandoned *ianjo* as well as memoirs of the survivors. The second step is to verify the data collections by testing their validity, authenticity, originality, and also their relation to the research topic. The data verification stage can be differentiated into two forms: internal and external. By committing internal investigation, data verification and credibility are corresponded to their contents, while by committing external investigation, originality of the data is checked. Besides verifying data, comparing data archives is also committed among similar data to find the most objective materials. Next, the verified data are interpreted. In this step, data are analysed to find their relevance, backgrounds, and their importance to the research focus, especially to any photo documentaries. In the final step, the writing process is conducted in a systematic way so that the research is understandable and appropriate with historical writing methods.

## VII. Research Scope

The scope of this research is limited by period and place. The time limit for this research begins in 1942, as the initial year of the Japanese annexation of the Dutch East Indies, and ends in 1945, as the final year of the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies. The spatial limit for this research included Java and Borneo Islands within Dutch East Indies territory, as most of *ianjo* activities were centralized mainly in these two islands: Java as the central place for agricultural activities and Borneo as the central place for oil mining activities.

## VIII. Conceptual Framework

This research is analysed using social history theory including approaches like women's history, ethnic history, and labour history. Social history, often called the new social history, is a broad branch of history that studies the experiences of ordinary people in the past. Social history was contrasted with political history, intellectual history and the history of great men/women. It covers such various topics in World history such as gender relations, ethnics and race, the history of personal relationships, consumerism, sexuality, the social history of politics, crime and punishment, and history of the senses (Adas, 1985: 335). It touches on, and arguably helps to focus, major issues of public debate, for example, on the comfort women issue in Asia. Social history is in its own way to the 'winds of change', both

chronologically, in the choice of historical subject matter and methodologically in the adoption of multi-disciplinary perspectives.

As part of social history, women's history approach is applied to describe the stories of ordinary women who lived in the *ianjo* that have historical significance and affect women's history as well. Ethnic history approach is applied to discover the narration of women ethnicity inside *ianjo* as during the Japanese occupation, the military armies took many women from various ethnicities to the *ianjo*. Finally, labour history approach is also applied to determine labor forces in the Japanese annexation as one important background for this research.

#### **IX. Significance of Research**

I believe that this research can shed some light on the facts concerning the sexual life of the Japanese military in Southeast Asia during 1942 – 1945. In this respect, I discover an important aspect that this research presents an attempt to discover and analyse in the English language information on Japanese military brothels (*ianjo*) and narration of women inside the *ianjo* in the Dutch East Indies region. This research can contribute to the academic community especially those who concern about social history in Southeast Asian studies. This research can assist scholars who are interested in the relation between war and women in Southeast Asia to gain a better understanding of how military presence may generate sexual violence towards women. Moreover, I believe that the findings of this research will

be beneficial for the development of Southeast Asian women studies in general, and of Indonesian women studies in particular.

#### X. Literature Review

This research generally applies books and report documents as the primary source for the literature review. The books and report documents were selected from issue-based, preferably on the narration of comfort women during the Japanese occupation in the Dutch East Indies. Composing from the most general up to the most specific issue, there are five international books, two memoirs, two local books, and one report to be compiled in this literature review section.

The foremost brief narration of Japan's comfort women (*jugun ianfu*) is found in a book written by Yuki Tanaka in 2001 titled "Japan's Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery and Prostitution during World War II and the US Occupation". This book gives contextual background of the establishment of *jugun ianfu* system in East Asia (China and South Korea) as well as in the Dutch East Indies to represent Southeast Asia region, which gives general understanding to compound narration about the comfort women issues in this thesis. Moreover, the book also gives a wide perspective on how the system of the comfort women had been started by the Japanese military army during the occurrence of the Pacific War. However, the book has limitation in the detail description of the Dutch East Indies profile during the occupation of the Japanese army.

More detailed information on *jugun ianfu* in Asia could be found in the book “Legacies of the Comfort Women of World War II, edited by Margaret Diane Stetz and Bonnie B.C. Oh in 2001 that covers not only the narration of *jugun ianfu* in Asia (China and South Korea), but also some documents that served as the proof of Japanese involvement in establishing military comfort station during the Asia Pacific War. The book explains in a more detailed way on some reasons why the Japanese military established the comfort women system in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, the book only gives general description on how the *ianjo* existed in the Dutch East Indies and more detailed information regarding what went on inside the *ianjo* is needed.

An interesting book was written in 2008 by Sarah Soh titled “The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan” that covers women’s labour as sexual military slaves during the Japanese occupation of East Asia and some areas of Southeast Asia region. The advantage of this book is that it shows the reader how the system of comfort women correlates boldly with the labour force during the presence of the Japanese military. The women who worked inside the *ianjo* could not be considered as prostitutes as they had never been given any material compensation for their sexual service, instead, most of them were recruited by coercion.

Specific topic on Japanese military comfort women in Dutch East Indies region (later known as Indonesia) was written by Bart van Poelgeest in 1994 in a report document version titled “Report of a Study of Dutch Government Documents on the

Forced Prostitution of Dutch Women in the Dutch East Indies during the Japanese Occupation”. This report gives the readers a specific narration of Dutch women who became victims of the comfort stations and were forced to have sex with Japanese soldiers. The book is limited to explaining the narration of Dutch women who became comfort women inside *ianjo* in the Dutch East Indies. More women narration from other ethnicities, therefore, still needs to be explored.

More detailed explanation of foreign internees during the Japanese occupation was written by D. van Velden in 1963 in a book translated into English, titled “*De Japanse Interneringskampen Voor Burgers Gedurende de Tweede Wereldoorlog*” (Japanese Civil Internment Camps During the Second World War), which discovers the main location of *ianjo* where Dutch women were captured, in particular some places in Java Island. However, the book, besides being limited to narrations of the foreign *ianfu* in the Dutch East Indies, is also limited to locations on Java Island only.

On the other side, concerning other island aside from Java, a book written by Ooi Keat Gin in 2011 titled “The Japanese Occupation of Borneo, 1941 – 1945” explains about the presence of Japanese military comfort women in Borneo Island during the Japanese occupation in Dutch East Indies. The greatest advantage of this book is that it gives the reader detail profile of Borneo Island during Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies and how the system of comfort women affected the local people living in the island. Nevertheless, the book only focuses on giving



brief description of the island profile and population statistics and only mentions very little that is related to the stories of local women who lived inside *ianjo* in Borneo Island.

Regarding the stories of women who once lived inside *ianjo*, one important memoir was written by a *jugun ianfu* survivor, a Dutch woman who lived in the Dutch East Indies during Japanese occupation, Jan Ruff O'Herne, who wrote a book titled "50 Years of Silence" in 1994 that opened her sexual experience inside Japanese *ianjo*. The book has a strong effect on how the reader perceived the brutality that was experienced inside the *ianjo*, especially to the writer, and it clearly describes the operating mechanism to operate the *ianjo* and how the women were treated inside such places.

Beside the foremost memoir written by a Dutch *ex-ianfu*, a more detailed narration about how the mechanism to run *ianjo* by the Japanese in the Dutch East Indies was written by Roy Lavon Brooks in 1999 in her book titled "When Sorry Isn't Enough: the Controversy over Apologies and Reparations for Human Injustice". Brooks goes further to not only collect various stories of women who survived the *ianjo*, but also proposes possible human rights' violation committed by the Japanese Imperial Army during the Pacific War era. Nevertheless, despite the complexity and detail information regarding the stories of the women inside the *ianjo*, the book lacks information on more specific ethnicities of the DEI's local women, in particular the Javanese.

To go further with the local narration of Javanese women inside *ianjo*, there is another book, written in Bahasa Indonesia, compiled by Marwati Djoened Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notosutanto in 1992 titled *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia: Zaman Jepang dan Zaman Republik Indonesia* (National History of Indonesia: the Japanese Period and Republic Period). The book covers the history of DEI's local women who lived inside *ianjo* based on the *jugun ianfu* survivors' personal experience. Despite the detailed data related to the stories of local women, the book, however, limits the space to elaborate more issue on Indonesian *jugun ianfu* to only 2-3 pages.

In a longer space, Lan Fang in 2006 wrote a novel titled "Perempuan Kembang Jepun" (The Flower Women of Japan) based on factual stories of *jugun ianfu* in the Dutch East Indies. The book generally narrates the story of local women who were once employed as an *ianfu* in Java Island and how they experienced brutality of Japanese soldiers. The book has disadvantage in that it only narrates the story during the war.

Lastly, the most monumental literature was written by Pramoedya Ananta Toer who wrote "Perawan Remaja dalam Cengkraman Militer" (Virgin Teenagers under Military Grip) in 2001. This novel was written based on historical documents related to the Japanese strategy to recruit women as *jugun ianfu*. The book is special in its own way that it does not only describe the situation inside *ianjo* experienced by DEI local women, but also the narration after they escaped from the *ianjo*. The

book, however, only focuses on telling the story of local women narration without providing documentary evidence for references.

Thus, from several literature reviews elaborated, this thesis will try to compile most of important aspects that is still needed in order to contribute to Southeast Asian women issues, under a specific topic about Japanese military brothels (*ianjo*) in Java and Borneo Islands of Dutch East Indies during 1942 – 1945. This thesis, eventually, tries to approach the issue of comfort women in Southeast Asia from some combined perspective of history and women's rights.



## CHAPTER II : Archipelago Profile in the Early 20th Century

### I. The Landscape


#### A. Geographical Setting

The Dutch East Indies or presently known as the modern Indonesia is located in the southern part of Southeast Asia. The country lies between the Indian and Pacific oceans and between the continents of Asia and Australia, south of Malaysia and the Philippines, and northwest of Australia<sup>1</sup>. The archipelago comprises of a group of islands located in between 6° degree of north latitude and 11° of south latitude, and 95° and 141° of east longitude. The whole area of DEI is about 753,000 square miles, and stretch of land almost as large as 767,000 square miles. The foremost components of the DEI are three large islands and parts of two more. These are Java, Sumatra and Celebes, most of Borneo, and the western half of New Guinea. The lesser ones are some 3,000 islands, such as the Spice Islands or Moluccas; and Bali, Lombok, Timor, Flores, Sumba and others in line with the long axis of Eastern Java. Geographers have divided DEI into four great groups: (1) the main Sunda Islands, or Java, Madura, Sumatra, Celebes, and the Dutch territory in Borneo; (2) the Lesser Sunda Islands, or Bali, Lombok, Timor, Flores, Sumba, and others; (3) the Spice Islands or Moluccas; and (4) the Dutch territory in New Guinea (Simmons, *et.al*, 2013: 324).

---

<sup>1</sup> Country Profile: Indonesia, Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, December 2004.

*Map 1: DEI in 1940's<sup>2</sup>*



The Dutch East Indies possesses the largest chain of archipelago in the world. It consists of five major islands and about 30 smaller groups. There are total number of 17,508 islands of which about 6000 are inhabited. Islands of the DEI are one of the planet's largest archipelagos. The islands are blessed with abundant natural resources and one of the earth's greatest assemblages of biological diversity. The country is also home to a biodiversity that is only second to Brazil. Rich with natural reserves, the DEI has become a commodities powerhouse and a leading commodities exporter in a number of resources, including: natural gas, coal, palm oil, rice, cocoa, coffee, tea, tin, nickel, bauxite, and most importantly, large amount of gas-based resources and petrochemical and finest crude oil can be found in islands of the DEI.

<sup>2</sup>Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941-1942, source: <http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/MapSWP.html>

Taken from a document in a Military Report on the Netherland's Possessions in the East Indies; prepared by the General Staff of War Office (1919:8), it is commonly described that the mountains of the Archipelago moulded two distinct systems: first, beginning with the Barisan Mountains, in Sumatra, runs forward through Java and the consecutive islands to Timor, finally losing itself in the north of Halmaheira. This structure may be an extension of the mountain system of the Malay Peninsula. The second one originates from the mountains of north Celebes, spreading its branches to the Philippines and Sangi Islands. The larger islands of the Archipelago, especially Sumatra and Borneo, have several rivers, rendering the country fertile. In Java there are more than 400 rivers, but only two of them, the Solo and the Brantas, are navigable. In Sumatra most rivers are large, such as the Singkel, on the west coast, and the Siak, the Indragiri, the Djambi, and the Moesi, on the east. The substantial form of Borneo makes it an exemption, large rivers being found in nearly every part of it.

As described by Patrick Witton (2003: 38), physically, Java is prominent for a wide-ranging mountain chain originating from the northern part of Sumatra. From that region the range leads all of the west coast of Sumatra, the southern coast of Java, and eastward to the islands situated off the southern coast of the Dutch part of New Guinea. A second group of mountains is found in the northern part of Celebes; a third in Halmahera (the largest of the Moluccas) and other islands west of Halmahera. Moreover, in almost all these group active or partly active volcanoes are

numerous. Tectonically, Indonesia is highly unstable as she lies on the Pacific Ring of Fire where the Indo-Australian Plate and the Pacific Plate are pushed under the Eurasian plate where they melt at about 100 km deep.

Sumatra and Borneo have extensive lowlands, but there are smaller plains in Java. A northern plain and a southern plain are distinguished landscapes in the Dutch part of New Guinea, but both are mountainous, representing the two slopes of a longitudinal mountain range. While the volcanic ash has resulted in fertile soils, it makes agricultural situations impulsive in some areas. Of the 400 volcanoes, approximately 150 are still active. Aside from volcanoes, islands in DEI are connected by sea and some most important sea routes in DEI were the Java Sea, Flores Sea, Banda Sea, Straits of Makassar, Straits of Karimata, and Banka Straits to connect between islands (Simmons, *et.al*, 2013: 324).

#### B. Colonial Administrative Setting

The DEI was divided in directly governed territories and self-governing territories. These latter were ruled over by, more or less, independent native monarchs. As stated by Joop de Jong in his book *De Waaier van Het Fortuin, de Nederlanders in de Indonesisch Archipel (1595 - 1950)* (1998: 2-11), the native states were of special importance on the Outer Islands, the Netherlands East Indian islands with the exclusion of Java and Madura. On the Outer Islands lived 40% of the population within their self-governing territory. In Java was only 7% of the territory occupied by native states: the so-called Principalities or *Vorstendlanden* (Yogyakarta

and Surakarta). The whole territory of the archipelago, including the native states, was divided into provinces/*gewesten*. The Governor (also called Resident or Assistant-resident) was the Dutch head of a province. The province was divided into divisions/*afdelingen* at the head of which stood an Assistant-Resident assisted by a Controller/*controleur*. Native communities were preserved in their original form all over the archipelago. In Java, for example, villages or groups of villages were known as *desa* while in Sumatra were recognized as *marga* or *nagari*.

A Governor-General implemented executive and administrative authority. He was supported by a council of four to six members. This council had no part in executive affairs; its duties were chiefly advisory. A legislative body, A *Volksraad*, was created in 1918 (Simmons, *et.al*, 2013: 323). Thus, from a document in a Military Report on the Netherland's Possessions in the East Indies; prepared by the General Staff of War Office (1919:6), from a political point of view the Dutch possessions are divided into three areas below:

1. Territories like Java, which, with the exception of the native principalities of Djokjakarta and Soerakarta, are directly controlled by the Dutch.
2. Territories in which the native princes are, subject to certain restrictions, allowed to govern their own dominions, for example, Yogyakarta and Surakarta in Java, Sambas in Borneo, the Batak lands in Sumatra, and Gowa in Celebes.



3. Territories like New Guinea in which the Dutch have not yet set up a complete administration.

Moreover, the Military Report document (1999:5) also mentioned that under the provisions of the constitution of 1922 the Kingdom of the Netherlands was declared to include the Netherlands East Indies as a crown colony. The possessions of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Asia, constituting the territories generally known as the Netherlands East Indies or Dutch East Indies (DEI) then comprised:

1. Sumatra and neighboring in-lands.
2. The Archipelago of Bintang or Riouw.
3. The Lingga Archipelago.
4. The Karimata Archipelago.
5. The Tambilan Inlands.
6. The Anambas Islands.
7. The Natoena Islands.
8. The group of Banka and Billiton with neighbouring islands.
9. Java with Madoera and neighbouring islands.
10. Borneo as far north as a line drawn from Datu Point' to St. Lucia Bay ( $4^{\circ} 10'$  North Latitude and  $117^{\circ} 53'$  East Longitude) along the main watershed ; and the neighbouring islands lying south of these two points, except at the extreme north, where the headwaters of the Sembakong and Sibuko rivers

are assigned to British North Borneo. The island of Sebatik, lying off St. Lucia Bay, is divided between Great Britain and Holland. (This frontier was settled by the delimitation treaty of 1915.)

11. Celebes with neighboring islands.
12. All other islands lying east of Borneo and Java as far as 141° East Longitude, and south of Mindanao in the Philippines as far as 11° South Latitude. The northernmost possessions of Holland in the direction of the Philippines are the Nanoesa and Taldoer Islands, the boundary between the Dutch and American islands lying between the Nanoesas and the island of Palmas which is American. The 141<sup>st</sup> parallel crosses New Guinea, thus leaving the western half of that island to Holland. The frontier on the British New Guinea is slightly modified along the course of the Ply River; between the points at which that river intersects the 14:1st parallel the frontier follows the river.

CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY

Within the limit of the East Indian Archipelago are certain districts belonging to foreign Powers, according to the Military Report document (1919:6), included:

1. The northernmost portion of Timor and a small territory on the north-west coast of that island, which are Portuguese.
2. The northern part of Borneo, which is British, and is divided between the Crown Colony of Labuan, the territory of the British North Borneo Company, the Sultanate of Brunei, and the territory of the English Rajah of Sarawak, who

pays a nominal yearly tribute to Brunei, although Sarawak is four times the size of the latter State.


3. The Sulu Islands, which belong to the United States. They are a connecting link between Borneo and the Philippines, and may be regarded- as belonging properly to the East India Archipelago. The fact that their inhabitants are Moslems also connects them rather with the East Indies than with the Philippines. The boundary between them and British North Borneo runs between the island of Sibutu, which is American, and the Borneo mainland.

All the rest is so-called Government territory which has been handed over to the Netherlands by agreements, like with Great Britain in 1814 (Anglo-Dutch Treaty), 1824 (Treaty of London), 1867 (Anglo-Dutch Gold Coast Treaty), and 1878 (Dutch/Bulungan Agreement) or has become Dutch by right of conquest, purchase, or treaties with native States (Trost, 1995:7). The Military Report document (1996:7) further reported that access to the ring shaped by the Dutch possessions is gained by numerous straits. The best known are the Straits of Sunda and Bali, and the Straits of Malacca, which separate Sumatra from the Malay Peninsula. Further east the northern entrances from the Pacific are wider, such as the China Sea and the Seas of Sulu and Molucca. In the same way the countless island's composing the Archipelago are separated by channels of several scopes.

## 1. Java Island

The profile of Java Island was comprehensively documented in a Dutch document named *A Manual of Netherlands India (Dutch East Indies)* compiled by Geographical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division by the Naval Staff-Admiralty (1920: 22). According to the manual book, Java is positioned between Sumatra to the west and the chain of the Lesser Sunda Islands to the east, ranges from 114:° 31' E. and 8° 47' S. in the cape of Balambangan, to 105° 12' E. in Java Head, and 5° 47' S. in St. Nicholas Point (at opposite ends of Sunda Strait). The island may be labelled in the simplest terms as consisting of a central mountain chain encompassing longitudinally from east to west, and edged by lowlands, almost uninterruptedly on the north, but sporadically on the south. Nevertheless, the customary physical division of Java is into (a) East, (b) Middle, and (c) West, and thus, each of these divisions has certain structural characteristics of its own.

*Map 2: Java in DEI*<sup>3</sup>



<sup>3</sup> Peter Boomgaard (ed.), 1991, "Map of Jav" (Reprinted from *Changing Economy in Indonesia: A Selection of Statistical Source Material from the Early Nineteenth Century to 1940*), Amsterdam, Royal Tropical Institute.

The Manual of Netherlands India (Dutch East Indies) by the Naval Staff-Admiralty (1920: 23) further described the separation of Java Island's territory into three parts. The first part is in the West Java. In this area, the mountains are massed in the south and the main watershed lies well on that side of the island, with the exception of the extreme west where there is little low-lying land along the south coast, while on the other hand the northern lowlands attain their widest extent. Further, in the central region next to the western side, there is Middle Java area. In this relatively narrow division, the mountains form a chain foundation with fewer volcanoes, and these more widely separated. This system is marked off from the mass of Merbabu and Merapi by the Kedu valley, through which the River Praga flows. In the eastern part of Java Island, the East Java district, it comprises of an isthmus lengthening from Bali Strait westward to south from Pasuruan, and of a broader portion, the main mass of East Java, westward of that line as far as the longitude of Surakarta. In this division lowlands and highlands are less abruptly shared than in the others, and the volcanic eminences, instead of growing in groups or masses like that farther west, stand secluded.

As from the document of the Military Report (1919:51), it was stated that the gem of the entire archipelago of the DEI is Java, the most densely populated land near the equator. All the plains and the mountain sides to a high elevation have been turned into gardens. Rice, sugar-cane and tobacco are raised on the lower

lands. The natural fertility of the soil of the low-lying lands, especially in Java, is developed to the utmost, both by the industry of the population, which is essentially an agricultural one, and by the perfection to which the system of artificial irrigation has' been brought. The rivers of Java are used extensively for irrigating rice and other crops. Rice being the staple food of the country, enormous quantities of it are needed and produced for the inhabitants, and the harvest may be estimated at an average 'of about 6,000,000 tons per annum. As the consequence of its environmental setting, in Java during the Dutch colonial period, there are about 140 sugar factories, and about 200,000 acres of land under sugar cultivation. As the Dutch controlled the land commodities in java, the global price of sugar in Java in 1917 was 16 gulden (£1 6s. 8d.).

The Military Report document (1919: 50) continued to expose the trading potential product of Java and how the land was blessed by a fertile soil to cultivate various marketable agricultural products. Java has been the principal producer of sugar-cane only since the Cuban insurrection of 1898. In the middle zone are the coffee plantations, Java coffee being exported to all parts of the world. Still higher are the tea plantations, which yield about 10,000,000 lbs. a year. Java is also the largest producer of cinchona bark (quinine). Its oil wells are tumbling the imports of kerosene and supplying a part of the eastern market. Little of its cotton (about 2,500,000 lbs. a year) was exported. The port of Batavia, in Java, is the profitable center through which the larger part of the exports, most of them sent to the

Netherlands, are forwarded. The cultivation of sugar has in the last 20 years, since the industry was freed from the leading strings of a Government monopoly, made gigantic progress year by year till the export reached 1,300,000 tons, of which Soerabaja and Pasoeroean produce one-third. Tobacco, coffee, tea, cocoa, and rubber are also grown all over Java. From the manual report of DEI (1920: 24), it was known that in Java Island, the fertility of the soil is due to the existence of river and volcanic mountain. The rivers play the utmost role in managing Java agriculture and plantations and the best adapted rivers for this purpose are those flowing northward to the Java Sea. The soil fertility is also supported by the volcanic ashes as there are about 125 volcanic centers in Java, of which 13 are active.

Moreover, the document of Military Report of DEI (1919: 64-65) depicted the transportation line that the Dutch built in order to support the great potential market in Java. It was mentioned that Java Island support most of the Dutch trading commodities and thus the Dutch Government built most of archipelago main roads and train routes in this island. One of the great features of Java is the system of excellent roads which traverses the island in every direction. Good roads are a necessity in the island, as the whole of the eastern portion consists off the roads of impassable morass and paddy fields, while the western portion is extremely mountainous. At the end of 1915, 3,238 km of Government railways were working in Java, as well as 210 km of private lines. The first railway in the Dutch Indies was the line from Batavia to Buitenzorg, opened in January, 1873. There were 2,126 km of

steam-tramways in Java in 1915. The roads are kept in admirable condition, every village being responsible for the section in its immediate vicinity, and the whole being under the constant supervision of European officials. The roads are usually planted with trees at small intervals. The bridges are strong, well-constructed, and maintained in excellent repair; in fact, the roads of Java compare favorably with the best roads in Europe.

## 2. *Borneo Island*

Borneo of DEI is known as the largest island in Dutch East Indies territory as well as the world's third biggest island, right after Greenland and Papua New Guinea Island that lies in the center of the equator line. The island is unique as it also shares one third of its northern area to British government. Geographically, Borneo measures 600 miles east to west and is over 500 miles wide. Dutch claimed its territory over the island for 210,600 square miles and British owned 29,500 square miles and the British added Serawak and Brunei with 50,000 and 2,226 square miles, respectively. The island, strategically located in a central position in archipelagic Southeast Asia, was (and still is) off the world's major trade route. Borneo is located to the southwest of the Philippines, next to Celebes on its eastern side separated by Straat Makassar, Java is to the south, and Sumatra and Malay Peninsula are to the west. The South China Sea laps its northwest coast, while the Sulu and Celebes Seas its northeast and the Java Sea in its south coast. The equator passes through the



island's center. The highest point, at 4,093 meters, is reached at Mount Kinabalu in the heart of Sabah, which is reputedly the highest peak in Southeast Asia. Dutch Borneo was divided into the South and East District with its capital at Banjarmasin, also the capital of Dutch Borneo, and the West District with its capital at Pontianak. The South and East District covered 149,000 miles with a population of 1,400,000 and the West District covered 57,000 square miles supporting 830,000 people (Rottman, 2002: 204).

*Map 3: Borneo in DEI*<sup>4</sup>



<sup>4</sup> , Ooi Keat Gin, 2011, "The Japanese Occupation of Borneo 1941-1945", Routledge, London and New York, p.12.

Borneo possesses three distinct ecological zones: the coastal and estuarine periphery; the river valleys; and the forested uplands of the interior that impacted on the history and human geography of the island. There were several coastal zone in Borneo that served as the location for the chief cities of Borneo, like Kota Kinabalu, Bandar Seri Begawan, Kuching, and for DEI territory, many of these towns are sited on the estuarine area of the rivers: Samarinda on the Mahakam, Banjarmasin on the Barito, Pontianak on the Kapuas and Sibuluan on the Rejang. Borneo is substantially engraved into four zones and administratively into three nation states. The higher northwest part of the island becomes the state of Sabah (before 1963, British North Borneo) while its lower portion is Sarawak; both Sabah and Sarawak are two component states of the Federation of Malaysia. The northern one-third of the island of Borneo was called British Borneo and included North Borneo, a British possession, Sarawak, and Brunei, both British protectorates ruled by Sultans. The independent, sovereign Malay Muslim Kingdom of Negara Brunei Darussalam perches comfortably between Sabah to the northeast and Sarawak to the southwest (Gin, 2004: 234).

Borneo Island has a vast rainforest and is rich in natural resources. Unlike Java Island, industrialization is low in Borneo but timber and mining industries have played an important role in its development. Borneo is also rich in mineral resources. Mineral resources such as gold, diamonds, iron, and tin deposits are present in the 'continental core' and the metamorphosed margins of this core, the auriferous areas of southwest Sarawak and West Kalimantan. The forest sector is also important as

timber, rubber, copra, resin, gum, and camphor are available in this region. Borneo is also rich area for gems. Diamond, gold, and iron are mined while silver, copper, and other base metal prospects are largely unexplored in Borneo. Coal, petroleum and natural gas production of Borneo contribute significantly to the Dutch trading (Brown, 2009: 103). The most important spot for oil production in Borneo is the Tarakan oilfields, the island of some 150 miles northwest of *Borneo* in Bulungan coast can produce about 1,000 tons a day and it is the most viscous mineral oil in the world. The crude oil pumped from the wells of Tarakan was famous for its very high quality. The total production of oil in 1917 was 1,687,591 tons, as against 1,678,839 tons in 1916 (Dunn, 1988: 26).

Dutch East Indies, mostly represented by Borneo and Sumatra, was the most important oilfield spot in the early of 20th century. As the colony for the Netherlands, the Dutch managed the oilfield under the patronage of Royal Dutch Shell. Until the end of 1940's, there were three international oil company in Borneo: Royal Dutch Shell, Stanvac, and Caltex. In the same year, the total oil production in the DEI positioned at fifth in the world (Anderson, 1986: 1). Before Tarakan oilfield was discovered in 1905, several earth oil spots were uncovered in the Mahakam Delta and a concession was granted in 1891 at the Sanga-Sanga, a tributary of the Mahakam and in 1897, new oil fields area found in around Balikpapan bay. The Balikpapan oil refinery was the second largest in the Dutch East Indies region as two-thirds of its crude oil came from southeast Borneo in Kutai and Tarakan (Gin, 2013:

57). The Naval Intelligence Division of the Dutch Admiralty (1944: 265) reported that the mineral wealth of Borneo Island also included coal, one of important mineral resources with a very high price in global market during the industrial period at that time period. The Pulau Laut mine off the coast of South Borneo became the largest private coal mine in the Dutch East Indies by 1912 and supplied 27 per cent of the colony's total. Although of lower grade than the hard coal from mines later developed in Sumatra, Borneo coal still formed one-third of Indonesian output in the 930's. There was also a small coal mine in western Serawak by 1856 and it was taken by the British government.

Gin (2013: 11) further explained that on the eve of the outbreak of the Pacific War (1941–1945), the island of Borneo was politically divided into two halves: the upper, northern portion was referred to as British Borneo, and the remaining southern and western parts as Dutch Borneo. British Borneo comprised three 'independently' administered territories: Sarawak under the White Rajah, Sir James Brooke (1841), the Malay Muslim Sultanate of Brunei, and British North Borneo administered by the British North Borneo Chartered Company (1881). All three territories were British protectorates from 1888. Dutch Borneo was administratively divided into *Zuider- en Oosterafdeeling* van Borneo (South and East Borneo), and *Westerafdeeling van Borneo* (West Borneo). Alongside Dutch- administered territories there were the various *zelfbesturen* or self- ruled native areas such as Berau and Kutai in the east

and southeast, and Pontianak and Kota Waringin in the west and southwest respectively.

## II. The People

Most of population of the DEI existed nearby region where water systems were recognized. With the exclusion of a few small islands in the south-eastern area, where water is not readily accessible, there are plentiful supplies of water in the DEI. The rural population, which constituted 97 per cent of the total, depends largely upon wells, streams, rivers and collections of rain water. Wells are the most common sources of water for home use. Municipal system equipped water to only a small quantity of the urban populace. Where such systems existed, they usually assisted the European population and about half the Chinese population. In most cities, with the exemption of Batavia, less than 3 per cent of the native population had access to water from the municipal supply system. In Batavia, more than 10 per cent of the natives had water piped to their homes. The vast majority of natives, however, either used water from wells or subscribed it from water sellers. In 1938, there were 235 water plants in operation, and 46 more were under construction. About half of them were in Java; the rest were in the outer islands (Simmons, *et.al*, 2013: 326).

There has been significant argument about the origin of the native peoples who exist in massive diversity in the Dutch East Indies. They are now usually divided

into three chief races the Indonesians, the Malays, and the Papuans. The Indonesians, who possibly shaped the native population in most of the islands, are exemplified today by such races as the Baduy in Java, the Bataks in Sumatra, and the Dayaks in Borneo. The dominant peoples of the western half of the archipelago, however, are of Malay race. This people, coming from south-eastern Asia, constrained the Indonesians back into the interior of the islands, and established on the coasts: they are represented today by such peoples as the Javanese, Madurese, and Sundanese in Java, the Acehnese, and Minangkabau Malays in Sumatra. Malays of the DEI are a mixed race, modified by Hindu and Chinese strains in the west of the archipelago, and by Papuan blood in the islands lying nearer New Guinea. The characteristic of their skin is light brown or light yellow, and the hair black, straight and stiff, with little growth on the face or body ; the nose is short and flat, with a pointed tip and broad nostrils, the eyes dark and slightly oblique, the cheek-bones prominent and the mouth large ; the body is well formed, and strong, but somewhat slender (A Manual of the Dutch East Indies, 1920: 159).

In more ethnic point of view, the census in 1905 shows that the population of DEI may be divided into five categories:

*(table 1) Population Statistics (published of the last ethnicity census in 1905)<sup>5</sup>*

Ethnicity/ Area	Europeans	Chinese	Arabs	Other foreign Orientals	Natives	Total
Java and Madoera	64,917	295,193	19,148	2,842	29,715,908	30,038,008
Other Possessions	15,993	268,256	10,440	20,128	7,304,552	7,619,369
Total	80,910	563,449	29,558	22,370	37,020,460	37,717,377

The Manual of the DEI (1920: 127) further reported that European society in the East Indies really means the Dutch society, since 92 per cent of the Europeans are Dutch, though only 7 per cent, of these are actually born in Holland. The Germans, of whom there were 1,400 in 1905, are the most numerous European people after the Dutch: half of them were in the Outer Possessions, chiefly in Sumatra. In 1905, there were 300 British, 300 Belgians, with small numbers of French, Americans, and Austrians. The above figures do not include the 12,000 Europeans in the army or the 2,200 in the navy, in Netherlands India, where there are few white working-men, the soldier forms a class apart, though after his discharge he frequently finds a place in European society as an administrator or other official.

In the Dutch East Indies, most of the foreign ethnics lived in populous towns throughout Java, Borneo, and Sumatra Island as can be seen on the next page:

---

<sup>5</sup> Military Report on the Netherland's Possessions in the East Indies; prepared by the General Staff of War Office, 1919, Department of Defense Library, document number A 2245 (B18/373) 50 9/19 H&S 6276wo, HBM Government Collection, p. 159.

(table 2) *Ethnic Population of Some of the Principal Towns in 1905*<sup>6</sup>

Town/ Ethnicity	Batavia	Semarang	Soerabaja	Pekalongan	Djokjakarta	Soerakarta	Padang	Palembang	Bandjermasin
Europeans	8,777	5,126	8,068	480	1,477	1,572	1,789	372	455
Natives	99,320	76,413	124,473	36,816	72,641	109,524	83,337	50,703	12,684
Chinese	28,150	13,636	14,843	3,371	5,266	6,532	5,136	7,304	2,581
Arabs	2,058	698	2,482	1,061	97	337	210	2,420	910
Other Foreign Orientals	246	787	337	41	86	413	368	186	78
Total	138,551	96,660	150,198	41,719	79,567	618,378	91,440	60,985	16,708

*In the above tables Japanese and half-castes are classified as Europeans*

<sup>6</sup> Military Report on the Netherland's Possessions in the East Indies; prepared by the General Staff of War Office, 1919, Department of Defense Library, document number A 2245 (B18/373) 50 9/19 H&S 6276wo, HBM Government Collection, p. 160.



In the further census in 1912, it shows that the population of DEI may be divided into the natives, whose numbers are imperfectly known in many parts, but who are reckoned as numbering some 47 million, the foreign Orientals, who numbered 770 thousands; and the Europeans, of whom there were 105 thousands. In 1912, out of the 104,837 Europeans in the Netherlands Indies, there were 86,681 in Java and Madura, and 18,156 in the Outer Possessions: Java, which forms only 7 per cent, of the area of the islands, contains 80 per cent, of the European population, and this is 1 per cent, below the European population of Ceylon, taking the relative size of the islands into consideration. In 1912, in total, there were 295,000 Chinese in Java and Madura, and 385,000 in the Outer Possessions. Thus their numbers have been doubled in Java in the last half-century, and quadrupled in the Outer Possessions. Half of those living in the Outer Possessions are in Sumatra, especially on its east coast. It is expected that the number of Europeans in the Outer Possessions will increase rapidly. The above figures do not include the 12,000 Europeans in the army or the 2,200 in the navy; in Netherlands India, where there are few white working-men, the soldier forms a class apart, though after his discharge he frequently finds a place in European society as an overseer or other official (A Manual of the Dutch East Indies, 1920: 125).

The great majority of the Arabs in the Dutch East Indies came originally from Hadramaut, and Arabs from other parts, such as Baghdad, are usually undesirable from a political, an economic, or a moral point of view. Altogether classes of

Hadramaut society are represented in the archipelago: the *seyyids* or the religious nobility, the *qabili* or the members of the race who always wear arms, the burghers or the largest class who may not wear arms, and the Bedouin or the nomads who live almost exclusively by cattle-rearing. There were no definite Arab settlements before the early part of the nineteenth century when the opening of the Suez Canal facilitated communications. Nevertheless in 1905, it was noted that there were 19,148 Arabs in Java and Madura, and in 1912, 4,145 in Sumatra, and 3,738 in Borneo. They are not united among themselves, intermarry with all classes in the archipelago, and the royal dynasties in Bantam and Cheribon in Java, and in Siak, Aceh, and other places in Sumatra are of Arab descent (A Manual of the Dutch East Indies, 1920: 133).

According to the census, the total population of native people of the DEI on 1930 was 60.7 million, of which 41.7 million lived in Java and 19.0 million in the rest of the country. The total number can be seen below:

(table 3) Regional Census of the Dutch East Indies in 1930<sup>7</sup>

Population					
Region	Male	Female	Both Sexes	Area (sq.kms.)	Density (per sq.km)
Java	20,424,225	21,294,139	41,718,364	132,174	316,1
Sumatra	4,271,456	3,983,387	8,254,843	473,606	17,5
Kalimantan	1,102,886	1,065,775	2,168,661	539,460	4,0
Sulawesi	2,095,895	2,136,011	4,231,906	189,035	22,4
Maluku and West Irian	390,555	367,495	893,400	496,456	1,8
Nusa Tenggara	1,719,533	1,740,526	3,460,059	73,614	47,0
<b>Total DEI</b>	<b>30,004,550</b>	<b>30,587,333</b>	<b>60,727,233</b>	<b>1,904,345</b>	<b>31,9</b>

In 1940 it was said that the total population in the DEI was almost 71 million and natives Indonesian are said to number 68,632,000 (Simmons, *et.al*, 2013: 334), however, in 1942, this pattern of demographic development in the Dutch Indies was rudely interrupted. In 1942, Japan invaded and the World War II occupation began. In the wake of the war and independence, the majority of Indo-Dutch people and their descendants left for the Netherlands; a significant proportion arriving in that country for the first time (Imhoff and Beets, 2004: 49). The Japanese in the East Indies, who are the newest arrivals in the archipelago, have thus a considerable prestige with the natives, but take no part in European society. Formerly they were mostly acrobats and female prostitutes, or followed various indefinite callings, but there are now a growing number of Japanese traders, a large proportion living in the Outer Possessions (A Manual of the Dutch East Indies, 1920: 132).

<sup>7</sup> Department van Economische Zaken, Volkstelling, 1930 (Population Census, 1930), 8 vols. (Batavia, 1930 - 1936)

#### A. Java Island


The total population of Java, Madura, and the dependent islands was given as 36,035,435 in 1912, and consisted of 35,577,660 natives, 86,681 Europeans, and 351,094 foreign Orientals, largely Chinese. Thus the natives formed about 98 per cent, of the total population, the Chinese have been slowly decreasing, and the Europeans increasing in numbers since about 1870. The majority of the towns are on the north coast, where the trade of the island is largely concentrated; there are no capitals of residencies on the south coast and those which are not on the north coast lie mostly in the center of Java. The towns are thus situated in the most thickly populated and highly cultivated part of the country, and there are no divisional capitals in the thinly populated parts, such as South Bantam and the Preanger Regency.

*(table 4) Population in Java in 1915 per Town*<sup>8</sup>

CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY

---

<sup>8</sup> A Manual of Netherlands India (Dutch East Indies), Geographical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty, H.M Stationery Office, London. University Press, Oxford, 1920, p. 149.



Ethnic population in Java was divided into the following groups: natives, Europeans, Chinese, and other Asians. About 20 per cent of the Europeans were in Java, while more than 50 per cent of the Chinese lived in other islands, mostly in East Sumatra and West Borneo. The Javanese constituted more than 47 per cent of the total population (27,8 million) followed by the Sundanese (8,6 million) and the Madurese (4,3 million). These three ethnics were originated from Java Island (Nitisastro, 1970: 78)

As separate from the foreigners, European and Oriental, the population of Java comprises of three chief races—the Javanese, Sundanese, and Madurese, who all came initially from the similar Malay typical. The dissimilarity in character between the Sundanese and the Javanese is to be described by the stronger influence exercised over the latter by the Hindus and the difference between the

Javanese and the Madurese is due to the fact that the Madurese who have now settled in a large part of Eastern Java, were restricted for a long period to the island of Madura, where they earned a difficult living by trading and fishing, while the Javanese have always been primarily agriculturists, led them to live in rural areas compared to urban.

Java was considered as the rice bowl of the archipelago as well as sugar exporter. Java by the time of early 20th century grew over-populated. In 1900, the indigenous population of Java was already about 28.4 million, by 1920 it had reached 34.4 million, and in 1930, the number of indigenous people of Java was around 41 million (Ricklefs, 2008: 34).

(table 5) *Population of the Natives in Java region in 1930*<sup>9</sup>

Population					
Region	Male	Female	Both Sexes	Area (sq.kms.)	Density (per sq.km)
West Java	5,587,000	5,810,146	11,397,146.00	46,877	243,0
Central Java	7,478,854	7,786,650	15,265,504	37,375	408,2
East Java	7,358,371	7,697,343	15,055,714	47,988	492,0
Total Java	20,424,225	21,294,139	41,718,364	132,174	316,1

In 1930, nearly 70 per cent of the Indonesian population was living in Java comprising about 7 per cent of the total land area of Indonesia. While in the gender ratio aspect, most societies the gender distribution of Javanese is slightly skewed

<sup>9</sup> Department van Economische Zaken, Volkstelling, 1930 (Population Census, 1930), 8 vols. (Batavia, 1930 - 1936)

towards the female population. For 1900 the numbers for adult men are 6,681,112 and for adult women 7,258,901 (a gender ratio of 1.08) on a total population of according the same census of 1905 25.5 million 'indigenous' people. The gender ratio has not changed at all in the 19th century, but the age ratio definitely has (Merle, 1986: 12). The official 1940 population approximation for Indonesia as a whole was 70,4 million and for Java was 48,4 million as for the other islands were 22.0 million in total. These estimations were based on the assumption of a constant rate of increase after the census of 1930, and a further assumption of identical growth rates for Java and for the other islands. As the impacts of wars and the coming of Japanese in Java, some data on vital rates for a number of regions of Java in the years 1943 and 1944 indicate a decrease in the number of births and an increase in the number of deaths so great that the estimated crude death rates surpassed the estimated crude birth rates (Anderson, 1966: 48). During most of this period, vital rates experienced unexpected changes as a result of the Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945. Under the occupation, the severe and haphazard mobilization of available manpower and food crops for the Japanese war effort brought about a rapid weakening in the people's living conditions. Village (*kampong*) societies were shocked by the exorbitant compulsory deliveries of crops, by the recruitment of hundreds of thousands of men and women for forced labor, which in turn had significant repercussions on the course of fertility and mortality (Nitisastro, 1970: 115).

## B. Borneo Island

Compared to Java Island, Borneo Island, the largest island in the Dutch East Indies territory had relatively smaller number of population. According to a census in 1905 in several principal towns in Borneo, the total number of native inhabitants was around 58,819 people (as compared to Java's main towns in the same year of 1905 for around 29,715,908– see table 1). The greater part of Dutch Borneo, on the basis of the taxation figures, has only two or three people to the square mile, and it is only in Pontianak (20,984) and Banjarmasin (16,708) and their neighborhood that the population rises above forty or fifty per square mile. There are, in all, only thirteen towns with populations from 1,000 to 5,000. The people are mostly settled on the big rivers and their tributaries, separated in the interior by uninhabited stretches of forest. The first of these towns is the capital of West Borneo, the second that of South and East Borneo. The other principal towns, with populations in 1905, are Sambas in West Borneo, and Samarinda and Martapura in South and East Borneo. The table is given below:



*(table 6) Native Population in Main Towns Borneo in 1905<sup>10</sup>*

Town	Population
Pontianak	20,984
Banjermasin	16,708
Sambas	12,096
Samarinda	4,733
Martapura	4,298
Total	58,819

In a whole part of Dutch Borneo, according to official returns in the Manual of the DEI report (1920: 189), had about 1,572,460 inhabitants in 1912 of whom 1,127 were Europeans, 138,747 Chinese, and 4,580 Arabs and other foreign Orientals. This figure is probably, however, too small, and one authority gives the population of the whole of Borneo as approximately 3,000,000 people. In Borneo, most of the foreign ethnics lived dividedly in either British Borneo or Dutch Borneo. British owned a wide range area of 206,049 square kilometer of Borneo area, comprising North Borneo, Brunei, and Serawak, while Dutch Borneo covered an area of 548,748 square kilometer, comprising areas of West Borneo and South-Southeast Borneo, with the total population of all ethnics as many as 803,035 people in British Borneo territory and as many as 2,168,661 people in Dutch Borneo region. Detailed data can be clearly seen in the table below:

---

<sup>10</sup> A Manual of Netherlands India (Dutch East Indies), Geographical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty, H.M Stationery Office, London. University Press, Oxford, 1920, pp. 189-190.

(table 7) Ethnic Population in Borneo in 1930's<sup>11</sup>

Territory	North Borneo	Brunei	Sarawak	West Borneo	South and Southeast Borneo
Census Year	1931	1931	1939	1930	1930
Native	210,057	26,746	361,676	689,585	1,327,427
Chinese	50,056	2,683	123,626	107,998	26,289
Europeans	-	-	-	1,077	4,562
Other Asians	22,202	706	5,283	3,787	7,876
Total Population	282,315	30,135	490,585	802,447	1,366,214
Area (sq km)	75,821	5,743	124,485	146,760	401,988

Borneo Island's native inhabitant is Malay race. Malays predominantly settled in clusters of kampong (*villages*). Nevertheless, in the Borneo context Malays are further well-defined by their places of origin: Brunei Malays, Sarawak Malays, Banjar Malays, Kapuas Malays, Bulungan Malays and others. There are also the non-indigenous Muslims, mainly with trading and mercantile backgrounds from neighboring regions such as Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, Madura and Sulawesi, who have migrated and settled in Borneo's coastal belt. Inter-marriage with locals gradually dissociated the immigrant Muslim from their original homeland, although some maintained their identity and cultural norms. Wet-rice cultivation, sea and river fishing, smallholding of commercial crops (rubber, coconut, fruit), and small-scale trading activities sustained a generally subsistence and Spartan existence (Gin, 2011:9).

---

<sup>11</sup> Ooi Keat Gin, 2013, "Post-War Bornei 1945-1950: Nationalism, Empire, and State-Building", Routledge, New York, p.18.

In general term, the local people who inhabit Borneo are called the Dayak people. The term 'Dayak' means 'person' or 'inland person,' the latter because most of the communities settled in the interior, upriver, forested upland areas. Dayaks are mostly non-Muslim and they consist of a heterogeneous group that is culturally diverse as well as numerically significant. Immigrant Asian peoples, notably Chinese, and Indians, from mainland China and the South Asian sub- continent respectively, are two minority groups in Borneo, however, the Chinese mostly ruled in maintaining the important trading sector in Borneo. Ethnic identity of Dayak, Malay, and Chinese became particularly important in the nineteenth century of Borneo (might be applied to in other DEI's islands) under Dutch indirect rule as one's ascribed ethnicity determined legal status and land rights. Initially, only people defined as "natives" could legally occupy and use customary land, while Chinese were defined as aliens and migrants, so-called foreign Orientals, and thus could not be defined as Natives. In Borneo, the assimilation was more difficult for Chinese than for the other groups that included in the colonial "Foreign Oriental" category like the Arabs, the Japanese, and the Indians. For instance, if people of Arab or Indian heritage who married local Dayaks or Malays, they would be assimilated into the category of the natives and they came to be treated legally as native citizen and local, but if a Chinese married to a Dayak, the known children of these unions were not assimilated in the same way (Sikor and Lund, 2009: 48).

In Borneo, according to Gin (2011: 14), the Japanese, having included in the foreign oriental category, involved in fishing, plantation agriculture, timber, mining (oil), and retail in Japanese goods. Most of Chinese immigrants to West Kalimantan were gold miners with self-governing mining settlements. Trading communities were established in most townships throughout Borneo. Before the Pacific War occurred in 1941, the Chinese monopolized the commercial life of both coastal and inland settlements. The Chinese were also involved in commercial agriculture. Overall the Chinese are the most significant minority community in present-day Borneo (Sikor and Lund, 2009: 58).

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in early December 1941, there were pockets of Japanese communities in various parts of Borneo, not unlike elsewhere in Southeast Asia. The majority of the early Japanese inhabitants in Southeast Asia, particularly in British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies were *karayuki-san* inmates of brothels in urban centers (Reece, 1998: 12). These female Japanese prostitutes came from impoverished parts of rural southwestern Kyushu and were sold by their families into white slavery. In Borneo Japanese brothels were notoriously conspicuous in urban Kuching and the oil towns of Miri and Lutong in Sarawak, and Seria in Brunei, a greater presence in the timber port of Sandakan, British North Borneo, and in the oil-rich centers of Kutai and Tarakan, Balikpapan, and other townships such as Banjarmasin and Pontianak in south and west Dutch Borneo respectively (Gin, 2011: 11).

## CHAPTER III : Japan Military Invasion to Dutch East Indies 1942 – 1945

*"Military action is important to the nation - it is the ground of death and life, the path of survival and destruction, so it is imperative to examine it" - Sun Tzu.*

### I. Global Casualties: World Wars and Asia

The First World War from August 1914 to November 1918 was principally a Western and Eastern European battle. The war was essentially playing a insignificant effect upon Asia, however, the consequences and settlement of World War I encouraged different countries in different directions leading to the far worse World War II and its more damaging but critical end. Japan as an ally of Great Britain declared war on Germany in 1914 but it played only a minor part by defeating a small German garrison in Tsingtao (China) (Gruhl, 2007: 23). The stakes in World War I were the possible loss to a nation of its role in the world, including the shifting of military power, and changes in frontiers, territories, or colonies, included some 15 million dead, 9 million military and 6 million civilians. The Second World War, from 1931 to 1945, had far greater global human consequences in these killed, wounded, and in other casualties of all kinds. This world war, reasonably argued, was started in Asia by Japan in 1931. The aim of the major totalitarian aggressors, Imperial Japan, Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany (the Axis partners) was to dominate through military

might vast parts of the world, its populations, economies, and resources. The war was four times more destructive of life, and even more destructive of infrastructure, property, and economies, than the First World War. The human scale of death and suffering brought by World War II period is thus measured by at least 300 million casualties (Gruhl, 2007: 24).

Japan involved in the 1921 Four Power Treaty (the United States, Britain, France, and Japan) as it recognized the status quo between nations in the Pacific and aimed to settle problems by diplomacy. Under the terms of the Four Power Treaty, Japan was bestowed the responsibility of security in the Pacific with only three other powers: Britain, France, and the United States. In this power, Japan stood at number three, just behind Britain and the United States with the third largest navy on earth (Dickinson, 2013:75). Japan's cooperation was persistent in 1922 with the Nine Power Treaty, additionally comprised of Belgium, China, the Netherlands, Italy, and Portugal, who joined the earlier four nations. This body of cooperative nations arrived at further agreements to reduce the threat of conflict in Asia and the Pacific. The body in its work also agreed to support equal opportunity for commerce in China for all nations and to refrain from seeking more concessions there as a product of the Washington Conference Treaty System (Gruhl, 2007: 27).

Between the wars, Tokyo was represented by moderate leaders who worked cooperatively with the Western governments (for instance, in 1919, the League of Nations was founded as part of the Versailles settlement of the war). Importantly,

Japan, with sixty-one other nations, signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact on August 27, 1928 (the Pact of Paris). The Kellogg-Briand Pact was a seminal event in world affairs and it codified within international law the idea that resort to the use of force to achieve foreign policy objectives was no longer permissible. Humanitarian intervention is not explicitly rejected by the pact and thus it failed to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War (Murphy, 1996:60). By signing the pact, Japan renounced war as an instrument of national policy and obliged to settle international disputes only by peaceful means, however, Japan's militarist with imperial ambitions were difficult for the less warlike Japanese to control, for instance, Japan impressively defeated Russia in the 1904 - 1905 war, gaining South Manchuria and Korea as protectorates and also the southern part of Sakhalin Island. Soon after, in 1910, Japan annexed a resisting Korea into its fold and Japan had never lost a war to other nations.

Japan attempted to further advance its Asian ambitions in 1915 with the "Twenty-one Demands" made of China that would have reduced that country to a state of dependency on Japan. After the World War I, Japan, as a member of the winning side, was once again rewarded for her militarism in gaining territory (special rights in China's Shantung Peninsula, and a League of Nations mandate to the Marshall, Mariana, and Caroline island groups in the Pacific. Japan moved her further military ambition by initiating the stage of tragedy of the Asia-Pacific War, from Manchuria to China to Indochina from 1931 to 1941. The Asia-Pacific War began with

the Japanese Kwantung Army invasion of Manchuria in September 1931. This initially small army was located there to protect the Japanese rail lines and other interests. Then "the Mukden Incident" (the Japanese military started hostilities by concocting an explosion on a railway near Mukden and using it as an excuse for the army to spread out across Manchuria to bring it under their complete control), as it was called, was carried out by the army's leaders without authority from the Japanese government in Tokyo. In protest, the Chinese boycotted Japanese goods throughout China and Shanghai where there was some disorder (Perez, 2013:254)

In reaction, in January 1932, the Japanese landed 1,800 troops in Shanghai from the sea and the number was developed up to about 70,000 troops to deal with the stiff Chinese resistance. The first mass bombing of a city was started and despite the international outcry, it heralded the accepted practice by all sides in World War II. The Japanese army started with about 10,000 troops in Manchuria, which grew to 300,000 by 1933. The Japanese even followed this incursion by invading provinces to the west of Manchuria. In 1936, Japan continued to encroach southward into more of China through threats, intimidation, and inducements, pushing nearly to Peking. The early objective was to acquire part of Northern China as a buffer for Japanese held Manchuria and later for greater China's resources and economic potential. In their 1937 assault on China, from July to October, the Japanese initially attacked westward into Inner Mongolia and southward into north China. The Imperial Army surged from the Peking region south toward Hankow and Nanking, falling short of



reaching the Yellow River. Like most Japanese campaigns in China, they followed the major railway lines between the major cities (Gruhl, 2007: 30).

During the war (1937-1945) there were many incidents of brutality and massive bloodshed. The series of incidents which stand out amongst these as particularly horrific and which have come to exemplify the worst excesses of Japanese treatment of Chinese are known as 'The Rape of Nanking'. Isobel Egan (2010:5-6) noted that considering the Japanese frontline forces first, there are four main aspects considered to have caused the Japanese brutality. First, there was a collapse of control within the Nanking frontline forces due to personal rivalries. This resulted in significant chance for soldiers in Nanking to act independently of instructions from Tokyo (Yamamoto, 2000:49). This gave the Japanese military in Nanking unrestricted opportunity to carry out whatever actions they wished, which, in the context of brutalizing treatment and training practices backed too much of the brutality of 'The Rape of Nanking'. Second, the deficiency of a formal surrender clearly marking the end of hostilities could have, in the eyes of Japanese soldiers, greatly blurred the lines between war and peace, soldiers and civilians. Third, here was a serious lack of supplies, that the only way to survive was to pillage. It also looks at the fact that morale was dropping among the soldiers and they were given incentive to continue their brutality on Chinese civilians. Lastly, the Japanese military were given secret orders to kill all prisoners of war, which largely led to many mass executions. This order, issued before Japanese soldiers had even entered

Nanking, set an example for the Japanese army that no mercy was to be shown to the Chinese civilians, thus leading to much of the brutality they later showed. Thus, of all the 1931 - 1945 Asia-Pacific War deaths, approximately 87 percent were Asian victims of Japanese aggression, 1 percent was Western Allies, and 12 percent were Japanese. The list of victim nations and their people is a long one. It includes Korea (annexed by Japan in 1910), China (including Manchuria), Hong Kong, Indochina (Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam), and the Philippines. The list continues with Thailand, Burma, eastern India, Malaya (Malaysia), Singapore, the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), Timor, New Guinea, Pacific, and Indian Ocean islands (Gruhl, 2007: 9)

## **II. Japan Military Operation in the DEI**

In the mid of 1941, Japan started to invade Southeast Asia region after its diplomatic relation with the United States was exacerbated. The President of the United States, Roosevelt, declared an embargo on the supply of crude oil to Japan. Limited to natural resources, almost 80 per cent of Japan's domestic need of oil was imported from the United States and Mexico. After the United States stopped its oil exports, Japan had only a two-year supply of fuel for industries and less than one-year supply for military fuel (Asia for Educators, 2009). Japan, being in the middle of war with its colony territories, like Korea and Manchuria, could only produce 1.7 million barrels of oil per year in its own field. In a great need of natural resources, Japan expanded its invasion to Southeast Asia. On December 11, 1941, the Japanese

military troops reached the Netherlands East Indies, later known as Indonesia, in Sulawesi Island, and a month later, on January 10, 1942, the troops landed in Borneo Island (Soetopo, 2011: 108 – 112). Most places that the troops seized were center of natural resources, especially oilfields and refineries, to support the Japanese effort in the war.

The Japanese expansion to Southeast Asia, including to the DEI region, was to support the Japanese' efforts in the World War II, the Japanese planned to acquire as many oils as possible. By the time the Japanese came to Borneo and Sumatra Island, the British and the Dutch had settled their oil refineries station named Shell and Royal Dutch. In Borneo Island, Shell and Royal Dutch had been jointed into Royal Dutch Shell in 1904 and these companies were responsible to explore new oilfields in the island. According to De Jong (1991: 43 – 45), before the Japanese invasion in 1942, these two companies had exploited 7.9 billion tons of oil, but when the Japanese took over the oilfield, in only one year, from April 1942 until March 1943, the Japanese could exploit 4 billion tons of crude oil and half of that numbers were transported to Japan. Moreover, in April 1943 until March 1944, Japan had increasingly upgraded the number of crude oil for more than 7 billion tons. In the next year, April 1944 until March 1945, Japan exploited 5.5 billion tons of oil but the distribution of the oil to Japan was halted due to Ally's attack (De Jong, 1991:43-5).

Finally on March 9, 1942, the government of the Netherlands signed the Kalijati treaty that symbolized its surrender without conditions to Japan, under Dai

Nippon military authority (Frederic&Vondon, 2001: xxiv). This treaty, signed by Hein Ter Poorten to represent the Dutch-Hindies Governor Tjarda van Starckenborgh-Stachouwer and Hitoshi Imamura to represent Japan in Kalijati region in West Java (Jong, 2002: 57), officially stated the end of the Dutch colonization over the *Netherlands-Indië*, that was later declared its independence as a state known as Indonesia. The Dutch surrender to Japan was mainly affected by the impact of the World War II, as in May 1940, in the early period of the war, The Dutch territory had been occupied by the German Nazi. Adolf Hitler sent Queen Wilhelmina his personal guarantee that Germany would respect Dutch neutrality, but the pledge was violated. The nation suffered a great loss in economy and more than 220,000 Dutch citizens were killed (Axelrod, 2007:591). Having their own internal conflict in their own territory, the Dutch could not protect their interest over the Dutch East Indies over the aggressive action of the Japanese military action. After attacking Pearl Harbor in the United States territory, taking its part in the World War II, the Japanese were confident that they would conquer East and Southeast Asia region and fought all European powers to gain control over these regions. The Dutch, allied with England and the United States, fought against Japanese interest in Southeast Asia in January 1942, but they finally could not hold their authority (Klam, 2003: 24).

On December 11, 1941, the Japanese military troops came to the Netherlands East Indies, later known as Indonesia, firstly landed in Sulawesi Island, in the northern part of the region. A month later, on January 10, 1942, the troops

landed in Kalimantan Island, in Tarakan city. Most places that the troops seized were center of resources, especially oil, to support the Japanese effort in the Second World War. After seizing Sulawesi, and Kalimantan Island, during the following weeks, the Japanese armies moved to Sumatra Island, approaching Palembang in South Sumatra and finally arrived in Java Island (Soetanto, 2011: 108-112).

On March 9, 1942, one day after Lieutenant General Imamura Hitoshi, the Commander of the Sixteenth Army, declared that he would assume all the official powers which had belonged to the Dutch Governor-General, he persuaded both Governor General Tjarda van StarckenborghStachouwer and the Supreme Commander of the Dutch Forces Lieutenant General H. TerPoorten to surrender unconditionally. As the result, General TerPoorten's announced his acceptance to the term in the next day and this moment brought to a virtual end the Dutch rule in Indonesia (Sato, 1994: 12). According to M.C Ricklefs (1993: 250), in order to effectively manage the region, the Japanese divided their seized region into three areas of administrations headed by a Military Governor (*Gunseikan*), as below:

1. Java and Madura in the Java Island region under the 16th Army, with Jakarta as the center of administration.
2. Sumatra Island under the 25th Army, with Bukittinggi as center of administration.
3. Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku, Nusa Tenggara, and Irian Jaya Island under the Navy's Southwestern Fleet with Makasar as center of administration.

Ever since the early 1920s the Japanese had shown particular interest in the development of the oil resources at Kutai and Tarakan in southeast Borneo, which represented two notable sources in the Dutch East Indies. Overall oil exploration and production in Dutch Borneo had been dominated by *Bataafsche Petroleum-Maatschappij* (BPM; Batavian Petroleum Company) since the early 1900s. However, during the 1930s, two players made inroads beyond the exploratory stage, namely the *Nederlandsch- Indische Aardolie- Maatschappij* (NIAM; Netherlands Indies Oil Company) and the Japanese-owned *Borneo Olie-Maatschappij* (Borneo Oil). The former was in fact a joint venture between the Netherlands Government and BPM. The real 'outsider', from a military- strategic viewpoint, was Borneo Oil. What raised official eyebrows and confirmed initial suspicions of Japanese intentions were revealed through the antics of Borneo Oil at Sankulirang (Gin, 2011:16).

As the Japanese replaced the Western-centered cultural-racial policy of the Dutch with a pan-Asianist principle of homogeneity under the slogan of Asian superiority over Europe (Jones, 1977: 60). There were around 260,000 of the Japanese military personnel put in Indonesia in three years of their regime in Indonesia. April 1942 was the first attempt of the Japanese movement, the Triple A Movement, began in Java Island. In the beginning of the Japanese military occupation to the Dutch East Indies, they used local nationalist sentiment to win people's heart (Ricklefs, 1993: 251), for instance, the red and white flag was permitted to fly, Indonesia Raya anthem was permitted to sing, and they also gave hope of

independence (Soetanto, 2011: 110). However, since March 20, 1942, two military government regulations were issued, announced that any kind of discussion, movement, suggestions, or propaganda concerning the administration and structure of the country are temporarily prohibited, and they also forbade any other flag to rise except the Japanese flag.

By March 1942 the Japanese had taken over almost all of *Netherlands-Indië*<sup>12</sup> regions including Borneo, Celebes, Sumatra, Timor, Moluccas, New Guinea, and Java. After taking control over almost all of *Netherlands-Indië* territory, Japan spread their propaganda, known as “3A’s propaganda”, or The Triple A Movement, explained as "Jepang Pemimpin Asia", "Jepang Pelindung Asia" and "Jepang Cahaya Asia" (Japan as the leader, the protector, and the light of Asia) (Reid&Akira, 1986: 13). One major aspect of the Japanese occupation on Indonesia was the introduction and development of new media for political propaganda, such as in the newspapers, pamphlets, books, posters, photographs, broadcastings, music, and so on. In order to run their military politics smoothly, particularly in occupying Java, the Japanese military government paid great attention to "grasp people's mind" (*minshinha'aku*) and how to "propagate and tame" (*senbukosaku*), aimed to mold Indonesian, especially Javanese behaviour and thinking like a Japanese so that they could

---

<sup>12</sup> The term used to name the Dutch East Indies as mentioned in the document.

become dependable partners on the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere (Kurasawa, 1987:59).

For the Japanese, the resources of the DEI were far more important than those of countries in Southeast Asia, like in Burma and the Philippines. Indeed, the oil of Borneo and Sumatra was a prime reason for the determination to invade Southeast Asia. Through promoting the Triple A Movement, the Japanese aimed at developing popular support, particularly from the DEI nationalist leaders, Soekarno and Hatta that translated the coming of the Japanese as a political awakening and the grievances behind it into a national consciousness and will for national independence. The Japanese propaganda convinced the DEI nationalist leaders to rely on them and that they would assist the advantage to consolidating nationalist movement (Tarling, 2004: 58). Shigeru Sato (1994) stated that the Japanese held a preliminary meeting in November 1942, attended by Soekarno and Hatta from the DEI side, and by Colonel Nakayama, Miyoshi Shinkichiro, and Saito Shizuo from the Japanese side to discuss a wide range of topics. The DEI members expressed their wish to establish and conduct a cooperative mass movement under their own leadership. Their requests were centralized in the idea to use the word "Indonesia", "Indonesia Raya" as the song of the organization (later on becomes the country's national song), and to use "Red and White" as the (national) flag. The nationalist leaders', however, grew hope to the Japanese as a catalyst that sped up their movement to eventually paving the way for independence.



Unlike Burma and the Philippines, the DEI was not granted formal independence by the Japanese in 1943. No DEI representative was sent to the Greater East Asia Conference in Tokyo in November 1943. But as the war became more desperate, Japan announced in September 1944 that not only Java but the entire archipelago would become independent. This announcement was a tremendous vindication of the seemingly collaborative policies of Sukarno and Hatta.

In some aspects, the coming of the Japanese to Indonesia in 1942, somehow, helped the Indonesian nationalist movements to develop clear formation of the national language, national army, and surely, the preparation of the national independence declaration in 1945. Nevertheless, the new implementation of social policy from the Japanese military government has not only affected the nationalist movements' reality, but it has also greatly impacted the reality of the local women. Blackburn argued that during World War II, there was a high level of violence in the archipelago such as the buried story of sexual violence during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia called *Jugun Ianfu*, a system in which many women were forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese military (Blackburn, 2004: 198). The exact number of these women still remains unknown because the issue did not come out openly and many of the victims were silent. However, as stated by some historians, at least 10,000 women in Indonesia from many ethnic groups, including Dutch women, were forced to give sexual service to the Japanese military troops in the

military brothels that were located in many districts in archipelago's islands, most of which were centralized in Java Island (Tierney, 199: 732).

During the war, many areas in Java faced increasingly severe and ultimately catastrophic food shortages. Sharp reductions in harvested areas were caused by greatly below market prices set by Japanese military administrators, the disruption of transport, and regional autarky. The resulting drop in the output of rice, and most other foods, together with strict autarky, particularly affected Jakarta and Surabaya, even though neither was greatly distant from rice growing areas. In October 1943, the Japanese divided Java and Madura into 17 districts, prohibited trade between them in rice, and exacted severe penalties on anyone caught contravening the ban. Famine deaths in Java are estimated to be at some two to three million, between about 4.5% and 7.0% of the population (de Jong, 2002: 280).

### **III. Japan Military Policies in DEI**

As Japanese expansion to Southeast Asia, including to the Netherland East Indies region was to support the Japanese' efforts in the World War II. The Japanese planned to acquire as many oils as possible. In 1942, the Japanese acquired 300,000 kilolitres of oil in 1942, 2 million-kilolitre in 1943, and 4.5 million kilolitres in 1944. Furthermore, the Japanese policy on war economy, forced them to build economic restructure to strengthen the war industry (Sato, 1994:8). From the document of Explanation by the Head of the Department of Industry on 14 April 1945, the 'war

economy' involved mobilization of resources for war effort as well as economic controls to enable non-combatant local population to obtain minimum amounts of basic commodities for their day-to-day lives. The most basic commodities for the general public were foodstuffs and clothing materials. During the war, Japan forced to produce rice in Java, but the rice exported from Java was comparatively small, even the amount was not as big as in other Southeast Asia region, most of the surpluses, however, derived from the three deltas at the mouths of the Mekong, Chao Phraya, and Irrawaddy, in Burma (2,7 million tons) and Thailand (1,4 million tons). As for clothing materials, Southeast Asia imported almost all of its needs. The Japanese calculated that in order to produce one third of the pre-war consumption level of textiles in Java, starting from cultivation of cotton, 2.3 million people a day must work.

As Tarling mentioned (2004), like the earlier colonial powers, the Japanese sought collaborators. While the Japanese military leaders and troops were often welcomed by the nationalist, they tended at first to turn to more established or traditional leaders, only re-enlisting nationalist support as their position deteriorated. Like the earlier powers, too, they offered a limited amount of education and aimed to effort war mobilization with as much amount of natural resources as they could. The work of the Japanese military leaders to provide their resources was actually supported by the Nationalist leader of DEI, Soekarno (who later became the first president of Indonesia), as he collaborated with the Japanese trying to get what

support he could for the future independence of Indonesia. Shortly after their arrival, the Japanese released Soekarno from his place of detention in Bencoolen and allowed him to proceed to Java. Here, he contacted Hatta and Sjahrir and it was mutually decided that the nationalist struggle could best be prosecuted at two levels: legally above ground and underground. Soekarno and Hatta were to work above ground through the collaboration with the Japanese, and Sjahrir was to organize an underground resistance. He even encouraged the formation of voluntary work brigades, the *romusha*, to assist the Japanese war effort. As World War II neared its end Sukarno secured from the Japanese Army arms and training for Indonesians. The Japanese saw this as a source of military aid in preventing the probable Allied attack. The local Nationalist movement saw the Japanese military coming as the arming and training of an Indonesian army to resist the return of the Dutch to Indonesia (It was seen later that after the surrender of the Japanese Government on August 15, 1945 to the Allies, Soekarno and Muhammad Hatta declared the independence of Indonesia on August 17<sup>th</sup>) (Watkins, 2011).

With the support of DEI local leaders, the Army and the Navy mobilized local labors for projects, and they were directly related to military operations such as construction of fortifications, airstrips, ships, roads, railways, storage facilities, and vegetable gardens for the troops (Sato, 1994: 7). According to one Japanese record of labor force (*romusha*) in Java, approximately 2.6million labors were in the employment of the Japanese in November 1944 in this island with the total

population of approximately fifty million, with the composition of the Army employed ten per cent of them, the Navy three per cent, and the civil administration 87 per cent (Fumio, 1944: 220). The Navy's civil administrative unit in charge of Bali, Lombok, and Sumbawa calculated work force in the following way. People from the age of ten to fifty were considered work force. Those from ten to fifteen and from forty-one to fifty were observed half as efficient as those in between. A man from the age of sixteen to forty constituted one unit of labour. Such man would work 300 days per year on average. He was therefore 300 units of labour per year. On the ground that women were less frequently engaged and less efficient in physically demanding labour than men, a woman in the same age group was considered 60 units per year, and those from ten to fifteen and from forty-one to fifty 30 units each (Aalders *et.al*, 1998: 81-82). Calculated this way, Bali had 90 million, Lombok 57 million, and Sumbawa 23 million units of labour per year. The demand for labour in Bali in 1944, not including the demand by the military, was calculated to be 116 million (68 million for agriculture and 48 million for other fields), 60 million in Lombok (34 and 26 million respectively), and 26 million in Sumbawa (10 and 16 million) (Sato, 2000:8).

During its occupation time, the Japanese penetrated its culture to DEI's local culture. The Japanese, for example, taught *hakko-ichu-u* (literally means eight corners, one roof), a Japanese political slogan to show that imperial rule had been divinely ordained to expand until it united the entire world (Beasley, 1991:226). The

Japanese local cultures were also introduced to the Indonesian people, such as in their performance arts, and their local habits of *bureiko* (male celebration after finishing work with drinks and women). The Japanese also forced its local values of *meshi-bokko*, a sincere attitude to the state/the Japanese emperor, to Indonesian local women, in which, they could not refuse any demand from the Japanese who asked them to become a nurse, a worker, or even to perform an art on a stage. As *meshi-bokko* became a value that should be held by Indonesian local women, they were not supposed to refuse any requests or even demands from the Japanese officers under any conditions or circumstances. Their actions should be based on their own sincerity to support the Japanese war efforts. This view was also applied when the soldiers needed *bureiko*. The Japanese considered that a woman who donated her body to the soldiers was a country's heroine as she had stood in the Japanese's interest (Savitri, 2010, 288).

## CHAPTER IV : Japanese Military Brothels (*Ianjo*) in the Dutch East Indies

### I. The Existence of *Ianjo* in DEI

#### A. Documents of Evidence

Much has been written about the history of the Japanese military comfort system. The term refers to military-controlled brothels, organized by the Japanese government, to serve members of the Japanese armed forces stationed abroad. The first was set up in Shanghai in 1932, a year after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. But it was not until 1937 that Japan began greatly expanding its officially sanctioned and closely regulated "comfort system" for the sexual gratification of the Japanese soldiers as they waged war throughout East Asia and the Pacific, one enormous incident was the 1937 "Rape of Nanking" (Dolgopol and Paranjape, 1994:25). Japanese invaders, in addition to slaughtering hundreds of thousands of Chinese civilians, raped approximately 20,000 women (Schmidt, 2000: 61). The Rape of Nanking caused an international outcry, prompting an image-conscious Japan to take steps to prevent a repeat of that event. The solution that was adopted consisted of a regulated system of military brothels, the *ianjo* or the comfort station, in which each of them was controlled in whole or in part by the Japanese military. In theory, the system would provide the soldiers with a sexual outlet, thereby preventing them from indiscriminately raping local women. The establishment, operation, and control of the comfort station were authorized by the highest level of the Japanese

government, including Emperor Hirohito himself. Ultimately, it “consisted of the legalized military rape of subject women on a scale and over a period of time that was previously unknown in history (Ahmed, 2004:121).

During the war in China in the 1930s, particularly in the 1937 incident of the Rape of Nanking, the occurrence of venereal disease among the Japanese troops had led to problems with deployment and the Japanese military forces therefore decided to set up military brothels as a preventive measure. Young girls from Korea, China, the Philippines, Guam, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Netherlands thus became victims of the comfort stations and were forced to have sex with the soldiers of the Japanese Imperial Army. Nevertheless, during the Japanese invasion and the start of the occupation of the Dutch East Indies, various incidents of rape occurred, in, for example, some cities in the Dutch East Indies territory such as Tarakan, Manado, Bandung, Padang and Flores (Van Poelgeest, 1994: 3).

From his investigation, Tanaka Yuki (1996: 98) mentioned that on the advice of its military leaders, Japan established a system of military brothels called “comfort stations” throughout Asia. There were four major reasons the Japanese military decided that comfort stations were necessary. First of all, the Japanese military leaders were very concerned about the rape of civilians by members of the Japanese armed forces. They believed that “a ready supply of women for the armed forces would help reduce the incidence of rape of civilians.” Additionally, the military leaders “believed that the provision of comfort women was a good means



of providing their men with kind of leisure.” The military leaders were also concerned about the incidence of venereal diseases and believed that “venereal disease threatened to undermine the strength of their men (and hence their fighting ability) and that it could also potentially create massive public health problems back in Japan once the war was over.” Finally, the military leaders were concerned with security, believing that “private brothels could be [easily] infiltrated by spies”.

A small number of the comfort women were actually Japanese women, over the age of twenty-one, who had been professional prostitutes before the war and volunteered to work in military brothels as a system of legalized prostitution already existed in Japan at this time (Dolgopol and Paranjape, 1994:30). However, the number of those professional prostitutes was very small as in fact, most of the comfort women were conscripted from Japan's colonies and occupied territories, including Korean women and women from various regions of Asia and the Pacific islands that fell under Japanese control during the war (Ahmed, 2004:125).

Neither the government in Tokyo nor the supreme command of the 7th army issued general regulations or instructions with regard to the establishment of military brothels in the former Dutch East Indies; there were only a few general rules concerning the treatment of the local population and of prisoners of war and internees. These, nonetheless, did not include any regulations or exceptions specifically relating to prostitution. However, the Japanese armed forces regarded the establishment of brothels as an accepted practice to “reward” the soldiers and also

to build their morale. In practice, it was the local military commanders who had to draw up regulations on the establishment of military brothels in their territory, for example, the chief of staff of the 16<sup>th</sup> army on Java and thus head of the military administration there decided that a license was required for the establishment of a military brothel. A license was issued only if certain conditions were met, relating to, for example, regular medical check-ups and payment. A further precondition was that the women working in the brothels had to do so voluntarily; according to the regulations, a license would only be issued if the women involved signed a statement to the effect that they -were providing their services voluntarily. Within the organization of the 16<sup>th</sup> army, the officer in charge of the commissariat was responsible for issuing these licenses and for ensuring observance of the conditions under which they were issued, however, such supervision was needed, as the women eligible for work in the military brothels were very young and frequently could not read the "volunteer statement", which was drawn up in Japanese or Malay (Van Poelgeest, 1994: 6).

Taken from the list of documentary evidence for Indonesia from People Tribunal in Tokyo in 2000 compiled by the Women's Active Museum on War and Peace (WAM) in Tokyo<sup>13</sup>, there are 4 types of important documents to prove the

---

<sup>13</sup> Personal Document, taken in WAM Museum, Tokyo, Japan, September 20<sup>th</sup>, 2014.

existence of comfort station and comfort women in the Dutch East Indies under Japanese occupation:

- 1). 12 official documents from the Japanese Army to issue comfort stations in the Dutch East Indies during 1942 to 1945,
- 2). 8 official memoirs from the Japanese Army regarding the establishment of comfort stations in the Dutch East Indies during 1942 to 1945, taken in the post-war period,
- 3). 2 recorded testimony of witnesses,
- 4). 2 evidences of the survivors (plus one document of indictment from the Netherlands).

Each document provides proof on how the Japanese Military leaders were involved in the establishment of *ianjo*, how they built the *ianjo*, how the *ianjo* were operated, and how the girls were employed inside the *ianjo*. Some documents proving the involvement from the Japanese Military leaders are, for example in the Document #1 *Tai-den* No. 602 (Taiwan Army Telegram No. 602). This document stated that it is a confidential telegram from the commander of the Taiwan Army to the War Minister, upon the request of the Southern Army requesting travel permits for proprietors of comfort stations. It also shows that the military police investigated and selected comfort station proprietors and the Japanese Army granted them with travel permits. Furthermore, Document #13 *Niju-san Sai de Sanzennin no Soushikikan* (23 years old,

commander of 3000 men)/ Nakasone Yasuhiro (Lieutenant Junior grade of Accounting of the Navy, later became a Lieutenant and Prime Minister after the war, shows that the military set up comfort stations in the areas Balikpapan, Borneo Island, as recorded below:

*“Our fleet arrived in Palau, at the same time as the war broke out on December 8<sup>th</sup> our fleet went into Davao in the Philippines. It was when our fleet entered the third landing place, Balikpapan. Before long, there were soldiers and naval civilian employees who attacked local women or who gave themselves over to gambling. For these men, I went to great lengths and even built comfort stations. In fact, they packed into them like sardines.”*

A document titled #17 *Kaigun Shukei Taisa no Shuki* (Memoirs of navy captain of accounting) / Iwata Seiji (Chief of the 1<sup>st</sup> section, Interdance Department, Navy in Osaka / Captain at the war's end) shows that the first thing that the Navy did when they arrived in Java Island was to set up comfort stations, as similarly stated in Document #19 *NakimushiGunyiMonogatari* (A Story of a Tear Driven Military Doctor) / Tanaka Yasuyosi, Military Doctor, the 432<sup>nd</sup> Independent Infantry Battalion that the Chief of Staff of the army was involved in setting up comfort stations in Borneo (Api and Kuching) and they imported the girls to work inside the *ianjo* from other places outside Borneo Island, and most of the girls were recruited from Java Island.

Based on the official documents from the Japanese Army and testimony from the Japanese soldiers, it is clearly stated that the establishment of comfort stations

in Java and Borneo Island were systematically organized and managed by the Japanese Army. For example, Document #6 War Diary of the 1<sup>st</sup> company of the 45<sup>th</sup> Field Anti-aircraft Gun Battalion, shows the military administration of comfort stations that covers the opening of comfort station, its location, the prices, the division of usage condoms according to hygienic condition of the comfort women, method, warnings, times, and a temporary closure of a comfort station, in any case of contagious diseases are found. As cited from the document:

*“the comfort station to be opened tomorrow and the following points are to be kept: 1. The South barrack to the East of the 47<sup>th</sup> regiment’s officers must pay 2 yen/hour; 2. Commissioned officers must pay 15 yen/hour; 3. Condoms absolutely have to be paid; 4. Hygienic condition of the comfort women is indicated by cloths and they must pay for health checking; 5. The usage of comfort station is from 9 a.m to 4 p.m and for commissioned officers from 4 p.m to 9 p.m.”*

From Document #7 The Diary of Kinbara Setsuzo, vol.1, No.3, “c” (10<sup>th</sup> to 28<sup>th</sup> of July, 1941), it was clear that one reason for building *ianjo* was so that the Japanese soldiers could conduct themselves in such way that would cultivate a sense of trust among the native inhabitants that they (the Japanese) love them (the local people) and were acting sincerely toward the local people. The Japanese must be extremely careful to give the local people no reasons to distrust the discipline of the Japanese Army, by committing rapes, for example. Another reason was that the Japanese required help from village headmen to be assigned the task of building comfort

stations and strictly administered syphilis tests to prevent venereal disease from spreading amongst the soldiers.

Furthermore, Document #10 *Heibi-4-Kimitsu* No. 137 (Secret Telegram of 4<sup>th</sup> Section, Naval Preparation Bureau No. 137), Addressed to Rear Admiral Nakamura Toshihisa (Vice Admiral as of November 1942), Chief of Staff of the South-west Area Fleet, suggests that the fleet was involved with the proprietors of the comfort stations regarding the matters on the placement of facilities and goods for, transportation of the comfort women and management of comfort stations in DEI including Balikpapan and Malaya. The telegram clearly stated that necessary facilities and equipment to build comfort stations (*ianjo*) are: 1) lodging (the South West Fleet shall lend a temporary lodging (to proprietors of the comfort stations) and shall sell (the lodging) off (to the agents) upon request in the future), 2) bedding (the proprietors shall prepare futon, sheets, pajamas, blankets, mosquito nets, and other materials, and the authority (the Southwest Area Fleet) will help the agent obtain them upon request), 3) foods, drinks, and other materials (the comfort station agents shall adequately prepare foods, drinks, and other materials , and the authority (the Southwest Area Fleet) will help the agent obtain them upon request), 4) sanitary goods (The Fleet shall prepare condoms for its military personnel and the comfort station agents shall prepare condoms for the Fleet's paramilitary personnel. Those documents show that the establishment of *ianjo* in DEI was not an accidental action but more likely to have been prepared and ordered by Japanese military leaders.


## B. Iainjo in Java and Borneo Island

Data taken from Women's Active Museum on War and Peace recorded that according to official and military related documents, there were about 30 locations of comfort stations throughout DEI's islands that covered 3 locations in Sumatra Island, 2 locations in Borneo Island, 6 locations in Java Island, 17 locations in Celebes Island, 1 location in Lombok Island, and 1 location in East Timor Island (now becomes Timor Leste State). According to testimonies of comfort women survivors, it could be tracked 21 locations of comfort stations throughout DEI's islands that covered 4 locations in Sumatra Island, 5 locations in Borneo Island, 9 locations in Java Island, 1 location in Celebes Island, 1 location in Halmahera Island, and 1 location in East Timor Island (now becomes Timor Leste State). Meanwhile, according to Japanese soldiers testimonies, there could be 33 locations of comfort stations throughout DEI's islands that covered 12 locations in Sumatra Island, 3 locations in Borneo Island, 5 locations in Java Island, 1 location in Bali Island, 7 locations in Celebes Island, 1 location in Halmahera Island, 1 location in Ambon Island, 1 location in Sumba Island, 1 location in Papua Island, and 1 location in East Timor Island (now becomes Timor Leste State).

Based on complete reports on comfort station that combined official and military related documents and testimonies of comfort women survivors and Japanese soldiers testimonies, it can be stated that there were there were about 13 locations of comfort stations throughout DEI's islands that covered 3 cities in

Sumatra Island ( Medan, Palembang, and Padang), 2 cities in Borneo Island (Balikpapan, Banjarmasin), 5 cities in Java Island (Jakarta, Sukabumi, Bandung, Semarang (Magelang, Yogyakarta), Surabaya (Malang)), 1 city in Celebes Island (Kendari), 1 city in Halmahera Island, and 1 city in East Timor Island, however, most of *ianjo* activities were centralized mainly in two islands: Java as the central of agricultural activities and Borneo as the central of oil mining activities. The location of *ianjo* in the two islands is illustrated in a picture below:

Map 4: Java and Borneo Island<sup>14</sup>



In Java Island, there are some places that were once served as Japanese military brothels (*ianjo*) still in a good condition to be seen, while in Borneo Island, most of former *ianjo* could not be traced anymore:

<sup>14</sup> Personal Document, taken in WAM Museum, Tokyo, Japan, September 20<sup>th</sup>, 2014.



Picture 1: Former lanjo in Java Island (Central Java – Semarang, Semarang Kurabu)<sup>15</sup>



Picture 2: Former lanjo in Java Island (Central Java – Semarang, Hotel Du Pavillion)



Picture 3: Former lanjo and lanfu in Java Island (West Java – Cimahi)<sup>16</sup>



<sup>15</sup>Memorabilia lanjo di Semarang: Jejak Sejarah Sumirah Jugun lanfu asal Salatiga (The Historical Trace of Sumirah, the former Jugun lanfu from Salatiga), Eka Hindra <http://www.geocities.ws/jugunianfuindonesia/jejaksumirah.html>

<sup>16</sup>Eka Hindra, *Jugun lanfu* asal Cimahi Jawa Barat Indonesia (*Jugun lanfu* from Cimahi, West Java) <http://www.geocities.ws/jugunianfuindonesia/albumindonesia.html>

*Picture 4: Former Ianjo in Java Island (West Java – Simpang Street)<sup>17</sup>*



*Picture 5: Former Ianjo in Java Island (Central Java – Place of Dutch Internment)*



*Picture 6: Papak Building in Java Island (Central Java – a place to put recruited girls before sent to ianjo)*




---

<sup>17</sup> Eka Hindra, *Jugun Ianfu asal Cimahi Jawa Barat Indonesia (Jugun Ianfu from Cimahi, West Java)*  
<http://www.geocities.ws/jugunianfuindonesia/albumindonesia.html>

Picture 7: Asrama Telawang (Chikada's house as an ianjo in Borneo Island)



## II. Mechanism in Operating Ianjo

It was stated by the Japanese official government that in the establishment of military comfort station, any force recruitments were illegal and thus all the women who became prostitutes in the camps should be voluntarily engaged and paid (see Document #6 War Diary of the 1<sup>st</sup> company of the 45<sup>th</sup> Field Anti-aircraft Gun Battalions in the appendix). However, in practice, the recruitment of the *jugun ianfu* was done unfairly and fraudulently. In many cases, the girls were promised to get a job or education, while in reality they were sent to military comfort camps. Most of these girls were those who came from poor families with low education. In other cases, the recruitment was done by force or coercion, as Japanese officers kidnapped them on the street and raped them or due to family terror.

As stated by Indri Hapsari Mustika Dewi (2014), an Indonesian historian on women's issue, the effort of gathering women and girls who would be mobilized to fulfil the need of sexual desire of Japanese soldiers and civil officers may be

categorized into models: the first was through ‘mass searching’, characterized by the involvement of certain parties who were largely a part of the village apparatus (local government officers with direct access to conduct mobilization effort). This model was commonly conducted in a village office or in a given places, followed with a medical check-up process. Having been selected, only the candidates of *jugun ianfu* appraised to be feasible would be employed as *jugun ianfu*. Those perceived to be unhealthy or infeasible would commonly be placed in restaurant, entertainment place, hotel or household of military officer. While those who to be a *jugun ianfu* would be placed in an *ianjo* or other place to fulfil the Japanese military and civil officers’ sexual desire. Second method was ‘small-scale searching’, which range from finding one or two women to more. The women who were recruited as result of this process were commonly placed in personal houses and frequently taken by the Japanese soldiers or officers.

Picture 8: Documented announcement and propaganda to recruit girls<sup>18</sup>



In a more systematic way, as Dewi (2014) explained, the Japanese military employed three methods of recruitment of the *jugun ianfu* women. *First*, coercion through physical violence includes sexual violence, such as rape; *second*, coercion by frightening the women through threats as well as terror including psychological violence; *third*, coercion by dishonestly promising to give them a job and/or education. Women recruited through the third method were promised jobs such as waitressing, washing and cooking or acting. The third method used intermediaries or brokers to recruit Indonesian women and girls. There were two kinds of brokers in the effort to gather women who will be utilized for the sexual needs of Japanese soldiers and civil officers: *First*, common people who sought self-benefit by deceiving

<sup>18</sup> Santi, June 29<sup>th</sup>, 2014, <http://santijehannanda.wordpress.com/2014/06/29/momoye-kisah-seorang-jugun-ianfu/>

others. *Second*, those people who have power and authority to recruit woman as *jugun ianfu*.

The Japanese Army set out regulations for all facilities in *ianjo* (see Document #6 War Diary of the 1<sup>st</sup> company of the 45<sup>th</sup> Field Anti-aircraft Gun Battalion), for example, while each facility's working hours varied somewhat on paper, generally, working hours were to be in at 09.00 or 10.00 in the morning and end at 18.00 or 19.00 in the evening for enlisted men and later for officers, and also the rank of soldiers would determine the length of time allowed for a visit, ranging from 30 minutes to 1 hour, however, in practice, even after regular working hour, the facilities could be used throughout the night, mostly by officers, even on weekends men soldiers would arrive. In addition, according to Parker and Chew, many *jugun ianfu* were forced to clean used condoms and to clean their genitalia with an antiseptics every time they served a soldier, they were also injected by "number 606" a medical code to "clean" their disease. As the *ianjo* offered condoms, many soldiers did not use it and many former *jugun ianfu* were infected with several sexual diseases (Brooks, 1999: 96).

Poesponegoro and Notosutanto (1992: 69) mentioned that the Japanese did not differentiate any ethnicities when recruiting *jugun ianfu*. After the girls were taken, they were sent to the *ianjo* (camps) that served as the brothel house. *Ianjo* during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia were located in the Japanese military bases, ex-Dutch boarding houses, or even local residents houses. According to

Poesponegoro and Notosutanto (1992), the *ianjo* were described as being guarded by the Japanese officers to manage the security of the place. Inside the *ianjo*, there were many rooms with numbers as the place for the *jugun ianfu*. Outside the *ianjo*, there was a small room served as the place for the clients to buy tickets and condoms. In the afternoon until midnight, the client must pay 2.5 – 3.5 *rupiah*, but if the client wanted to rent until the next morning, they must pay 12.5 *rupiah*. The Japanese said to the girls that in every ticket bought by the client, they would be paid, but in fact, they had never been paid. Some girls, the survivors of *jugun ianfu* system, testified that most of them kept that tickets, hoped that those would be redeemed with some amounts of money. However, since the first time they came, until they collected the tickets in big baskets, they did not get any payments.

Still, according to Poesponegoro and Notosutanto (1992:71), the girls, after they were placed in their rooms, had their name changed into Japanese' name, for example, Mardiyem, one survivor of *jugun ianfu*, testified that her name was changed into Momoye. Her other friends, Waginem had Sakura as her name, Suharti into Masako, Nur into Noburu, and Jatinem into Haruye. Those names were announced and stacked near the room's number. Moreover, although in *ianjo*, the Japanese applied ticket system, the *jugun ianfu* were never paid. They only got low quality food, mostly given once a day, and forced to have sex with the clients for almost 24 hours whenever they came (usually started from 12.00 afternoon until the next day in the 10.00 morning). In addition, the Japanese facilitated *ianjo* with medical officers

that were responsible to evaluate the *jugun ianfu*'s health. However, the roles of these medical officers were mostly to abort the fetus if pregnancy occurred and to recognize if any sexual disease appeared. These officers were also responsible for guaranteeing the reproductive health of a new member of *jugun ianfu* after they were recruited.

### III. The Women Inside Ianjo

*Jugun ianfu* was a euphemism term coined by the Japanese government. *Jugun* means "attached" (or accompanying or following) the military. The word *ian* (comfort) is adequate to convey the meaning that the soldiers who received sexual pleasure but quite contrary to express *Fu* (women) who are actually sex slaves of the soldiers to endure the forced prostitution and sexual subjugation with continuous rape on an everyday basis during the war. In order to satisfy the sexual cravings of Japanese soldiers during World War II, the Japanese government recruited in excess of 100,000 women from all over Asia to serve in frontline brothels. They labelled these women *jugun ianfu* in the same meaning of comfort women for military men (Kim and Kim, 1998: 267).

A more detail information about *ianjo* was given by van Velden in his book, *Japanese Civil Internment Camps during the Second World War* (1963:5). In the book, he stated that in almost all islands in Indonesia region, where the Japanese troops came to seize, the biggest camps were concentrated in Java Island. The



camps themselves differed enormously and kept women from various ethnicities, both local women of the DEI and Western women. In the DEI during the Japanese occupation, the smallest camp was located in Pangkalpinang in Sumatra Island that held approximately four people. The largest was named Tjihapit I located in West Java that held around 14,000 people. In some areas, mainly Java and Sumatra, the men were separated from the women and children and, from about 1944 onwards, boys over ten years of age (the age differed over time and place) were transferred from the women's camps to the men's camps, and in Java there were special camps for boys, the sick, and old men.

In the DEI alone there are 98,000 females classed as Europeans. Of these at least one half would be Eurasian of varying degrees of mixed blood, but they are all recognized as Dutch nationals and it would be difficult to discriminate amongst them. As to the children, there are 53,000 classed as European attending school and a total of 93,000 under 19 years old (Stoler, 1989: 154). From a cablegram to the Australian Prime Minister's Department from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in London dated 26 September 1940, it was known that since September 1940, tentative arrangements had been made with Australia for the possible evacuation of 100 British men, 300 women and 200 children from Java and Sumatra 'in the case of an emergency', and it continued until 27 December 1941 as the British Consul General advised British women, particularly those with children, in the East Indies to take any opportunity to leave for Australia or elsewhere 'as conditions

may not be favorable later'. Nevertheless, according to a document in the Cypher from Batavia, N.E. Indies to Foreign Office dated 27 December 1941, no evacuation plans were made for Dutch women and children, making them vulnerable to being captured by Japanese military personnel. As stated in a document in the Bulletin of International News. Vol. XVII, No. 26, 27 dated December 1941, p. 2037, 22 December 1941, just before Hong Kong fell, the Commander-in-Chief in Batavia broadcast an exhortation to the army to defend the East Indies with the motto 'To die standing rather than live on our knees'. One Dutch survivor, Daphne Jackson in her memoir book, *Java Nightmare* (1989:17), suggested that none of the Dutch was aware of any evacuation plans for Dutch civilians. Dutch families were not supposed to leave the Indies by order of the Government and it was obvious that in the event of a Japanese invasion the masses of women and children would be a very big problem. Consequently, in Java (and some places in Sumatra), the Dutch ethnicity dominated some camps and all were completely sexually segregated, with the younger children staying with their mothers. Van Velden (1963:8) stated that there were at least five notable *ianjo* found in Java Island that interned Dutch people, as below:

(table 8) *Ianjo* and Dutch Internees

JAVA CAMPS			Internees	Estimated presence
1	Tjihapit I	14,000	Dutch women and children	1943 – November 1944
2	Grogol II	unknown	Dutch men and boys	September – November 1944
3	Kampong Makassar	3,600	Dutch women and children	From January 1945 - unknown
4	Bloemenkamp	1.,200	Dutch women and children	Moved to Ambarawa camps
5	Ambarawa Camps I - IX	Fluctuated	Dutch and Javanese women, men. and children	unknown

On 1 March 1942, the Japanese landed in three different parts of Java, cutting families off from each other and creating panic and chaos. The small Dutch naval forces put up a courageous resistance for a time, but on 8 March the Dutch Armed Forces surrendered (Cady, 1964: 566). Resistance in Sumatra lasted a little longer but in the end it too surrendered. Thousands of Dutch men, women and children were captured as well as British women and children who were living there, plus those who had, on the eve of surrender, hurriedly left Singapore for the ‘safety’ of Java or Sumatra. Any faith the Dutch civilians may have had in their own strength and that of the British and Americans was completely shattered (Jackson, 1989:1).

On another island, Borneo, ethnic Chinese filled most of the comfort station camps. However, unlike the Dutch and the local Javanese people in Java Island, the

Chinese in Borneo had been aware of the coming of the Japanese to occupy Borneo. The “Rape of Nanjing” tragedy remained in the minds of the community. Therefore, the bulk of the Chinese urban population fled their homes to rural areas in order to avoid the Japanese. Chinese males sought to avoid being forced into labour gangs while the women shuddered at the thought of being raped and/or recruited as comfort women to service Japanese forces. Consequently, two trends developed in Borneo as girls of marriageable age were hurriedly married off, which led to a 10 percent increase in population for the Kuching area during this period (Noakes, 1950: 83). The second occurrence was the ‘fright- and- flight’ response, which witnessed an exodus of a third or as high as half of the Chinese population of Kuching leaving for the interior and the coastal districts, such as Santubong, where they lived off the land (Lockard, 1987: 155).

Women were brought to Borneo Island camps over for prostitution from various parts of the Imperial Japanese Empire, notably Korea, Taiwan, China and Java. Local native and Chinese women also served in the military brothels, like the foreign women, the majority of local ‘comfort women’ were forcibly recruited. Most of them were they were 17 and 18 year old girls from good homes. After the women [procurers] forced their parents to hand them over, they were put straight into the brothels under the charge of a Japanese woman and not allowed to go out (Gin, 2011: 66-68).

As to re-tell the story inside the *ianjo* in the DEI during the war, an official testimony from former *jugun ianfu* in the DEI had been given by two Indonesian women, Mardiyem and Suhanah, recorded in two documents named #23 #24, and also from a Dutch woman, Ruff-O-Harne, recorded in a document of indictment from the Netherlands for war crime against Dutch women in Tokyo People's Tribunal in 2000. As taken from the official documents of the survivors' narration in Tokyo People's Tribunal (VAWW-Net Tribunal 2000) from WAM museum, the documented stories can be seen below:

1. Mardiyem (a local DEI woman from an *ianjo* in Borneo Island)

"I departed from Yogyakarta (Java Island) by train with some other girls to leave for Surabaya port before taking a ship to Banjarmasin (Borneo Island). I decided to go to Borneo Island as I was offered to be a singer by some Japanese officers. As I arrived in Borneo Island, I was put in a small room by a Japanese man named Chikada. I remembered that Chikada was a manager of a place that later I knew it was the comfort station. Chikada was the first man who took my virginity by raping and beating me numerous times. In this place, I had to suffer from sexual exploitations until I was forced to have an abortion. I still carry a vivid memory of the rape I had suffered even after the doctor's order not to have any sexual intercourse following my abortion."

2. Suhanah (a local DEI woman from an *ianjo* in Java Island)

"I was abducted by Japanese military personnel in my hometown when I was playing in the yard at her house. At that time, my father was pleading to the military police to get his daughter back but the police killed my father. Then, I was transported by car and I was firstly raped by officers

several times before reaching the comfort station in Simpang street. In that place, I had to undergo sexual violence every day without having enough time to have a rest and eat.”

### 3. Ruff O’Harne (a Dutch woman from an *ianjo* in Java Island)

“Taken out from my internment place in West Java, I was forced to sign a paper which I refused to sign. I was beaten hardly but I never signed the paper. I was placed in a small room and some military men entered my room. That was the first time I had my sexual intercourse by force although I came from a religious family background. I was supposed to be nun before I finally lost my virginity by rape.”

Picture 9: *Javanese Women testified in Tokyo People’s Tribunal (VAWW-Net Tribunal 2000)*<sup>19</sup>




---

<sup>19</sup> William Bradley Horton, Pramoedya and the Comfort Women of Buru: A Textual Analysis of Perawan Remaja dalam Cengkraman Militer (Teenage Virgins in the Grasp of the Military), *Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies*, Waseda University No.14, March 2010, p. 83.

## CHAPTER V : Indonesian Jugun Ianfu in the Postwar Era

### I. International Post-war Reaction

In the lead-up to the Tokyo Trial, the United Nations War Crimes Commission was set up in October 1945 on behalf of 17 Allied nations, including all the major powers except the Soviet Union. The Commission's responsibility was to ensure the detection, apprehension, trial, and punishment of those accused of war crimes. The Far East and Pacific Sub-Commission, based in China, was set up to investigate war crimes in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, each member government established its own National War Crimes Office. This meant that the responsibility for field investigations and the preparation of charges fell to the individual countries (Henry, 2013:365).

The Commission compiled a list of 32 violations of laws and customs of war that warranted criminal punishment at the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials. Listed at numbers 5 and 6 respectively, "rape" and the abduction of girls and women for the purpose of enforced prostitution" appeared high on the list alongside other egregious war crimes (Sandoz, 2009: 667-68). Nevertheless, Ustinia Dolgopol (2001: 248-55) also notes that although rape was mentioned relatively frequently, little information on enforced prostitution was recorded. The Allies, however, had volumes of evidence about the establishment and operation of the comfort stations but crimes against the comfort women were never tried at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. As part of the

terms of surrender, the Tokyo Trial was convened on 3 May 1946 at Ichigaya Court in Tokyo at the behest of the United States Government (Henry, 2013:366)

Based on The Hague and Geneva Conventions as the first international treaties to establish conventions regarding the laws of war, the Tribunal tried 28 political and military leaders of the Japanese empire (not including the emperor) for three main categories of crimes committed in the context of Asia-Pacific War: crimes against peace, conventional war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The defendants included former ministers and prime ministers, ambassadors and high-ranking military generals. Of those charged, 25 were found guilty, seven sentenced to death by hanging, one declared insane, and two died before the completion of the Trial. Rape was not enumerated as a "crime against humanity" or a "war crime" in the Tokyo Charter and no rape victims were called to testify (Henry, 2013:367). Moreover, sexual enslavement and forced prostitution were barely even mentioned during the trial, despite the extensive knowledge and documentation of these crimes. Rape was explicitly included as a crime in the Tokyo Indictment, and charges were in fact brought against defendants for war crimes committed during the Nanjing invasion under the 1907 Hague Convention IV and 1929 Geneva Convention. The Trial, however, was criticized as highly politicized and unfairly biased, as well as racist and self-interested, for example, in the Judgment of the Tokyo Trial, it was clearly stated that Japan's plan was to "secure the military, naval, political, and economic



domination of East Asia and of the Pacific and Indian oceans, and of all countries and islands therein or bordering thereon (IMTFE Judgment, 1948:49762).

Picture 10: Japanese military men who involved in the war brutality of *jugun ianfu*<sup>20</sup>



In December 2000, the Women's International War Crimes Tribunal held in Tokyo to hear the cases of former comfort women. The tribunal was not legally recognized; rather, it was a people's tribunal organized by an international coalition of non-governmental organizations. Comprised of an international and gender-balanced array of qualified legal scholars, the Women's Tribunal heard oral and videotaped testimony and gathered extensive documentary evidence (Ahmed, 2004:128-148). One *jugun ianfu* survivor from the Philippines even narrated her story in drawings that she drew by herself. The pictures can be seen below:

---

<sup>20</sup> The writer took pictures of the drawings personally from the WAM office in Waseda University, Tokyo, at September 20, 2014.

Picture 11: Drawings from Filipino *jugun ianfu* survivors<sup>21</sup>




<sup>21</sup> The writer took pictures of the drawings personally from the WAM office in Waseda University, “The writer took pictures of the drawings personally from the WAM office in Waseda University, Tokyo, at September 20, 2014. The woman survivor came from islands around modern called the Philippines-Indonesia border. During that period of time, Indonesia was called DEI under the government of the Netherlands, and the Philippines was controlled by the United States of America”.

## II. Local Narration of DEI Women Survivors

Despite the fact that survivors had already testified on the sexual violence that occurred in the DEI under Japanese military occupation in the Tokyo Tribunal forum, many unpublished stories had also told by them and other women who had not gotten the chance to give their testimony in Tokyo. The stories were scattered among personal notes and many of the survivors were left silent for decades. One survivor, who also made her testimony in Tokyo, Mardiyem, was the bravest to tell her story into a book and published it in Indonesia under very heavy controversy.

*Picture 12: A book that compiles Mardiyem's profile and testimony*<sup>22</sup>



---

<sup>22</sup><http://santijehannanda.wordpress.com/2014/06/29/momoye-kisah-seorang-jugun-ianfu/>

Mardiyem (her Japanese name was Momoye) was born on February 7<sup>th</sup>, 1929, in a middle class family in Yogyakarta, Central Java district. Her mother died when she was not even one year old and on her 10 years birthday, her father passed away. Mardiyem felt that she was blessed to have a good natural voice that made her dream to live independently as a singer. Mardiyem was 13 years old when one day, one of her neighbor, Zus Lentji, offered her a job as a singer in Borneo Island. Mardiyem enthusiastically accepted the offer and planned to leave for Borneo Island although her big family tried to convince her to stay in Yogyakarta. Mardiyem maintained at her decision, the one that she would regret for the rest of her life, and she followed other 48 girls from her neighborhood to chase their dream to become a singer. The group was sent to Surabaya, East Java, to finally sail to Borneo Island using a wood ship named Nichimaru. Once they arrived at Telawang in South Borneo Island, the girls were dropped in an old boarding house that served as an *ianjo*, and Mardiyem was placed in room number 11 covered with a wood door with a Japanese name, Momoye, to replace her local name. Everyone would call her Momoye since then. Mardiyem felt so frightened and all girls screamed in their rooms as all Japanese military soldiers intruded their room.

Mardiyem remembered that moment as the first time she had sex in a very brutal way. One man with a beard attacked her and forced her to have sex multiple times. After he satisfied his desire, he left Mardiyem naked and bleeding in her room, and not even she had a chance to put her clothes on, one by one, other military

men opened the door and she had to give her body to seven men that night. She described in her book:

*“Mereka meremas-remas tubuhku seperti ayam panggang, benar-benar seperti orang kelaparan. Aku dan teman-teman yang lain cuma bisa pasrah saja. Jika berani menolak atau melawan, maka pukulan dan tendangan yang akan kami terima. Kami sama sekali tidak dihargai. Mereka memperlakukan aku seperti benda mati saja. Rasanya mereka itu tidak membutuhkan perempuan, yang mereka butuhkan sebetulnya hanya lubang kemaluan perempuan saja.”*

(They squeezed my body as if they were eating grilled chicken when they felt starving. I and other girls could not do anything, because if we dared to say no to them they would surely punch and kick us. We had no value at all. They just needed our vagina, nothing more – writer’s translation)

As the allies attacked Borneo Island and destroyed the military camps in Tarakan, Telawang, and other strategic places in Borneo Island, Japanese soldiers left the *ianjo* and did not even give confirmation or apologize. Mardiyem left the *ianjo* with some permanent damages in her body, including her broken womb as she was forced to abort her baby. Mardiyem went back to Yogyakarta and the family rejected her by saying she was a prostitute. She got married with a man but did not have enough money to make a living. Society considered her as a threat to their village as she came back home as a rape victim. The government did not provide any support for her and in 1991, as global movement on Japanese sexual abuse during the Pacific War in Asia occurred, Mardiyem voiced her to refuse against negative stigma and

asked other girls she knew to follow the movement and seek for justice. Unfortunately, many of them refused to speak up as it would embarrass themselves and their families. Mardiyem also testified that she had never received any money or compensation for her suffering as an *ianfu*.

Another story comes from a survivor named Ema Kastinah whose Japanese name was Miyoko<sup>23</sup>. In 1942, Japanese military personnel intruded Ema's village in West Java and Ema, who was 17 years old, was kidnapped by some Japanese troops. She was sent to an *ianjo* on Simpang Road in Cimahi. She was chosen because of her beauty and she really wished to remove her beauty if she knew that beauty would only lead to her whole life sufferings. She waited for some hours until a doctor came and did various medical examinations on her body and she was put in a small room with a bed where suddenly a Japanese military man came and stripped her clothes for sex. She, then, spent three years of her life to give her body to around 10 military men each day and she often lost her consciousness and collapse.

---

<sup>23</sup> *Jugun Ianfu: the Sex Satisfaction Giver*, <http://old.nabble.com/Jugun-Ianfu,-Pemuas-Nafsu-Sex,-Sepenggal-Kisah-Sedih-t17337861.html>.

Picture 13: Ema's profile from Hilde Janssen's photo exhibition<sup>24</sup>



A group of doctors were in charge of maintaining her health and she was asked to warn the soldiers to use condoms or she called it *kaputjes*. The condoms were locally made in Teluk Tiram region in Banjarmasin city, Borneo Island, in a Japanese factory named Nomura owned by Hitaki (Nawawi et al, 1991). Every time the soldiers finished to satisfy themselves on Ema, the doctors gave her a red liquid to be used to wash her vagina. The location of *ianjo* was not too far from Ema's house, and every time she had a chance to go out from her room, she went back home to meet her mother. She could not tell her mother of what had happened as she was afraid to embarrass her mother. Ema had to go back to her room after she finished to meet her mother to avoid punishment from *kempetai* (Japanese military police). After two years, her mother finally knew and suffered from deep depression.

---

<sup>24</sup> *Schaamte en onschuld* (rasa malu dan bersalah), Hilde Jansse, 2010. In Dutch language, *Jugun lanfu* is called Troostmeisjes.


After the Japanese lost the battle against the allies, the *ianjo* was left and Ema went home just to be secluded from society. She could not even get a job and had to live on her family's mercy. She found a man who loved her and they kept her past as their own secret. However, after some years, her husband passed away and her husband's family knew about Ema's past and they accused Ema as a naughty woman who worked as a prostitute. Ema, who had her womb broken due to her terrifying experience in *ianjo*, had no children to accompany her and she had to live alone in poverty until she passed away as the Japanese had never given her any payment and compensation for her sorrow.

Aside from the survivor's local narration collected in personal memoirs and narrations from a photo exhibition, in Indonesian literature, there is also a monumental literature written by Pramoedya Ananta Toer titled "Perawan Remaja dalam Cengkraman Militer" (Teenage Virgins in the Grasp of the Military). The writer, Pramoedya, was a political internee of Indonesia's New Order Regime in the 1970's. He wrote the script of the book as he met Javanese comfort women during World War II in Buru Island, an isolated island to place Indonesian political prisoners (Horton, 2010: 72). Pramoedya tried to carefully relate who met who, when, and other information obtained at that meeting in the island, and for about 5 years later, he constructed chapters for his book. The transcript was dated on June 14, 1979, but it was only after 1990's, after rumors of large compensation payments spread throughout Indonesia and both international and domestic demand for sensational



news stories blossomed, the manuscript was finally delivered to the published KPG (Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia). On September 12, 2000, Pramoedya went to Japan to receive the Fukuoka prize for his intellectual and humanitarian contributions.

*Map 5: Buru Island in Indonesian Archipelago*<sup>25</sup>




Pramoedya wrote his transcript by composing reports from a number of Javanese men who were exiled to Buru Island and met the women involved in the *jugun ianfu* system. For instance, a Javanese man, also a political internee for the New Order Regime, named Rodius Sutanto, met two women from Central Java who claimed to have come to Buru Island in 1944. They were persuaded to have a study in Japan, but now they never returned to Java as they were ashamed to go home. Pramoedya's book clearly describes how the women survivors were wastantly heart broken because they had to live other places other than their homeland in Java

---

<sup>25</sup> William Bradley Horton, Pramoedya and the Comfort Women of Buru: A Textual Analysis of *Perawan Remaja dalam Cengkraman Militer* (Teenage Virgins in the Grasp of the Military), *Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies*, Waseda University No.14, March 2010, p. 72.

Island. These women lived in an oppressed feeling and they realized that if they ever go back to their local community in Java, it would result in the collapse of the local communities and their tradition (Horton, 2010: 72).

*Picture 14: The Book Cover*<sup>26</sup>



Taken from Pramoedya Ananta Toer's book, "Teenage Virgins in the Grasp of the Military" (2001:39), another story comes from another internee who was able to talk to a woman who identified herself as Sulastri from Central Java (Semarang District). According to Toer, in 1944, she was forced to leave her parents to go to a school in Tokyo. Her parents had not been willing to let her go with the Japanese officers, but they were warned that they were being disloyal to the Emperor. Sulastri was finally sent out on a ship with other 228 girls, 22 of whom were from Semarang, and landed on Buru Island in early 1945. After Japan surrendered, those women had

---

<sup>26</sup> William Bradley Horton, Pramoedya and the Comfort Women of Buru: A Textual Analysis of Perawan Remaja dalam Cengkraman Militer (Teenage Virgins in the Grasp of the Military), *Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies*, Waseda University No.14, March 2010, p. 73.

to fend for themselves and Sulastri was involved in local society. As a woman, she became the property of a man in a village in the Wai Tona Dara valley of Buru Island. She was limited to talk and have interaction by her husband.

There was also a woman named Kartini, a daughter of a local Javanese civil servant, who was also said to be sent to have a school in Tokyo. She was picked up from her home in Sukorejo and taken by a Japanese man in a motorcycle sidecar to Kendal district where she joined other girls. On the ship, the man who had counted her brought her to a room in the Buru-bound ship and raped her repeatedly. Kartini was then took to Morotai after some girls had were died, and she was responsible for all the Japanese guards of the romusha (forced-labor) working on moving rocks on the beach until some Chinese girls arrived. She was finally able to escape, after which she met an Alfuru man who helped her (Horton, 2010: 76).

As the Allies attacked some main Japanese military central camps, those girls were released and lived under several conditions, as Pramoedya wrote:

*“Mereka semua ingin pulang. Tak ada fasilitas. Tak ada uang. Tak ada pelindung. Tak ada kenalan. ... Walau ingin pulang, mereka menanggung beban moral yang berat, merasa telah tercemar, dan tak sampai hati mencemari nama keluarga.”* (Toer, 2001:39)

(They were all eager to go back home. No facilities. No money. No protection. No one to ask for help. ... and even when they really wanted to go home, they had a very heavy burden on their shoulder, they were spoiled, and they just could not spoil the family name too. – writer’s translation.)

Toer continued (2001: 35-36), as the Japanese lost the battle from the Allies in World War II on August 1945, numerous girls from Java Island were released as one of strategies to hide war crimes. The strategy ran smooth for four reasons. First, right after Japanese armies surrendered to the Allies, Indonesian government has not yet been established enough to develop investigation team for the court. Second, the focus of Indonesian armies and government were still on another battlefield with the Netherlands to protect its territory. Third, even after the new Indonesian government has been set up, the country still faced other internal problems of political parties. Fourth and finally, the Indonesian government has acted so carelessly in its attempt to resolve this *jugun ianfu* matter. In the post-war era, no special commission to investigate and advocate this issue was ever established and even during the international negotiation about war booty, the comfort women issue was dismissed. The dismissal of the comfort women issue in Indonesia has been mainly related to the local government attitude in handling the issue and, moreover, the local society also played a pivotal role in ignoring the victims.

### III. Indonesian-Japanese Government Attitude

After the Pacific War was over, the Japanese left *jugun ianfu* in their *ianjo*. In some cases, when Japanese military bases were bombed by *Sekutu* (Allies), most *jugun ianfu* girls escaped. Comfort stations were mostly established wherever the Japanese military traveled, including at the front lines. Some were attached to other

types of recreational establishments, such as restaurants. As most of the women lived around conflict zone and they followed the armed forces into all areas of battle, large numbers of them were killed in the fighting. Others were killed by their captors after escape attempts, insubordinate behavior, or, in some cases, because they had contracted sexually-transmitted diseases that rendered them unsuitable to continue as comfort women. Many committed suicide. At the end of the war, large numbers of comfort women were simply abandoned. Sometimes, also, the women were expected to join defeated Japanese troops in their custom of mass suicide. Many who would not have chosen this fate voluntarily were killed *en masse* by the retreating troops using gunfire, dynamite, grenades, or fire (Vanderweert, 2001:150). In some cases, most of the girls died of hunger and illness, often from broken bones or internal injuries from brutal beatings. It is then estimated that only about twenty five percent of the comfort women survived the end of the war.

*Picture 15: The arrival of the Allied war crimes investigation team in Namlea, headed by Australian Maj. Arnott, October 1945.<sup>27</sup>*



<sup>27</sup> Courtesy of Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, source: <http://www.kamparchieven.nl/>

As this had come to be considered as war crime, Japan was forced to pay a settlement to compensate several women exploited as sex slaves during World War II. This relatively small settlement came by way of a judicial decree. Japan's parliament, the Diet, has provided for community rehabilitation through the "Asian Women's Fund". The Diet has not issued an apology (though several prime ministers have), the question arises as to whether the Asian Women's Fund constitutes a reparation or a settlement. The Japanese government itself has never openly admitted responsibility for the *jugun ianfu* system and only some representatives utter apology.

Document reveals three types of facilities for sex slaves committed by the Japanese Imperial Army, the first were those directly run by Japanese military authorities, second, those run by civilians but essentially set up and controlled by Japanese military authorities, and third, those that were mainly private facilities but some priority for military use. Despite these differences, there were common characteristics among those three facilities types. First, the facilities were under strict control of the Japanese armies which helped to establish and to manage these facilities and helped to recruit sex slaves. Second, the facilities were used exclusively by Japanese soldiers and army civilian employees. Third, the facilities had to obtain a permit from the army and accept its support and control in all procedures. Lastly, all facilities followed written regulations created by the Japanese Army (Parker, 1999: 95). In Indonesia, the existence of the comfort women operation was first exposed in

1948 when Batavia (now Jakarta) hosted public trials concerning the sexual internment of Dutch women. However, a special court for Indonesian local women has never been committed. Even after in 1990, forty-five years after the end of World War II, of all Japanese officials only Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi personally offered an apology for the acts perpetrated by the military against comfort women (Brooks, 1999: 87).

#### A. Chronology of Handling Indonesian Jugun Ianfu Survivors

In 1951, Japan signed the San Francisco Peace treaty, formally concluding its war with the Allies. According to the document of Multilateral Treaty Peace with Japan dated on September 8, 1951 (3 U.S.T. 3169, 136 U.N.T.S. 45, and 3 U.S.T. at 3183), the treaty was meant to resolve all remaining claims between the Allied Powers and Japan and expressly waived any other claims for wartime reparations by the Allied nations or their nationals not mentioned in the Treaty. The states parties to the treaty included some whose national had been enslaved as comfort women, like Indonesia, the Netherlands, and the Philippines, but the treaty contained no mention of the victims of rape, forced prostitutions, or sexual slavery. In 1965, the Japan-South Korea Basic Treaty was signed. Under this treaty, Japan paid the South Korean government an "Independence Congratulation Fund", consisting of \$800 million in grants, soft loans, and private credit in return for the relinquishment of all individual wartime claims made by Korean nationals. Again, the issue of rape and forced prostitution were left out of the negotiations and the resulting treaty. Thus,

the comfort women were effectively abandoned by all the governments involved, including their own, and legally foreclosed from the possibility of reparations (Hicks, 1995: 130-131, 153-156).

After the war, Allied Powers set up tribunal throughout East Asia and the Pacific to investigate and prosecute war crimes committed by the Japanese. Eleven nations participated in the effort, but the United States assumed the dominant role (Vanderweert, 2001:152). Comfort system crimes were actually hidden from view until recent years. The Japanese did, in fact, go to great lengths to hide the comfort system from the Allied Powers. Almost immediately after its surrender, the Japanese military ordered the destruction of many documents relating to the comfort system and documents not destroyed were stored away in inaccessible archives. Central command sent encrypted messages to the various military outposts instructing that comfort women should be disguised as nurses. Hundreds of comfort women were also hidden in mental institutions or leprosy sanatoria. Sometimes the women were simply killed using methods that would obliterate all remains. However, the Japanese were not able to hide the system completely. Numerous accounts exist of the Allied soldiers discovering the brutalized comfort women, interviewing them, helping to repatriate them to their homelands. The Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces prepared a research report dated on November 15, 1945, entitled, "Amenities in the Japanese Armed Forces (Dolgopol and Paranjape, 1994:30-32). Nevertheless, the Tokyo Tribunal, which prosecuted the main war criminals, did not



prosecute any "comfort women" cases of all the other post-war tribunals in Asia and the Pacific, only the Batavia Tribunal, conducted by the Dutch in the DEI (present-day Indonesia), took up the issue of comfort women. Japanese soldiers were prosecuted for the subjection of thirty-five Dutch women into sexual slavery. However, the cases of native Indonesian comfort women were ignored by the Batavia Tribunal (David Boling, 1995:547).

For the case of Indonesia, the report on comfort women issue is taken from a Document of Report on the Handle of Ex *Jugun Ianfu* by Indonesian Government in Cooperation with Asian Women's Fund (AWF) from the Ministry of Social Affairs of Republic of Indonesia dated in 2006. According to H. Bachtiar Chamsyah, Indonesian Minister of Social Affairs at that time, in order to settle any matters related to *jugun ianfu*, the Japanese government formed an institution called Asian Women Fund (AWF). The Indonesian government helped to implement the initiative by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Minister of Social Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia and the Asian Women's Fund concerning Promotion of Social Welfare Service for Elderly People in Indonesia on March 25, 1997. The Indonesian government through the Ministry of Social Affairs, cooperated with AWF in handling *jugun ianfu* matters by building and rehabilitating social services institution for the elderly, or mostly known as *Panti Sosial Tresna Werdha* in Indonesian language, in 10 years, starting in 1997 until 2007. Thus, in accordance with the MoU, the Ministry

of Social Affairs obliged to make report to AWF on the realization of the activities and also the benefits of the cooperation.

The rationale of the decision comes from four points of considerations:

1. In 1958, four political and two economic agreements<sup>28</sup> were signed in Jakarta on January 20<sup>th</sup> between Indonesian-Japanese governments to terminate the state of war between the two countries:

a. Agreed Minutes of the Formal Negotiations on the Treaty of Peace

Between the Republic of Indonesia and Japan (*Butir-Butir Kesepakatan dalam Negosiasi Formal dalam Perjanjian Damai Antara Republik Indonesia dan Jepang* ).

b. Agreement on Reparation Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and Japan (*Perjanjian Pampasan Perang Antara Republik Indonesia dan Jepang*). The agreement was ratified through Law No.13/1958, dated on March 27, 1958/ LN No.31/TLN 1560.

c. Treaty of Peace between Republic of Indonesia and Japan (*Perjanjian Perdamaian Antara Republik Indonesia dan*

---

<sup>28</sup> Official documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the republic of Indonesia.

*Jepang*). The agreement was ratified through Law No.13/1958, dated on March 27, 1958/ LN No.31/TLN 1560.

d. The Charter of Ratified Agreement on Treaty of Peace between Republic of Indonesia and Japan (*Piagam Ratifikasi Perjanjian Perdamaian Antara Republik Indonesia dan Jepang*).

e. Summary of Discussions Between the Indonesian and Japanese Panels on the Drafting of the Treaty of Peace, Reparations Agreement. Protocol Relating to Settlement of the Trade Debts, Exchange of Notes on Economic Cooperation and Other Relevant Documents (*Kesimpulan Diskusi Antara Panel Indonesia dan Jepang dalam Pembuatan Naskah Perjanjian Perdamaian, Persetujuan Perbaikan, Protokol Mengenai Penyelesaian Hutang Perdagangan, Pertukaran Nota dalam Kerjasama Ekonomi dan Dokumen Lain Yang Berhubungan*), this agreement as signed earlier on January 18<sup>th</sup>.

f. Protocol Between The Government of The Republic of Indonesia and Japan Relating to Settlement of the Claims with Respect to Balances in the Former Clearing Accounts and Other Accounts (*Protokol antara Pemerintah Republik*

*Indonesia dan Pemerintah Jepang Mengenai Penyelesaian Penagihan-Penagihan Terhadap Neraca-Neraca Di dalam Clearing Account-Clearing Account yang Lalu dan Account-Account Lain yang Bersangkutan*). The agreement was ratified through Law No.13/1958, dated on March 27, 1958 (Patrick, 2007:183)

Based on these agreements, since 1958, President Soekarno (Indonesia's first president) concluded the Japan and Indonesian Peace Treaty and Reparation Agreement with the Japanese government and received \$223 million over twelve years and \$400 million in economic aid over twenty years. The president used the money to develop Indonesian economic in post-war era rather than for individual claims. This agreement created another controversy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century as the Association of Former Special Recruits, founded in 1985, insisted that Japan acknowledged 15,000 dead and missing former special recruits and offered restitution. They requested 2.7 million yen per person in 2001 for the unpaid salaries. Back in 1940's, Japan recruited more than 50,000 Indonesians and employed them as auxiliary soldiers for the Japanese military, starting in April 1943 when the first recruitment was made on Java. However, the Japanese government insisted that compensation had been completed by the 1958's Japan and Indonesian Peace Treaty and Reparation Agreement (Ishida, 2005:23).

2. The issue of *jugun ianfu* came into surface in Indonesia per December 1991 as the Japanese government took an initiative to conduct a deep study regarding the issue of comfort women in the effort to establish Japan's Peace, Friendship, and Exchange Initiative of Japanese government and people. This initiative was based on the reality that of more women had suffered as a result of maltreatment committed by Japanese military ruler in former Japanese occupied countries, including Korea, the Philippines, India, China, Burma, Hong Kong, Macao, and Indo China.

3. On August 31<sup>st</sup>, 1994, Japanese Prime Minister, Tomihiro Murayama, emphasized the comfort women issue in his statements that offered his personal apology for the suffering that took place during Japanese military occupation in World War II in Asian countries. This deep apology would be materialized among others through increasing mutual understanding of the two countries and societies for better future generations. Nevertheless, based on the study performed by Cabinet Councilor Office on External Affairs on August 4, 1993, it would be impossible to know the exact number of women recruited as sexual worker for the Japanese soldiers during the war due to absence of related documents.

4. As a form of materialization for the Japan's deep apology stated in point 3, on June 14<sup>th</sup>, 1995, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Kozo Igarashi, announced the

formation of Asian Women's Fund (AWF) that started to work on July 19<sup>th</sup>, 1995 and directly implemented activities related to *jugun ianfu* matters. The AWF was funded by Japanese government and society.

The Indonesian government, with the presence of the 1958's agreements, has asserted not to ask compensation and only expected that the Japanese government would make great effort to seek the best solution for this issue as proof of the Indonesian government's willingness to maintain its national dignity. On August 24<sup>th</sup>, 1995, the Indonesian Secretary General of Ministry of Social Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia held a meeting with the Councilor of Japanese Embassy for Indonesia and the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Murayama, to draw a program plan for Indonesian *jugun ianfu* as follows:

1. AWF has been established to execute compensation and to also handle the matter of *jugun ianfu* in Indonesia.
2. The fund for AWF was supported by the Japanese government and people and the money would be allocated for the welfare and health for Indonesian women. The total money for the compensation was 380 million Yen and it would be distributed in 10 years.
3. By this compensation, the Japanese government has expressed deep regret.

4. Mr. Murayama as the Japanese Prime Minister would personally meet the Indonesian *ex-jugun ianfu* and made promise to decide ways to express remorse from the Japanese people related to the issue.

Thus, the Indonesian government welcomed the plan offered by the Japanese government and proposed some following conditions as:

1. The money for the compensation should be granted and channeled through the Indonesian government that appointed the Ministry of Social Affairs to distribute the money, and it should not through other agency or individuals.
2. The management of the fund utilization should be kept transparently.
3. The Indonesian government would appreciate if the fund could be allocated for larger humanity purposes in the form of social welfare and health projects for women in general, the *ex-jugun ianfu* were included in this term.
4. Any concerns about technical matters would immediately be held between Indonesian government, represented by the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Japanese Embassy for Indonesia.

One year later, in July 1996, a meeting of Coordination of Welfare Area at Ministerial level in the Coordination Meeting of Political and Security Area was held to assign the Indonesian Minister of Social Affairs to handle the issue of Indonesian

*jugun ianfu* in coordinative ways and a report should be submitted to the president of the Republic of Indonesia. Furthermore, on March 21<sup>st</sup>, 1997, the Japanese government, represented by the Japanese Prime Minister, has also issued a letter of apology to Indonesian government via the president of the Republic of Indonesia, and the letter was followed up on April 4<sup>th</sup>, 1997, by the Indonesian Minister of Social Affairs as ordered by the president, through the letter of Minister of State Secretary No. R-66/M.Sesneg/4/1997 stated that the solution on *jugun ianfu* issue should not be exaggerated.

The next step was taken in the form of another MoU signed on March 25<sup>th</sup>, 1997, between the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Japanese government that was represented by AWF. The document of MoU stated that the Japanese Government and people would coordinate to provide social welfare services for elderly in Indonesia through the construction and rehabilitation of social services institutions for the elderly that valued as much as 380 million yen distributed in 10 years. The Indonesian government received the compensation under the law of Minister of Social Affairs Decision No. 37/HUK/1997 dated on July 4<sup>th</sup>, 1997, and thus, formed a team that consisted of representatives of attorney General Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Coordinating Ministry for People Welfare, Ministry of Domestic Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Information, Ministry for Women Affairs, and Ministry of Social Affairs.



Further implementation was taken on October 21st, 1998, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a formal letter, titled No. 1037/SB/X/98/06/01, to Minister of State Secretary that asked the attitude of the Government of Republic of Indonesian to handle *ex-jugun ianfu* matters, which stated that if there is any possible legal suit concerning this problem, it would be dealt with by Attorney General. For that purpose, some documents have been delivered to the Attorney General. On October 27th, 1998, the Minister of Social Affairs reported to the President via a letter, titled No. A/A-22/X-98/MS, regarding Government Policy to handle *ex-jugun ianfu* matters. The letter was clarified that based on information from Second Secretary of Japanese Embassy, the model of addressing *ex-jugun ianfu* matters in Indonesia was through construction and rehabilitation of Social Services Institutions for the elderly (in accordance with the MOU) and it was stated to be the best model.

On December 31<sup>st</sup>, 1998, the Indonesian President replied the letter of the Minister of Social Affairs ordered the Coordinating Minister for People Welfare and Poverty Alleviation, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Domestic Affairs and Minister of Social Affairs, through the letter of Minister of State Secretary No B.679/M Sesneg/12/1998, regarding to the government policy on handling matters related to *ex-jugun ianfu*. In the letter, it was stated that the handling of *ex-jugun ianfu* is solely based on the policy of the government of Republic of Indonesia. Nevertheless, the government's decision rose public protests and critics, and thus, the government made further coordinative policy in dealing with *jugun ianfu* issue as follows:

1. On June 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2001, the Indonesian Minister of Health and Social Welfare formed Coordinating Team for Handling Claims of Comfort Women (*Jugun Ianfu*), which was secured with a decision letter of Ministerial of Health and Social Welfare of the Republic of Indonesia No. 10A/HUK/2001 dated June 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2001.
2. The membership of Coordinating Team is representatives of General Attorney Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Coordinating Ministry Office of Public Welfare, Ministry of Domestic Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Information, Ministry Office of Women Roles and Ministry of Social Affairs.
3. Report on the Policy to Handle Comforter Women (*Jugun Ianfu*) will be consisting of: Background, Legal Framework, Indonesia Government Policy and Implementation of AWF aid, dated on January 31<sup>st</sup>, 2002, prepared by the Director General for Social Services and Rehabilitation, delivered to Asian Women's Fund and Japanese Embassy in Indonesia via Political Section I. It must demonstrate that Indonesian government's policy to address *ex-jugun ianfu* matters referred to the agreement from the Memorandum of Understanding dated on March 25<sup>th</sup>, 1997.
4. A letter from the Minister of Social Affairs No. A/A-115/IV-02/MS dated on April 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2002, was sent to the Indonesian President regarding to the Confirmation on Government Policy in Handling *ex-jugun ianfu* matters

asserted that the Government of the Republic of Indonesia used the MOU agreed by both countries in dealing the issues.

5. On April 17<sup>th</sup>, 2002, the Minister of Social Affairs formed Coordinating Team for Handling Matters Related to *Jugun Ianfu* Claims which was secured with Ministerial of Social Affairs' Decision No 25/HUK/2002 on April 17th 2002. The membership of Coordinating Team is representatives of General Attorney Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Coordinating Ministry Office of People Welfare, Ministry of Domestic Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Communication and Information, Ministry Office of Women Empowerment, Indonesia Corps of Women (KOWANI) and Ministry of Social Affairs.

#### B. The Distribution of the Money


On March 25, 1997, an MoU was agreed and signed between the government of the Republic of Indonesia, represented by the Ministry of Social Affairs with the government of Japan, represented by the Asian Women's Fund (AWF), which is in principle the government of Japan was coordinative and reported to the Indonesian president on behalf of *jugun ianfu* issue. The AWF asked benefits from the agreement that:

1. The aid implies that the Japanese government has met its promise to compensate for the casualty caused by Japanese soldiers during Japanese occupation,
2. The construction of additional building in Social Services Institutions for the elderly in Indonesia has increased the capacity of Social Services Institutions for the elderly to accommodate more clients,
3. The equipment delivered to Social Services Institutions for the elderly under this program is also useful for the elderly such as television set, wheelchairs, refrigerators, tables, beds and others which can be used by elderly,
4. The elderly can live in proper buildings that make them live comfortably,
5. The Indonesian government can be motivated to renovate other Social Services Institutions for the elderly n surrounding AWF aided buildings.

CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY


The money was then allocated to construct and rehabilitate, in total, 69 elderly house (PSTW), with the construction of 61 PSTWs and the renovation of adding facilities in 8 PSTWs (Prasetiaju, 2010), with the total aid fund of AWF used was more than 24 billion rupiahs in five steps of payment for 10 years, 1998 to 2008 (equal with \$ 240,000). The recapitulation of the construction can be seen below

Graph 1 to illustrate the steps of recapitulation of construction of social service for elderly during 1998 – 2008.



In one decade, there were 61 elderly houses built. Started in 1998, there were 5 PSTW constructed, and the number was increased in 1999 as the government construct 6 more PSTW. In 2001, 10 PSTW was constructed and the number of the constructed buildings was doubled in 2003 as 21 more houses were built. Finally in the last phase, 27 PSTW were constructed in 2006. The reconstruction covered almost all areas in Indonesia, consisted of 31 buildings in Java Island, 15 buildings in Sumatra Island, 3 buildings in Borneo Island, 8 buildings in Sulawesi Island, 3 buildings in Nusa Tenggara Island, and 1 building in Papua Island, and the total money used to build the elderly houses can be seen below:

Graph 2 to illustrate the money used to make a construction of social service for elderly during 1998 – 2008 (in million rupiahs).



In the 1990s, the Japanese government has indeed helped to set up the Asian Women's Fund to raise money from private sources to financially compensate former comfort women. Japan paid only the administrative costs of the Asian Women's Fund, but it invited private donors to contribute further. Because the action did not come with a formal apology or acceptance of legal responsibility from Japan, however, most former comfort women have refused to accept the money. It must be noted, however, that money is not the major motivation for the continuing legal actions. Former comfort women have repeatedly expressed a desire to reveal the truth about the atrocities of the comfort system so as to prevent such crimes from being repeated in the future. Those women speak of wanting to restore their dignity and honour before a society that has disregarded their suffering and humiliation and, in some ways, held them responsible for it (Ahmed, 2004:128-129).

Hick (in Brooks, 1999) reiterated us that historically, women throughout Asia were accorded a low ranking *de jure*. It is commonly viewed that rape and sexual abuse were perceived as an inevitable part of the wartime experience. In addition, the women who had suffered were mostly from poor families with little influence over the ruling elites. More significantly, few women were willing to come forwards because of the cultural shame attached to their sexual experience in a society that prized chastity. For all these reasons, the comfort women issue was still ignored in postwar treaty negotiations. Moreover, the next issue of *jugun ianfu* re-appeared as in March 2007, Japan's Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, issued a controversial statement to refute the involvement of Japanese military in the sexual slavery system.

In Indonesia, some demands are now delivered to current Japanese government related to *jugun ianfu* issue, and it is not solely about compensation money or aid to the local government. First, the Japanese government should formally recognize and apologize that the *jugun ianfu* system was in practice. Sexual slavery deliberately implemented by the Japan during 1942-1945. Second, the dark history of *jugun ianfu* should be put into the school curriculum in both countries, Indonesia and Japan, so that the young generation will know the truth. Third, the *jugun ianfu* survivors should be compensated as the victims of war in personal support.

## CHAPTER VI : Conclusion

Back to the early period of 20th century, Japan was included in the Four Power Treaty and the country was declared as the third largest navy in the world. As Japan became involved in major war with its neighbouring countries, particularly Russia, China, and Korea, due to its military ambitions, natural resources and labor became important aspects in sustaining the Japanese war efforts. Oil cut off before Pearl Harbor. In order to maintain its oil reserves, Japan invaded Southeast Asia and particularly attacked Dutch East Indies oil refining industries. During the Asia-Pacific War, The Japanese seized Southeast Asia region and took control over some important resources. Particularly in Indonesia, started officially on March 9, 1942, the Japanese replaced the Dutch's authority to control Indonesia with its military army. In order to support its effort in war, the Japanese applied war economy policy, especially in oil and rice. In this reason, the Japanese required many male labors to do *romusha* (forced work). In the same time, females were less desired to do *romusha*, instead, they were trapped into *jugun ianfu* (comfort women) system that seemed to shape an enforced prostitution to be put inside an *ianjo* or comfort stations. In the Dutch East Indies territory, there were there were about 13 spots of comfort stations throughout DEI's islands and most of *ianjo* activities were centralized mainly in two islands: Java as the central of agricultural activities and Borneo as the central of oil mining activities.



The *ianjo* or comfort stations were first established at the request of the Japanese military authorities, as part of war efforts in China by the incident of the Rape of Nanking. There were seemingly various reasons for establishing *ianjo* in the place where the Japanese military personnel were stationed, however, the greatest motivations were to prevent a worsening of anti-Japanese feelings on the part of the Chinese people as Japanese military personnel had raped Chinese civilian women in occupied areas on numerous occasions. Furthermore, the Japanese military leaders also hoped to prevent the spread of venereal diseases among Japanese officers and men, as otherwise military effectiveness would be reduced; and lastly, it was also feared that contact with civilian women could result in the leaking of military secrets that might threaten the Japanese ambition to conquer Asia.

In *jugun ianfu* system, especially in Java and Borneo Island, the Japanese applied systematized recruitment to get girls to work as sexual slave in *ianjo* (military brothels). In Java Island, most *ianjo* were filled by local Javanese and Dutch ethnicity, while in Borneo Island, Javanese ethnic dominated the military brothels while most of Chinese local people were able to escape to British territory of Borneo. Most of comfort station in Borneo was private bars that imported women from Korea and China as well. The Japanese did not treat those girls differently according to their races, instead, in *ianjo*, the rank of soldiers would determine the length of time allowed for a visit. The girls who worked as *jugun ianfu* were forced to service the Japanese military army whenever they came, without any work time. In

order to fulfil the army's fantasy, the girls also had their name changed into Japanese name. In a day, one girl who was forced to be an *ianfu* had to sexually serve twenty up to fifty soldiers. Doctors were provided to control the girls' reproductive health but most of their duties were to prevent the spread of venereal diseases and pregnancy, thus, if pregnancy occurred, *ianfu* had to abort the fetus.

After the Asia-Pacific war was over, most girls who were forced to be a Japanese military personnel's prostitute were died due to various reasons, like severe illness, being killed by the soldiers, or committed suicide. Some of the survivors were just left in the *ianjo* and abandoned without any compensation. From the testimony of some women survivors in the Tokyo People Tribunal in 2000, they were given coupon after they had finished giving sexual service to the military men, however, the coupons were never redeemed into money and the women survivors could never build their life.

Back to the time when the Japanese came to occupy the DEI, both Soekarno and Hatta, the two DEI foremost nationalist leaders, agreed to do "everything legally possible to give the nationalist struggle a broader legal scope, and at the same time secretly support the revolutionary resistance" (Sato, 1994: 104-5). *Ianjo*'s of the DEI were intentionally built and the nationalist leaders of the DEI acknowledged the incident with no further actions to prevent. Sending local girls to *ianjo* might be also considered to be "legal" for the local nationalist groups as it was part of Japanese requirements to effort victory on war against the western colonialists.

The comfort women system, applied inside *ianjo* that spread throughout islands in Dutch East Indies during the Japanese occupation in the region, has to be considered as a war crime and an action of VAW. After the Asia Pacific War was over, most of Southeast Asian *jugun ianfu* survivors were silent for decades, and the Japanese government also still neither admitted responsibility for creating the comfort station system nor given compensation directly to former comfort women. The Indonesian government, unlike the South Korean's, has also never addressed this issue formally and directly to the Japanese government until the present day.

The survivors of *jugun ianfu* in Indonesia even had never been compensated or even considered as war victims. The Japanese government, under international court, established Asian Women's Fund to re-dress the issue, but has never publicly admitted and apologized for the presence of *jugun ianfu*. The money was delivered to the Indonesian government as a form of political bilateral cooperation between two governments and the money, managed by the Asian Women's Funds, and it was spent to construct and build social service houses for elderly in many provinces in Indonesia. Even so, despite "the sacrifice" for the sake of the building of the nation, the story of Indonesian women as an *ianfu* by the Japanese military men was skipped in the modern Indonesian national history books, and the survivors were rejected by the local communities and violated in many sectors, like in education, social relationship, as well as employment.

Thus, to conclude, apparently, in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia, the comfort women issue was still ignored in post-war treaty negotiations, and this issue brings further impact to the women's rights in broader perspective caused by sexual stigma. The ex-comfort women were maligned, humiliated, assault, beaten, raped, physically tortures, and threatened with weapons, however, the local society still rejected their presence and even hid their story to prevent social disgrace. Radhika Coomasaswamy, the UN Special Rapporteur on issues of Violence Against Women even recommended that the Japanese government should give a formal, clear, and unambiguous apology to the victims of sexual abuse during the war period, give an adequate monetary compensation to the victims by the Japanese government and not from private funds, as well as punish those involved (Coomaraswamy, 1997, U.N Doc.E/CN.4/1996/1996/53; see also: Chelala, 1999: 1196).

Further, the poor implementation of law enforcement to handle the women victim during the Japanese occupation era might bring impact to the present's sexual violence against women cases in the modern Indonesia. The women who became a victim from sexual violence may not be granted social support and law protection, and even tended to hide their sexual violence experience to avoid shame to the family, and this cultural aspect keeps making the country becomes tolerant to sexual violence against women and defending the doers. If the Indonesian government stands against VAW and has a willingness to protect the women war victim in the past war period, some demands can be delivered to current Japanese government

related to *jugun ianfu* issue. For instance, first, the Japanese government should formally recognize and apologize that the *jugun ianfu* system was in practice a sexual slavery action that was deliberately implemented by the Japan during 1942-1945. Second, the dark history of *jugun ianfu* should be put into the school curriculum in both countries, Indonesia and Japan, so that the young generation will know the truth of history. Lastly, the *jugun ianfu* survivors should be compensated as the victims of war in personal support. In this way, the implementation of law related to VAW cases in Indonesia could be more strengthen and enforced fairly.



## REFERENCES

Aalders, G. (1998). Oorlogsdokumentatie '40-'45: Negende Jaarboek van het Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdokumentatie (Labour for Great Asia: Indonesian Coolies in the Outer Islands, 1942-1945). . Amsterdam, Walburg Press.

Ahmed, A. R. (2004). "The Shame of Hwang V, Japan: How the International Community Has Failed Asia's "Comfort Women"." Texas Journal of Women & the Law **14**(1): 121-149.

Al-Gozaaly, M. N. (2012). Whither women's rights in ASEAN? Jakarta, The Jakarta Post.

Anderson, B. R. O. (1966). Japan - The Light of Asia, in Josef Silverstein et al. Southeast Asia in World War II: Four Essays, New Haven.

ASEAN. "Bangkok Declaration." Retrieved September 3, 2013, from <http://www.asean.org/news/item/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration>.

ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). "ASEAN Human Rights Declaration." Retrieved September 3, 2013, from <http://aichr.org/documents/>.

Axelrod, A. (2007). Encyclopedia of World War II. New York, Facts on File Inc.

Barlett, A. G. e. a. (1986). Pertamina: Perusahaan Minyak Nasional (Pertamina: the National Oil Company). Jakarta, Inti Idayu Press.

BBC News for Indonesia. "Violence Against Women in Indonesia." Retrieved 21 September, 2014, from [http://www.bbc.co.uk/indonesia/berita\\_indonesia/2012/03/120307\\_komnasperempuan.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2012/03/120307_komnasperempuan.shtml).

Beasley, W. G. (1991). Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945. Oxford, Oxford.

Blackburn, S. (2004). Women and the State in Modern Indonesia, Cambridge.

Boling, D. (1995). "Mass Rape Enforced Prostitution and the Japanese Imperial Army: Japan Eschews International Legal Responsibility."

Bonga, D. W. (1996). Eight Prison Camps: A Dutch Family in Japanese Java. Ohio, Ohio University Centre for International Studies.

Boomgaard, P. e. (1991). Map of Java. Reprinted from Changing Economy in Indonesia: A Selection of Statistical Source Material from the Early Nineteenth Century to 1940.. Amsterdam, Royal Tropical Institute.

Bosma, U. (2001). "Labour Relations in Java 1650, 1800, 1900. ." IISH.

Brooks, R. L. (1999). When Sorry Isn't Enough: The Controversy over Apologies and Reparations for Human Injustice. New York, New York University Press.

Brown, I. (2009). The Territories of Indonesia. UK, Routledge.

Bulletin of International News (1941). the broadcast of Commander-in-Chief in Batavia: 2037.

Cady, J. F. (1964). South East Asia its Historical Development. New York, McGraw Hill.

Cesar, C. (1999). "Spirit of Comfort Women Remains Intact." The Lancet **353**.

Coomaraswamy, R. (1997). Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and Consequences, Ms. Radhuka Coomaraswamy, in accordance

with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1994/45: Report on the mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea and Japan on the issue of military sexual slavery in wartime, The United Nations.

D, v. V. (1963). De Japanse Interneringskampen Voor Burgers Gedurende de Tweede Wereldoorlog (Japanese Civil Internment Camps During the Second World War).

Groningen, J.B. Walter.

De Jong, L. (1991). Pendudukan Jepang di Indonesia: Suatu ungkapan berdasarkan Dokumentasi Pemerintah Belanda. Jakarta, Kesaint Blanc.

De Jong, L. (2002). The Collapse of a Colonial Society: The Dutch in Indonesia.

Leiden, KITLV Press.

Department of Defense Library (1919). Military Report on the Netherland's Possessions in the East Indies. General Staff of War Office.

Department van Economische Zaken (1938). Volkstelling 1930-1936 (Population Census 1930-1936) Economische Zaken. Batavia. **8.**

Dewi, I. H. M. (2014). "Gender and the Triangle of Violence : Who was the Indonesian Jugun lanfu (Comfort Women)." Retrieved February 17, 2014, from <http://www.internationalpeaceandconflict.org/profiles/blogs/gender-and-the-triangle-violence-who-was-the-indonesian-jugun#.UxHpzXZ22PU>.

Dickinson, F. R. (2013). World War I and the Triumph of a New Japan, 1919-1930.

Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Dolgopol, U. (2008). Marking the Mind: A History of Memory. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.



- Dolgopol, U. P., Snehal (1994). "Comfort Women: An Unfinished Ordeal " Int'l Communication of Jurists **11**.
- Dumberry, P. (2007). State Succession to International Responsibility. Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff.
- Dunn, W. J. (1988). Pacific Microphone. The United States, Texas A&M University Military History Series.
- Dutch Foreign Office at DEI (1941). Cypher from Batavia, N.E. Indies to Foreign Office. Dutch East Indies.
- Egan, I. (2010). "The Rape of Nanking." CLIO: A Journal for Students of History in the Australian Capital Territory.
- Frederic, W. H., & Robert L. Vondon (2001). Area Handbook Series: Indonesia Country Study – 6th Edition. Washington D.C., U.S Government Printing Office.
- Fumio, M. (1944). Gunsei Shubo' (Notes on the Military Administration), Gunsei Shiryo, No. 90. Memo Unpublished. Tokyo, Defence Agency Library.
- Gin, O. K. (2004). Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia from Angkor Wat to East Timor. California, ABC-CLIO.
- Gin, O. K. (2011). The Japanese Occupation of Borneo, 1941–1945. New York, Routledge.
- Gin, O. K. (2013). Post-War Bornei 1945-1950: Nationalism, Empire, and State-Building. New York, Routledge.

Gruhl, W. (2007). Imperial Japan's World War Two: 1931 - 1945. New Jersey, Transaction Publisher.

Haller-Trost, R. (1995). "The Territorial Dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia over Pulau Sipadan and Pulau Ligitan in the Celebes Sea: A Study in International Law." International Boundaries Research Unit Boundary and Territory Briefing 2.

Head of the Department of Industry (1945). Resume van de Verklaring van den HeerSangyoobutyooddo. 14/4-2065' [Summary of the Explanation by the on 14 April 1945].

Henry, N. (2013). "Memory of an Injustice: The Comfort Women and the Legacy of the Tokyo Trial." Asian Studies Review 37.

Hindra, E. (2010). "Indonesian Survivors from West Java." Retrieved January 18, 2015, from <http://www.geocities.ws/jugunianfuindonesia/albumindonesia.html>.

Hindra, E. (2010). "Memorabilia lanjo in Semarang (Memory of lanjo in Central Java)." Retrieved January 18, 2015, from <http://www.geocities.ws/jugunianfuindonesia/jejaksumirah.html>.

Höjjer, B. (2011). "Social Representations Theory: A New Theory for Media Research." Journal of Nordicom Review 32 No. 2.

Horton, W. B. (2010). "Pramoedya and the Comfort Women of Buru: A Textual Analysis of Perawan Remaja dalam Cengkraman Militer (Teenage Virgins in the Grasp of the Military)." Journal of Asia-Pasific Studies Waseda University Tokyo.

Hortreiter, I. (2001). Women's Human Rights in Southeast Asia. Bangkok, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES).

Hsu, Y. P. (1993). "Comfort Women From Korea: Japan's World War II Sex Slaves and the Legitimacy of Their Claims for Reparations." Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 2.

Ikatan Perempuan Positif Indonesia (2012). "Pendokumentasian Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan Dengan HIV." Retrieved December 23, 2014, from <http://www.ippi.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Laporan-Survey-Kekerasan-IPPI-20121.pdf>.

Indonesian Women National Committee of Violence Against Women (2010). A Report of 2010. Jakarta, Indonesian Women National Committee of Violence Against Women,.

Ishaya, R. (1993). Indonesian women's organizations during the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945. Amsterdam, Universiteit van Amsterdam.

Ishida, M. Y. (2005). Toward Peace: War Responsibility, Postwar Compensation, and Peace movements and Education in Japan. Lincoln, Center for US-Japan Comparative Social Studies.

Jackson, D. (1989). Java Nightmare. Padstow, Grafton Books.

Jansse, H. (2010). Schaamte en onschuld. Jakarta.

Jones, T. (1977). Leiden, KITLV.

Jong, J. d. (1998). De Waaier van Het Fortuin, de Nederlanders in de Indonesisch Archipel (1595 - 1950). the Hague, the Hague University Press.

Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1948). International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) (1948a) with Justice Erima Harvey Northcroft Tokyo War Crimes Trial Collection, University of Canterbury, New Zealand,.

Kimm Chin and Kim, S. S. (1998). Delayed Justice: The Case of the Japanese Imperial Military Sex Slaves. Los Angeles, UCLA.

Klam, J. (2003). The Rise of Japan and Pearl Harbor. Minnesota, Byron Press.

Kurasawa, A. (1987). "Propaganda Media on Java Under the Japanese 1942 - 1945, Southeast Asia Program Publications at Cornell University." JSTOR.

Lee, L. E. (1991). World War II: Crucible of Contemporary World, Commentary and Readings. New York, ME Sharpe.

Lee, S. R. (1997). "Comforting the Comfort Women: Who Can Make Japan Pay ?". Retrieved February 23, 2014, from <https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/articles/volume24/issue2/Lee24U.Pa.J.Int%27IEcon.L.509%282003%29.pdf>.

Lockard, C. A. (1987). From Kampung to City: A Social history of Kuching, Malaysia, 1820–1970. Ohio, Ohio University.

Martyn, E. (2005). Women's Movement in Postcolonial Indonesia: Gender and Nation in a New Democracy. London, Routledge.

Mckellar, R. (2011). Target of Opportunity and Other War Stories. Bloomington, Author House.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (1958). Agreed Minutes of the Formal Negotiations on the Treaty of Peace Between the Republic of Indonesia and Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. Jakarta.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (1958). Agreement on Reparation Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and Japan c. Treaty of Peace between Republic of Indonesia and Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. Jakarta.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (1958). The Charter of Ratified Agreement on Treaty of Peace between Republic of Indonesia and Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. Jakarta.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (1958). Protocol Between The Government of The Republic of Indonesia and Japan Relating to Settlement of the Claims with Respect to Balances in the Former Clearing Accounts and Other Accounts. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. Jakarta.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (1958). Summary of Discussions Between the Indonesian and Japanese Panels on the Drafting of the Treaty of Peace, Reparations Agreement, Protocol Relating to Settlement of the Trade Debts, Exchange of Notes on Economic Cooperation and Other Relevant Documents Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. Jakarta.

Ministry of Social Affairs of Republic of Indonesia (2006). Document of Report on the Handle of Ex Jugun Ianfu by Indonesian Government in Cooperation with Asian Women's Fund (AWF). D. G. f. S. S. a. R. Directorate of Social Service for Elderly. Jakarta.

Moscovici, S. (1984). The Phenomenon of Social Representations. Social Representations. R. M. F. S. Moscovici. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Murphy, S. (1996). Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania University Press.

Nabel (2011). "Jugun lanfu." Retrieved January 18, 2015, from <http://old.nabble.com/Jugun-lanfu,-Pemuas-Nafsu-Sex,-Sepenggal-Kisah-Sedih-!-td17337861.html>.

Naval Intelligence Division of the Admiralty (1944). Netherlands East Indies Naval Intelligence Division. London. 2.

Naval Staff – Admiralty (1920). A Manual of Netherlands India (Dutch East Indies), Geographical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division. H.M Stationery Office. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Netherlands Institute for War Documentation. "The Allies." Retrieved January 10, 2015, from <http://www.kamparchieven.nl/>.

Nitisastro, W. (1970). Population Trends in Indonesia. the United States, Cornell University.

Noakes, N. L. (1950). Sarawak and Brunei: A Report on the 1947 Population Census. Kuching, Government Printing Office.

O’Herne, J. R. (1994). 50 Years of Silence. Sydney, Tom Thompson.

Parker , K. J. F. C. (1999). Reparations: a Legal Analysis. When Sorry isn't Enough: the Controversy over Apologies and Reparations for Human Injustice. R. L. and R. L. Brooks. New York, New York University Press.

Perez, L. G. (2013). Japan at War: an Encyclopedia. California, CLIO.

Poesponegoro, M. D. N., Nugroho (1992). Sejarah Nasional Indonesia: Zaman Jepang dan Zaman Republik Indonesia (National History of Indonesia: the Japanese Period and Republic Period). Jakarta, Balai Pustaka.

Prasetyaju, R. A. (2010). "Jugun lanfu at a Glance." Retrieved February 23, 2014, from [http://www.theglobalreview.com/content\\_detail.php?lang=en&id=3112&type=99#.UxKvEnZ22PU](http://www.theglobalreview.com/content_detail.php?lang=en&id=3112&type=99#.UxKvEnZ22PU).

Raben, R. (1998). *Arbeid voor Groot-Asie: Indonesische Koelies in de Buitengewesten, 1942-1945* (Labour for Great Asia: Indonesian Coolies in the Outer Islands, 1942-1945). *Oorlogsdocumentatie '40-'45: Negende Jaarboek van het Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie*. G. e. a. Aalders. Amsterdam, Walburg Press.

Reece, B. (1998). *Masa Jepun: Sarawak under the Japanese 1941-1945*. Kuching, Sarawak Literary Society.

Reid, A. O., Akira (1986). *The Japanese Experience in Indonesia: Selected Memoirs in 1942 - 1945*. Ohio, Ohio University Press.

Reyes, G. J., Gerard A (2011). *Handbook of International Disaster Psychology* Westport Praeger Publishers.

Ricklefs, M. C. (1986). "Some Statistical Evidence on Javanese Social, Economic and Demographic History in the Later Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries." *Modern Asian Studies Journal* 20-1.

Ricklefs, M. C. (1993). *A History of Modern Indonesia Since C. 1300*, Stanford University Press.

Ricklefs, M. C. (2008). *A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200 - Fourth Edition*. New York, Palgrave MacMillan.

Rottman, G. L. (2002). *World War II Pacific Island Guide: A Geo-Military Study*. Westport, Green Wood Press.

Sandoz, Y. (2009). "The History of the Grave Breaches Regime." Journal of International Criminal Justice **7**.

Santi (2014). "Momoye." Retrieved January 18, 2015, from <http://santijehannanda.wordpress.com/2014/06/29/momoye-kisah-seorang-jugun-ianfu/>.

Sato, S. (1994). War, Nationalism, and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942 – 1945. Singapore, Chong Moh Printing Ltd.

Sato, S. (2000). "Labor Relations in Japanese Occupied Indonesia." the CLARA Programme Australia **8**.

Savitri, D. (2010). "Kejahatan Perang oleh Jepang: Studi Kasus Terhadap Jugun-Ianfu Sebagai Hegemoni Kebudayaan di Indonesia Periode 1942 – 1945 (The Japanese War Crimes: A Case Study of Jugun Ianfu as a Cultural Hegemony in Indonesia 1942-1945)." Indonesian Criminology Journal **6**.

Schaffer, K. S., Sidonie (2004). Human Rights and Narrated Lives: The Ethics of Recognition. New York, Palgrave MacMillan.

Schmidt, D. A. (2000). Ianfu: The Comfort Women of the Japanese Imperial Army of the Pasific War. New York, Edwin Mellen Press.

Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs (1940). Cablegram to the Australian Prime Minister's Department. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. London.

Shiraishi, S. S., Takashi (1993). The Japanese in Colonial Southeast Asia: An Overview. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.



Simmons, J. S. (2013). India and the Far East: A Geography of Disease and Sanitation. The United Kingdom, Butterworth-Heinemann.

Soetanto, S. (2011). "Indonesian Nationalism and the Japanese Occupation during World War II." the Journal of Sophia Asian Studies No. 19.

Stoler, A. (1989). Rethinking Colonial Categories', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31:1.

Suryochondro, S. (1984). Potret pergerakan wanita di Indonesia (The Portrait of Women Movements in Indonesia). Jakarta, Rajawali.

Tarling, Nicholas. (2004). Nationalism in Southeast Asia. Routledge, New York.

Tanaka, Y. (1996). Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II. Colorado, Westview Press.

Tempo Magazine Indonesia (2005). Pemerintah Didesak Selesaikan Kasus Jugun Ianfu. Tempo Magazine Indonesia. Jakarta.

The Global Network of Women Peace Builder. "Women in Conflict." Retrieved September 28, 2013, from [The UN Women. "Briefs on Women's Human Rights in the ASEAN Region: Violence Against Women." Retrieved September 23, 2013, from \[http://cedawseasia.org/docs/issue\\\_brief/Issue\\\_Brief\\\_Violence%20Against%20Women.pdf\]\(http://cedawseasia.org/docs/issue\_brief/Issue\_Brief\_Violence%20Against%20Women.pdf\).](http://www.gnwp.org/written-statement-submitted-to-<u>cedaw-on-the-occasion-of-the-general-discussion-on-women-in-conflict-and-post-conflict-situations</u></a>.</p>
</div>
<div data-bbox=)

The UN Women. "Declarations, Reservations and Objections to CEDAW." Retrieved September 28, 2013, from <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm>.

Tierney, H. (1999). *Women's Studies Encyclopedia*. Westport, Greenwood Press.

Tjaden, P. (2005). "Defining and measuring violence against women: Background, issues, and recommendations." Retrieved September 28, 2013, from <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw-stat-2005/docs/expert-papers/Tjaden.pdf>.

Toer, P. A. (2001). Perawan Remaja dalam Cengkraman Militer (Teenage Virgins in the Grasp of the Military). Jakarta, Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia.

van Imhoff, E. B., Gijs (2004). "A Demographic History of the Indo-Dutch Population 1930-2001." Journal of Population Research **21**.

van Poelgeest, B. (1994). "Report of a Study of Dutch Government Documents on the Forced Prostitution of Dutch Women in the Dutch East Indies during the Japanese Occupation." Retrieved January 9, 2015, from <http://www.awf.or.jp/pdf/0205.pdf>.

Vanderweert, S. J. (2001). "Seeking Justice for Comfort Women: Without an International Criminal Court, Suits Brought by World War II Sex Slaves of the Japanese Army May Find Their Best Hope of Success in U.S Federal Courts." 27 N.C. J. Int'l L. & COM. Reg.

Wagner, W. (1995). "Description, Explanation, and Method in Social Representation Research." Retrieved September 28, 2014, from [http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/psr/PSR1995/4\\_1995Wagne.pdf](http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/psr/PSR1995/4_1995Wagne.pdf).

Warren, J. F. (1993). Ah Ku and Karayuki- san: Prostitution in Singapore 1870–1940. Singapore, Oxford University Press.

Watkins, T. (2011). "The Soekarno Era of Indonesian History." Retrieved January 10, 2015, from <http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/indonesia1.htm>.

Witton, P. (2003). Indonesia. Melbourne, Lonely Planet.

Women's Active Museum on War and Peace (WAM) (2000). Documentary evidence for Indonesia from People Tribunal in Tokyo in 2000. W. University. Tokyo.

World Health Organization's (WHO). "Violence Against Women." Retrieved September 17, 2013, from <http://www.who.int/gender/violence/v4.pdf>.

Yamamoto, M. (2000). Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. London, Westport.



## APPENDIX

The complete list of documentary evidence for Indonesia from People Tribunal in Tokyo in 2000 can be seen below:

### 1. The 12 official documents from the Japanese Army

Name of Documentary Evidence	Concerning about	Date of Issue
Document #1 <i>Tai-den</i> No. 602 (Taiwan Army Telegram No. 602)	Passage for personnel to be dispatched to the South.	March 12, 1942
Document #2 <i>Riku-a-mitsu</i> No. 188 (Secret Telegram of the Army No. 188)	Passage for personnel to be dispatched to the South.	March 16, 1942
Document #3 <i>Tai-den</i> No. 935 (Taiwan Army Telegram No. 935)	Passage for people to be dispatched to the South.	June 13, 1942
Document #4 <i>Riku-a-mitsu</i> No. 1398 (Secret Telegram of the Army No. 1398)	The Procedures of the Transport.	November 18, 1942
Document #5 <i>Riku-a-mitsu</i> No. 1283 (Secret Telegram of the Army No. 1238)	The Mode of Procedure of the Advance of Army Related Personnel into the Occupied Southern Areas (Including Hongkong).	April 23, 1942
Document #6 War Diary of the 1 <sup>st</sup> company of the 45 <sup>th</sup> Field Anti-aircraft Gun Batallion	Military's administration of comfort stations.	April 3, 1942 and May 14, 1942
Document #7 The Diary of KinbaraSetsuzo, vol.1, No.3, "c"	Inspection from military doctor to comfort stations.	July 26, 1941

(10 <sup>th</sup> to 28 <sup>th</sup> of July, 1941)		
Document #8 War time history documents and condition at the end of the war of the 48 <sup>th</sup> division	Confirmation of the fact that records on comfort employees in DEI are included in the war time history of the army and they had to be disposed.	July 5, 1946
Document #9 Secret Announcement No. 26 of South-west Area Fleet	Comfort matters and comfort facilities.	December 20, 1944
Document #10 <i>Heibi-4-Kimitsu</i> No. 137 (Secret Telegram of 4 <sup>th</sup> Section, Naval Preparation Bureau No. 137), Addressed to Rear Admiral Nakamura Toshihisa (Vice Admiral as of November 1942), Chief of Staff of the South-west Area Fleet	Proprietors of the comfort stations.	May 30, 1942
Document #11 Report on the repatriation of the Second Repatriation Squad	Person responsible for comfort stations in Southern Celebes.	June 20, 1946
Document #12 The case of Semarang trial at the temporary Court martial in Batavia	Recruitment from Dutch internment camps and were made comfort women.	1995

## 2. The 8 official memoirs from the Japanese Army

Title of Document / Author	Concerning about	Date of Issue
Document #13 <i>Niju-san Sai de Sanzennin no Soushikikan</i> (23 years old, commander of 3000	The Military set up comfort stations in the areas of Palau and Davao of Philippines, and	June, 1978

men)/ Nakasone Yasuhiro (Lieutenant Junior grade of Accounting of the Navy, later became a Lieutenant and Prime Minister after the war	Balikpapan (Borneo), DEI.	
Document #14 <i>OuroKamakuramaru no niju-go nichikan</i> (25 days on Kamakuramaru ship) / Hata Eiichi (Borneo Labor Section, General affairs Department, Navy administration of Borneo)	The job of setting up and opening comfort stations fell under the jurisdiction of the “minsei-bu”, military administration by the Navy in Balikpapan.	August 15, 1977
Document #15 <i>Celebes Senki</i> (Commentaries on the Battle of Celebes) / Okumura Akira (The 37 <sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment of 1942 (Showa 17), Second Lieutenant at the war’s end)	Military conducted recruitment and a medical examination of comfort women, and built comfort station in Celebes.	1974
Document #16 The document of the Center for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility, No. 503 / Center for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility	Military construction party and medical unit were directly involved with the opening of comfort stations in Kupang in East Timor	1982
Document #17 <i>Kaigun Shukei Taisa no Shuki</i> (Memoirs of navy captain of accounting) / Iwata Seiji (Chief of the 1 <sup>st</sup> section, Interdance Department, Navy in Osaka /	The first thing that the Navy did was to set up comfort stations when occupying Java Island	1979

Captain at the war's end)		
Document #18 <i>Ianfu to heitai</i> (Comfort Women and the Soldiers) / Akimoto Minoru (the 48 <sup>th</sup> brigade, the 48 <sup>th</sup> Division, Field Heavy Artillery Battalion Leading Privaye from December 22, 1942 until the lost of war)	Korean women were placed in comfort stations in DEI	1988
Document #19 <i>NakimushiGunyiMonogatari</i> (A Story of a Tear Driven Military Doctor) / Tanaka Yasuyosi, Military Doctor, the 432 <sup>nd</sup> Independent Infantry Battalion	The involvement of the Chief of Staff of the army to set up comfort stations in Borneo (Api and Kuching)	1980
Document #20 <i>LobangTengohKucil Doctor to naru</i> (LobangTengoh becomes a Kucil Doctor) / KadlmaYoshihide (worked at the First Field Hospital of the 2 <sup>nd</sup> Imperial Guard Division)	Military doctor was conducting a venereal disease examination in comfort station in Medan, Sumatra Island.	1980

### 3. The 2 recorded testimony of witnesses and 2 evidences of the survivors

Name of Witness	Qualification of Witness	Date of Testimony
Document #21 / AnangTanjungAspan (74 years old by year 2000, he was about sixteen years old when Japanese occupied the area)	Neighbor of the former comfort station of the Japanese Army on SimpangTerawan Street, Banjarmasin, Borneo Island	September 20, 2000

Document#22 / Muhammad Sukri (78 years old by year 2000)	Neighbor of the former comfort station of the Japanese Army on SimpangTerawan Street, Banjarmasin, Borneo Island	September 20, 2000
--	--	--------------------

#### 4. The testimony of the survivors

Name of Survivor	Comfort Station Location	Date of Recording
Document #23 / Mardiyem	Borneo Island	September 19 2000
Document#24 / Suhanah	Java Island	September 20, 2000
Document of indictment from the Netherlands for Ms. Ruff-O-Harne	Java Island	December 10, 2000

Based on the official documents from the Japanese Army and testimony from the Japanese soldiers, it is clearly stated that the establishment of comfort stations in Java and Borneo Island were included in Japanese Army military strategy before occupying Dutch East Indies, as follow:

#### 5. Special Documents to Establish *Ianjo*

Name of Documentary Evidence	Character of the Document	Citation
Document #1 <i>Tai-den</i> No. 602	It is a confidential telegram from	“In regard to the



<p>(Taiwan Army Telegram No. 602)</p>	<p>the commander of the Taiwan Army to the War Minister, upon the request of the Southern Army requesting travel permits for proprietors of comfort stations. It shows that the military police investigated and selected comfort station proprietors and the Japanese Army granted them with travel permits</p>	<p>Secret Telegram of Army No. 63, we've been asked by the Southern Army General Command to dispatch as soon as possible 50 native comfort women to Borneo. As per Secret Telegram of Army No. 623, we request travel permits for the 3 operators who have been investigated and selected by the military police."</p>
<p>Document #12 The case of Semarang trial at the temporary Court martial in Batavia</p>	<p>It is an analysis document of Prof. Yoshimi on the case of Semarang trial t the temporary Court in Batavia on February 24, 1948 for Dutch <i>ianfu</i>. The analysis makes clear that permission from the headquarter of the 16<sup>th</sup> army was required to establish comfort stations and that the commander of the 16<sup>th</sup> army was able to open or close comfort stations at any time if he so wished.</p>	<p>"Commander of the Officer Candidate Corps who was called on to take charge of the establishment of comfort stations by the administrator of the district of Semarang, requested from the 16<sup>th</sup> Army Headquarters (commanded by Lt. General Harada umaichi) to take girls fom the (Dutch) internment camps as comfort women."</p>
<p>Document #13 <i>Niju-san Sai de Sanzennin no Soushikikan</i> (23</p>	<p>It shows that the military set up comfort stations in the areas</p>	<p>"Our fleet arrived in Palau, at the same</p>

<p>years old, commander of 3000 men)/ Nakasone Yasuhiro (Lieutenant Junior grade of Accounting of the Navy, later became a Lieutenant and Prime Minister after the war</p>	<p>Balikpapan, Borneo Island.</p>	<p>time as the war broke out on December 8<sup>th</sup> our fleet went into Davao in the Philippines. It was when our fleet entered the third landing place, Balikpapan. Before long, there were soldiers and naval civilian employees who attacked local women or who gave themselves over to gambling. For these men, I went to great lengths and even built comfort stations. In fact, they packed into them like sardines.”</p>
<p>Document #14 <i>OuroKamakuramaru no niju-go nichikan</i> (25 days on Kamakuramaru ship) / Hata Eiichi (Borneo Labor Section, General affairs Department, Navy administration of Borneo)</p>	<p>It shows that the job of setting up and opening comfort stations fell under the jurisdiction of the “minsei-bu”, military administration by the Navy in Balikpapan.</p>	<p>“I went on board the Kamakuramaru at Yokohama harbor on November 1<sup>st</sup>, 1942 and arrived in the final destination, Balikpapan, on November 25<sup>th</sup>. Around that time I got notice that Korean prostitute is coming from the inland, so I waited since they can communicate in</p>

		Japanese. I was involved from setting up through the opening of it, because of the jurisdiction matter.”
Document #17 <i>Kaigun Shukei Taisa no Shuki</i> (Memoirs of navy captain of accounting) / Iwata Seiji (Chief of the 1 <sup>st</sup> section, Interdand Department, Navy in Osaka / Captain at the war’s end)	It shows that the first thing that the Navy did was to set up comfort stations when occupying Java Island	“Life in the occupied land of Java. Occupational force first set up a comfort station holding girls as military employees, as a countermeasure of sexual intercourse.”
Document #19 <i>Nakimushi Gunyi Monogatari</i> (A Story of a Tear Driven Military Doctor) / Tanaka Yasuyosi, Military Doctor, the 432 <sup>nd</sup> Independent Infantry Battalion	It shows the involvement of the Chief of Staff of the army to set up comfort stations in Borneo (Api and Kuching)	“Other than Japanese girls, there were girls from Korea and Taiwan, and sometimes there were girls from Island of Java.”
Testimony document #21 from a witness named Anang Tanjung Aspan (74 years old by year 2000, he was about sixteen years old when Japanese occupied the area)	Testimony: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The building on Simpan Terawan street, now renovated into a market, was built and controlled by the Japanese Military during Japanese occupation.</li> <li>2. Only the soldiers with star marks and anchor marks were permitted to enter.</li> <li>3. <i>Kempeitai</i> (Military Police) came over once in a while and watch over the place.</li> <li>4. Inside the place, women were kept and were having sex.</li> <li>5. Heard girls inside of the building were crying and screaming.</li> </ol>	
Testimony document #22	Testimony:	

from a witness named Muhammad Sukri (78 years old by year 2000)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Heard from Japanese soldiers that <i>Minseibu</i> (Japanese government) gave permission to Japanese military to run the comfort station.</li> <li>2. Japanese military police was patrolling around the house and gave a report every two hours.</li> </ol>
---	---

Based on the official documents from the Japanese Army and testimony from the Japanese soldiers, it is clearly stated that the establishment of comfort stations in Java and Borneo Island were systematically organized and managed by the Japanese Army, as follow:

#### 6. Special Documents to Manage *Ianjo*

Name of Documentary Evidence	Character of the Document	Citation
Document #6 War Diary of the 1 <sup>st</sup> company of the 45 <sup>th</sup> Field Anti-aircraft Gun Battalion	The document shows the military administration of comfort stations that covers the opening of comfort station, its place, the prices, the division of usage condoms according to hygienic condition of the comfort women, method, warnings, times, and a temporary closure of a comfort station, in any case of contagious diseases are found.	<p>“the comfort station to be opened tomorrow and the following points are to be kept:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The South barrack to the East of the 47<sup>th</sup> regiment’s officers must pay 2 yen/hour.</li> <li>2. Commissioned officers must pay 15 yen/hour.</li> <li>3. Condoms absolutely have to be paid.</li> <li>4. Hygienic condition of the comfort women is indicated by cloths and they must pay for health checking.</li> <li>5. The usage of comfort station is from 9 a.m to 4</li> </ol>

		p.m and for commissioned officers from 4 p.m to 9 p.m.”
Document #7 The Diary of Kinbara Setsuzo, vol.1, No.3, “c” (10 <sup>th</sup> to 28 <sup>th</sup> of July, 1941)	It is précis writing of the day book of Kinbara Setsuzo, a chief of Medical section, Medical Bureau of War Ministry from November 9, 1941 to September 11, 1943. Military doctor who inspected DEI reports that it is necessary that village headmen be assigned the task of building comfort stations.	“It is necessary that we take care to conduct ourselves in such way as to cultivate a sense of trust among the native inhabitants that we love them and are acting sincerely toward them. Even though there are many Muslims who practice polygamy, their sense of virtue is strong. We must be extremely careful to give them no reasons to distrust the discipline of the Japanese Army, by committing rapes, for example. (...) It is necessary that village headmen be assigned the task of building comfort stations and strictly administering syphilis tests.”
Document #9 Secret Announcement No. 26 of South-west Area Fleet	Official document which shows that among the duties of the adjutant under the chief of staff were comfort matters and comfort facilities.	“Adjutant Lieutenant Shima be responsible to handle relief/comfort and comfort facilities”
Document #10 <i>Heibi-4-Kimitsu</i> No. 137 (Secret Telegram of 4 <sup>th</sup> Section, Naval Preparation Bureau	This is a confidential telegram sent to the chief of staff to the commander of the southwest area fleet. It shows that the	“Necessary facilities and equipment are: 1) lodging (the South West Fleet shall lend a temporary lodging

<p>No. 137), Addressed to Rear Admiral Nakamura Toshihisa (Vice Admiral as of November 1942), Chief of Staff of the South-west Area Fleet</p>	<p>fleet was involved with the proprietors of the comfort stations regarding the matters on the placement of facilities and goods for, transportation of the comfort women and management of comfort stations in DEI including Balikpapan and Malaya.</p>	<p>(to proprietors of the comfort stations) and shall sell (the lodging) off (to the agents) upon request in the future), 2) bedding (the proprietors shall prepare futon, sheets, pajamas, blankets, mosquito nets, and other materials, and the authority (the Southwest Area Fleet) will help the agent obtain them upon request), 3) foods, drinks, and other materials (the comfort station agents shall adequately prepare foods, drinks, and other materials , and the authority (the Southwest Area Fleet) will help the agent obtain them upon request), 4) sanitary goods (The Fleet shall prepare condoms for its military personnel and the comfort station agents shall prepare condoms.</p>
---	---	---

## VITA

The writer is currently a master-degree student of Southeast Asian Studies Program at Chulalongkorn University.

She was born in Jakarta on January 9th, 1987 and got her bachelor degree from the Faculty of Philosophy, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

As for her academic passion, she wrote many issues concerning Human Rights with particular interest on Women's Rights in Southeast Asia.

