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
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**SIAMESE JUNK TRADE WITH JAPAN  
FROM THE 17TH TO THE EARLY 18TH CENTURY**



**Miss Naoko Iioka**

**A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of Master of Arts in Thai Studies**

**Program of Thai Studies**

**Faculty of Arts**

**Chulalongkorn University**

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TO THE EARLY 18<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY

By: Naoko Iioka

Department: Thai Studies Center

Thesis Advisor: Dhiravat na Pombejra, Ph.D.

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นาโอโกะ อีอิโอะกะ : การค้าสำเภาของสยามและญี่ปุ่น จากคริสต์ศตวรรษที่ 17 ถึงต้นคริสต์ศตวรรษ  
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วิทยานิพนธ์เรื่องนี้มีความมุ่งหมายที่จะพิจารณาประวัติศาสตร์การค้าของอยุธยาผ่านการศึกษาค้า  
ระหว่างสยามและญี่ปุ่นในระหว่างคริสต์ศตวรรษที่ 17 และต้นคริสต์ศตวรรษที่ 18 การค้าขายกับญี่ปุ่นนั้น  
มีความสำคัญยิ่งยวดต่อพระมหากษัตริย์สยาม เนื่องด้วยเป็นแหล่งที่มาของสินค้าและความมั่งคั่งอัน  
เอื้ออำนวยในการรักษาความมั่นคงของอาณาจักร เพื่อที่จะให้เกิดความเข้าใจในความสัมพันธ์  
ทางการค้าระหว่างสยามและญี่ปุ่นมากขึ้นนั้น ในวิทยานิพนธ์เรื่องนี้ผู้เขียนได้เน้นศึกษาจาก  
ข้อมูลหลักฐานร่วมสมัยของญี่ปุ่น จากการศึกษาวิเคราะห์ข้อมูลหลักฐานต่างๆ ของญี่ปุ่น  
และจากงานที่ได้ศึกษามาก่อนหน้า ผู้เขียนได้ทำการวิเคราะห์ในส่วนต่างๆ ดังนี้ ส่วนที่หนึ่ง  
ศึกษาลักษณะของการค้าสำเภาของสยาม โดยเปรียบเทียบกับการค้าสำเภาของจีน  
และเมืองท่าอื่นๆ ในเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ และในส่วนที่สอง ศึกษาประวัติศาสตร์การค้า  
ระหว่างสยามและญี่ปุ่นจากปี ค.ศ. 1604 ถึง ค.ศ. 1728



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Naoko HOKA: Siamese Junk Trade with Japan from the 17<sup>th</sup> to the Early 18<sup>th</sup> Century. Thesis Advisor: Dhiravat na Pombejra, Ph. D.

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This thesis attempts to view the commercial history of the Ayutthaya kingdom through the study of the Siamese-Japanese trade during the seventeenth century and early eighteenth century. The Japan trade was important for the Siamese kings as it provided them with goods and wealth that enabled them to maintain the kingdom. In order to obtain a better understanding of the commercial relationship between Siam and Japan, this thesis closely looks at Japanese contemporary materials. After an analysis of these Japanese materials and previous studies, Part One explores the characteristics of Siamese crown junks, compared with the junks from Chinese and other Southeast Asian ports. Part Two gives a chronological history of the Siamese-Japanese trade from 1604 to 1728.

Program Thai Studies

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## CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT (English)	iii
ABSTRACT (Thai)	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	v
CONTENTS .....	ix
EDITORIAL METHOD .....	x
LIST OF TABLES .....	xii
INTRODUCTION .....	1
PART ONE CROWN TRADE	
Chapter	
1. JAPANESE SOURCES .....	6
Works on Geography .....	7
Works by Chinese Interpreters .....	8
Secondary Sources .....	20
2. "CROWN JUNKS" AND CHINESE JUNKS:	
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS .....	22
Previous Studies .....	23
<i>Senra-sen</i> .....	27
Testimonies of the Chaptains .....	29
3. CHARACTERISTICS OF SIAMESE JUNKS .....	34
The Size of Junks .....	37
The Siamese Onboard .....	39
The Shipping Routes .....	40
Place of Departure .....	46
Ships from Non-Siamese Ports .....	48
Ports of Call .....	52
Return Voyage .....	55
Cultural Exchange .....	58
4. THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE TRADE .....	60
The Chinese Merchants .....	61
The Siamese Officers .....	69
The Moor Traders .....	72
The Japanese Residents in Siam .....	74

Chapter	Page
PART TWO HISTORY OF SIAMESE-JAPANESE TRADE, 1604-1728	
5. HISTORY OF SIAMESE JUNK TRADE WITH JAPAN, 1604-1656 .....	80
Development of Diplomatic Relationship, 1604-1629..	80
Pre-Seventeenth Century Relations .....	80
Ieyasu's Missives .....	82
King Songtham's Embassies .....	84
Development of Commercial Relationship, 1604-1629.	88
Vermillion Seal Ships .....	88
<i>Sakoku-rei</i> .....	29
King Prasatthong's Efforts to Restore Relations .....	93
The Dutch Involvement in Siamese-Japanese Trade ...	96
6. HISTORY OF SIAMESE JUNK TRADE WITH JAPAN, 1656-1728 .....	106
Reopening of the Trade .....	106
The Junks under the Zheng Regime, 1661-1683 .....	108
The Trade Quotas 1685 and 1689 .....	110
King Phetracha, 1688-1609 .....	115
King Sua, 1703-1709 .....	122
King Thaisa and the <i>Shinpai</i> .....	123
CONCLUSION .....	129
REFERENCES .....	131
BIOGRAPHY .....	146

สถาบันวิทยบริการ  
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

## EDITORIAL METHOD

Since this thesis is concerned with peoples and events in several countries, there are inevitable problems in the identification of people and places not native to the Roman alphabet and in the dating of events and sources using a multiplicity of calendars. For convenience, this thesis will be reasonably consistent in the following choices.

### Romanization

This thesis adopts a modified version of the Thai Royal Academy's General System of Phonetic Transcription to romanize Thai names and words. Personal names are transcribing following the preferences of the individuals concerned whenever known.

The Japanese words, names, and titles are spelled in the Hepburn system throughout this thesis as it is considered the easiest to use insofar as pronunciation is concerned. Names and terms appearing in quotation from contemporary European sources retain their original spellings.

Chinese words and names are romanized according to the Basic Rules for Hanyu Pinyin Orthography promulgated by the State Languages Commission in 1988, except for place names like "Fukien" (Fujian) and "Amoy" (Xiamen), for which more widely recognized conventional English spelling is employed.

## Names

Thai names were referred to by their given name not their surname after the first references. Japanese and Chinese names uniformly appear in their original order, with the family name preceding the given name.

Pronunciation of Japanese names is frequently not apparent from the characters with which the name is written. However, since the Japanese scholars can simply write the Chinese characters for a name in their texts, they need not choose a pronunciation. The author verified pronunciations in standard reference works whenever possible.

## Dates

Siamese, Japanese, and Chinese used different lunar-solar calendars. Throughout this thesis, all dates are converted to a single system, the Gregorian calendar.

## LIST OF TABLES

Table	Pages
1. "Siamese Junks" Visiting Nagasaki, 1679-1728 .....	34
2. Siamese Crown Junks, 1679-1628 .....	35
3. Average Number of Crew .....	38
4. Southeast Asian Junks, 1674-1727 .....	39
5. Sailing Patterns of Siamese Junks .....	41
5. Junks Fitted out in Siam, 1679-1728 .....	43
6. Ports of Departure, 1679-1728 .....	45
7. Export Items of the Siamese Junks in 1690 .....	117
8. Siamese Junks Bound for Japan, 1679-1709 .....	124

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย



## INTRODUCTION

The renown of the Siamese kingdom of Ayutthaya (1351-1767) lies in its successful maritime trade, and Japanese sources prove to be consequential in the study of the economic history of this important era. Historical research about Siamese trade has rarely focused on Japan since the beginning decades of the seventeenth century as many believe that Siamese-Japanese trade became stagnated. This thesis thus attempts to give a narrative history of trade between Siam and Japan during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries through examining Japanese contemporary materials, such as *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki*, in order to examine the actual relationship between Siam and Japan during this time.<sup>1</sup>

Indeed, Japanese official documents are the most systematically collected contemporary records written in an Eastern language on Ayutthaya economic and trade history. While extant Siamese records from this period are extremely limited in both volume and variety, the Chinese accounts do not show much interest in commerce, emphasizing more the diplomatic aspects. In order to overcome the paucity of information on the Ayutthaya period, generations of Thai historians have

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<sup>1</sup> For convenience's sake, the Romanization of Japanese in this thesis is based upon contemporary pronunciation. Most of the Japanese sources gave the Chinese pronunciation along with the *Kanji* (Chinese characters). However, since there are many Chinese dialects and merchants came from different provinces, the pronunciations presented in each Japanese report and official record depended on the dialect of these merchants or writers. It might be extremely confusing to present all the different pronunciations here. As a matter of fact, it is impossible to know how the Japanese actually pronounced these Chinese terms in the seventeenth century.

been looking for contemporary materials outside of the country.<sup>2</sup>

Fortunately, there are abundant writings in Western languages. Dutch, French and English archival sources provide a considerable amount of data and information about the kingdom. Besides, Spanish, Portuguese, and Persian sources are also available.<sup>3</sup> As a consequence, initial historical researches on the Ayutthaya period were made by western scholars and depended on European sources. There are a number of works by western scholars that specifically deal with the relationship between Siam and European powers during the Ayutthaya period.<sup>4</sup> Yet, it is fair to say that the major concern of the early western accounts of Siamese history was the European activities in Siam rather than the history of Siam itself. These studies cannot help but showing a biased western point of view instead of seeing history from a Siamese viewpoint.

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<sup>2</sup>For instance, Suebsang Promboon, "Sino-Siamese Tributary Relations, 1282-1853" (Ph. D. diss., University of Michigan, 1977); Dhiravat na Pombejra, "A Political History of Siam under the Prasatthong Dynasty 1629-1688" (Ph. D. diss., University of London, 1984).

<sup>3</sup>For example, John O'Kane, trans., *The Ship of Sulaiman*, Persian Heritage Series, no. 11 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); Tome Pires, *The Sumu Oriental of Tome Pires*, trans. A. Cortesao, 2 vols. (London: Hakluyt Society, 1944).

<sup>4</sup>Several works done by western scholars specifically deal with the relationship between Siam and European powers during Ayutthaya period. For example, John Anderson, *English Intercourse with Siam in the Seventeenth Century* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1890; reprint Bangkok: Chalermisit, 1981); Maurice Collis, *Siamese White* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1936; reprint Bangkok: AVA Publishing House, 1996); E. W. Hutchinson, *Adventurers in Siam in the Seventeenth Century* (London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1940); E. W. Hutchinson, *1688 Revolution in Siam* (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1990); George Vinal Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth-Century Thailand*, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Special Report no. 16 (Illinois: Northern Illinois University, 1977).

On the other hand, there are only a few historians who focus on Siamese trade with the East Asian region.<sup>5</sup> Among them, Sarasin Virapol made a monumental study of the Chinese-Siamese trade between 1652 and 1858.<sup>6</sup> His study shows that the Chinese-Siamese trade was carried on by both the Siamese tributary missions to China and Chinese private junks and that the triangular trade between Siam, Japan, and China served the vital function of expanding the scope of Siamese crown trade since King Narai's reign (r. 1656-1688) up to the early eighteenth century.<sup>7</sup>

Despite the significance of the Siamese trade with Japan, this topic has been barely focused on as a subject in its own sake. This thesis, therefore, will present the Siamese-Japanese trade during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries in its historical context. The first part will first give a brief introduction of the extant historical records together with a review of previous studies and, then, the characters of the Siamese crown trade. The definition of the crown junk, the participants in the trade, as well as the trade routes between Siam and Japan will be analyzed.


<sup>5</sup>For instance, Suebsang Promboon, "Sino-Siamese Tributary Relations, 1282-1853," Ph. D. diss., University of Michigan, 1977; Jennifer Wayne Cushman, *Fields from the Sea: Chinese Junk Trade with Siam during the late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries*, Studies on Southeast Asia, no. 12 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

<sup>6</sup>Sarasin Virapol, *Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade, 1652-1853*, Harvard East Asian Monographs, no. 76 (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, 1977).

<sup>7</sup>Sarasin, *Tribute and Profit*, 58-69. For an analysis of the term "junk" see Anthony Reid, "The Rise and Fall of Sino-Javanese Shipping," in *Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia* (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1999), 57-60; also see Jennifer Wayne Cushman, *Fields from the Sea: Chinese Junk Trade with Siam during the late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries*, Studies on Southeast Asia, no. 12 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 43.

The second part of the thesis is a chronological survey of commercial intercourse between Siam and Japan from 1604 to 1728. As it is the changes of Japanese policy that drastically affected the trade throughout this period, the consequences of the transitions of Japan's trade system and their influence on Siamese crown trade will be analyzed. 1604 is taken as a beginning since Japan's vermilion seal trade system was established this year and, therefore, 1604 marked an official opening of the commercial relationship between the two countries. On the other hand, 1728 is taken as an end simply because of unavailability of the contemporary Japanese materials. Hereafter, the most important source *Tosen Fuscisu-gaki* does not provide any more information on Siamese junks.

This thesis intends neither to recount the history of Ayutthaya itself nor to reassess the western discourse of the Ayutthaya history but to offer an additional view of this important period in Thai history. Believing that a different perspective, however narrow it may be, could contribute to a more balanced understanding of history, this thesis hopes to view the commercial history of the Ayutthaya kingdom in its unique context through the study of the Siamese-Japanese trade during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.



**PART ONE**  
**CROWN TRADE**

สถาบันวิทยบริการ  
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

## CHAPTER 1

### JAPANESE SOURCES

Japanese historical writings on Ayutthaya are an important source in understanding the economic history as well as international relations of the kingdom. Of course, Japanese sources focus on their own interests. The subject of Siamese-Japanese intercourse has been examined from a Japan-centered point of view.<sup>1</sup> Tales of Yamada Nagamasa, one of the most famous and popular Japanese expatriates in Siam, have always been the center of the narrative.<sup>2</sup> Although few scholars were aware that Japanese documents could be useful for the historical study of China and Southeast Asia, it was not until the 1970s that Ishii Yoneo saw the Japanese materials in a new light. Unlike previous scholars, he tries to look at these sources in a Siamese context,<sup>3</sup> introducing them into the

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<sup>1</sup> Shinmura Izuru, "Senra no nihon-machi (Japanese settlement in Siam)," in *Zoku Nanban koki* (Miscellaneous thoughts on Southern countries) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1914); Uchida Ginzo, "Tokugawa-jidai ni okeru nihon to syamu to no kankei ni tsuite (Japan-Siam relations during the Tokugawa period)," *Zoku shiteki kenkyu* (Historical studies) (Tokyo: Fuzanbo, 1915), 155-190; Kawashima Motojiro, *Tokugawa jidai no kaigai boekika* (Japanese traders during the early Tokugawa period) (Tokyo: Jinyusya, 1917); Miki Sakae, *Nissen kotsu-shi* (A study of the history of intercourse between Japan and Siam) (Tokyo: Kokon Shoin, 1934); Gunji Kiichi, *Juhichi seiki ni okeru Nich-Sen kankei* (Japanese-Siamese relations in the seventeenth century) (Tokyo: Research Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1934); Gunji Kiichi, *Tokugawa jidai no nichu-sen kokko* (Siamese-Japanese relations during the Tokugawa era) (Tokyo: Toa Keizai Chosakyoku, 1938).

<sup>2</sup> For example, Miki Sakae, *Yamada Nagamasa* (Yamada Nagamasa) (Tokyo: Kokon Shoin, 1936).

<sup>3</sup> Ishii Yoneo, "Seventeenth Century Japanese Documents about Siam," *Journal of Siam Society* 59 (July 1971): 61-74; Ishii Yoneo, "Koshikokka toshitenno ayutaya (Ayutthaya as a port polity)," in *Tonan ajia sekai no rekishiteki isou*

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study of Southeast Asian history, and particularly that of Siam.<sup>4</sup> This thesis examines a variety of Japanese records and writings in order to study the economic history of the Ayutthaya kingdom. It is, thus, necessary to briefly introduce these works.

### Works on Geography

Even though the Japanese were prohibited from going abroad since the 1630s because of the Tokugawa *bakufu*'s *sakoku* policy, the so-called "seclusion policy" which is discussed in details later, the Japanese had never lost their interest in the rest of the world. Several geographical works on foreign countries were written and published in the late seventeenth century. The interest taken by the Japanese in Siam first appeared in these geographical studies of overseas countries, including the *Zoho ka-i tsushoko*.

### *Zoho Ka-i Tsushoko*

*Zoho ka-i tsushoko* (Revised studies on trade with China and other foreign countries) is considered to be one of the most monumental works written by a Japanese on the topography and commercial geography of foreign countries.<sup>5</sup> This work was originally published in 1708 in five volumes.

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(Historical dimensions of state and society), ed. Ishii Yoneo, Karashima Noboru and Wada Hisanori (Tokyo: Tokyodaigaku Shuppankai, 1992), 75-91.

<sup>4</sup> Ura Renichi, "Ka-i hentai kaidai: Tosen fusetsu-gaki no kenkyu (A study of Ka-i hentai)," in *Ka-i hentai*, Hayashi Harunobu and Hayashi Hoko, ed. Ura Renichi, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1958), 76-77.

<sup>5</sup> Nishikawa Joken, "Zoho ka-i tsushoko (Studies on trade with China and other foreign countries)," in *Nihonsuidoko, suidokaihen, zoho ka-i tsushoko* (Tokyo: privately printed, 1900; Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 1944), 61-194 (page citations are

Born in Nagasaki, the author Nishikawa Joken (1648-1724) was an astronomer and geographer.<sup>6</sup> His writing describes countries all over the world including Europe, Africa, America, Oceania, and Southeast Asia. The information in *Zoho ka-i tsushoko* contains the distance between these foreign countries and Japan, their local people, language, customs, weather, special products and so on. The accounts of Southeast Asian countries include a picture of a Siamese junk presented at the end of volume four.<sup>7</sup> Nishikawa's previous work *Ka-i tsushoko* (Studies on trade with China and other foreign countries), which first came out in 1695, has a similar description of Southeast Asian countries at that time. These two works are regarded as the summarization of Japanese knowledge about overseas affairs in the late seventeenth century.<sup>8</sup>

#### Works by Chinese Interpreters

Despite its xenophobic foreign policy, the rulers of Tokugawa *bakufu* never lost their interests in international affairs. Since 1640, the *bakufu* had three authorized open ports for foreign trade; Nagasaki for Chinese junks and Dutch ships, Tsushima for Korean ships, and Satsuma for Ryukyu ships. These trade channels were expected to serve as information

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to the reprint edition).

<sup>6</sup> Iijima Tadao, introduction to *Nihonsuidoko, suidokaiben, zoho ka-i tsushoko*, by Nishikawa (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1944), 3-7.

<sup>7</sup> Nishikawa, "Zoho ka-i tsushoko," 166-167.

<sup>8</sup> Wada Hisanori, "Development of Japanese Studies in Southeast Asian History," *Acta Asiatica*, no. 18 (1970): 96.

pipelines as well.<sup>9</sup> Through these three ports, the *bakufu* tried to gather information on political development in East Asia as much as possible. Owing to the great number of Chinese junks, it was through the Nagasaki routes that the greatest volume of information flowed into the Japanese government. In particular, the *bakufu* exclusively focused its intelligence activities on Chinese junks and Dutch ships at anchor.

### Interpreters at Nagasaki

Prior to the twentieth century, the Chinese language was one of the official languages used in international trade in East and Southeast Asia. As it was used in the Chinese-Japanese trade records and documents, Chinese interpreters were employed at the Japanese ports. Under the supervision of Nagasaki magistrates, Chinese interpreters actually engaged in trade themselves as well as intelligence activities. The information used in this study derives from the official documents made by these Chinese interpreters. Before introducing the works by the Chinese interpreters, a brief description of the role of the official interpreter at Nagasaki will be given.

The first *to-tsuji* (Chinese interpreter) was officially assigned in 1604.<sup>10</sup> Stationed at Nagasaki, the Chinese interpreters were engaged in

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<sup>9</sup> For an analysis of *bakufu*'s intelligence routes see Ronald P. Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984; reprint, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 142-146 (page citations are from the reprint edition).

<sup>10</sup> Nakamura Tadashi, "Kinsei ni okeru Nihon, Chugoku, Tonannajia-kan no sankaku boeki to musurim (Muslim merchants and the trilateral trade between Japan, China and Southeast Asia in the early modern period)," *Shien (Journal of History)* (Fukuoka), no. 132 (March 1995), 56-57.

every single procedure regarding the Chinese junk trade. They also looked after the crew members of a junk from its arrival until departure. At the same time, the Chinese interpreters were merchants in their own right. Usually, they were emigrants from China, and their positions kept passing on to their descendants.<sup>11</sup>

Under the supervision of the Chinese interpreters, there were also other foreign language interpreters called *ikoku tsuji*. These foreign interpreters included specialists in four different languages; namely *Tonkin tsuji* (Vietnamese interpreter), *Luzon tsuji* (Spanish interpreter), "*Mouru*" *tsuji* ("Moor" interpreter), and *Senra tsuji* (Siamese interpreter).<sup>12</sup> The language skill was handed down exclusively within particular families and the interpreter job, therefore, became the monopoly of a few families.<sup>13</sup>

The role of foreign interpreters was minor and very limited. Although the Spanish and "Moor" interpreters were in charge of the speakers of these two languages among crew members from all ports, their number was not nearly as many as the Chinese interpreters.<sup>14</sup> While

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<sup>11</sup> For more information on Chinese interpreters, see Yamaki Teijiro, *Nagasaki no tojin boeki* (The trade with the Chinese at the port of Nagasaki) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Koubunkan, 1964).

<sup>12</sup> Tonkin refers to the area under the control of the Trinh lords in the north Vietnam.

<sup>13</sup> Nakamura, "sankaku boeki to musurim," 56-60.

<sup>14</sup> Nagashima Hiromu closely looks at an interpreters' handbook written in the late eighteenth century. His research reveals that most of "*Mouru*" words and sentences in the handbook are identified as Persian. For an analysis of

the Chinese interpreters handled the trade with all the junks from all the ports, there were occasions when Siamese and Vietnamese interpreters were called on duty when junks from Siam and Tonkin entered Nagasaki.

In 1656 the Japanese government appointed the first Siamese interpreter. Morita Chosuke returned to Japan after a residence of seven years in Ayutthaya in 1634. When a Siamese embassy brought a missive from King Prasatthong (r. 1629-1656) to the shogun, Morita was called and requested to read the missive, which was written in Siamese. Afterwards he became an official Siamese interpreter.<sup>15</sup> His descendants continually succeeded in this position until 1855 when all foreign interpreters were eventually integrated into the body of Dutch interpreters.<sup>16</sup>

Nevertheless, the role of Siamese interpreter, as well as those of Southeast Asian countries, was never as prominent as the Chinese. The number of junks from Southeast Asian ports was much smaller than those from various ports on the coast of mainland China. Moreover, a large number of junks were exclusively manned by Chinese. There had never

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"Mouru" language, see Nagashima Hiromu, "Yakushi chotanwa no Mourugo ni suite (On the 'Mouru' language in the *Yakushi chotanwa*: as aspect of Japanese knowledge on India in the Tokugawa Era)," *Nagasaki kenritsu kokusai keizai daigaku ronshu (Journal of Liberal Arts and Economics)* (Nagasaki) 19, no. 4 (March 1986): 133-168. Nakamura, "sankaku boeki to musurim," 56.

<sup>15</sup> Ishii Yoneo and Yoshikawa Toshiharu, *Nichitai koryu 600-nen shi* (A history of intercourses between Japan and Thailand for the last six hundred years) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1987), 77-79.

<sup>16</sup> Nakamura, "sankaku boeki to musurim," 60.

been a single junk from Southeast Asia that was operated only by local crewmen without the Chinese. In fact, more than ninety-eight percent of the crew on board of junks from Southeast Asian ports was Chinese.<sup>17</sup> Even though a few Southeast Asian locals were on board, Chinese captains officially represented the junks and exclusively dealt with trade. As most of the trading business was conducted in Chinese language through the Chinese interpreters, there was not much room for foreign interpreters to participate in these affairs.<sup>18</sup>

#### *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki*

One of the main duties of the interpreters at the trading ports was to compose an official report. Upon arrival at Nagasaki, Chinese junks and Dutch ships were inspected by the interpreters. These Chinese and Dutch interpreters were then responsible for interrogating the crew members, gathering intelligence, and making a report of each junk and ship. These reports are called *Fusetsu-gaki*, which literally means "rumor."

Engelbert Kaempfer (1651-1716), a German physician who was sent to Nagasaki on a mission by the United Netherlands Chartered East India Company (Verenigde Oost-indische Compagnie, VOC), observed the inspection by the Nagasaki authorities when the Dutch ship *De Waelstroom* dropped anchor at the assigned place on 25 September 1690.

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<sup>17</sup> Ishii Yoneo, introduction to *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia: Translations from the Tosen Fusetsu-gaki, 1674-1723*, ed. Ishii Yoneo, Data Paper Series, Source for the Economic History of Southeast Asia, no. 6 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998), 3.

<sup>18</sup> For an analysis of foreign interpreters see Wada Masahiko, "Nagasaki totsui tyuno ikoku tsui nituite: Tonkin tsui wo tyushin toshite (A study of foreign interpreters)," *Southeast Asia: History and Culture* 9 (February 1980): 24-50.

He wrote:

...two Buggioses [*bugyo*], or Gentlemen of the Governors, sent by them with their commission, with many subordinate clerks, interpreters and soldiers, who called all those that were newly arrived, and made them pass in review before them one after the other, according to the list given them, viewing every one from top to toe, and writing his name, age and business, with a pencil on paper. Besides this, about six persons more were examined every one in particular, concerning our voyage, from whence we came, when we set out, how long we had been on the way, whether we did not land somewhere, and the several answers were carefully written down.<sup>19</sup>

Chinese junks, of course, had to go through more or less the same process as Dutch ships. At the port of Nagasaki, Chinese junks were under strict control. Within two days after the junks cast anchor, Chinese interpreters interviewed *sendo* (captain) and *waki sendo* (vice captain).<sup>20</sup> According to their testimonies, the interpreters drew up *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki*. These reports were carefully cross-checked against each other and finally submitted to the *bakufu* through the magistrates of Nagasaki.<sup>21</sup> *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* were important in the Japanese government's foreign policy

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<sup>19</sup> Engelbert Kaempfer, *A Description of the Kingdom of Siam 1690*, trans. John Gaspar Scheuchzer (London, 1727; reprint, Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1987), 96 (page citations are from the reprint edition).

<sup>20</sup> For a detailed discussion of the roles of junk crews see Chapter 4 below.

<sup>21</sup> For more information on the process of making *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* see Ura, "Ka-i Hentai kaidai," 27-38.

at the time. The rulers of the *bakufu* utilized these reports from the Chinese junks together with *Oranda Fusetsu-gaki* from the Dutch ships in their decision-making process on international affairs.<sup>22</sup>

Every year, all incoming Chinese junks were allotted a sequential number in the order of arrival. Instead of their actual names, the Japanese officials identified every ship by the year, the given number, and the place of origin. During the inspection, the interviewees were required to identify themselves with the number and the year that they were given on their previous visits in Japan. This numbering system was in effect from 1674.<sup>23</sup>

The junks' original names were never recorded in the Japanese official documents. Although the Chinese junks had their own names, the Nagasaki port officials neglected them. Instead, the Chinese interpreters used a serial number and the place of departure as each junk's temporary name. Every year, all incoming junks were labeled according to their orders of arrival together with their ports of origin. For example, the second junk arriving at Nagasaki from Siam was referred as "Ship No. 2 Siam Ship".<sup>24</sup> As long as the junks were anchored at Nagasaki, they had to identify themselves by these temporary names rather than their own

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<sup>22</sup> For a discussion of the *bakufu*'s decision-making process concerning international affairs see Toby, *State and Diplomacy*, 110-167.

<sup>23</sup> Ura, "*Ka-i Hantai kaidai*," 2-3.

<sup>24</sup> When this thesis refer to a particular junk's number, "Ship" will be used instead of "junk" for convenience. See Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*.

original names.

Compared to *Oranda Fusetsu-gaki*, the accounts of *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* were more accurate for several reasons. First of all, Chinese interpreters were dealing with a language they knew well, whereas the Dutch interpreters' poor language skills were infamous among the Dutch at that time.<sup>25</sup> Secondly, unlike the Dutch, the Chinese merchants were private and independent traders. While *Oranda Fusetsu-gaki* was sometimes distorted because of Dutch political interests, Chinese merchants were mostly free from the influence of foreign government or corporation. Lastly, the Chinese junk's captain was well aware that the report could be checked against the reports of other Chinese captains, and they could possibly be punished on the account of false information.<sup>26</sup>

Although the *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* were standard reports made for the Japanese government, their focus had been changing over the years. Up to the 1680s, the *bakufu* was keen to update the political development in China. *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* of this period focused on Taiwan issues and barely mentioned trade matters.<sup>27</sup> After the fall of Zheng regime in 1683, the format of *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* was more or less fixed. Each report contained information such as the latest news about the country where the junk came from, date of the departure, route to Japan, total number of

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<sup>25</sup> Toby, *State and Diplomacy*, 145.

<sup>26</sup> Toby, *State and Diplomacy*, 143.

<sup>27</sup> Under the Zheng regime, Taiwan was called Dongning. However, this thesis refers to the island as Taiwan for the sake consistency.

people onboard, crew members' ethnicity, and experiences of the previous visits to Japan. In addition, the names of the captain, vice captain, chief accountant, and passengers were usually given. Since the 1720s, however, the value of *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* seemed to have decreased. The *bakufu* was more concerned about the western powers at the time. *Oranda Fusetsu-gaki* therefore became more important to the Japanese government as they provided much needed information.<sup>28</sup>

In general, *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* retained a high degree of accuracy on the matters in which the junks were directly involved. On the other hand, some might not consider these interpreters' reports as significant sources because most of the information about political issues was little more than harbor gossip circulating among the port officials. Nevertheless, *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* made good references to the history of Southeast Asia. After all, they were contemporary accounts of the residents of and visitors to various Southeast Asian countries. The fact that it is difficult to obtain contemporary information on Southeast Asia in the seventeenth century makes *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* valuable.

### *Ka-i Hentai*

There are three published collections of manuscripts of *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki*. First of all, Hayashi Harunobu (1618-1636) and Hayashi Hoko (1644-1732) compiled *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* and entitled it *Ka-i Hentai* between 1674 and 1720.<sup>29</sup> Although there are several lacunas, this compilation contains 2,264 of *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* from 1644 to 1717. In addition, there is a second

<sup>28</sup> Ura, "Ka-i Hentai kaidai," 44-45.

collection of *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* called *Kiko shosetsu*. Indeed, it is a sequel of *Ka-i Hentai* and provides the reports made between 1717 and 1724. In the late 1960s, Ura Renichi edited both *Ka-i Hentai* and *Kiko shosetsu* and published them together under the same title of *Ka-i Hentai*.<sup>30</sup> Ura's version of *Ka-i Hentai* includes sixty-three *Fusetsu-gaki* submitted by Siamese junks.<sup>31</sup> The last collection of *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* is owned by Matsudaira Bunko. It contains *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* from 1724 to 1728. The text was published under the title of *Shimabara-bon tojin fusetsu-gaki* in 1974.<sup>32</sup>

Apart from the above manuscripts, a few more *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* were found in *Wakan-yosebumi* compiled by Matsumiya Kanzan in 1726.<sup>33</sup> *Wakan-yosebumi* contains *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* submitted by a Siamese junk in 1680. The report was based on the testimony of the Siamese *tsai fu* (chief accountant) on board of a Siamese junk.<sup>34</sup> To sum up, *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* composed during the period between 1644 and 1728 are currently

<sup>29</sup> Ura, "Ka-i Hentai kaidai," 50-51.

<sup>30</sup> Ura Renichi, ed., *Ka-i Hentai*, 3 vols. (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1958-1959).

<sup>31</sup> For more detailed bibliographical information on *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* see Ura, "Ka-i Hentai kaidai," 43-66.

<sup>32</sup> Oba Osamu, ed., *Tosen shinko kaitoroku; shimabarabon tojin fusetsu gaki; wappu tomecho* (Material for study of Chinese merchants sailing to and from Japan in the Edo period), Sources and Materials Series of the Institute of Oriental and Occidental Studies 9, no. 1 (Osaka: Kansai University Press, 1974), 97-140.

<sup>33</sup> Matsumiya Kanzan, *Wakan yosebumi*. In *Kyoho jidai no nicchu kankei siryo* (Materials for intercourses between China and Japan during the years of Kyoho), Sources and Materials Series of the Institute of Oriental and Occidental Studies 9, no. 2, ed. Oba Osamu (Suita: Kansai University Press, 1986), 95-343.

available in print, and they provide the majority of the information used in this study.

### *Toban Kamotsucho*

The other important source made by the Chinese interpreters was a compilation of the cargo lists of Chinese junks and Dutch ships. Since the very beginning of the seventeenth century, all incoming junks and ships were required to submit their cargo lists to the magistrates of Nagasaki. These lists were translated into Japanese by interpreters and called *Kamotsu aratamecho* (the lists of imports) or *Kihan nimotsu kaiwatashicho* (the lists of exports). On top of that, from 1685 onwards, the interpreters were obligated to prepare a compilation of *Kamotsu aratamecho* and *Kihan nimotsu kaiwatashicho* at the end of every trade season. The magistrates of Nagasaki then bounded them together and submitted to the *bakufu*, which referred them for annual audit.<sup>35</sup>

The collection of manuscripts entitled *Toban Kamotsucho* (the lists of cargos of Chinese junks and foreign ships) covers the period between 1711 and 1712. Originally, *Toban kamotsucho* included twenty volumes, yet only thirteen of them exist today. The extant ones were reproduced and published with an introduction by Yamawaki Teijiro in 1970.<sup>36</sup> *Toban kamotsucho* provides useful information on Siamese junks during the

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<sup>34</sup> Matsumiya, *Wakan yosebumi*, 161.

<sup>35</sup> Yamawaki Teijiro, introduction to *Toban kamotsucho*, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Naikaku Bunko, 1970), 2-5.

<sup>36</sup> Yamawaki Teijiro, ed., *Toban kamotsucho* (The lists of cargos of Chinese junks and foreign ships), 2 vols. (Tokyo: Naikaku Bunko, 1970).

period from 1711 to 1714 when *Kai-Hentai* lacked any data.<sup>37</sup>

### *Totsuji Kaisho Nichiroku*

*Totsuji kaisho nichiroku* (The diary of the office of Chinese interpreters) was an official diary kept by the Chinese interpreters.<sup>38</sup> Since the Chinese interpreters were deeply involved in trade and looked after the junks' crews during their stay at Nagasaki, most of the references in *Totsuji kaisho nichiroku* related to Chinese junks and their trade. Sometimes, *Totsuji kaisho nichiroku* contains information on the junks that cannot be found in other sources.

*Totsuji kaisho nichiroku* originally comprised of ten volumes and covered the period between 1663 and 1715. But the second volume, which presumably describes the period from 1672 to 1687, is currently missing. The extant nine volumes are available in print.<sup>39</sup>

### *Tosen Shioko Kaitoroku*

In 1715, the *bakufu* introduced the *shinpai* system. The annual entry of Chinese junk into Nagasaki was limited to thirty. In order to regulate the number of Chinese junks, the *bakufu* issued *shinpai* or patents for

<sup>37</sup> For more information on *Toban kamotsucho* see Yamawaki, introduction to *Toban kamotsucho*, vol 2, 1-11; and Ishii, "Thai-Japanese Relations," 6-7.

<sup>38</sup> Tokyo Daigaku Shiryo Hensansyo, ed., *Totsuji kaisho nichiroku* (The diary of the office of the Chinese interpreters), 7 vols. (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1955-1968; reprint, Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1984).

<sup>39</sup> Ishii, "Thai-Japanese Relations," 6-7; also see Nichiroku Kenkyukai, "*Totsuji kaisho nichiroku no kenkyu*," 36.

trade. No junk without a legitimate *shinpai* was allowed to enter the port for trade.<sup>40</sup> *Tosen shioko kaitoroku* was a compilation of an annual list of the entry of Chinese junks and their *shinpai* from 1715 to 1735.<sup>41</sup>

### Secondary Sources

Besides the *Zoho ka-i tsushoko* and the various reports made by the Chinese interprets, there are other Japanese and foreign sources that provide useful information on the economic history of Ayutthaya.

### *Tsuko Ichiran*

*Tsuko ichiran* (Collection of Historical Sources for the Foreign Intercourses during Tokugawa Days) was the most comprehensive compilation of documents of the Tokugawa bakufu. Hayashi Akira (1800-1859) prepared this work to serve as a handbook for the diplomatic precedents of the bakufu. *Tsuko ichiran* was followed by a sequel, *Tsuko ichiran zokushu* (Supplement of *Tsuko ichiran*). Completed in 1853, both of them were collections of various official documents and descriptions of countries, which had established relations with Japan between 1566 and the last days of the Tokugawa period (1603-1867).<sup>42</sup> Although they were not materials directly concerned with commerce, various references cited in

<sup>40</sup> For a detailed discussion of the *shinpai* system see pp. below.

<sup>41</sup> Oba Osamu, ed., *Tosen shioko kaitoroku; tojin fusetu gaki; wappu tomecho* (Material for study of Chinese merchants sailing to and from Japan in the Edo period), Sources and Materials Series of the Institute of Oriental and Occidental Studies 9, no. 1 (Osaka: Kansai University Press, 1974), 65-94.

<sup>42</sup> Hayashi Akira, ed., *Tsuko ichiran* (Collection of Historical Sources for the Foreign Intercourses during Tokugawa Days), 350 vols. (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankō-kai, 1912-1913); Yanai Kenji, ed., *Zokushu tsuko ichiran* (Supplement of

them proved to be useful in understanding the Siamese-Japanese trade relations of this period.

*Gaiban Tsusho*

*Gaiban tsusho* (Correspondents from foreign countries) is a collection of diplomatic letters and documents from the late sixteenth century, which was kept in the archives of Tokugawa bakufu.<sup>43</sup> The Tokugawa bibliographer Kondo Morishige (1771-1829) completed it in the early nineteenth century.<sup>44</sup> *Gaiban tsusho* includes thirty-two pieces of correspondence exchanged between Siam and the bakufu between 1606 and 1687.<sup>45</sup>

Although they were written in Japanese, and at times were not directly concerned the trade affairs between Siam and Japan, all of these sources provide very important insights into the economic history of Ayutthaya. This thesis aims to reconsider these materials and hence offer an alternative dimension to this historical period.

*Tsuko ichiran*), 151 vols. (Osaka: Seibundo, 1968-1973).

<sup>43</sup> Kondo Morishige, ed., *Gaiban tsusho* (Collection of historical sources for the foreign intercourses during the Tokugawa days), Kaitei Siseki Shuran, vol. 21 (Tokyo: Kondo Shuppanbu, 1901; reprint, Kyoto: Rinsen Shoten, 1983).

<sup>44</sup> Wada, "Development of Japanese Studies," 96-97.

<sup>45</sup> A list of all correspondence between Siam and the bakufu in *Gaiban tsusho* is shown in Ishii, "Thai-Japanese Relations," 10-11.

CHAPTER 2  
CROWN JUNKS AND CHINESE JUNKS:  
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS

Siamese kings themselves were principal merchants in the kingdom of Ayutthaya like other Southeast Asian rulers. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, developing the royal monopoly system, the kings of Ayutthaya aggressively invested in overseas trade. Siamese kings fitted out "crown junks" under their authorities and dispatched them to ports mostly in China and Japan. These junks exported animal skins, sapanwood, and precious metals to China and Japan and brought silver, copper and luxury goods from Japan and silk and porcelain from China to Siam. Some previous studies conclude the Siamese junk trade as a part of the Chinese commercial network.<sup>1</sup> However, Western and Japanese sources clearly distinguished "Siamese crown junks" in the Siamese-Japanese trade from other Chinese private junks.

It is widely accepted that Siamese crown junks were somehow related to the Siamese king. Yet the question of how the king was involved in these junks has not been clearly answered. Different scholars have different ideas and definitions of the "crown junks." The following section examines the history and concepts of the "Siamese crown junks" by different scholars in order to obtain a more precise nature of the Siamese-Japanese trade in the Ayutthaya period.

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<sup>1</sup> For example, Sarasin, *Tribute and Profit*, 58-69.



### Previous Studies

The distinction between “Siamese crown junks” and “Chinese junks” that bounded for Japan is rather confusing. Contemporary accounts of “crown junks” are too sketchy to confirm an absolute definition of “crown junks” and “crown trade”. In the 1680s, a French missionary Nicolas Gervaise wrote:

As the king of Siam as a large quantity of Chinese in his realm, it is through them that he continues to carry on trade with the Japanese, which has always been so advantageous to him. Every year he sends to Japan several of his ships manned by Chinese, accompanied by a few Siamese mandarins, who keep their eyes open for everything around them.<sup>2</sup>

In Japan, around the same time, Nishikawa Joken noted that there were one or two large “*Senya yakata no fune*” that came to Nagasaki from Siam every year, the Chinese residents in Siam served these junks as captains, and the Siamese were also onboard.<sup>3</sup>

Sarasin Virapol believes that after the *bakufu* refused to allow King Prasatthong’s missions to trade with Japan (which is discussed in Chapter 5), King Narai (r. 1656-1688), who personally owned crown junks, employed Chinese for his crown trade until 1664.<sup>4</sup> However, the

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<sup>2</sup> Nicolas Gervaise, *The Natural and Political History of the Kingdom of Siam*, translated by John Villiers (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1989), 232.

<sup>3</sup> Nishikawa, *Zoho ka-i tsushoko*, 128.

<sup>4</sup> Sarasin, *Tribute and Profit*, 58-69.

Dutch-Thai Treaty of 1664 included the provision that neither the Siamese king nor any of his subjects should be allowed to place the Chinese on board of their junks bound for Japan, Cochinchina, Tonkin, and other places.<sup>5</sup> After the treaty of 1664, King Narai resorted to "hiring" Chinese-owned junks to transport his cargo to China and Japan. In an attempt to circumvent the Dutch, King Narai shared profits with the vessels' owners.<sup>6</sup> To sum up, his research shows that there were two types of junks engaged in Siamese-Japanese trade during King Narai's reign, namely,

- 1) Siamese crown junks (from the 1630s up to 1664): The king owned the junks and employed Chinese on them.
- 2) Chinese junks (from 1664): Chinese-owned junks hired by the king. The profits from the trade were shared between the king and the owners of the junks.<sup>7</sup>

According to Sarasin, both the crown-owned junks and the Chinese-owned junks constituted the "crown trade" between Siam and Japan.<sup>8</sup>

To George Vinal Smith, the Siamese junks were by and large

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<sup>5</sup> Cochinchina referred to the southern part of Vietnam under the authority of the Nguyen family. In Japanese sources, the Nguyen's territory appeared as Guangnan.

For the details of the Dutch-Siamese Treaty of 1664 see Chapter 6.

<sup>6</sup> Sarasin, *Tribute and Profit*, 12.

<sup>7</sup> Sarasin, *Tribute and Profit*, 12.

<sup>8</sup> A more detailed account of the trade during the King Narai's reign is presented in Chapter 6.

"Chinese." The Japanese government doubted King Prasatthong's legitimacy and refused to allow any of his junks to trade with Japan from the middle of the 1640s to the early 1660s.<sup>9</sup> King Prasatthong could not succeed in trading with Japan throughout his reign. Instead, a great number of "Chinese junks" left Siam for Japan during the 1640s and 1650s.<sup>10</sup> In Smith's context, these "Chinese junks" indicate that they were owned by the Chinese and sent to Japan by the Chinese merchants on their own account during the period when Siamese crown trade was stagnant. It was in 1659 that King Narai and other Siamese traders successfully reentered the Japan trade. Since then, the king, his successor King Phetracha (r. 1699-1703), and other Siamese officials maintained the Japan trade by using the "Moor" and Chinese-Thai sailors on "their junks".<sup>11</sup> Meanwhile, the Chinese abandoned the Japan trade in late 1660s. There were two possible reasons for the decline of the "Chinese junk" trade with Japan. Firstly, the Dutch-Thai treaty of 1664 guaranteed the Dutch in the hide monopoly. The Chinese could no longer participate in the deer skin trade, which was the most profitable business at that time. Secondly, many other export goods were monopolies of the Siamese king. It was difficult for the Chinese merchants to obtain these goods in Siam for the Japan market.<sup>12</sup> As a result, there seemed to be no more "Chinese

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<sup>9</sup> Iwao Seiichi, "Reopening of Diplomatic and Commercial Relations between Japan and Siam during the Tokugawa Period," *Acta Asiatica* no. 4 (March 1963): 18-22.

<sup>10</sup> Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand*, 78.

<sup>11</sup> In the same book, however, Smith also writes that the Thais themselves entered the trade with Japan again in 1661. Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand*, 36, 78.

junks" from Ayutthaya after the late 1660s. Smith argues that after King Narai resumed the Japan trade, all the junks departed from Ayutthaya to Japan were actually "crown junks" that were sent by the Siamese king.

Smith concludes that the three main carriers of the Siamese-Japanese trade were:

- 1) Siamese royal junks and Japanese ships (from 1604 to the late 1630s): Japanese merchant junks authorized by the Tokugawa *bakufu*.
- 2) Chinese junks (from the 1640s to around 1660): Chinese-owned junks sent by Chinese merchants to Japan on their own accounts.
- 3) Siamese crown junks (from 1659/1661? onwards): Siamese kings' and other Siamese officials' junks manned by the Chinese and the "Moor" sailors.<sup>13</sup>

Both Sarasin and Smith agree that the Dutch-Thai treaty of 1664 has changed the structure of Siamese crown trade. But, their opinions on the carriers of Siamese-Japanese trade are slightly different.

Besides them, Ishii Yoneo emphasizes that the Siamese kings did not personally own the fleet of junks in trading with ports on South China coasts and Japan and that the Siamese kings chose certain Chinese captains and consigned their goods to them. His description suggests that

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<sup>12</sup> Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand*, 78

<sup>13</sup> Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand*, 36, 78.

Siamese crown junks were Chinese-owned junks and they only transported the Siamese kings' consignments.<sup>14</sup>

While the exact ownership of the Siamese "crown junks" is still debatable, it is clear that there were junks traveled to Japan for trade. The term "crown junks" used in this thesis does not imply that Siamese kings owned these junks. It only refers to those ships that were somehow related to the Siamese king. Whether the junks were in the possession of the kings or not, they were under the authority of the Siamese kings and actively involved in the Japan trade.

#### *Senra-sen*

An alternative dimension in understanding the nature of the Siamese junks can be found in Japanese historical writings. In order to obtain a clearer picture of Siamese junks, this section examines *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* submitted by the captains of Siamese junks.

Before going into the discussion, it is necessary to explain a few Japanese terms used in this thesis. In Japanese literal sense, "sen" means all types of ship. For instance, "Oranda-sen" refers to Dutch ship and "To-sen" refers to Chinese junks. Although the Nagasaki port officials recognized that there were different styles of ships from different ports, they described all kinds of ships as "sen".<sup>15</sup> As a result, it is impossible to

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<sup>14</sup> Ishii, "Koshikokka toshiteno Ayutaya," 80.

<sup>15</sup> For the information on the style of *tosen* in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries see Oba, "Hirado Matsuura shiryo hakubutsukan zo 'tosen no zu' nitsuite," 20-30.

know for sure the exact ship style according to the Japanese records. In this study, "junk" refers to transport from China and Southeast Asia used by Chinese merchants. "Ship" is used to describe the Dutch transport. Although the literal meaning of "*Senra-sen*" is "Siamese ship", it is translated as "Siamese junk" because the vessels from Siam were mostly in Chinese style with some Western influences.<sup>16</sup>

During the Tokugawa period, the Japanese treated Siamese junks as a part of *tosen* (Chinese junks). Having rejected diplomatic relations with the Ming court in 1621, the *bakufu* had never tried to restore the official relationship with China.<sup>17</sup> Under the *sakoku* system, only China and the Netherlands were permitted to participate in trade at Nagasaki as private entries. Therefore, the term *tosen* (Chinese junks) can be defined as Chinese-owned private junks, on which individual Chinese merchants conducted their business mainly for themselves. Nevertheless, the truth is that many junks from Southeast Asian ports visited Nagasaki almost every year. Since all the junks coming to Nagasaki had to be "Chinese" and, in fact, these junks were mainly manned by the Chinese, the Nagasaki authorities dealt with the junks from Southeast Asia as Chinese.

The Nagasaki port officials divided Chinese junks into three groups according to the distance from Nagasaki. The first one was called

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<sup>16</sup> Oba "Hirado Matsuura shiryō hakubutsukan zo 'tosen no zu' nitsuite," 26.

<sup>17</sup> Nagazumi Yoko, "Tei shiryū oyako to nihon no sakoku (The Zheng family and Japan's 'sakoku')" in *Sakoku wo minaosu* (A review of sakoku), ed. Nagazumi Yoko (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1999), 56-57.

*kuchi-bune* (short distance ships). They were originated from ports in Chinese provinces relatively near to Japan. Junks from Shangdong, Nanjing, Zhoushan, Putuoshan, Ningbo, Taizhou, and Wenzhou belonged to this division. *Naka-okubune* (medium distance ships) referred to the junks from Fujian and Guangdong provinces. This category included Fuzhou, Quanzhou, Amoy, Taiwan, Gouzhou, and Hainan. The last group was the *oku-bune* (long distance ships) that covered the junks from Southeast Asian countries.<sup>18</sup> Their origins were Tonkin, Guangnan (Cochinchina), Champa, Cambodia, Siam, Ligor, Songkhla, Pattani, Melaka (Malacca), Banten (Bantam), and Kelapa (Jakarta/Batavia).<sup>19</sup>

In the seventeenth century Japan, Siam was called *Senra*, *Syam*, or *Syamuro*. Japanese sources therefore referred junks from Siam as "*Senra-sen*". Yet, it should be noted that "*Senra-sen*" does not necessarily indicate that the junk was built in Siam, owned by the Siamese, originated from Siam, or operated by the Siamese crews. The actual condition was far more complicated.

### Testimonies of the Captains

In *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki*, Siamese junks (*Senra-sen*) identified themselves in several different ways. During the 1680s, most of the Siamese junks in *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* noted that they were either "*Senra-dashi no fune*" or

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<sup>18</sup> Literally translated, *kuchibune* means "mouth ships". *Naka-okubune* means "mid-inner ships" and *okubune* means "inner-ships".

<sup>19</sup> Oba Osamu, "Hirado Matsuura shiryō hakubutsukan zo 'tosen no zu' nitsuite (A study of 'tosen no zu' owned by Hirado Matsuura Historical Museum)," *Kansaidaiigaku tozaigakujutsu kinkyūsho kiyō* 5 (1972): 16-17; Ishii, "Seventeenth Century Japanese Documents about Siam," 165.

"*Senra-shidashi fune*". Both terms mean that the junks were fitted out in Siam. Accordingly, these Siamese junks loaded their cargo and departed from Siam. Yet, in the literal sense of the words, neither "*Senra-dashi no fune*" nor "*Senra-shidashi fune*" indicates that the Siamese kings were owners of or investors in these junks.

Among the Siamese junks, ships that seemed to have direct connection with the crown were named "*Senra yakata no fune*", meaning "Siamese king's junks". The King of Siam was known as "*yakata*" in Japanese.<sup>20</sup> In 1680, Ship No. 14, which originated from Amoy, reported that there were two "*Senra yakata no fune*" bound for Nagasaki from Siam that year.<sup>21</sup> *Wakanyosebumi* confirmed that Ship No. 26 Siam Ship came to Japan under the order of the Siamese king.<sup>22</sup> Therefore, the term "*Senra yakata no fune*" seems clearly to refer to junks which were operated under the authority of the king.

Since the 1690s, most of the Siamese junks identified themselves as "*Senra yakata moushitukeraru shidashi no fune*", "*Senrayakata no gechi wo motte shidashi mousi sourou fune*" or "*Senra yakatasidashi no fune*" on their *Fusethu-gaki*. There are a few more variations, but all of them basically mean that the junk was fitted out by the order of the king.

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<sup>20</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 1, 616-619; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 38-40.

<sup>21</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 1, 307-308; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 22-23.

<sup>22</sup> Matsumiya, *Wakan yosebumi*, 166.

Besides the king, the officials at Siamese court were engaged in the junk trade, too. In 1690, there was an incoming junk to Nagasaki identified as "*Senra tojin yakunin shidashi no fune*", namely the junk fitted out by a Chinese official of Siam. Earlier in 1687, Ship No. 107 Siam Ship arrived, and its captain reported that he was ordered to go to Japan by "*Senra shikken no mono*".<sup>23</sup> From a Japanese historical point of view, "*Shikken no mono*" suggests a regent. Meanwhile, Ishii translates the term as "minister". Ship No. 107 reveals that apart from the Siamese king ("*yakata*"), there was someone else in the court whose political power was strong enough to issue the ordering of junks. That person might or might not be a minister. He could also be a Chinese or a Siamese official. Indeed, it is impossible to know who it was and which position "*Senra shikkenno mono*" indicated apart from that person was not the king himself but worked at the court.

To sum up, the identification of Siamese junks ("*Senra-sen*") in *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* between 1679 and 1728 refers to four different types of junks:

- 1) "*Senra-dashi no fune*": Junks fitted out in Siam. Based only on this term, it is impossible to verify whether these ships were fitted out by the order of the king or not. They might be crown junks, or they might be Chinese private junks that only carried merchandise for the crown trade.
- 2) "*Senra yakata sidashi no fune*": Siamese crown junks that were fitted out in Siam by the order of the king.

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<sup>23</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 1, 783-784; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*,

- 3) "*Senra tojin yakunin shidashi no fune*": Siamese official junks that were fitted out in Siam by the order of the Chinese officials in the court of Ayutthaya.
- 4) Chinese private junks: Junks originated and fitted out in China. They stopped over Siam to prepare goods for the Japan market before proceeding to Nagasaki, but the Chinese interpreters considered them as "Siamese junks".

At Nagasaki, all of the four kinds were treated equally under the same label of Siamese junks although the Japanese port officials were well aware that junks from Siam included both Siamese crown junks and Chinese junks.

Another important issue regarding the incoming junks to Japan is that the reports in *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* were subject to the individual interpreters' renditions instead of objective facts. The captain of a junk did not write *Fusetsu-gaki* by himself. Although all Chinese junks testified to the Nagasaki authorities where they came from and who they were, it was the Chinese interpreters who judged the junk's identity and wrote the information down in *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki*. The contents of *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* were based on the testimonies of each captain, but these reports did not always reveal what the actual situation was. In short, the description of the junk's identity depended on the individual interpreters. Strictly speaking, the accounts of *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* could only suggest how the Chinese interpreters understood the junk's identity.

For instances, two junks were classified as "Siam Ship" in 1696, namely Ship No. 71 and No. 74. However, the captain of Ship No. 71 considered his junk was from Ningbo.<sup>24</sup> In fact, Ship No. 71 was first fitted out in Ningbo and then went to Siam before sailed to Japan. Ship No. 74, on the other hand, was originally fitted out in Siam, and its captain did not regard Ship No. 71 as a Siamese junk.<sup>25</sup> Nevertheless, the Chinese interpreters considered both of them as junks from Siam. A different interpreter could have easily categorized Ship No. 71 as from Ningbo instead of Siam.

Another example can be found in 1684. Ship No. 6 Guangdong Ship identified itself as "*Senra chi no fune*" or Siamese local junk.<sup>26</sup> Its name suggests that this junk's home port was Siam. Nonetheless, the Chinese interpreters regarded this junk as a "Guangdong Ship" because it called at Guangdong on the way to Nagasaki regardless of the exact origin and the captain's testimony. As a result, the classification in *Tosen Fusetu-gaki* did not necessarily reflect the true identity of the so-called "Siamese junks". The description of each *Tosen Fusetu-gaki* will be analyzed in detail in the next chapter.

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<sup>24</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 2, 1828-1829; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 74-75.

<sup>25</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 2, 1832-1833; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 75.

<sup>26</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 1, 423-424.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SIAMESE JUNKS

For the better understanding of the nature of the Siamese crown trade with Japan, this chapter explores three distinctive features of the Siamese junks. During the period between 1679 and 1728, the Chinese interpreters classified at least ninety-one junks as *Senra-sen* ("Siamese junks"). Out of these ninety-one junks, sixty-eight of *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* are available. Table 1 shows how each junk identified itself in its *Fusetsu-gaki*.

TABLE 1. "SIAMESE JUNKS" VISITING NAGASAKI, 1679-1728

	Number
Junks fitted out in Siam	28
Siamese crown junks	26
Siamese official junks	2
Chinese private junks from Chinese ports	5
Unidentified/Others	30
Total	91

Sources: *Tsuko ichiran*, *Tobankamotsucho*, and *Wakan yosebumi*.

There were only twenty-six junks recognized as "crown junks". On the other hand, it is not certain from this table whether the kings invested in those twenty-eight junks, which had been equipped in Siam. Besides, thirty junks did not give any statement regarding their identities. They were obviously from Siam, but whether they were crown junks or Chinese junks was unclear. The texts of *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* do not imply king's involvement in either the "junks fitted out in Siam" or the

TABLE 2. "SIAMESE CROWN JUNKS", 1679-1628

Year	Ship No.	Crew <sup>a</sup>	Captain	Route	Sources
1680	26	?		Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Wakan yosebumi</i> , 166.
1690	84	5/98	Guo Heguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 1279-1280.
	86	1/99	Chen Youguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 1283.
1691	79	4/118	Gao Xingguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 1384-1385.
	82	2/89	Liu Yueguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 1387-1388.
	88	3/98	Ceng Mingguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 1394-1395.
1693	75	4/106	Jiang Jingguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 1588-1591.
1694	61	3/106	Jiang Jingguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 1674-1675.
1698	43	2/102	Wang Dingguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 1997-1998.
1699	54	2/113	Wang Kuanguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2080-2081.
	63	3/102	Lin Chuguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2090-2091.
1703	69	3/77	Guo Longguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2332-2333.
	70	2/114	Huang Shiguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2333-2334.
	71	3/98	Wang Dingguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2334-2335.
1704	64	?		Siam-Korea-Nagasaki	<i>Tsuko ichiran</i> , vol. 4, 21.
	80	3/79	Guo Luguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2409-2410.
1707	79	78	Wang Dingguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2496-2497.
	80	103	Wu Chishen	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2497-2498.
	82	79	Yang Yaoguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2499.

Year	Ship No.	Crew*	Captain	Route	Sources
1708	100	2/81	Guo Yinguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2579-2580.
1709	53	2/67	Xu Zeguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2636-2637.
1710	37	3/70	Xu Xiaguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2667-2668.
1717	-	56	Lin Læguan	Siam-Nanyu-Zhoushan-Putuoshan-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2718-2720.
	2	99	Guo Yizhou	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2737-2738.
1718	23	2/64	Hu Yinhou	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2805-2806.
1719	26	3/101	Guo Zifei	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2849-2850.

Note: \* The number of Siamese crew/The total number of the crew members including the Siamese

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“unidentified” junks. In order to recognize the said fifty-six junks’ identity, this chapter first explores the unique features of Siamese crown junks. As Table 1 shows, twenty-six junks from Siam actually identified themselves as Siamese crown junks. It is in the light on these identified characteristics that these unclear junks are examined and discussed. Table 2 summarizes information of these crown junks.

### The Size of Junks

First of all, in comparison with junks from Chinese ports, Siamese crown junks were often large not only in terms of the number of crew-members but also the actual size of the ship.<sup>1</sup> As Table 2 shows, those Siamese crown junks carried an average of ninety-two crewmen. On the other hand, most of the junks from Chinese ports carried less than fifty crew aboard. *Zoho kaitusushoko* emphasizes that the junks from Siam were different from other junks in size.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, the picture of a Siamese junk, represented on “The Scroll of Foreign Ships”, proves that the size of Siamese junks was much larger than any other junks and Dutch ships.<sup>3</sup>

Table 2 includes an exceptionally small crown junk. In 1717, a Siamese junk carrying fifty-six Chinese crew on board came to Nagasaki. Compared with other crown junks, this one seems to be too small to be a crown junk. Yet, the captain’s testimony reveals that he had changed the

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<sup>1</sup> Nishikawa, *Zoho kaitusushoko*, 107.

<sup>2</sup> Nishikawa, *Zoho Kaitusushoko*, 128.

<sup>3</sup> Oba Osamu listed and compared all the pictures of Chinese junks and Dutch ships presented in *the Scroll of Foreign Ships*. Oba, “Hirado Matsuura shiryō hakubutsukan zo ‘tosen no zu’ nitsuite”, 21-22. See Figure 1.

original junk that set sail from Siam for a "smaller one" at Zhoushan since the original one was too large to control during the stormy season.<sup>4</sup> This case can be considered as exception. It is safe to say that Siamese junks were usually very large.

TABLE 3. AVERAGE NUMBER OF CREW

	Average Number of Crew
"Siamese Crown Junks"	92
Tonkin Ships	47
Guangnan Ships	57
Champa Ships	44
Cambodia Ships	55
Songkhla Ships	62
Ligor Ships	49
Pattani Ships	53
Malacca Ships	31
Kelapa Ships	53
Banten Ships	70

Sources: *Ka-i Hentai*, *Tsuko ichiran*, *Tobankamotsucho*, and *Wakan yosebumi*.

The sizes of junks depend not merely on the distances from the port of origin to Nagasaki. Although previous studies often explain that the Siamese crown junks were larger than junks from Chinese ports had to travel the longer distance, Table 3 shows that Siamese crown junks could be distinctively large even among the Southeast Asian junks. Therefore, Siamese crown junks can be identified by their number of crew as they were usually larger than the junks from other Chinese and

<sup>4</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 3, 2718-2720; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 90.

Southeast Asian ports.

TABLE 4. SOUTHEAST ASIAN JUNKS, 1674-1727

	A Total Number of Junks Arrived at Nagasaki	Number of Junks Carried Local People
"Siamese Crown Junks"	29	22
Tonkin Ships	28	5
Guangnan Ships	88	2
Champa Ships	5	0
Cambodia Ships	37	3
Songkhla Ships	7	0
Ligor Ships	11	1
Pattani Ships	18	0
Malacca Ships	8	0
Kelapa Ship	60	2
Banten Ships	3	0

Sources: *Ka-i Hentai* and *Tsuko ichiran*.

### The Siamese Onboard

The second feature of Siamese junk was that most of the Siamese crown junks carried a few "*Senra-jin*" (Siamese people) on board.<sup>5</sup> Usually, the Chinese dominated all the positions in junks from any places. Table 2 presents the number of the Siamese on board of each crown junk. On the contrary, Table 4 states that junks from other Southeast Asian ports barely brought local people. The presence of Siamese crew on certain junks therefore could be regarded as one of the features of Siamese crown

<sup>5</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 3, 2832-2833; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 246.

junks.<sup>6</sup>

### The Shipping Routes

Lastly, most of the crown junks which departed from Siam headed directly for Nagasaki. As Table 5 shows, the Japan bound junks normally left Siam in late June or early July and entered Nagasaki in August and September. They followed the cycle of the monsoons in the South China Sea. After the conclusion of the trade, the junks set sail from Nagasaki in late December or January and returned to Siam in February. Among the twenty-six Siamese crown junks which arrived in Nagasaki only two junks came by way of other ports between 1680 and 1719. In 1704, Ship No. 80 encountered a storm on the sea and cast anchor in Korea to wait for good winds.<sup>7</sup> In 1708, Ship No. 100 had to take shelter from the unfavorable wind in Guangnan.<sup>8</sup> Except these two unintentional calls because of bad weather conditions during the voyages, all other crown junks came directly from Ayutthaya. Therefore, those junks that departed from Siam and directly came to Nagasaki could be assumed as Siamese crown junks for the fact that they did not call at any other port on their way. The routes of crown junks and other junks were listed in Table 2 and 6 respectively. The shipping routes of Siamese will be described in further detail.

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<sup>6</sup> Except the junks from Siam, in 1690, Ship No. 74 Ligor Ship brought one Siamese onboard. Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 2, 1260-1261; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 133.

<sup>7</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 3, 2409-2410; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 85-86.

<sup>8</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 3, 2579-2580; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 87.

TABEL 5. SAILING PATTERNS OF SIAMESE JUNKS

YEAR	SHIP NO.	DAYS	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER
1680	14	51		18 SIAM ←		→ 7 NAGASAKI		
	15	51		20 ←		→ 9		
1683	5	14		12 ← → 25				
	7	14		13 ← → 26				
	19	20				18 ← → 4		
	22	47				1 ← → 16		
	23	39				10 ← → 16		
1684	24	50			20 ←		→ 7	
	18	81		28 ←			→ 16	
	19	81		28 ←			→ 16	
	20	87		22 ←			→ 16	
1686	80	68		25 ←			→ 31	
	93	73		30 ←			→ 11	
1687	107	76		15 ←			→ 30	
1688	150	44		21 ←		→ 5		
	152	58		7 ←		→ 3		
1689	46	46	2 ←		→ 18			
	51	69		13 ←		→ 20		
1690	81	54		8 ←		→ 10		
	84	52		22 ←		→ 12		
	86	70		14 ←		→ 22		
1691	79	47		11 ←	→ 28			
	82	63	28 ←		→ 31			
	88	80		27 ←			→ 14	
1692	55	49		27 ←		→ 14		
	64	54		2 ←		→ 23		
	71	23					29 ← → 20	
	un no.	113			4 ←			→ 22
1693	75	73		23 ←			→ 3	
1694	61	32			17 ←	→ 17		

YEAR	SHIP NO.	DAYS	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER
1695	30	48		24 ←		→ 10		
1696	74	60		18 ←		→ 16		
1697	85	91		6 ←			→ 4	
	88	59	30 ←		→ 27			
	100	70		15 ←		→ 23		
1698	43	89	29 ←			→ 25		
1699	54	113			5 ←			→ 25
	63	127		23 ←				→ 28
1701	30	30			28 ←	→ 27		
1703	69	50			1 ←	→ 20		
	71	56		27 ←		→ 21		
1704	80	97		20 ←			→ 25	
1707	79	60		27 ←		→ 25		
	80	60		27 ←		→ 25		
	82	61		27 ←		→ 26		
1708	100	46			6 ←	→ 20		
1709	53	50			7 ←	→ 25		
1710	37	44		28 ←		→ 10		
1717	2	85		28 ←			→ 20	
1718	23	70		27 ←			→ 4	
1719	26	32				29 ←	→ 30	
1728	10	9		29 ←	→ 7			

Sources : Ka-i Hantai

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TABLE 6. JUNKS FITTED OUT IN SIAM, 1679-1728

Year	Ship No.	*	Captain	Route	Sources
1679	8			Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 296-197.
	?	1/?	Yan Ziguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Wakun yosebumi</i> , 160.
1680	4	1/?	Yan Ziguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Wakan:yosebumi</i> , 160.
	15			Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 308-209.
	16			Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 309-310.
1681	2			Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 324.
1682	5			Siam-Nagasaki	<i>K Ka-i Hentai</i> , 344-345
	9			Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 348.
	25			Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 357-358.
1683	5			Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 366-367
	7			Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 368-369.
	19			Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 397-399.
	22			Siam-Guangdong-Taiwan-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 403-405.
	23			Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 405-406.
	24			Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 406.
1684	18			Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 436-437.
	19			Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 436-437.
1685	43		Yan Ziguan		<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 510.
	?		Xu Senguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 616-617.

Year	Ship No.	*	Captain	Route	Sources
	?		Chen Heguan		<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 618-619.
1686	80	9/?	Xu Senguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 616-617.
	82		Chen Heguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 618-619.
	93		Wang Zhuguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 633-634.
1688	150	61	Kuo Zhengguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 988-989.
	152	4/103	Xu Ranguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 990-991.
1689	46	106	Xu Senguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 1117-1118.
	51	107	Ceng Mingguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 1124-1126.
1692	55	1/57	Ceng Anguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 1466-1467.
	64	2/112	Guo Heguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 1478-1479.
	71	4/119	Chen Miaoguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 1486-1487.
	-	1/93	Ceng Mingguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 1491-1492.
1694	47	1/120	Xu Xuanguan	Siam-Chaozhou -Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 1655-1656.
1696	74	2/93	Hong Shuguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 1832-1833.
1697	85	3/104	Hung Laoguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 1932-1933.
	88	1/89	Wang Dingguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 1935-1936.
	100	66	Xu Senguan	Siam-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 1947-1948.
1701	30	3/104	Xu Weiguan	Siam-Nanyu-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2204-2205.
1702	59				<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2333-2334.
	66		Wang Dingguan		<i>Tsuko ichiran</i> , vol. 4, 21.

Year	Ship No.	*	Captain	Route	Sources
1705	36				<i>Tsuko ichiran</i> , vol. 4, 62.
	52				<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2667-2668.
	69				<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2663-2664.
1706	74		Guo Yinguan		<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2579-2580.
	80		Wang Dingguan		<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2496-2497.
1708	100	2/81	Guo Yinguan	Siam-Guangnan-Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2579-2580.
1711	47		Xu Zeguan		<i>Tobankamotsucho</i> , 650.
	53		Cheng Baiguan		<i>Tobankamotsucho</i> , 701.
	54		Huang Chuanguan		<i>Tobankamotsucho</i> , 695.
1712	55		Xu Xuru		<i>Tobankamotsucho</i> , 1025.
	56		Guo Yida		<i>Tobankamotsucho</i> , 1031.
1715	?		Guo Tianyu		<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2719.
	7		Yan Yuchen		<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2719, 2737.
1720	30		Chen Ji		<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2928-2929.
1721	27		Li Yisheng		<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2987-2988.
1724	27	47	Li Yisheng	Ningbo-Siam-Putuoshan -Nagasaki	<i>Ka-i Hentai</i> , 2987-2988.
1725	18	55	Chen Xianqing	Ningbo-Siam-Ningbo- Putuoshan-Nagasaki	<i>Simabarabon</i> : 113-114.
	34		Li Yisheng		<i>Shimabarabon</i> : 138.
1728	10	54	Li Yisheng	Shanghai-Nagasaki	<i>Shimabarabon</i> : 138.

Note: \* The number of Siamese crew / The total number of the crew members



### Places of Departure

All the "Siam Ships" (*Senra-sen*) were supposed to come from Siam. However, the records in *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* show that not all "Siam Ships" originated in Siam. As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, a junk fitted out in Siam could sometimes be classified as a ship from another port. It was up to the Chinese interpreters who examined a junk upon its arrival at Nagasaki and to determine its port of origin. Indeed, the classification was rather flexible. In each case, the interpreters went on board the junk to conduct their investigation. They inspected the type of the junk, the kind of products in its cargoes, and the languages that the crewmembers spoke and so on. Up to 1715, the interpreters recognized its port of origin according to this comprehensive observation. As a result, the ports of origin simply indicate the place where each junk set sail as recorded in *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki*.

In some cases, the given name of ship did not coincide with the actual place of departure. For example, both Ship No. 6 Guangdong Ship and No. 9 Guangdong Ship in 1684 departed from Siam. They were Siamese "local" ships. Yet the Chinese interpreters considered these two junks to be Guangdong Ships since they called at Guangdong on the way from Siam to Nagasaki.<sup>9</sup> In other cases, the junks from Chinese ports such as Amoy and Ningbo were regarded as "Siam Ships", due to the fact that they went to Siam to purchase goods for the Japan market before they headed to Nagasaki.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 1, 423-424, 429.

Also, it should be noted that the port of origin did not represent their home port. A junk could come to Nagasaki from different ports under different captains. Chinese junks at that time traveled from port to port all over East and Southeast Asia, and they exchanged goods in every port they called at. As a matter of fact, their voyages were not always round trips. The junks did not always go back to their ports of origin after they left Nagasaki.

TABLE 7. PORTS OF DEPARTURE, 1679-1728

	Name of Ship*	Other Places	TOTAL
Siam Ships	65	8	73
Tonkin Ships	10	16	26
Guangnan Ships	33	49	82
Champa Ships	1	4	5
Cambodia Ships	17	18	35
Songkhla Ships	2	5	7
Ligor Ships	5	6	11
Pattani Ships	9	9	18
Malacca Ships	8	0	8
Kelapa Ship	26	20	46
Banten Ships	3	0	3

Sources: *Ka-i Hentai* and *Tsuko ichiran*.

\*For example, Siam Ships from Siam, Tonkin Ships from Tonkin, and so on.

Between 1679 and 1728, seventy-three junks entered Nagasaki and their routes were described in their *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki*. Before 1679, the format of *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* had not yet been fixed, and they barely mentioned the routes. The earliest *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* record of a Siam Ship

<sup>10</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 1, 1735-1737.

was found in 1679, while the last one was in 1728. Table 7 suggests that out of seventy-three Siamese junks, sixty-five junks actually came from Siam during this period. Compared with junks from other Southeast Asian countries, this rate is very high. In fact, more than fifty percent of other Southeast Asian junks came from ports in China.

### Siam Ships from Non-Siamese Ports

If a junk from some other port was considered to be a Siam Ship, there should be reason and explanation. The following is the reason why the Chinese interpreters determined the eight junks shown in Table 5 to be Siam Ships.

In the 1680s, many Siam Ships identified in *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* indeed were not junks originated from Ayutthaya but China, such as Amoy and Taiwan:

- 1) In August 1680, Ship No.14 Siam Ship arrived in Japan from Siam. The junk originally departed from Amoy and first called at Siam. It intended to go back to Amoy. However, due to the undesirable political conditions, the junk decided to go to Japan.<sup>11</sup> The crews and passengers of this junk were all from Amoy. They purchased goods in Siam for Japan and set sail for Nagasaki.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> In the early 1680s, the Qing was trying to conquer the Zheng regime. In 1680, all the Zheng forces withdrew from Amoy to Taiwan. Until the final Qing conquest of Taiwan in 1683, the conditions at South China Sea were unstable.

<sup>12</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 1, 307-308; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 22-23.

- 2) In 1684, the captain of Ship No. 20 Siam Ship said that he was a resident of Taiwan. His junk was considered "Siamese" because he had sailed to Siam in the previous year.<sup>13</sup>

In the 1690s, a number of junks sailed annually into Siam from China. Some of them reloaded their cargoes in Ayutthaya and departed for Japan directly. Hence, they were categorized as "Siam Ships".

- 3) In August 1695, Ship No. 30 Siam Ship was a Chinese junk from Amoy. The junk originally sailed from Amoy to Siam, in where it sold most of its cargoes. The junk then procured new goods in Siam and head to Japan. In this year, five junks sailed from Amoy to Siam. One of the five junks was supposed to go to Japan from Siam, but there was no evidence showing that this particular Amoy junk arrived at Nagasaki. The rest of them planned to go back to their home port. However, these Chinese junks might visit Japan if profitable goods for Japan were available to them in Siam.<sup>14</sup>

- 4) In August 1696, Ship No. 71 Siam Ship arrived at Nagasaki. It left Ningbo in Zhejiang for Siam. There were another thirteen junks from Fukien, Guangdong and Zhejiang visited Siam this year. But only Ship No. 71 was destined for Nagasaki and the others were bound for their home ports.

In 1715, the identification of incoming foreign ship at Nagasaki

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<sup>13</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 1, 437-438

<sup>14</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 2, 1735-1737.

was changed. The *bakufu* adopted "New regulations of the Shotoku era" to regulate foreign trade and restrict the outflow of gold as well as silver. The new measures limited the number, tonnage, and cargo value of both Dutch ships and Chinese junks. Among them, the *shinpai* system was aimed to reduce the number of Chinese junks calling at Nagasaki. From 1715 onwards, no junk without a legitimate *shinpai* was allowed to enter Nagasaki for trade as discussed in Chapter 6. Since then, the system remained in effect until the end of the Tokugawa period. Under the *shinpai* system, the name of a ship was not verified by a number and its port of origin but simply according to the license that the captain carried. Among the thirty licenses issued each year for the Chinese junks, only one was given to Siamese junk. Ships from Pattani, Songkhla, and Ligor did not receive any quota at all. After 1715, there was no junk which arrived in Nagasaki from these ports.

In addition, the given port of origin written on the *shinpai* license could no longer be a reliable representation of the actual port of origin of each junk any more. These *shinpai* licenses were traded among Chinese merchants at ports.<sup>15</sup> In many cases, incoming junks carried licenses that had totally different captain's name and port of origin from their own.

In the 1720s, most of the Siam Ships were in fact from Chinese ports that only procured and brought Siamese products to Japan. These junks had not been to Siam. However, they were considered Siam Ships

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<sup>15</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 3, 2929; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 98-99.

by the Chinese interpreters because these junks carried *shinpai* license issued to Siam Ship and transported Siamese goods in their cargoes. As long as a junk carried a legitimate *shinpai* issued to a Siam Ship, the Chinese interpreters did not care where the ship actually came from and who the captain was. The Nagasaki authorities had no problem to allow these "Siam junks" to trade at Nagasaki.

5) In March 1722, Ship No. 2 Siam Ship sailed into Nagasaki directly from Shanghai. This junk did not go to Siam. However, since it brought the *shinpai* issued for a Siam ship, Chinese interpreters regarded the junk as a Siam Ship.<sup>16</sup>

6) In January 1724, Ship No. 27 Siam Ship arrived from Siam. Nonetheless, the ship originated from Ningbo and then went to Siam for trade. The captain Chen Hungqing also purchased some Siamese cargoes and raw silk in Shanghai before he set sail for Japan. Because Ship No. 27 carried a *shinpai* specified to a Siam Ship and carried Siamese products, the junk was considered a Siam Ship.<sup>17</sup>

7) In August 1725, Ship No. 18 Siam Ship was also originally from Ningbo. Being fitted out in Ningbo, the junk went to Siam in order to buy local products. Then, the ship went back to Ningbo and left there for Japan.<sup>18</sup>

8) In 1728, Ship No.10 Siam Ship arrived from Shanghai. Its

<sup>16</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 3, 2928-2929.

<sup>17</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 3, 2987-2988; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 99-100.

<sup>18</sup> Oba, *Shimabarabon tojin fusetsugaki*, 113-114. Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 99-100.

captain Li Yisheng held the *shinpai* that he had obtained on his last voyage to Nagasaki as the captain of Ship No. 34 Siam Ship.<sup>19</sup>

On the other hand, there were two junks actually departed from Siam but were regarded as Guangdong Ships. Both ships seem to call at the Chinese port simply because of bad weather conditions during their voyages.

- 1) In 1684, Ship No. 6 Guangdong Ship was from Siam. The ship was a "Siamese local ship", but they called at Guangdong on its way to Nagasaki. At Nagasaki, this ship was considered to be Guangdong Ship.<sup>20</sup>
- 2) In 1684, Ship No. 9 Guangdong Ship was also from Siam. It was regarded as a Guangdong Ship because it did, too, call at Guangdong on its way to Japan.<sup>21</sup> This junk sailed into Nagasaki from Taiwan in 1683.

### Ports of Call

More than eighty percent of the Siam Ships which arrived in Nagasaki came directly from Siam in the seventeenth century. The shipping routes show there was direct trade between Siam and Japan, mostly carried out by the Chinese junks. Up to 1715, the majority of the junks from Siam did

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<sup>19</sup> Oba, *Shimabarabon tojin fusetsugaki*, 138; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 102.

<sup>20</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 2, 423-434.

<sup>21</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 1, 429.

not call at any ports on the way to Nagasaki. On the other hand, fourteen Siam Ships among the total of seventy-three junks called at one or more than one port, mainly in China, between Ayutthaya and Nagasaki in the 1600s. The reasons included repairing, seeking shelter from storms, or sometimes loading and unloading cargoes.

In the early 1680s, there were Siam Ships which called at Guangdong:

- 1) In 1681, Ship No.2 Siam Ship reported that five ships were fitted out in Siam and bounded for Japan that year. One of them called at Guangdong to load some raw silk and silken fabric to sell in Japan.<sup>22</sup>
- 2) In July 1682, Ship No. 5 Siam Ship arrived at Nagasaki. Indeed, this ship came to Japan from Siam every year. In 1681, it set sail for Nagasaki after being fitted out in Siam. But because of strong adverse winds, the ship could not reach Japan and stopped over in Guangdong. It spent the winter there and then headed for Japan.<sup>23</sup>
- 3) Like the former example, Ship No.9 Siam Ship in 1682 also visited Nagasaki every year. This ship left Siam in 1681. Due to its large size, which made it difficult to maneuver under unfavorable conditions and strong advance winds, the ship steered towards Guangdong. Together with Ship No. 5, it

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<sup>22</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 1,324; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 25.

<sup>23</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 1, 344-345; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 26-27

departed Guangdong for Japan and arrived in 1682.<sup>24</sup>

- 4) In 1683, Ship No.22 Siam Ship departed from Siam. The captain was Xu Huanguan. While the ship called at Guangdong, its consignments were sold and new passengers and cargoes, including silk and silken fabric, were loaded. Because of a local rumor that the Imperial Navy of the Great Qing had confiscated a ship bound for Japan, the junk abruptly left the port and received its water supply from Taiwan.
- 5) In 1684, Ship No. 6 Guangdong Ship, which originated from Siam, called at Guangdong. The captain was Xu Huanguan who came to Nagasaki every year between 1682 and 1684. Presumably, he had some connections with Guangdong.
- 6) In 1694, Ship No. 47 Siam Ship arrived in Nagasaki. It left Siam in 1693 and called at Chaozhou in Guangdong because of adverse winds. It stayed in Chaozhou for the winter and then went to Nagasaki.<sup>25</sup>
- 7) In 1701, Ship No. 30 Siam Ship, originally fitted out in Siam, called at Nanyu in Guangdong.<sup>26</sup>
- 8) In 1717, a Siam Ship commissioned by the king arrived at Nagasaki. Due to the adverse winds, the ship entered Nanyu in Guangdong, Xhoushan in Zhejiang, and Shipu in Zhoushan.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 1, 348; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 27.

<sup>25</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 1, 1655-1656; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 71.

<sup>26</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 3, 2204-2205; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 81-82.

There were only two "Siam Ships" that called at ports other than China.

- 1) In 1704, Ship No. 80 Siam Ship, commissioned by the king, came to Nagasaki. The ship saw a storm at sea and cast anchor in Korea in order to wait for good winds.<sup>28</sup>
- 2) In 1708, Ship No. 100 Siam Ship set sail from Siam. The king also commissioned this ship, and there were two Siamese aboard this junk. Because of the unfavorable winds, the ship went to Guangnan before heading to Japan.<sup>29</sup>

Although the Chinese junks dominated the triangular trade between Siam, China, and Japan in the 1690s, a significant number of Siamese junks carried on the trade between Ayutthaya and Nagasaki. These Siam Ships were mostly commissioned by the kings. The routes of these junks showed that they left Siam and headed directly to Japan. There was no junk which called at Amoy on the way to Nagasaki from Siam.

### Return Voyages

The Nagasaki port officials were not concerned where the junks went after they finished their trade in Japan. Therefore, limited data is available on this matter. Besides a few Siamese junks called at Guangdong and Amoy due to bad weather on their way home, most of the junks seem to return to Siam directly. There were a number of exceptions in which the

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<sup>27</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 3, 2718-2720.

<sup>28</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 3, 2409-2410.

<sup>29</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 3, 2579-2580; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 87.

same Siamese junk arrived at Nagasaki in successive years as some other ships. There are five such cases:

- 1) In 1681, Ship No. 7 Siam Ship went to Guangdong and came back to Nagasaki as Guangdong Ship in 1684.<sup>30</sup>
- 2) In 1688, Ship No. 150 Siam Ship left Nagasaki for Amoy. This ship came to Nagasaki as Ship No. 27 Amoy Ship in 1689.<sup>31</sup>
- 3) In 1699, Ship No. 54 Siam Ship, commissioned by the king, left Nagasaki and planned to go back to Siam. However, it entered Amoy because of the advanced winds. In the next year, this ship and its crews came back to Nagasaki as Ship No. 21 Amoy Ship.<sup>32</sup>
- 4) Ship No. 79 Siam Ship in 1707 headed for Guangdong after they finished their business at Nagasaki.<sup>33</sup>
- 5) In 1715, two Siam Ships arrived at Nagasaki. Because of the adverse winds the ship was unable to return to Siam directly and went to Guangdong.<sup>34</sup>

Taking a few examples from *Tosen Fusetsugaki*, Sarasin Virapol concludes that from King Narai's reign up to the first decade of the eighteenth century, Siamese junks frequently called at Chinese ports on

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<sup>30</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 1, 424.

<sup>31</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 2, 1133.

<sup>32</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 3, 2127.

<sup>33</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 3, 2563-2564.

the way to and from Japan. This triangular trade served the vital function of extending the scope of both Siam's foreign trade and the Chinese junk trade in the Eastern Seas at that time.<sup>35</sup> Nonetheless, a close look at *Tosen Fusetsugaki* indicates the fact that under the authority of the King of Siam, most of the Siamese junks left Siam and go straight to Japan. On the way, they barely called at any port.

Siamese junks were quite unlike other Chinese junks. They were distinctively large and they came straight to Japan while the majority of junks from Southeast Asia called at Chinese ports on the way to Nagasaki. Given that most of the Siamese junk left Siam for Nagasaki under the authority of the king and that there were a few Siamese, on behalf of the king, watching over the junks, the captains might not have freedom to choose to call at any ports on their way unless a call was unavoidable. Besides, the large capacity of Siamese junks might have allowed them to carry on the voyages between Siam and Japan without additional supply of necessary goods. Yet no contemporary sources provide concrete explanations.

Siamese crown junks usually came directly to Nagasaki with more than ninety crew and included a few Siamese officials, then other Siamese junks can be examined under this criteria to determine whether they were sent by the king as crown junks or not.

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<sup>34</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 3, 2719.

<sup>35</sup> Sarasin, *Tribute and Profit*, 58-60.

### Cultural Exchange

Alongside of trade and shipping, there was the transfer of technology during the trade between Siam and the rest of the world. This technological exchange was an important part of cultural and mutual communication.

In the pre-modern Southeast Asia, craftsmen with particular skills were especially in demand by the wealthy courts. They were usually bonded to the king or a powerful official. For instance, King Ekathosarot (r. 1605-1610) dispatched Siamese envoys to the Netherlands in late 1607.<sup>36</sup> Between 1608 and 1610, five Siamese including two ambassadors visited the major cities and ports such as Amsterdam, Hoorn as well as Enkhuizen. In addition, they also examined the Dutch shipyards. Subsequently, the king of Ayutthaya asked the Dutch for craftsmen, specialists in shipbuilding, navigation and weaponry to work for his court. During King Narai's reign, the Dutch craftsmen were sent regularly to Ayutthaya. Likewise, Thai carpenters went to Batavia to learn various crafts from the Dutch.<sup>37</sup> However, Siamese kings no longer asked the Europeans to sent craftsmen to work for them in Ayutthaya after 1688.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> It was the first ever Siamese diplomatic mission to Europe. As for the details of this mission to Netherlands, see Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand*, 12-13; Brummelhuis, *Courtier and Diplomat: A History of the Contacts between the Netherlands and Thailand*, 10-11.

<sup>37</sup> Adrian B. Lopian, "Power Politics in Southeast Asia," in *From Japan to Arabia: Ayutthaya's Maritime Relations with Asia*, ed. Kennon Breazeale (Bangkok: Toyota Foundation, 1999), 141-142.

<sup>38</sup> Dhiravat na Pombejra, "Seventeenth Century Ayutthaya," 258-259.

Similarly, Siamese junks conveyed technology from Japan to Ayutthaya. In 1668, *Totsuji kaisho nichiroku* reported that Ship No. 39 Siamese ship brought a number of Siamese on board. These Siamese neither had their own cargo nor engaged in business transaction on their own account.<sup>39</sup> Among them, the Chinese interpreters recognized four Siamese as leaders of the Siamese crews: a supervisor, an accountant, and two silversmiths. While Japanese silver was exported to Ayutthaya, it was no surprise that Siamese silversmiths came to Japan in order to learn the Japanese silversmithing skills.<sup>40</sup>

Since Ship No. 39 was commissioned by King Narai, it is reasonable to assume that these silversmiths arriving at Nagasaki by Siamese junk were sent by the king of Ayutthaya.<sup>41</sup> Unfortunately, there is no further information about these Siamese craftsmen. Details such as how long they had stayed in Japan, who gave them instructions, and what they actually learned were still unknown. However, it should be noted that among the Siamese crews, there were not only envoys and accountants but also craftsmen and artisans who were sent by the court to improve their skills.

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<sup>39</sup> Hayashi, *Tsuko ichiran*, vol. 1, 96-99.

<sup>40</sup> Hayashi, *Tsuko ichiran*, vol. 1, 98-101.

<sup>41</sup> Anthony Reid, "The Organization of production in the pre-colonial Southeast Asian port city," in *Brides of the Sea: Port Cities of Asia from the 16th-20th Centuries*, ed. Frank Broeze (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1989), 65-71.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE TRADE

While many Siamese junks set sail for Japan under the king's order, there still remains the question of how the kings were involved in these royal junks. In fact, it was the Chinese shipboard organization that served the crown junks and accommodated the king's commissions. Whether they were Siamese crown junks or Chinese private junks, all the junks were almost exclusively manned and managed by Chinese traders.<sup>1</sup> Jennifer Wayne Cushman closely studies the people who were involved in the trade between Siam and China at both ends during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.<sup>2</sup> It is pointed out that the crew composition on a junk had not changed much since the late Ming period. Therefore, even though her research does not exactly cover the period that this thesis deals with it provides useful information on the structure of Chinese shipping operation in the seventeenth century. Besides, Ng Chin-Keong presents an analysis of Fukienese merchants who were involved in coastal as well as overseas junk trade during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.<sup>3</sup> Referring to these researches, this chapter first explores the shipboard organization of the Chinese junks that sailed into Nagasaki. Then the roles of the Siamese

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<sup>1</sup> Japanese at that time referred to Chinese people as *tojin*.

<sup>2</sup> Cushman, *Fields from the Sea*, 97-114.

<sup>3</sup> Ng Chin-Keong, *Trade and Society: The Amoy Network on the China Coast 1683-1735* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983).

crew on board of the crown junks will be focused. Moreover, the groups of people who involved in the trade between Siam and Japan will be discussed. Through examining these topics, this chapter intends to investigate the relationship between the kings and their junk crew.

## The Chinese Merchants

### Officers

The people who worked on board a junk were divided into two groups, namely, officers and ordinary sailors. Each member had a specialized duty.

### Captain

The captain was the senior officer on board a Chinese junk.<sup>4</sup> When the junk arrived at Nagasaki, he talked to Chinese interpreters and dealt with official duties representing all the crew. *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* were made from their testimonies. The captain was permitted to ship his own cargo, sell cabin accommodations to passengers, and receive commission on the sale of their merchandises as the agent of the principal investors.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, the success of any voyage depended greatly on the captain's ability to sell the goods at the most advantageous price.<sup>6</sup> Yet he had no responsibility for the navigation of

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<sup>4</sup> *Senshu* and *sendo* in Japanese and *Ch'uan-chu* in Chinese refer to captain.

<sup>5</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 1, 783-784; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 44.

<sup>6</sup> Cushman, *Fields from the Sea*, 102.

the junk during the voyage.<sup>7</sup>

The captains were not necessarily the junk-owners, the cargo-owners, or the chief investors. The captains of small size junks were often the junk-owners and the cargo owners at the same time. Using their own junks, the captains conducted their own business.<sup>8</sup> In term of large junks, on the other hand, it is more likely that the captains were the agents on behalf of the junk owner or/and the principal consignors. Since large ocean-going junks were costly and required huge investments, only wealthy merchants could afford them.<sup>9</sup> However, as the well-established merchants usually no longer felt like going on a dangerous voyage by themselves, they assigned a captain to take charge of the junks on their behalf. In many cases, the captain was his kinsman, a trading-partner, or merely a hired employee.<sup>10</sup> Sometimes, the junks were the joint venture of several traders.<sup>11</sup> In order to form a partnership and construct a junk to be owned in common, two or more merchants would pool their capital. Sometimes, one of the investors embarked on their junk as a captain, and other times, the investors agreed to employ one.

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<sup>7</sup> Nishikawa, *Zoho kaitusushoko*, 106.

<sup>8</sup> Oba, "Hirado Matsuura shiryō hakubutsukan zo 'tosen no zu' nitsuite," 36.

<sup>9</sup> Ng, *Trade and Society*, 153; Nishikawa, *Zoho kaitusushoko*, 106.

<sup>10</sup> Ng, *Trade and Society*, 154-155;

<sup>11</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 2, 2664-2663.

### Vice-Captain

In addition, there were vice-captains on board.<sup>12</sup> Usually, the vice-captain's share of the investment in the junk was smaller than the captain.<sup>13</sup> In other words, the difference between the captain and the vice-captain was the volume of the capital they invested in the junk.

### Accountant

Although the captain exclusively took care of the trade, the accountant also played an important role in the junk trade.<sup>14</sup> The accountant was in charge of money as well as cargo and responsible for keeping records of the payments and other financial aspects of its sale.<sup>15</sup> Besides, he supervised the junk's loading and unloading at the ports.<sup>16</sup>

The accountant seemed to be the third ranking officer on Chinese junks. Normally, *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* contains only the names of the

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<sup>12</sup> Vice-captain appears as *Waki-sendo* and *fuku-sendo* in Japanese sources.

<sup>13</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 2, 2132-2133.

<sup>14</sup> Accountants were called *ts'ai fu* in Chinese. Japanese sources refer them as *zaifu*, *zaifuku* or *hissya*. As a matter of fact, *zaifu* and *ts'ai fu* are just different pronunciations for the same Chinese characters. Cushman translated *ts'ai fu* as "accountant" and "clerk". Ng explained this position as a "clerk cum treasurer". On the other hand, in Ishii's English translation of *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki*, it is translated as "purser". Nishikawa, *Zoho kaitusushoko*, 106; Oba, *Hirado Matsuura shiryō hakubutsukan zo 'tosen no zu' nitsuite*, 31-32; Cushman, *Fields from the Sea*, 104; Ng, *Trade and Society*, 149; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 47, 71, 77, 81, 87, 89.

<sup>15</sup> Nishikawa, *Zoho kaitusushoko*, 106; Ng, *Trade and Society*, 149; Cushman, *Fields from the Sea*, 104-105.

<sup>16</sup> Cushman, *Fields from the Sea* 104-105.

captain and vice captain. In some of the *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki*, however, the names of accountants were given after the captain and the vice captain. In accordance with the value and size of the cargo, a junk could have one to three officers functioning as accountants aboard.<sup>17</sup> Yet, smaller junks did not always employ an accountant.<sup>18</sup>

The captain, vice-captain, accountant, and general manager were considered to be the leaders of the crew members by the Nagasaki port officials. For example, in 1699, there was a rupture between the captain and the crew of Ship No. 54 Siam Ship. As a result, many sailors of this junk fled from the Chinese camp, where they were supposed to stay. After this incident, the magistrate prohibited the captain, accountant, and general manager of this junk from sailing back into Nagasaki again.<sup>19</sup>

The majority of the captains and vice captains came to Nagasaki more than once. Indeed, their positions on the junks were not always the same. For example, in 1687, Xu Qian Guan visited Japan as the accountant of Ship No. 107 Siam Ship. Later, he came back to Nagasaki three more times as the vice captain of Siamese junks.<sup>20</sup> In 1694, Yang Lian Guan was the vice captain of Ship No. 47 Siam Ship. Yet, in 1692,

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<sup>17</sup> Cushman, *Fields from the Sea*, 104.

<sup>18</sup> Ng, *Trade and Society*, 49.

<sup>19</sup> Tokyo daigaku, *Totsuji ksisho nichiroku*, vol. 3, 78-81.

<sup>20</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 2, 990-991, 1117-1118, 1273-1274; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 47, 48, 52.

he was the passenger onboard Ship No. 64 Siam Ship.<sup>21</sup> In 1696, Wang Ding Guan was the accountant of Ship No. 74 Siam Ship. Between 1697 and 1707, however, he served as the captain of Siam Ships at least five times.<sup>22</sup> Therefore, the positions of captain, vice captain, and accountant were inter-changeable. In general, the vice captain and the accountant could step up to the position of captain after they gained experience of trading with Japan.

### General Manager

There was the post of a general manager onboard who looked after the general affairs on the junks.<sup>23</sup> The general manager was the fourth ranking officer following the accountant.<sup>24</sup> He was responsible for general affairs.

### Minor Officers

Moreover, there were various minor officers on each junk who worked in less-specialized duties under the direction and supervision of the captain and senior officers. Their duties covered the practice of navigation, management of the voyage, and maintenance of the junk. However, since they were not directly involved in business transactions

<sup>21</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 2, 1655-1656; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 71.

<sup>22</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 2, 1935-1936, 1997-1998, vol. 3, 2496-2497; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 77, 79, 86.

<sup>23</sup> General manager was called *sokan* in Japanese and *tsung-han* in Chinese. Nishikawa, *Zoho kaitsushoko*, 106; Ng, *Trade and Society*, 149.

<sup>24</sup> Nishikawa, *Zoho kaitsushoko*, 106.

with Japan, Japanese sources pay little attention to them.

For instance, the navigator was responsible for charting the junk's course, guiding the junk along proper sea-routes, checking the weather at the sea, and maintaining the compass during the voyage.<sup>25</sup> There were also helmsmen. They assisted the navigator and managed the steering of the junk.<sup>26</sup> The personnel who took charge of the mast were responsible for the direction.<sup>27</sup> Besides, there were crew who took charge of small boats for landing, anchor at harbor, lines for, food as well as cooking, carpentry, and so on.<sup>28</sup> At least seventeen officers including both senior and minor worked for a Chinese junk.<sup>29</sup>

### Sailors

The rest of the crew were ordinary sailors.<sup>30</sup> Under the supervision of the officers, the sailors performed the daily operational tasks.<sup>31</sup> The number of sailors depended upon the size of the junk. The Japanese

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<sup>25</sup> *Kacho* in Japanese. *Huo-ch'ang* in Chinese. Nishikawa, *Zoho kaitusshoko*, 106; Cushman, *Fields from the Sea*, 104; Ng, *Trade and Society*, 149.

<sup>26</sup> *Dakou* in Japanese. *To-kung* in Chinese. Cushman, *Fields from the Sea*, 104; Nishikawa, *Zoho kaitusshoko*, 106.

<sup>27</sup> *Ahan* as well as *aban* in Japanese. *Ya-pan* in Chinese.

<sup>28</sup> Nishikawa, *Zoho kaitusshoko*, 105; Oba, "Hirado Matsuura shiryō hakubutsukan zo 'tosen no zu' nitsuite," 30-32; Ng, *Trade and Society*, 149.

<sup>29</sup> Isono Nobuharu, *Nagasaki niyage* (Nagasaki, 1847; reprint, Tokyo: Seizando Shoten, 1985).

<sup>30</sup> *Kousya*, or *konsya*, in Japanese. *Shui-shou* in Chinese.

<sup>31</sup> Cushman, *Fields from the Sea*, 105.

classified junks into three groups according to their size. Large junks had more than one hundred sailors on board. Medium-sized junks brought around sixty to seventy sailors. Thirty or forty sailors worked onboard small junks.<sup>32</sup> Siamese junks were, of course, categorized into the large junk.

### Passengers

Apart from the junk crew, Chinese junks usually carried passengers aboard. Owing to the large cargo capacity of the ocean-going junks, the captains often invited other merchants to share the cargo compartments in order to obtain as many cargoes for one shipment as possible.<sup>33</sup> These passengers were called *kyaku* in Japanese.<sup>34</sup> Usually, they were merchants with smaller capital.<sup>35</sup> As they could not afford to own or rent a vessel by themselves, they paid for the cargo compartments and got aboard with their own goods. Junks often had to wait at the port until enough merchandise was collected and passengers gathered for the voyage.<sup>36</sup>

Passengers could embark on the junks and provide cargoes for the shipment wherever the junk called at and whenever the captain needed

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<sup>32</sup> Nishikawa, *Zoho kaitsohoko*, 106.

<sup>33</sup> Ng, *Trade and Society*, 158-159.

<sup>34</sup> In Japanese, *kyaku* means guests or travelers.

<sup>35</sup> Ng, *Trade and Society*, 158-159.

<sup>36</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 3, 1639-1640.

to recruit more traders. Thus when the junk touched at any port before it reached its final destination, the original lot had been disposed of and new goods were bought for later sale. In other words, if a junk could not purchase enough cargoes for the Japan trade at the port of origin, or if it lost the cargoes during the voyage, the junks often called at ports on the way to Japan in order to load more passengers and cargoes.<sup>37</sup> Successful passengers sometimes came back to Nagasaki as captains of their own junks.<sup>38</sup>

All the crew onboard were also merchants themselves. Indeed, all of the people who participated in junk trade were merchants, in the sense that they made profit from the commercial intercourses. Although the owners of the consigned goods were the principal beneficiaries of the enterprise, every member, regardless of his position, was allowed to bring a specific quantity of merchandise to sell on his own account during the voyage. As far as Siamese crown junks concerned, the principal investor of these junk was the king of Ayutthaya. At the same time, the captain, other officials, as well as all the sailors also carried their own cargoes on board of the crown junks.

The number of the officers, sailors, and passengers onboard a

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<sup>37</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 1, 366-367; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 29.

<sup>38</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 2, 988-989, 1384-1385, 1588-1591, vol. 3, 2080-2081.

junk depended on the size of the junk and the volume of its cargo.<sup>39</sup> As late as the 1660s, every junk was required to present a list of crew members to the magistrate of Nagasaki on its arrival.<sup>40</sup> Every crew's name, age, duty, and religion were recorded on this list. However, very few crew lists are available today.<sup>41</sup> A junk from Cambodia arrived in 1641 provides an example of the composition of junk crew. This Cambodian junk was a small-sized junk with a total number of forty-six crew members onboard. It had a captain, ten passengers, eighteen officers, and seventeenth sailors aboard.<sup>42</sup> All of the crew members were Chinese.

#### The Siamese Officers

On top of the Chinese officers, Siamese junks usually brought a few Siamese officers to Japan. However, there were only scattered references to the Siamese crew members in Japanese sources due to their small role in the actual business transactions of the trade.

The Siamese onboard were usually supervisors and

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<sup>39</sup> Oba "Hirado Matsuura shiryō hakubutsukan zo 'tosen no zu' nitsuite," 33-34.

<sup>40</sup> Nakamura Tadashi, "Kinse boeki niokeru tosen no tsumini to norikumiin (The cargoes and crew of Chinese junks in trade during early modern period)," 66.

<sup>41</sup> Oba, "Hirado Matsuura shiryō hakubutsukan zo 'tosen no zu' nitsuite," 32-33.

<sup>42</sup> Nakamura, "Kinse boeki niokeru tosen no tsumini to norikumiin," 73-75.

accountants.<sup>43</sup> For example, in 1668, Ship No. 30 Siam Ship carried two Siamese officers, namely, a supervisor and an accountant.<sup>44</sup> In 1699, the two Siamese arrived by Ship No. 54. At least one of them was a supervisor.<sup>45</sup>

Whether they served as supervisors or accountants, the Siamese never engaged in the trade.<sup>46</sup> The Siamese officers on Siamese junks were not merchants, and therefore, they never brought their own cargoes.<sup>47</sup> In 1668, Ship No. 39 Siam Ship carried "many" Siamese onboard.<sup>48</sup> Yet none of them brought their private cargo.<sup>49</sup> Chinese interpreters at Nagasaki reported that since the Siamese were not supposed to be good at trade, the king of Siam ordered the Chinese as captain to take care of the trade with Japan on behalf of the crown.<sup>50</sup>

These Siamese officials, of course, were assigned by the king. As

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<sup>43</sup> Tokyo Daigaku, *Totsuji kaisyonichiroku*, vol. 1, 98-101. Chinese interpreters at Nagasaki called supervisors *metsuke* and *meakashi*. In general, *metsuke* means to watch over something or someone and gives guidance when necessary. *Meakashi* means to keep eyes open.

<sup>44</sup> Tokyo Daigaku, *Totsuji kaisyonichiroku*, vol. 1, 96-99.

<sup>45</sup> Tokyo Daigaku, *Totsuji kaisyonichiroku*, vol. 3, 78-81.

<sup>46</sup> Tokyo Daigaku, *Totsuji kaisyonichiroku*, vol. 1, 98-101.

<sup>47</sup> Tokyo Daigaku, *Totsuji kaisyonichiroku*, vol. 1, 98-101.

<sup>48</sup> The exact number is unknown. But at least four Siamese was onboard. Tokyo Daigaku, *Totsuji kaisyonichiroku*, vol. 1, 96-99.

<sup>49</sup> Tokyo Daigaku, *Totsuji kaisyonichiroku*, vol. 1, 96-99.

<sup>50</sup> Tokyo Daigaku, *Totsuji kaisyonichiroku*, vol. 1, 98-101.

the accountant was in charge of loading and unloading the cargoes, the Siamese officials supervised the royal cargos and kept records of the sales during the voyage. After the junk returned from Japan to Siam, the accountant went to the palace to report the result of business at Japan and submit the account books to the king.<sup>51</sup>

A Siamese *Lichikaroubuncho* came to Nagasaki as an accountant in 1679 and 1680 respectively.<sup>52</sup> His testimony reveals that Yan Zi Guan, the Chinese captain of this junk, requested King Narai to assign a Siamese accountant to his junk and that the king ordered *Lichikaroubuncho* to serve as accountant.<sup>53</sup> After he returned to Siam from the first voyage, it took about forty days for him to finish all the official duty of preparing accounting reports at the capital. Then he went back to Bangkok to see his wife and kids. Soon, however, he received the next order from the king to serve the junk as an accountant and to repair the junk. He could spend only ten days with his family and again left Bangkok get on board the junk again. Until the junk set sail for Nagasaki, he busied himself in seeing the maintenance of the junk and loading the exports for the next passage across to Japan.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Matsumiya, *Wakan yosebumi*, 160.

<sup>52</sup> Tokyo Daigaku, *Totsuji kaisyonichiroku*, vol. 1, 98-101. He was the only one Siamese whose name appeared on Japanese documets and whose *Fusetsu-gaki* is available today.

<sup>53</sup> Matsumiya, *Wakan yosebumi*, 160.

<sup>54</sup> Matsumiya, *Wakan yosebumi*, 160.

### The Moors Traders

Apart from the Chinese and Siamese officials, there were the "Moor" traders onboard of Siamese junks. The group of people referred to as "Moors" was composed of Indian Muslims, Arabs, Turks, and Persians.<sup>55</sup> They were an influential force in the seventeenth century Ayutthaya and dominated the trading activities in the Bay of Bengal. Like the Chinese, some of them served the kings as high-ranking officials, traders, and sailors. They brought Indian clothes that were essential imports to the Siamese court through the ports on the Coromandel Coast to Ayutthaya. Some of these Indian cloths were also re-exported to Japan.

In Japanese sources, the "Moor" appeared as "*Mouru-jin*". They were most likely Persians. The "Moor" traders usually visited Nagasaki on board of Siamese junks but never came to Japan by their own ships.<sup>56</sup> They were active in the Japan trade particularly in the 1630s and 1660s. No Japanese source mentioned the visit of the "Moors" to Japan in the 1640s and 1650s.<sup>57</sup> It should be noted that the period of the "Moors'" absence almost overlapped with that of the Siamese crown junks.

During the 1630s, several Siamese junks took the "Moor"

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<sup>55</sup> Usually the "Moors" in the European sources can be identified with the above-mentioned countries. However, sometimes the "Moor" included other Muslims such as Malays. Nagashima, "Persian Muslim Merchants in Thailand," 1-2.

<sup>56</sup> Nishikawa, *Zoho kaitsumshoko*, 128, 131.

<sup>57</sup> Nagashima, "Persian Muslim Merchants in Thailand," 2-3.

merchants to Japan. These "Moor" merchants were purely "passengers" with their cargoes and had nothing to do with the junk operation during the voyage at sea. At Nagasaki, they sold their cargoes on his account. At times, some of the "Moors" remained at Nagasaki for more business after the junks that brought them to Japan left the country. Even though they missed the junks, it was not difficult for them to find either Dutch ships or Chinese junks that could accommodate them.

After the almost twenty years of absence, the "Moor" merchants reappeared in the Japan trade around 1660 when King Narai reentered the Japan trade by manning their junks with Chinese and Muslim sailors.<sup>58</sup> However, while the king spent much of his time in wars against Cambodia, Chaing Mai, and Burma, it was the "Moor" officials who controlled the trade. In 1663, Chinese interpreters reported that there were at least three Siamese junks sailed into Nagasaki, namely, Ship No. 5, 25 and 27 and recognized the presence of the "Moor"

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<sup>58</sup> Iwao Seiichi says that King Narai sent out two ships for Japan on 6 July 1661 in an attempt to reopen the trade with Japan. These two ships were "furnished with a letter of recommendation dated 29 May 1661, which had been prepared by Jan van Rijk, director of the Dutch factory in Siam." Although the voyages were made by the direct order of the King, these ships were sent out under the name of a Moor "Oja Pieshijit". They arrived at Nagasaki in August of the same year and left for home after making successful trade. Nagashima Hiromu, on the other hand, disagrees Iwao and states that the "Moor" merchants in Siam resumed visiting Japan in 1660. His argument depends on the letter written to the Governor-General at Batavia in 1660 by Joan Bouchelion, the director of the Dutch factory at Nagasaki. The same junk set sail for Japan again on 29 May 1661 and arrived at Nagasaki on 4 August 1661 with a pass issued by Jan van Rijk on 29 May 1661. Belonging to "Otsubashinousu" or Opra Sinorat, this junk brought fifty-four Chinese and twenty-three "Moors". Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand*, 36; Iwao, "Reopening of Diplomatic and Commercial Relations," 22; Nagashima, "Persian Muslim Merchants in Thailand," 3-4.

merchants onboard of Ship No. 5 and 25.<sup>59</sup>

Onboard Ship No. 5 was at least twenty-three "Moor" traders. According to their testimonies, King Narai, "*Mouru danna*" or the chief of the "Moor", and a Japanese resident in Siam Kiya Hanzaemon consigned their cargoes to them. After successful trade, Ship No. 5 left Nagasaki but wrecked near Satsuma. In the summer of 1664, the survivors including twenty-three "Moor" merchants and the saved cargoes were sent back to Nagasaki.<sup>60</sup> The surviving "Moors" left Nagasaki for Siam by a Dutch ship.<sup>61</sup>

According to the Dutch diaries at Nagasaki, the Moor traders arrived at Nagasaki aboard Siamese junks in 1666 and 1667 respectively.<sup>62</sup> They seem to be the last records on the "Moors" at Nagasaki.

### The Japanese Residents in Siam

As the vermilion-seal ship trade developed, Japanese emigrants spread out Southeast Asia along the busy trade routes. Besides the crew

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<sup>59</sup> Tokyo Daigaku, *Totsuji kaishonichiroku*, vol. 1, 6-7, 27, 28, 35.

<sup>60</sup> Under the *sakoku* system, any foreign ships wrecked on and drifted to the coast of Japan were towed into Nagasaki. All shipwreck survivors, cargoes, and fittings were also handed over to the magistrates of Nagasaki. Nakamura Tadashi, "Kinse-boei ni okeru tsumini to norikumiin (Cargoes and crews of the Chinese junks in the pre-modern period)," *Kyusyu sangyo daigaku syoukei ronso (Economic and Business Review)* 12, no. 1 (1971), 6.

<sup>61</sup> Tokyo Daigaku, *Totsuji kaishonichiroku*, vol. 1, 27-28, 35.

<sup>62</sup> Nagashima, "Persian Muslim Merchants in Thailand," 7.

members of these ships, merchants, and *ronin* or lordless *samurai* also traveled across the sea.<sup>63</sup> Moreover, persecuted Christians and their families fled from Japan, too. These people gradually settled and formed Japanese quarters in several major ports overseas.<sup>64</sup> The Japanese settlement in Siam was established on southern outskirts of the capital Ayutthaya as early as the beginning of the 1610s.<sup>65</sup> It was one of the largest Japanese settlements in the early seventeenth century. It is estimated that at its peak in the 1620s, the population of the settlement was more than one thousand.<sup>66</sup>

In Ayutthaya, the livings of the Japanese residents were more or less dependent on the trade between Siam and Japan. A few prominent Japanese directly invested in the Siamese-Japanese trade. They obtained *shuinjo* through their connections with the *bakufu* and sent their ships to

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<sup>63</sup> After the Ashikaga *bakufu* collapsed in 1573, Japan had suffered a series of civil wars. When finally Tokugawa Ieyasu seized the power as shogun in 1603, many *samurai* who belonged to the defeated party lost their lords and statuses. Seeking their fortune, some of them left Japan and crossed into Southeast Asia. They often worked as mercenaries of local authorities or Europeans stationed in the ports. Iwao, *Nanyo nihon-machi no kenkyu*, 16-18.

<sup>64</sup> However, the boundaries between all those groups of people were quite vague. Christians often became merchants to make their livings and got involved in the vermilion seal ship trade. Some of them were ship crews, merchants, and pirates at the same time. Even though they were primarily traders, they were not averse to committing piracy whenever they had opportunities. Iwao, *Nanyo nihon-machi no kenkyu*, 16, 129.

<sup>65</sup> Iwao, *Nanyo nihon-machi no kenkyu*, 139.

<sup>66</sup> For a detailed analysis of overseas Japanese during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries see Iwao, *Nanyo nihon-machi no kenkyu*. Chapter 5 exclusively deals with Japanese emigrants and their activities in Siam.

Japan as *Shuinsen*.<sup>67</sup> Most typically, the Japanese were involved in the deerskin trade, which were obtained from around the Chao Phraya basin, especially in Phitsanulok, Sukhothai, and Kamphaengphet.<sup>68</sup> The products were collected, cured, and processed by the Japanese residents in Siam exclusively for export to the Japanese market. Japanese residents also dominated the market of ray skins and sapanwood as the main supplier to the *shuinsen* coming from Japan.<sup>69</sup> At the same time, some Japanese were hired by Europeans as middlemen for purchasing merchandise and as laborers for preparing an export cargo to Japan.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> The names of Japanese residents in Siam who obtained *shuinjo* can be found in Iwao, *Nanyo nihon-machi no kenkyu*, 129.

<sup>68</sup> Ray skins were popular material for the hilt of Japanese sword. See Okada Akio, "Kinsei ni okeru sikagawa no yunyu ni kansuru kenkyu (A study of Japan's import of deer skins in early modern Japan)," *Syakai keizai shigaku* (Socio-economic History) (Tokyo) 7, no. 7 (1937): 58-59; Ishii and Yoshikawa, *Nichitai koryu 600 nen-shi*, 18-19, 47, 51. Jeremias van Vilet, "Description of the Kingdom of Siam," 67. For one view of Japan's demand for deer skins as munitions in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries see Okada Akio, "Kinsei ni okeru sikagawa no yunyu ni kansuru kenkyu," *Syukui keizai shigaku* 7, no. 7 (1937): 57-75; no. 8 (1937): 114-124. For the description of deer-hunt in the late seventeenth century see Letter from Bantam to the Company, London, dated December 31, 1664. O. C. 3041/2; quoted in Anderson, *English Intercourse with Siam*, 99-100, n. 2.

<sup>69</sup> Sapanwood (*Caesalpinia sappan* L.) is called *suo* in Japanese. Its extract yields red dye. As early as fifteenth century, Japan imported sapanwood from Siam via the Ryukyu trade network. Ray skins were popular material for the hilt of Japanese sword. For a contemporary account of sapanwood trade see Engelbert Kaempfer, *A Description of the Kingdom of Siam 1690*, translated by John Gaspar Scheuchzer (London, 1727; reprint, Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1987), 74 (page citations are from the reprint edition). Ishii and Yoshikawa, *Nichitai koryu 600 nen-shi*, 18-19, 47, 51; Okada Akio, "Kinsei ni okeru sikagawa no yunyu ni kansuru kenkyu (A study of Japan's import of deer skins in early modern Japan)," *Syakai keizai shigaku* (Socio-economic History) (Tokyo) 7, no. 7 (1937): 58-59. For a history of sapanwood trade in East Asia see Sogabe Shizuo, *Chugoku syakai keizaishi no kenkyu* (A Socio-commercial history of China) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1976), 483-496.

Once the *sakoku* policy was in place, the abandoned overseas Japanese had to find other ways to earn their living. Vermilion seal ships ceased calling into Siam and the Japanese emigrants lost their opportunity to send their own ships to Japan. In the 1630s, to secure and revive their business, the Japanese in Siam used their influence in the Siamese court and encouraged the king to dispatch an ambassador to give a friendly invitation to the Japanese merchants.<sup>71</sup> But their efforts were in vain. The *bakufu* rejected King Prasatthong's requests.<sup>72</sup>

Under the circumstances, the Japanese kept their position in maritime commerce. A few wealthy Japanese traders found themselves in the inter-regional trade.<sup>73</sup> Meanwhile, as the Dutch were the only Europeans permitted to visit the port of Nagasaki, the VOC must have managed to acquire a share of the Siamese-Japanese cargoes that were formerly carried by Japanese ships. Since the deerskin processing and trade were predominately controlled by the Japanese, the Dutch company could not make contract for the annual purchase of deerskin without the Japanese being involved.<sup>74</sup> Thus some Japanese became the

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<sup>70</sup> Iwao, *Nanyo nihon-machi no kenkyu*, 200-206.

<sup>71</sup> Jeremias van Vliet, "Description of the Kingdom of Siam," translated by L. F. van Ravenswaay, *The Journal of the Siam Society*, vol. 7, pt. 1 (1910): 58.

<sup>72</sup> For a detailed discussion see Chapter 5.

<sup>73</sup> Iwao, *Nanyo nihon-machi no kenkyu*, 206-209.

<sup>74</sup> Nagazumi, "Ayutthaya and Japan," 97.

employees of their former rival, the VOC.<sup>75</sup> When Siamese junk reentered the Japan trade, the Japanese emigrants invested these junks.<sup>76</sup>

Even though the Japanese government prohibited the overseas Japanese repatriating, it could not stop the correspondence between the overseas Japanese and their homes. In order to let their families know of their well-being, the Japanese in Ayutthaya consigned many letters and gifts for their parents and relatives to Siamese junks.<sup>77</sup> The latest letter of them was dated in 1661, in which a Japanese resident in Ayutthaya sent a picture of the Buddha to his hometown in honor of his parents.<sup>78</sup>



จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย


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<sup>75</sup> Iwao, *Nanyo nihon-machi no kenkyu*, 208.

<sup>76</sup> Tokyo Daigaku, *Totsuji kaishonichiroku*, vol. 1, 27-28, 35.

<sup>77</sup> Hayashi, *Tsuko ichiran*, vol. 1, 35.

<sup>78</sup> Iwao, *Nanyo nihon-machi no kenkyu*, 175-184.



**PART TWO**

**A HISTORY OF SIAMESE-JAPANESE TRADE,**

**1604-1728**

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย



## CHAPTER 5

### HISTORY OF SIAMESE JUNK TRADE WITH JAPAN, 1604-1656

The early seventeenth century marked the highlight of pre-modern diplomatic relations between Siam and Japan. From 1604, the vermilion seal ships visited Siam. On the basis of the already developed commercial relations, the bilateral relationship between Siam and Japan improved dramatically. During King Prasatthong's reign (r. 1629-1656), however, Siamese-Japanese trade suffered a severe setback due to the changing political situations in Siam and the introduction of a new foreign policy in Japan. This chapter presents the historical background of this "mutual friendship" and the "interruption" in the relations between the two countries in order to comprehend the relationship during the reign of King Narai and the economic history of Ayutthaya as a whole.

#### Development of Diplomatic Relationship, 1604-1629

##### Pre-Seventeenth Century Relations

Prior to the seventeenth century, the Siamese kings had some relations with the Japanese local *daimyo* (provincial lord) although there was no government-level relation between the two countries.<sup>1</sup> In the late 1570s,

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<sup>1</sup> For a brief account of Siamese-Japanese intercourse in the sixteenth century see Iwao Seiichi, *Nanyo nihon-machi no kenkyu* (A study of Japanese quarters in Southeast Asia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries), rev. ed. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1966), 127-129. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Ryukyu kingdom had diplomatic relations with Siam. The rulers of both countries exchanged missions and corresponded with each other. However, the author believes that a history of Ryukyu kingdom should not be treated merely as a part of that of Japan. For a history of Siamese-Ryukyuan intercourses before the seventeenth century see Ishii Yoneo and Yoshikawa Toshiharu, *Nichitai koryu 600 nen-shi* (A history of exchanges between Japan and

King Maha Thammaracha (r. 1569-1590) exchanged several letters and gifts with the Matura clan of Hirado on western Kyushu. In 1578, a Chinese merchant named Guo Daiguang came to Hirado with a letter of the king. In the following year, another Chinese trader Wu Dailao brought some gifts from the king. In return, Matura Takanobu (1529-1599) requested the king of Siam to send a junk every year to Japan and promised to provide Japanese goods for the king in the future.<sup>2</sup>

Nonetheless, when Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537-1589) became the chief Imperial minister in 1585, his heavy-handed diplomacy damaged the amicable relations between the Siamese king and Japanese local *daimyo*. While Hideyoshi encouraged the Japanese to trade with countries in Southeast Asia, his tendency to appeal to arms prevented commercial development and often caused tensions throughout East and Southeast Asia.<sup>3</sup> Finally, Hideyoshi's seven-year war with Korea and China from 1592 to 1598 was a severe blow to the relation between Siam and Japan.

Following the death of King Mahathammaracha, his son Naresuan (r. 1590-1605) ascended the throne in 1590. King Naresuan promptly received the news of Hideyoshi's action towards Korea,

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Thailand for the last six hundred years) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1987), 4-44.

<sup>2</sup> Kobata Atsushi, "Matura-ke bunko no kaigaikotsu siryo nitsuite (Sources on foreign intercourse of Matura archives)," *Shirin* (Journal of History) (Kyoto) 36, no. 6 (1950): 94-95.

<sup>3</sup> Between 1591 and 1594, Hideyoshi threatened the Spaniard in Luzon with military operations if they did not pay a tribute to Japan. Iwao Seiichi, *Nanyo nihon-machi no kenkyu*, 225-227.

probably through commercial channels. The king dispatched a mission to China and offered to send the Siamese navy against Japan.<sup>4</sup> At this point, the development of diplomatic relation between Siam and Japan was interrupted.

### Ieyasu's Missives

When Tokugawa Ieyasu seized power as shogun in 1603, Japan's foreign relations had already suffered greatly. Hideyoshi's war with Korea and China had left Japan isolated from the rest of Asia. Nevertheless, at the dawn of the Tokugawa *bakufu*, Ieyasu needed international recognition to create national power in the domestic arena.<sup>5</sup> It was, therefore, urgent to normalize foreign relations and monopolize the authority in international affairs.<sup>6</sup>

Meanwhile, in Siam, King Naresuan died on 25 April 1605. His younger brother Ekathotsarot (r. 1605-1610/11) succeeded to the throne. During this peaceful transition, the new king cultivated relations with foreign powers and improved his kingdom's commerce internationally. Under the reign of King Ekathotsarot, Siam recovered from the wars in the sixteenth century with the Burmese and restored itself as a major political and economic power in the region.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> The Chinese government rejected his offer in the end. David K. Wyatt, *Thailand: A Short History*, Thailand ed. (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1982), 104.

<sup>5</sup> Toby, *State and Diplomacy*, 234.

<sup>6</sup> For a study of Tokugawa foreign policy in the early seventeenth century see Nagazumi Yoko, *Kinsei shoki no gaiko* (Foreign policy in early modern Japan) (Tokyo: Sobunsha, 1990).

<sup>7</sup> Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand*, 11 and 13-14; Wyatt,

It was in this period that Tokugawa Ieyasu took the initiative in opening state-to-state relations between Japan and Siam. In 1606, Ieyasu sent his first letter with diplomatic greetings to King Ekathotsarot.<sup>8</sup> Ieyasu asked for friendship and alliance between the two countries.<sup>9</sup> Three suits of Japanese armour and swords were presented to the king of Siam in exchange for the best quality of eaglewood and some guns.<sup>10</sup> Until 1608, however, no response from King Ekathotsarot reached Japan. Ieyasu once again initiated diplomatic contacts with Siam. He ordered *toshiyori* (the bureaucratic elders of the *bakufu*) Honda Masazumi, who was one of Ieyasu's main policy advisors, to write to the king on his behalf.<sup>11</sup>

In 1610, for the first time, a merchant junk from Siam brought a response from Okya Phrakhleng, as the Siamese counterpart of Masazumi. Upon receiving Okya Phrakhleng's reply, Ieyasu sent a

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*Short History*, 105; and Anthony Reid, "Documenting the Rise and Fall of Ayudhaya as a Regional Trade Center," in *Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia* (Chaing Mai: Silkworm Books, 1999), 93.

<sup>8</sup> A few months before Ieyasu wrote to the king of Siam, a *daimyo* Simazu Iehisa (1576-1638) of Satsuma on southern Kyusu, who was also involved in the trade between Siam and Japan, received a letter from a minister of Siam. Iwao, *Shuinsen boeki-shi no kenkyu*, 160. Presumably, the letter was delivered by order of the king. Nevertheless, since this letter did not address to the *bakufu*, Japan's central administration at that time, this thesis takes Ieyasu's action to be the actual opening of state-to-state relations between Siam and Japan.

<sup>9</sup> Kondo, *Gaiban tsusho*, vol. 1, 101-102. For an English translation see Ernest Mason Satow, "Notes on the Intercourse between Japan and Siam in the Seventeenth Century," *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, no.13 (1885): 144-147.

<sup>10</sup> *Aquilaria agallocha*. An aromatic wood. The oil extracted from eaglewood is used for perfumes and incense. It was also known as aloes wood.

letter with some gifts to King Ekathotsarot. The gifts were presented to the king by the head of the Japanese residents.<sup>12</sup> Ieyasu asked to promote commercial and diplomatic relation between the two countries. In addition, Masazumi wrote to Okya Phrakhlang and delivered an address of his thanks. Subsequently, the *bakufu* exchanged letters and gifts with the Siamese kings between 1606 and 1629.<sup>13</sup>

### King Songtham's Embassies

As King Ekathotsarot died between October 1610 and November 1611, a series of succession conflicts broke out in Siam. Finally, King Songtham (r. 1610/11-1628) ascended the throne, and his reign marked the height of the diplomatic relations between Siam and Japan.<sup>14</sup> At least four Siamese embassies visited Japan during King Songtham's reign. In the summer of 1612, a junk from Siam arrived at Nagasaki. The captain had an audience with Ieyasu, who had already passed the office of shōgun on to his son Hidetada at the castle of Sumpu (present-day Shizuoka). In 1613, two more junks from Siam sailed into Nagasaki although it was not certain whether King Songtham actually sent these captains as his envoys or not.<sup>15</sup> In 1616, an official Siamese

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<sup>11</sup> Hayashi, *Tsuko ichiran*, vol. 6, 529-531.

<sup>12</sup> Iwao, *Shuinsen boeki-shi no kenkyu*, 159-160.

<sup>13</sup> Hayashi, *Tsuko ichiran*, vol. 6, 529-531; also see Satow, "Notes on the Intercourse," 147-175.

<sup>14</sup> For accounts of King Songtham's accession see Dhiravat, "A Political History," 121-122; Wyatt, *Thailand: A Short History*, 106.

<sup>15</sup> Hayashi, *Tsuko ichiran*, vol. 6, 529-531; Satow, "Notes on the

ambassador arrived in Nagasaki for the first time. Unfortunately, no record shows how he was received in Japan.<sup>16</sup>

The second Siamese embassy entered Nagasaki in 1621. The two envoys Khun Phichai Sombat and Khun Prasat together with twenty of their suite proceeded to Edo, present-day Tokyo. On 1 September 1621, the envoys had the privilege to be received by the shogun Tokugawa Hidetada (1579-1632) at the castle of Edo.<sup>17</sup> In the presence of *bakufu* officials and *daimyos*, the letter of King Songtham was presented to Hidetada. The letter and gifts from the shogun to the king were handed over to the envoys a few days after the audience.<sup>18</sup> A diplomatic precedent was established, and all the subsequent Siamese

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Intercourse," 147; Ishii Yoneo, "Seventeenth Century Japanese Documents about Siam," *Journal of Siam Society* (July 1971), 163; also see Miki, *Nissen kotsu-shi*, 55.

<sup>16</sup> Iwao Seiichi, "Sham kenshi-ko 1616 nen (A study of Siamese mission to Japan in 1616)," *Sigakuzasshi* 44, no. 6 (1933), 73-98; also see Ishii, "Seventeenth Century Japanese Documents," 163.

<sup>17</sup> In order to assure a smooth succession, Ieyasu named his son, Hidetada, to shogun in 1605, two years after the establishment of the Tokugawa regime. Ieyasu retired and became *ogoshi* (ex-shogun). Hidetada, however, ruled in name only. Under the so-called "dual monarchy," Ieyasu continued to control the actual workings of the government, especially foreign policy until his death of 1616. Kato Eiichi, "Unification and Adaptation, The Early Shogunate and Dutch Trade Policies," in *Companies and Trade*, ed. Leonard Blussé and Femme Gastra (Leiden University Press, 1981), 211; also see Nagazumi Yoko, *Kinsei shoki no gaiko*, sec. 1 *passim*.

<sup>18</sup> Hayashi, *Tsuko ichiran*, vol. 6, 531-537; Satow, "Notes on the Intercourse," 151-153. For a detailed description of the audience with Hidetada see Satow, "Notes on the Intercourse," 147-149; Ishii and Yoshikawa, *Nichitai koryu 600 nen-shi*, 74-77; Nagazumi Yoko, "Ayutthaya and Japan: Embassies and Trade in the Seventeenth Century," in *From Japan to Arabia: Ayutthaya's Maritime Relations with Asia*, ed. Kennon Breazeale (Bangkok: the Foundation for the Promotion of Social Sciences and Humanities textbooks Project, 1999), 90-91.

embassies were received in the same manner.<sup>19</sup>

It seems that there was a motive behind the 1621 Siamese embassy. In 1621, King Songtham was preparing for war against Cambodia, as the new king of Cambodia had recently renounced his status of vassal to Siam. King Songtham planned to send two forces to Cambodia, one by land and the other by sea, and asked the shogun for aid in the attack.<sup>20</sup> Yet his request for transporting troops of Japanese soldiers to Siam was turned down by the *bakufu*.<sup>21</sup> King Songtham was so preoccupied with the war against Cambodia that no embassy was sent to Japan in the following year.<sup>22</sup>

The third and fourth Siamese embassies visited Nagasaki in 1623 and 1626 respectively. The two envoys went to Kyoto where they had an audience with ex-shogun Hidetada, and then the reigning shogun Iemitsu (1604-1651).<sup>23</sup> Since Japanese ships had rendered the

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<sup>19</sup> Nagazumi Yoko, "Ayutthaya and Japan," 92.

<sup>20</sup> Jeremias van Vilet, "Description of the Kingdom of Siam," trans. L. F. van Ravenswaay, *Journal of Siam Society* 7 (1910), 36; Hayashi, *Tsuko ichiran*, vol. 7, 10-15; Satow, "Notes on the Intercourse," 157, 160; Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth Century*, 17.

<sup>21</sup> Iwao, *Shuinsen boeki-shi no kenkyu*, 130-131, 190-191. In July 1621, indeed, the *bakufu* forbade the employment of Japanese by foreign nations.

<sup>22</sup> Hayashi, *Tsuko ichiran*, vol. 7, 1-10; also see Satow, "Notes on the Intercourse," 157.

<sup>23</sup> The reply to the king Songtham was drawn up under the name of Hidetada, instead of Iemitsu. Hidetada retired in 1623 and his son Iemitsu succeeded him as shogun. Hidetada retained authority until his death in 1632. Hayashi, *Tsuko ichiran*, vol. 7, 1-2; also see Satow, "Notes on the Intercourse," 158-159.

king of Cambodia assistance, King Songtham was not pleased with the Japanese merchants and requested the shogun to warn the Japanese subjects not to go to Cambodia.<sup>24</sup> In 1626, Songtham's fourth and last embassy arrived at Nagasaki in a merchant ship. By order of the king, Okya Phrakhlang dispatched two envoys bearing his letter addressed to both Sakai Tadayo (1572-1636) and Doi Toshikatsu (1573-1644), who were in charge of the *bakufu's* foreign policy and attended Hidetada's audiences concerning foreign affairs.<sup>25</sup>

King Songtham died on 12 December 1628, and his eldest son King Chettha (r. 1628-1629) came to the throne. He dispatched his one and only embassy to Japan in order to announce his accession. The king wished to renew and continue the mutual friendly relations. In September 1629, three Siamese envoys presented King Chettha's letter to shogun Iemitsu at Edo. In response, Iemitsu assured him that he would maintain friendly communications and constant commercial intercourse between the two countries.<sup>26</sup> This mission conveyed the last letter from the Japanese government to Siamese king.

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<sup>24</sup> Some of Japanese joined the Siamese king's naval force. In 1624, the Cambodian side asked the shogun to maintain strict neutrality. Hayashi, *Tsuko ichiran*, vol. 6, 484-485; Iwao, *Shuinsen boeki-shi no kenkyu*, 113-114.

<sup>25</sup> Hayashi, *Tsuko ichiran*, vol. 7, 10-15; Satow "Notes on the Intercourse," 164-167. After Ieyasu's demise, his personal entourage quickly disappeared. New *toshiyori* came to the fore in Hidetada's administration. Sakai Tadayo and Doi Toshikatsu were in charge of *bakufu's* foreign policy and attended Hidetada's audiences on foreign affairs. Nagazumi Yoko, *Kinsei shoki no gaiko*, sec. 1 passim.

<sup>26</sup> Hayashi, *Tsuko ichiran*, vol. 7, 13; also see Satow, "Notes on the Intercourse," 169-171.

In these years, Japan's diplomacy at that time was heavily dependent on commercial network. The Japanese residents played an important role in Siam that enabled the *bakufu* to establish diplomatic relation with the court of Ayutthaya. Utilizing their connections with Japan, Japanese expatriates acted as intermediaries between Siamese kings and Japanese shoguns.<sup>27</sup>

### Development of Commercial Relations, 1604-1635

#### Vermillion Seal Ships

When Tokugawa Ieyasu became shogun in 1603, Japan's foreign trade was in the hands of the independent Japanese traders and the bulk of Europeans. Ieyasu considered the control of foreign trade was of the utmost important as a means of strengthening the finances of the *bakufu*. In 1604, the shogun implemented the *shuin* license system, whose origins could be dated back to the Muromachi period (1338-1573). The chief Imperial minister Toyotomi Hideyoshi elaborated this system by designating the central government as the sole authority issuing the licenses. Then Tokugawa Ieyasu finally consolidated the system, which aimed to establish the *bakufu* trade monopoly.<sup>28</sup>

The *bakufu* issued the *shuinjo* to those who wished to trade with overseas countries.<sup>29</sup> A license was valid for one single round trip to

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<sup>27</sup> Iwao, *Nanyo nihon-machi no kenkyu*, 162-163.

<sup>28</sup> Iwao Seiichi, *Shuinsen boeki-shi no kenkyu* (Studies in the history of trade under the vermilion-seal licenses of the Tokugawa Shogunate), rev. ed. (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1985), 41-59.

<sup>29</sup> *Shuin* literally means vermilion seal. Because the patent bore the official vermilion seal, it was called *shuinjo* (a letter with vermilion-seal).

Japan and endorsed with the name of the person to whom it was granted as well as the name of place where he was supposed to trade. Ieyasu sent a number of letters to the rulers of Southeast Asian countries as to introduce the *shuinsen* (vermilion seal ship). He urged that the traders bearing *shuinjo* patent be permitted to trade freely at their licensed destinations and that any Japanese ship lacking *shuinjo* be treated as pirates.<sup>30</sup> Hence, the license served as a passport as well as a visa when a licensed ship sailed into its destined port.<sup>31</sup> In addition, these licenses were capable of guaranteeing the right of free navigation on the high seas and were even effective guarantees of neutrality and safe passage in wartime. One of the reasons behind the development of the *shuin* license system was the so-called *wako*, pirates operating from Japan who had devastated the Chinese coasts during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Although most of *wako* were actually Chinese, the Ming (1368-1644) government prohibited all Japanese from landing in China. Therefore, Japanese traders had no choice but to voyage to Southeast Asia where they could obtain raw silk and other Chinese products.<sup>32</sup>

Under the *shuin* license system, the licensed traders and their ships dominated the trade between Southeast Asia and Japan. In the early years of the *shuin* system, licensed Japanese ships sailed for

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<sup>30</sup> Sakuma Sigeo, *Nichimin kankei-shi no kenkyu* (A study of the Japan-China relations during Ming period), (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1992), 361-365; Iwao, *Shuinsen boeki-shi no kenkyu*, 9-40.

<sup>31</sup> For a detailed analysis of Japanese trade under *shuin* licenses system see the authoritative study by Iwao, *Shuinsen boeki-shi no kenkyu*.

<sup>32</sup> Iwao, *Namyo nihon-machi no kenkyu*, 85-113.

nineteen major destinations in Southeast Asia. In 1604, at the request of Arima Harunobu (1567-1612) of Hizen, the Tokugawa *bakufu* issued the first series of *shuinjo* to ships bound for Siam.<sup>33</sup> Three licenses were granted to a Japanese resident Youemon in Siam. Shimazu Iehisa (1576-1638) of Satsuma also obtained one license this year.<sup>34</sup> After 1617, political and economic conditions caused the number of ports to be reduced to six.<sup>35</sup> Siam remained as one of the principal destinations for Japanese ships besides Taiwan, Tonkin, Cochin China, Cambodia, and Luzon. Between 1604 and 1635, some fifty-six Japanese ships issued with the official vermilion seal licenses were destined for Siam, which constituted the highest number of authorized licenses for any single country in these years.<sup>36</sup>

However, there were many different groups involved in the Southeast Asian junk trade through this licensed *shuinsen* system. During the Ieyasu's administration, the *bakufu* always offered equal protection and opportunities to all countries visiting Japan in search of commerce. With the patronage of the *bakufu*, many groups such as the *daimyo*, *bakufu* officials, Japanese merchants as well as Chinese and European residents in Japan sent their ships to Southeast Asia.<sup>37</sup> In

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<sup>33</sup> Hizen covered present Saga and Nagasaki prefectures on the western Kyusyu.

<sup>34</sup> Iwao, *Nanyo nihon-machi no kenkyu*, 129.

<sup>35</sup> Iwao, *Shuinsen boeki-shi no kenkyu*, 149-176.

<sup>36</sup> Iwao, *Nanyo nihon-machi no kenkyu*, 10-11.

<sup>37</sup> Kato Eiichi, "The Japanese-Dutch Trade in the Formative Period of the Seclusion Policy, Particularly on the Raw Silk Trade by the Dutch Factory at

addition, many individual traders traveled on board the *shuinsen* and participated in the *shuinsen* trade. These individual traders paid for their own passage and freight charge for the carriage of their goods to the *shuinsen* ship.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, the crew members of each ship were also permitted to carry their own merchandise to sell in foreign ports. Some of them exported Japanese silver to Siam. In exchange, they brought deerskins, sapanwood, ray skins and precious minerals back home.<sup>39</sup>

The rulers of Tokugawa *bakufu* gradually intensified the regulation of the licensed traders and tightened the control of the vermilion seal ships, which introduced Christian missionaries from abroad. From 1620 onward, only a few selected people who had close relations with the *bakufu* were permitted to outfit ships. In 1633, the *bakufu* restricted the number of *shuin* licenses. Finally, in 1635, *shuin* license system was dismissed, and Japanese were forbidden to make overseas voyages. It was a severe blow to Japanese traders. Japanese vermilion seal ships then disappeared from Asian seas. As a consequence, most of Japan's foreign trade fell into the willing hands of Chinese and Dutch merchants.<sup>40</sup>

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Hirado 1620-1640," *Acta Asiatica*, no. 30 (1976): 221.

<sup>38</sup> Iwao, *Shuinsen boeki-shi no kenkyu*, 262-286.

<sup>39</sup> Nagazumi Yoko, "Ayutthaya and Japan," 96.

<sup>40</sup> Iwao, *Shuinsen boeki-shi no kenkyu*, 400-434.

### *Sakoku-rei*

The Japanese foreign policy underwent crucial changes during the 1630s. In order to monopolize foreign trade, which had been conducted within the discretion of local *daimyo*, and control Christianity strictly, the *bakufu* issued five sets of memoranda to the magistrates of Nagasaki in 1633, 1634, 1635, 1636, and 1639.<sup>41</sup> The purpose of these five orders, usually called "*sakoku-rei*" as a whole, was mainly threefold. First and foremost, it aimed to forbid the Japanese to travel abroad and the overseas Japanese to come back home. Secondly, it restricted Christian and missionaries' activities in Japan. Lastly, the *bakufu* intended to gain control over the foreign trade.<sup>42</sup>

In 1633, the *bakufu* issued the first ban on Japanese traveling overseas. Then, in 1635, overseas Japanese were prohibited from repatriating. At this point, the *shuin-sen* trade came to an end. In the same year, the entrance of Chinese ships into Japan was restricted only to the port of Nagasaki. The last Portuguese galiot left Nagasaki for Macao in the summer of 1639. In the following year, a Portuguese ship sailed into Nagasaki from Macao. It petitioned the *bakufu* for trade. However, sixty-one out of seventy-four members onboard except the non-Christian sailors were executed.<sup>43</sup> At last, the *bakufu* only allowed

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<sup>41</sup> The term *sakoku* was not a contemporary seventeenth century term or the perceptions of Japanese about their own policies. For a detailed discussion of the term "*sakoku*" see Toby, *State and Diplomacy*, 11-14.

<sup>42</sup> For the texts of each *sakoku-rei* see Ishii Ryosuke, ed., *Tokugawa kinrei ko zenshu*, vol. 6 (Tokyo: Sobunsha, 1959), 375-379.

<sup>43</sup> Yamamoto Hirofumi, "*Sakoku to engambobi taisei* (*Sakoku and Japan's*

authorized foreign trade at Nagasaki. The Dutch factory was transferred from Hirado to Nagasaki in 1641. The *sakoku* system was established and reinforced until Japan reluctantly opened its doors in the late nineteenth century.

### King Prasatthong's Efforts to Restore the Relations

In 1630, the relationship between Siam and Japan faced a difficult time. King Prasatthong (r. 1629-1656) ascended the throne through a series of succession conflicts in 1629. Almost immediately, the news of the political upheaval in Siam was delivered to the *bakufu* by a Japanese captain Focquia Chicheymon returning from Siam. He informed the magistrate of Nagasaki that the new king was a usurper.<sup>44</sup> In late 1634, when Prasatthong's first embassy came to Japan with a hope to renew the friendship and invite the Japanese traders to Siam. The magistrate of Nagasaki questioned the ambassador on the last succession and the newly ascended king. However, the ambassador failed to present a convincing explanation on the king's legitimacy. At last, the magistrate of Nagasaki refused to convey the royal letter to the *shogun* on the ground that the ambassador was not qualified.<sup>45</sup>

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coast guard system)," in *"Sakoku" wo minosu*, ed. Nagazumi Yoko (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1999), 22-23.

<sup>44</sup> Iwao Seiichi, "Reopening of the Diplomatic and Commercial Relations between Japan and Siam during the Tokugawa Period," *Acat Asiatica* 4 (March 1963): 8-9.

<sup>45</sup> Nagazumi Yoko trans., *Hirado-oranda shokan no nikki* (Journal of the Dutch Company Trading House at Hirado). (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1969-1970), 157-158.

The second embassy left Siam in 1635 and put into Nagasaki in the following year. Yet, again, the ship was compelled to leave Nagasaki without accomplishing the mission. However, on its way home this ship was shipwrecked. Wondering what happened to his embassy, the king ordered a Japanese official Okphra Chula to write a letter to the magistrate of Nagasaki on his behalf. A Japanese junk delivered the letter to Japan in August 1638. Okphra Chula told that the king had decided to send another ambassador to Japan and asked the magistrate of Nagasaki if the *shogun* would intend to accept this embassy. In response, Chinese interpreters and foreign interpreters, possibly Siamese interpreters, drafted a letter to Okphra Chula.<sup>46</sup> It stated that "only after Japan lawfully recognizes the legitimacy of the king will the route to Japan be open."<sup>47</sup> Despite the *bakufu's* harsh response, King Prasatthong seemed not to get discouraged. He sent four more embassies to Japan during his reign. Before sixth embassy came home, King Prasatthong passed away on 7 August 1656.<sup>48</sup>

The desire for King Prasatthong to reestablish the diplomatic relation with Japan was more than political. Each ship sent by the king carried cargoes to sell or barter in Japan. The purpose of these ships

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<sup>46</sup> Nagazumi Yoko trans., *Hirado-oranda shokan no nikki* (Journal of the Dutch Company Trading House at Hirado), (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1969-1970), 127-128, 157-158; Iwao, "Reopening of the Diplomatic and Commercial Relations," 7-11.

<sup>47</sup> Nagazumi, "Ayutthaya and Japan," 95. Also see Iwao, "Reopening of the Diplomatic and Commercial Relations," 11.

<sup>48</sup> For the details of these missions see Iwao, "Reopening of the Diplomatic and Commercial Relations," 11-18.

was indeed to reopen the trade. Behind the king, there were Japanese residents in Siam hoping that the reopening of the trade could enhance their situations in Ayutthaya.<sup>49</sup> However, all embassies and letters were rebuffed by the *bakufu*.<sup>50</sup> Diplomatic relations between the two countries were never restored.

There were certainly many factors contributing to the deteriorating situation between Siam and Japan during the reign of King Prasatthong. The reason behind the *bakufu*'s rejection was due to the doubtful legitimacy of King Prasatthong, as according to Van Vliet some Japanese officials considered the king a usurper and a traitor.<sup>51</sup> Besides the *bakufu* regarding King Prasatthong as a usurper, and thus hesitated to accord diplomatic recognition, there were also Dutch interference. For their own political and commercial ends, the Dutch tried to prevent Siam from resuming direct trade and commercial relations with Japan.<sup>52</sup> Last but not least, as the *bakufu* was implementing its *sakoku* decrees and restricting its foreign relations,

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<sup>49</sup> Van Vliet, "Description of the Kingdom of Siam," 49.

<sup>50</sup> Iwao, "Reopening of the Diplomatic and Commercial Relations," 1-31.

<sup>51</sup> Van Vliet states:

Also the king ordered Oya Berkelangh on several occasions to send ambassadors with letters and presents to the governors of Naagasacque [Nagasaki] in Japan in order to make good for his actions to offer friendship and to invite the Japanese merchants to come again to Siam. But the legations were never received with the proper honor by the governors of Naagasacque. They even refused roughly the last legation, saying that the master who had sent them was not a legal king but a usurper, a traitor, and who had killed the real heirs and the princes of the blood.

Van Vliet, "Description of the King of Siam," 48-49.

<sup>52</sup> Iwao Seiichi, "Reopening of the Diplomatic and Commercial Relations between Japan and Siam during the Tokugawa Period," 5-7.

there was no chance for the Ayutthaya court to restore the official bilateral relationship between the two countries.

### Chinese Junks from Siam

While Siamese crown junks were struggling to obtain permissions for trade, throughout King Prasatthong's reign, there were Chinese junks coming from Siam and conducting trade at Nagasaki. The Dutch records reveal at least nine junks arrived at Nagasaki from Siam between 1651 and 1656.<sup>53</sup>

### The Dutch Involvement in Siamese-Japanese Trade

Apart from the Japanese, there were other key players involved in the Siamese-Japanese trade. One of them was the Dutch. It is, therefore, necessary to look at their activities for the better understanding of the economic and trading situation in Ayutthaya at the time.

### The Arrival of the VOC

When the United Netherlands Chartered East India Company (Verenigde Oost-indische Compagnie, VOC) first arrived at Ayutthaya in 1604, the Company mainly expected to establish commercial relations with China through the sponsorship of the king of Siam. Ayutthaya was perceived as a gateway to China. The VOC's effort to reach China through this channel was by no means successful.

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<sup>53</sup> Iwao Seiichi, "Kinsei nissi boeki ni kansuru suryoteki kosatsu (A study of Chinese trade with Japan in the seventeenth century, especially on volume and quantity)," *Shigaku zasshi* 62, no. 11 (1953): 12-13. The cargo lists submitted from some of the junks from Siam can be found in Nagazumi Yoko, ed., *Tosen yushutsunyuhin suryo ichiran 1637-1833: Fukugen tosen kamotu aratamecho kihan nimothu kaiwatashicho* (Lists of the volume of goods imported into and exports

However, the Company found that Ayutthaya could provide a limited supply of Chinese silk and porcelain. In order to take advantage of this supply and use Ayutthaya as the source of Chinese products, the Dutch set up a trading post or factory at Ayutthaya in 1608.<sup>54</sup>

The first contact between Japan and the Netherlands was made by the arrival of the *Liefde* on the east coast of Kyusyu, in 1600. Four years later, the survivors of this ship left Japan for Pattani, carrying the letter from Ieyasu to the "king" of Netherlands. The letter stated that Ieyasu gave the Dutch permission to enter any Japanese port and allowed them to conduct free trade. Until 1609, the Dutch attempts to directly contact the *bakufu* did not succeed because of the strong opposition from the Portuguese and Spaniards in the Indonesian archipelago. Finally in July 1609, a Dutch fleet sailed into Hirado. In August, three representatives of the Company, including an interpreter, headed to Sumpu and had an audience with Ieyasu. Ieyasu gave them a letter addressed to Prince Maurice and four copies of *shuinjo*. At the same time, Ieyasu permitted the Dutch merchants to stay in Japan and set up trading posts.<sup>55</sup> The first permanent VOC factory in Japan was thus established at Hirado (Firando) to the north

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from Japan by Chinese junks), (Tokyo: Sobunsha, 1987).

<sup>54</sup> For a detailed account of the Dutch arrival in Siam see Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth-Century Thailand*, 11, 47-48; also see Han ten Brummelhuis, *Merchant, Courtier and Diplomat: A History of the Contacts between the Netherlands and Thailand* (Lochem: Uitgeversmaatschappij De Tijdstroom, 1987), 9-10.

<sup>55</sup> Kato, "The Japanese-Dutch Trade in the Formative Period," 35-36; Kato, "Early Shogunate and Dutch Trade Policies," 215-218; also see Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand*, 51.

of Kyushu in 1609.<sup>56</sup>

### The 1610s

The establishment of Hirado factory in 1609 created a new possibility for the Dutch. By the end of 1610, the Ayutthaya office started to collect information necessary for its future entrance into the Japan trade, which up to that time was controlled by the Japanese traders.<sup>57</sup> The VOC soon discovered that Ayutthaya was a source of marketable goods for Japan. Japanese imports of primary importance at that time were Chinese raw silk and silken fabrics, followed by deerskins and sapanwood. Although these Chinese goods in Ayutthaya were more expensive and less plentiful than those in Pattani,<sup>58</sup> there were still substantial profits to be made in Japan by sending deerskins from

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<sup>56</sup> Both Dutch and English sources spelled "Firando" which derived from the pronunciation in western Kyusyu dialect. Anthony Farrington, "The Connection Between William Adams, The Netherlands, and Britain," *Hirado-shi Kenkyu (The Study of Hirado City History)* (Hirado) no. 5 (March 2000): 91.

<sup>57</sup> Nagazumi Akira, "Oranda no higashi indo kaisya keiei shoki ni okeru syam boeki no yakuwari (The Siamese trade in the early days of the Dutch East India Company)," *Toyo gakuho (The Journal of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko)* (Tokyo) 39, no. 2 (1956): 83. At first, Victor Sprinckel, the then director of the Pattani factory, wanted to open a new factory in Cambodia to obtain deerskins for the Japan market. For the lack of financial support from Bantam office, the plan to open a factory in Cambodia was abolished. Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand*, 51.

<sup>58</sup> In 1601, the Dutch first settled in Pattani where Chinese merchants frequently visited. When the VOC was established in 1602, the Company expected to seek a contact with China through Pattani and to make Pattani the rendezvous point for VOC ships in Asia. In the early years of its operation, the Ayutthaya office was dependent on Pattani. Under the director ship of Cornelis van Neijeerode from 1617 to 1621, the Ayutthaya factory gradually gained autonomy from Pattani. Brummelhuis, *Merchant, Courtier, and Diplomat*, 9; Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand*, 50.

Siam.<sup>59</sup>

During the early 1610s, nonetheless, the Ayutthaya factory failed to send any ship to Japan. There were two main reasons. In the first place, the factory had financial problems in those times.<sup>60</sup> As the price of deerskins in Ayutthaya soared up, the factory could not purchase enough goods for the Japanese market because of its limited funding.<sup>61</sup> Although the factory managed to buy a few deerskins and some sapanwood for the Japan trade, these goods were shipped on the vessels of the Japanese merchants and Dutch free traders (non-VOC ships).<sup>62</sup> Secondly, from 1610 to 1615, the Company's attempt to send deerskins to Japan via Pattani was not successful. Due to the fragile nature of the deerskins and the conditions for shipment, it was very difficult to send them by such a route. As early as 1610, Maerten Houtman proposed that junks should be sent straight from Ayutthaya to Japan. Nevertheless, the Company kept trying to send deerskins, rayskins, and sapanwood from Ayutthaya to Japan via Pattani until 1615.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Nagazumi Akira, "Oranda no higashi indo kaisya keiei shoki ni okeru syam boeki no yakuwari," 83.

<sup>60</sup> Nagazumi Akira, "Oranda no higashi indo kaisya keiei shoki ni okeru syam boeki no yakuwari," 83.

<sup>61</sup> Copie Missive van Maerten Houtman uijt Judea aen den oppercoopman Hendrick Janssen ij Pataniij, 24 April 1613; quoted in Iwao Siiichi, *Nanyo nihon-machi no kenkyu*, 200-201.

<sup>62</sup> Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand*, 52; Nagazumi Akira, "Oranda no higashi indo kaisya keiei shoki ni okeru syam boeki no yakuwari," 83.

<sup>63</sup> Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand*, 50-52, 78-79.

In the meantime, the VOC struggled to find a niche for itself in the Japan trade in the early 1610s. The Company faced fierce competition in Japan where the Japanese merchants dominated the trade between Southeast Asia and Japan. Furthermore, there were other rivalries besides that of the local Japanese traders. As a result of Ieyasu's promotion of foreign trade, the number of Chinese junks visiting the coast of Japan increased. The role of Chinese merchants became more prominent. On the other hand, *Senra-sen* (Siamese junks) also sailed directly into Nagasaki for trade. For instance, two junks from Siam entered Nagasaki in 1613, while a number of Siamese merchants came to Japan for trade in 1617.<sup>64</sup>

Aside from the Asian competitors, VOC also faced competition from their European counterparts. The direct access to the Chinese silk market through the Macao-Nagasaki route gave the Portuguese an edge over their European rivals.<sup>65</sup> Similarly, the British East India Company established a foothold at Hirado and entered into the Japan trade in 1613. Because of the influence of William Adams (1564-1620), the first Englishman who landed in Japan and gained Ieyasu's favor, the British Company obtained a far more advantageous position in the Japan trade than the VOC.<sup>66</sup> Bearing the *shuin* license and commanded

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<sup>64</sup> Miki, *Nissen kotsu-shi*, 55.

<sup>65</sup> For a chronological description of the Portuguese trade with Japan see C. R. Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon: Annuals of Macao and The old Japan trade, 1555-1640*, Lisboa: Centro De Historicos Ultramarinos, 1963.

<sup>66</sup> Kato, "Early Shogunate and Dutch Trade Policies," 219. For the details of British entrance into the Japan trade see Anderson, *English Intercourse with Siam*, 53.

by Adams, the British vessel *Sea Adventure* left Hirado to Ayutthaya in December 1615 in order to open up trade between Siam and Japan. The *Sea Adventure* continued this route until 1618 when it was heavily damaged.<sup>67</sup> On top of that, the Bantam office neglected the Dutch factory in Hirado. Until the 1614, the Hirado factory received virtually no overseas goods.<sup>68</sup>

With the arrival of the goods from the Bantam office in 1614, the Ayutthaya factory was prepared to expand its operation and decided to send Siamese goods to Japan. In 1615, the *Hope*, which was dispatched by the Hirado factory directly to Ayutthaya, initiated direct trade between Japan and Siam.<sup>69</sup> Ayutthaya became the VOC's prime source of deerskins and sapanwood for the Japan market. In 1617, Van Nerijenrode advised the Company to invest in a warehouse and more staff in Ayutthaya in order to facilitate the trade with Japan.<sup>70</sup>

However, it was not easy for the VOC to maintain profitable business in Siam. The price of deerskins soared when Japanese traders arrived by *shuinsen*.<sup>71</sup> Yet there were some disadvantages to the Company in participating in the deerskin trade. While the Japanese

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<sup>67</sup> Satow, "Notes on the Intercourse," 141; Iwao, *Nanyo nihon-machi no kenkyu*, 166. For details of the voyages of the *Sea Adventure* between Siam and Japan from 1615 to 1618 see Anderson, *English Intercourse with Siam*, 59-72.

<sup>68</sup> Kato, "The Japanese-Dutch Trade in the Formative Period," 219-220.

<sup>69</sup> Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand*, 52.

<sup>70</sup> Brummelhuis, *Merchant, Courtier and Diplomat*, 17.

<sup>71</sup> Iwao, *Nanyo nihon-machi no kenkyu*, 165-166, 200-201.

residents controlled the deerskin trade in Siam, the Company could not procure deerskins without Japanese cooperation. The preparation of the deerskins, furthermore, needed a large number of temporary workers. In 1617, the co-directors of Ayutthaya factory Maerten Houtman and Cornelis van Nijenroode made an agreement with the head of Japanese residents Kii Kyuemon to purchase deerskins and ray skins.<sup>72</sup> In addition, the Company had difficulty in buying royal monopoly goods such as sapanwood and lead because King Songtham favored the Japanese merchants. In order to compete in the Japan trade successfully, the VOC thus needed huge investments of money and manpower.<sup>73</sup>

#### The 1620s

The VOC's position in the Asian trade greatly improved in the 1620s. The Company built a new trading post on the south side of the island of Taiwan in 1624. The foundation of the Castle Zeelandia guaranteed a supply of Chinese silk to Japan and enabled the Dutch to establish themselves in the Japan trade.<sup>74</sup> Around the same time, the conditions

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<sup>72</sup> J. K. J. de Jong, *Overzicht der betrekkingen van de Nederlandsch Oost-Indische Compagnie met Siam*, *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal, Land en Volkenkunde*, Deel XIII, 1684, 438-440; translated in Iwao, *Nanyo nihon-machi no kenkyu*, 368-370. Kii Kyuemon served as the head of Japanese residents from 1616 to 1620. For more detailed account of Kii Kyuemon's role in Siam see Iwao, *Nanyo nihon-machi no kenkyu*, 164-167; also see Iwao, "Sham kenshi-ko 1616 nen."

<sup>73</sup> Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand*, 52-53.

<sup>74</sup> In 1601, the Dutch made first contacts with the Ming court. In the following twenty years, the VOC made a number of diplomatic efforts to initiate commercial relations with China, but they were unsuccessful. Eventually, the VOC and the British East India Company attacked the Portuguese at Macao. At last, the military forces pressured China into allowing the Dutch to occupy Taiwan in 1624. Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand*, 47.

in Japan also became favorable for the Dutch. The British East India Company closed its factory at Hirado in 1623,<sup>75</sup> and the Spaniard left Japan in 1624. The withdrawals of European competitors from Japan allowed the Dutch to penetrate into the Japan market. From 1625 onwards, due to the growth of the Taiwan-Nagasaki trade, Dutch trade with Japan increased considerably.<sup>76</sup> By 1628, the Company had succeeded in controlling this aspect of the Japan trade.

Despite these favorable developments in the early 1620s, the VOC was uncertain about whether the Company's effort to maintain Siam as a trading post was worthwhile or not. When the VOC headquarters was moved from Bantam to Batavia (Jakarta) in 1619, Ayutthaya was basically an exporter of rice and other foodstuffs to Batavia, especially when conditions in Java was unstable. But as a trading port, the Ayutthaya factory failed to make enough profit to convince the Council of India to keep its operation in Siam. At the end of 1622, the Company closed the Ayutthaya factory, leaving an assistant Jan van Campen to collect debts and maintain diplomatic relations.

In 1624, the food supply to the Dutch in Batavia was once again cut off, and the Company resolved to reopen the Ayutthaya factory. A

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<sup>75</sup> The English factory at Ayutthaya was already closed in 1622. Anderson, *English Intercourse with Siam*, 84.

<sup>76</sup> Kato, "The Japanese-Dutch Trade in the Formative Period," 222. For the detailed account of the trade between the Taiwan factory and Japan see Nagazumi Yoko, *kinse shokino gaiko*, sec. 3.

new director Pieter dan der Elst was sent to purchase rice for Batavia. From 1624 to 1626, Siam became the provider of rice as well as other provisions to the people of Batavia.<sup>77</sup> To the Company, Siam was now more important as a supplier of rice to Batavia than as a supplier of deerskins to Japan. It was not until the Dutch expanded the Japan trade in the late 1620s when the Ayutthaya factory became an important part of the trading business for the Company.

Nonetheless, the positive situation of the Dutch turned around at the end of the 1620s. In 1628, the intense competition between the Dutch and the Japanese traders caused a serious conflict. As a result, the Hirado factory was shut down and the *bakufu* issued an embargo on all trade with the Dutch.<sup>78</sup> At the beginning of 1629, the Dutch left

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<sup>77</sup> Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand*, 52-55, 143; Brummelhuis, *Merchant, Courtier and Diplomat*, 17.

<sup>78</sup> In an attempt to exclude Japanese traders from trade with the Chinese at Taiwan, the VOC charged *shinsen* 10% export tax when they left Taiwan. But the Japanese traders complained and refused to pay claiming that they had been sailing into Taiwan since before the Dutch arrived. In 1628, the Governor of Formosa Pieter Nuijts (1598-1655) had quarreled with a Japanese merchant Hamada Yahei who conducted a *shuinsen*. Hamada carried out an attack on the Governor's house and took Nuijts as a hostage. Nuijt was released after he promised that he would give safe conduct to the Japanese traders and let them return home with a few Dutch hostages. But, the problem was further complicated when Nuijt attacked the Japanese ship crews. The magistrate of Nagasaki complained to the Governor of Hirado factory Cornelis van Neijenrode and reported the incident to the *bakufu*. In 1632, at last, Governor General Jacques Specx decided to extradite Nuijts to the *bakufu*. He was detained until the summer of 1636. Maehira Fusaaki, "Sakoku' nippon no kaigai boeki (The Japan's foreign trade under the 'sakoku' system)," in *Sekaishi no naka no kinse* (Early modern Japan in a world history), ed. Asao Naohiro (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1991), 136-138; Nagazumi Yoko, "The Vermillion Seal Maritime Trade in Taiwan" (Maritime History of East Asia and the History of the Island of Taiwan in the Early Modern Period: International Conference in Celebration of the Eightieth Birthday of Professor Yung-ho Tsao, October 26-27, 2000, photocopied), 6-8; Kato, "The Japanese-Dutch Trade in the Formative Period,"

Ayutthaya again.<sup>79</sup> With the closing of the Japan market, there was no longer any justification for maintaining the Ayutthaya office. From 1628 to 1633, the trade with Japan suffered a complete standstill.

This kind of hostile situation between the European companies and Asian traders was rather common at the time. In the same year of 1628, the Portuguese were involved in a serious conflict with the Siamese and the Japanese. At the mouth of Chao Phraya River, a Portuguese ship seized, plundered and burned several ships including a Siamese crown junk belonging to King Songtham and a Japanese vermilion seal ship.<sup>80</sup> As soon as this news reached Japan, the *bakufu* imposed an embargo on the Portuguese galleons anchored at Nagasaki. The Portuguese fortunes in trade with Siam and Japan declined and never recovered.

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225-226; Also see Wouter Milde, "Bull in the China Shop, Pieter Nuyts in China and Japan (1627-1636)" (Maritime History of East Asia and the History of the Island of Taiwan in the Early Modern Period: International Conference in Celebration of the Eightieth Birthday of Professor Yung-ho Tsao, October 26-27, 2000, photocopied).

<sup>79</sup> Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand*, 56; Brummelhuis, *Merchant, Courtier and Diplomat*, 18.

<sup>80</sup> Jeremias van Vilet, "Description of the Kingdom of Siam," 52-53; Boxer, *Great Ship from Amacon*, 115; Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand*, 18-20.

## CHAPTER 6

### HISTORY OF SIAMESE JUNK TRADE WITH JAPAN,

1656-1728

#### Reopening of the Japan Trade

Siamese-Japanese trade became active again after the reign of King Prasatthong. As the king died on 7 August 1656, conflicts in connection with the succession to the throne broke out in Siam. After the violent deaths of two successive kings, King Narai (r. 1656-1688) was enthroned on 26 October 1656.<sup>1</sup> At the beginning of his reign, King Narai pursued an aggressive foreign policy, which often led Siam into wars with neighboring countries.<sup>2</sup> In order to finance these expensive wars, King Narai not only promoted foreign trade but also made export goods under royal monopolies in late 1662.<sup>3</sup>

In the beginning of the 1660s, King Narai himself also entered the Japan trade directly. Previous studies disagree as to which year King Narai exactly sent his first junk to Japan. According to Iwao Seiichi, King Narai sent two ships to Japan on 6 July 1661.<sup>4</sup> However, Nagashima

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<sup>1</sup> Wyatt, *Thailand: A Short History*, 107; for the detailed discussion of King Narai's ascension see Dhiravat, "A Political History of Siam," 248-269.

<sup>2</sup> For detailed descriptions of King Narai's war with neighboring countries see for example W. A. R. Wood, *A History of Siam* (Bangkok: Chalermit Bookshop, 1959), 190-194; Dhiravat, "A Political History of Siam," 284-297.

<sup>3</sup> Dhiravat, "A Political History of Siam," 293.

<sup>4</sup> Iwao, "Reopening of the Diplomatic and Commercial Relations between Japan and Siam during the Tokugawa period," *Acta Asiatica* no. 4 (March 1963):

Hiromu recently shows that it was not in 1661 but 1662 that the king dispatched two junks manned by Chinese and Moors to Japan.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, Smith's writings present contradictory information. He first writes that "the king and other Siamese traders successfully reentered the Japan trade in 1659 by manning their junks with Chinese and Muslim sailors." Nevertheless, in the same book, he also says "in 1661, the Thais themselves entered the trade once again."<sup>6</sup> In fact, all of these three works depended on the Dutch materials. In any case, it seems that King Narai's trading venture started in 1662 at the latest and had made good profit in 1662.<sup>7</sup>

According to Japanese sources, the first Siamese junk arrived in Japan during King Narai's reign appeared in the summer of 1663. At least three junks sailed into Nagasaki from Siam this year. King Narai, the Persian Okphra Sinaowarat, and the Japanese resident Kiya Hanzaemon invested in them.<sup>8</sup> It was the Moors merchants who took care of the

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<sup>5</sup> Nagashima, "Persian Muslim Merchants in Thailand and their Activities in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century," 5.

<sup>6</sup> *The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand*, 37, 78.

<sup>7</sup> Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand*, 37; Dhiravat, "A Political History of Siam," 293.

<sup>8</sup> Kimura Hanzaemon was one of the most prominent Japanese merchants in Siam in the seventeenth century. He became the chief of the Japanese residents in Siam around the 1640s. Up to the 1670s, he was active in the Southeast Asian trade, sending his ships to Ligor, Cambodia, and CochinChina. He also worked for the VOC in correcting, processing, and sending deerskins as well as rayskins to Japan. Iwao, *Nanyo nihon-machi no kenkyu*, 179-182.

Siamese court and Kimra Hanzaemon's business at Nagasaki. The Chinese captain of Ship No. 5 Wang Liu Guan, who also conducted his own trade at Nagasaki, had nothing to do with this Siamese trade.<sup>9</sup>

### The Junks under the Zheng Regime, 1661-1683

During the mid-seventeenth century Zheng Cheng Gong (1624-1662), who had controlled Amoy and then the island of Taiwan, played an important role in the Siamese-Japanese trade. Zheng was the son of a Fukien maritime adventurer and trader, Zheng Zhi Long (1604-1661), and a Japanese woman.<sup>10</sup> After his father defected to the Qing dynasty in 1646, Zheng Cheng Gong became an independent pro-Ming warlord. Having a base in Amoy, he controlled Fujian, Guangdong, as well as Zhangzhou, and traded with Ryukyu, Taiwan, Japan, and many Southeast Asian countries. More than eighty percent of the Chinese junks arriving at Nagasaki in the 1650s were under the control of the Zheng Cheng Gong regime.<sup>11</sup> Driven out from Amoy, Zheng withdrew to Taiwan in 1661. After a nine-month victorious battle against the VOC, he captured Fort

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<sup>9</sup> Tokyo daigaku shiryō hensan syō, ed., *Totsujī kaishō nichi roku* (The diary of the office of the Chinese interpreters), vol. 7 (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppan kai, 1955), 6-7, 10.

<sup>10</sup> Zheng Zhi Long was often called Yi Guang. Also, Zheng Cheng Gong was better known to European as Koxinga. Koxinga was rendered from his title Gouxinye, which means "His Lordship of the Imperial Surname." For a biography of Zheng Zhi Long see Nagazumi, *Kinse shōki no gaiko*, 140-141; also see Ng Chin Keong, *Trade and Society*, 49-50.

<sup>11</sup> Since Zheng dominated the supply of Chinese goods between mainland China and Taiwan, the VOC trade at Taiwan was stagnant in these years. Nagazumi Yoko, "Tei shiryū oyako to nihon no sakoku (Zheng family and sakoku)," in *"Sakoku" wo minosu*, ed. Nagazumi Yoko (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1999), 67.

Zeelandia and took over Taiwan from the Dutch in early 1662.

In response to the Zheng's stronghold in Taiwan, the Qing court adopted a negative maritime policy.<sup>12</sup> Since the Chinese government was fully aware that the smuggling activities along the South China Sea coast had contributed to the financial viability of the Zheng's resistance force, the Qing government promulgated the first imperial edict forbidding navigation on the sea in 1656. However, the sea prohibition law did not work with satisfactory results, as the sea smuggling still thrived. The junks from China, on the other hand, steadily decreased from the 1650s due to the official maritime ban, which imposed by the Qing court.<sup>13</sup> In 1681, there were nine junks from Southeast Asia visiting Nagasaki, but none was from mainland China.<sup>14</sup> Until his grandson Zheng Ke Shuang

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<sup>12</sup> Hiramatsu Hakari, "Shinsho no gaikoku boeki (Foreign trade in the early Qing dynasty)," Ng Chin Keong, *Trade and Society: The Amoy Network on the China Coast 1683-1735* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983), 52-53. For the details of the maritime ban see Tanaka Katsumi, "Shinsho no shina enkai (The coastline of China in the early Qing dynasty)," *Reikshigaku kenkyu (Historical Research)* 6, no. 1 (1636): 73-81; no. 3 (1636), 318-330.

<sup>13</sup> There are no extant Japanese source records the exact number of Chinese junks traded with Japan between 1635 and 1647. According to Dutch sources, Iwao estimated that an average of fifty-seven junks entered Nagasaki every year from 1634 to 1644. However, because of the maritime ban, the number of Chinese junk steadily decreased since 1653. Iwao Sheiichi, "Kinse nisshi boeki no suryoteki kosatsu (A study of Chinese trade with Japan in the seventeenth century, especially on volume and quantity)," *Shigakuzasshi (Tokyo)* 62, no. 11 (1953): 18; Oba Osamu, "Hirado Matsuura shiryō hakubutsukan zo 'tosen no zu' ni tsuite (A study of 'tosen no zu' owned by Hirado Matsuura Historical Museum)," *Kansaidai-gaku tozaigakujutsu kenkyū-sho kiyo* 5 (1972): 15.

<sup>14</sup> *Shigakuzasshi (Tokyo)* 62, no. 11 (1953): 18; Oba Osamu, "Hirado Matsuura shiryō hakubutsukan zo 'tosen no zu' ni tsuite (A study of 'tosen no zu' owned by Hirado Matsuura Historical Museum)," *Kansaidai-gaku tozaigakujutsu kenkyū-sho kiyo* 5 (1972): 15.

(1670-1707) surrendered himself to the Qing government in 1683, the Zheng family dominated the Japan trade for almost three decades, and most of the Southeast Asian junks coming to Nagasaki during the mid-late seventeenth century were connected to the Zheng regime.<sup>15</sup>

When Taiwan was under attack by the Qing in the early 1680s, many junks belonged to the Zheng regime fled to Southeast Asia. In 1684, six Siamese junks were listed. In fact, three of them belonged to Taiwan.<sup>16</sup>

#### The Trade Quotas of 1685 and 1689

As the Qing dynasty conquered Taiwan in 1683, the Zheng's dominance over the Siamese-Japanese trade gave way to the Qing court. In the following year, Emperor Kangxi lifted the maritime ban that was enforced in 1656. As a consequence, there was a remarkable increase in the number of Chinese junks which arrived at Nagasaki. In 1684, prior to the opening of overseas shipping, twenty-four Chinese junks visited Nagasaki. In 1685, the number increased to eighty-five.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 10. Even the VOC at Taiwan could not get any marketable goods for the Japan market without the Zhengs. For a detailed analysis of the roles of the Zhengs in the Japan see Nagazumi Yoko, *Kinse shoki no gaiko*, chap. 3.

<sup>16</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 1, 429, 433, 437-438; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 36-38.

<sup>17</sup> Iwao Seiichi, "Kinse nisshi boeki no suryoteki kosatsu (A study of Chinese trade with Japan in the seventeenth century, especially on volume and quantity)," *Shigakuzasshi* (Tokyo) 62, no. 11 (1953): 18; Oba Osamu, "Hirado Matsuura shiryō hakubutsukan zo 'tosen no zu' ni tsuite (A study of 'tosen no zu' owned by Hirado Matsuura Historical Museum)," *Kansaidaiigaku tozaigakujutsu kenkyū-sho kiyo* 5 (1972): 15.

Although Qing China lifted the maritime ban, it was the Japanese government that decided on its trade policy, including the incoming number of Chinese junks calling. In the light of the rapidly increasing Chinese ships, the Tokugawa *bakufu* concerned about the excessive outflow of gold and silver. Hence, the *Jokyo* Edict was introduced in December 1685. The Tokugawa *bakufu* imposed a limit of six thousand *kan* a year on the volume of Chinese junk and three thousand *kan* a year for the Dutch.<sup>18</sup> Any junk that arrived after the trade quota given for the year was full was not allowed to trade officially and forced to reload the cargoes.<sup>19</sup>

Despite the *bakufu*'s efforts to limit the trade volume, the incoming number of the Chinese junks continued to rise. In 1688, it reached a peak as this year witnessed a total number of 194 junks entering Nagasaki for trade.<sup>20</sup> Worrying about smuggling as well as illicit trade, the *bakufu* decided to take measures, limiting the number of Chinese junks that were allowed to sail into Nagasaki. A restrictive schedule of the trade and number of Chinese junks was laid down.<sup>21</sup> At the same time, in order to

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<sup>18</sup> One *kan* is equivalent to one hundred tael, or about 3.75 kg of silver.

<sup>19</sup> Ura, "Ka-i hentai kaidai," 7; Oba, "Hirado Matsuura shiryo hakubutsukan zo 'tosen no zu' ni tsuite," 15-16.

<sup>20</sup> Oba, "Hirado Matsuura shiryo hakubutsukan zo 'tosen no zu' ni tsuite," 16.

<sup>21</sup> The schedule of the trade and the number of Chinese junks were decided as follows:

1. A total of twenty "Spring junks"; five junks from Nanjing, seven from Ningbo, two from Putuoshan, and six from Fuzhou junks.
2. A total of thirty "Summer junks"; three junks from Nanjing,

prevent the Chinese merchants from coming into contact with the Japanese, the *bakufu* set up *Tojin yashiki* (the Chinese camp) at Nagasaki in 1689.<sup>22</sup> All Chinese traders were forced to settle within the small camps surrounded by fences and ditches during their stays. In addition, there was a guard-post on each of its four sides. The annual entries of Chinese junks were limited to seventy. Only two were junks from Siam.

The implementation of the *Jokyo* Edict severely impacted the Siamese-Japanese trade. From 1685 to 1687, the Siamese trade with Japan suffered greatly. In 1685, at least four junks left Siam for Japan.<sup>23</sup> Among them, Captain Xu Chao Guan's junk sank on the way.<sup>24</sup> The other three managed to reach Japan. Captain Yan Zi Guan's junk (Ship No. 43) succeeded in trading. Nevertheless, Captain Yan's junk wrecked off the shore of Guangnan on the way back to Siam. As a result, five crews were

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four from Quanzhou, four from Ningbo, three from Zhangzhou, two from Kelapa, one from Cambodia, one from Putuoshan, five from Amoy, one from Pattani, four from Fuzhou, and two from Guangdong.

3. A total of twenty "Autumn junks"; two from Nanjing, three from Chocninchina, two from Siam, two from Gaozhou, three from Fuzhou, one from Ningbo, four from Guangdong, one from Tonkin, two from Chaozhou.

See Ura, "*Ka-i hentai kaidai: Tosen fusetsu-gaki no kenkyu*," 10-11; Oba, "*Hirado Matsuura shiryō hakubutsukan zo 'tosen no zu' ni tsuite*," 15-16; Sarasin Viraphol, *Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade, 1652-1853*, Harvard East Asian Monographs, no. 76 (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, 1977), 65-66; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 10-11.

<sup>22</sup> Oba, "*Hirado Matsuura shiryō hakubutsukan zo 'tosen no zu' ni tsuite*," 15; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 5.

<sup>23</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 1, 510, 633, 616-619; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 39.

<sup>24</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 1, 633; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 41.

drowned, and all the cargoe was lost at sea.<sup>25</sup> When the other two Siamese junks headed by Xu Sen Guan and Chen He Guan respectively arrived, the trade quota of the year 1685 was already full. The two junks were allowed to dispose a part of their cargoes to pay for the expenses of their homeward voyages while they sailed back home with most of their cargo brought from Siam.<sup>26</sup> In other words, all the junks which departed from Siam that year failed to bring any Japanese goods back to Siam.

Iwao Seiichi maintains that no Japanese document clarifies the reason why Japanese authorities in the last days of King Narai changed their attitude towards Siamese junks and denied trade with them.<sup>27</sup> It is possible that the Nagasaki authorities rejected these junks simply because that year's trade quota was already filled up. During these years, the Nagasaki authorities consistently treated the Siamese junks as "Chinese" junks. The rejection perhaps was a result of the strict quota policy, in which both Chinese and Siamese junks were counted in the same category, rather than discrimination against Siam.

Carrying the same cargoes, Xu Sen Guan's Ship No. 80 and Chen He Guan's Ship No. 82 returned to Nagasaki on 31 August 1686. Ten days later, one more junk under the command of Wang Zhu Guan entered

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<sup>25</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 1, 633-634; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 41; *Tsuko ichiran*, vol. 7, 21-25.

<sup>26</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 1, 616-619; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 38-40.

<sup>27</sup> Iwao, "Reopening of the Diplomatic and Commercial Relations between Japan and Siam during the Tokugawa period," 29-30.

Nagasaki from Siam (Ship No. 93). Again, that year's trade quota was almost filled by the time they arrived. As the captains were well aware that the *bakufu's* concern was about the outflow of silver and gold, they tried to convince the Japanese government that they had no such intention to take either gold or silver out of the country. Instead, they only put in a petition for extra-quota transactions on a barter basis. Nevertheless, the Nagasaki authorities did not permit these Siamese junks to dispose as much of the cargoes as the captains expected. Chen He Guan's and Wang Zhu Guan's junks made their way back to Siam, but the losses were so great that they had to give up the following year's voyages to Japan.<sup>28</sup>

Thus, only one junk departed from Siam on 15 June 1687 and arrived in Japan on 30 August (Ship No. 107). Okya Phrakhlung sent this junk in order to investigate the current conditions of trade at Nagasaki. Along with the captain Xu Sen Guan, this junk carried nine Siamese. They brought a letter from the Phrakhlung addressed to the "King of Japan".<sup>29</sup> The letter not only referred to the unsuccessful business in 1685 and 1686 but also requested an approval of a sufficient amount of trade. The Phrakhlung's concern over the last few years' trade in the letter indicates that the Phrakhlung might have fitted out these junks himself. Unfortunately, there is no record suggesting how the *bakufu* dealt with this letter.

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<sup>28</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 1, 616-619; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 38-41; Hayashi, *Tsuko ichiran*, vol. 7, 21-25.

<sup>29</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 1, 616-619/783-784; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from*

In June 1688, two junks (Ship No. 150 and 152) left Siam for Japan. When these junks set sail from Siam, the kingdom was in the middle of political disputes over the throne. King Narai had been seriously ill since March and Okphra Phetracha was the de facto ruler of Siam.<sup>30</sup> Upon their arrivals on 4 August, the captain Guo Zheng Guang and Xu Rang Guang reported the presence of a French garrison at Bangkok and the unstable situation in Siam in which King Narai's minister Phaulkon was executed.<sup>31</sup> Since Xu's junk (Ship No. 152) had four Siamese on board, it was highly possible that the King, the members of royal family, or the Phrakhlung, had consigned their cargoes on this junk. Nevertheless, *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* does not mention anything about the consignors. Of course, the crews of these two junks had no idea that King Narai, at the age of fifty-five, had passed away on 11 July 1688 while they were on the way to Nagasaki.

### King Phetracha, 1688-1703

Following the death of King Narai, Okphra Phetracha (r. 1688-1703) acceded to the throne by eliminating two princes with a legitimate claim to the succession. In the summer of 1689, two junks (Ships No. 46 and 51)

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*Southeast Asia*, 42-43; Hayashi, *Tsuko ichiran*, vol. 7, 21-25.

<sup>30</sup> Dhiravat, "Political History of Siam," 435-437; Wyatt, *Thailand: A Short History*, 117. *Tosen fusetsu-gaki* contained the information on the King Narai's illness and Phetracha's takeover of the Lopburi palace. Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 2, 988-991; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 49-51.

<sup>31</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 2, 988-991; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 44-47. For one view of these incidents see Hutchinson, *1688 Revolution in Siam: The Memoir of Father de Beze, s.j.*; also see Dhiravat, "A Political History of Siam," chap. 8.

fitted out in Siam brought the news of the latest political developments in Siam to Nagasaki. According to the testimonies in the *Tosen fusetsu-gaki*, the captains Xu Sen Guan (Ship No. 46) and Cheng Ming Guan (Ship No. 51) gave rather negative comments on King Phetracha and even described him as a usurper. Therefore, it is very likely that these junks had nothing to do with the crown trade.<sup>32</sup>

In 1690, King Phetracha himself started investing in the Japan trade. In June, three Siamese junks left Ayutthaya successively and arrived in Nagasaki in the middle of August. Among them, two were fitted out by the order of the king (Ships No. 84 and 86), and one by a Chinese official of Siam (Ship No. 81).<sup>33</sup> Trying to dispel the "misunderstood" situation, the captain of Ship No. 86 Cheng Young Guan presented a pro-Phetracha version of the succession and insisted that the newly enthroned Phetracha was the legitimate heir to the throne according to King Narai's last will.<sup>34</sup> In that year, these three Siamese junks together brought various Siamese products valued at 152,980 *tael*.<sup>35</sup> Yet these junks only exported a few

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<sup>32</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 2, 988-991; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 49-51.

<sup>33</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 2, 1173-1174, 1279-1280, 1283; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 52-58.

<sup>34</sup> "When his [King Narai] health deteriorated the former King [King Narai] summoned the said high-ranking Siamese official [Okphra Phetracha]" to his bedside to tell him to marry his daughter and ascend the throne as King of Siam. This he was told while the King was still alive. The senior Official [Okphra Petracha] accepted the gracious offer with much appreciation. Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 56-58; also see Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 2, 1283.

<sup>35</sup> The catty and tael, while not actual units of currency, were used for accounting purpose. They were the only two units commonly used to quote prices for goods in the international trade. Catty was corresponded to the

Table 8. Export Items of the Siamese Junks in 1690

Ship No. 81		Ship No. 84		Ship No. 86	
Items	Volume	Items	Volume	Items	Volume
Velvet	50 rolls	Crepe	15 rolls	Brown Sugar	55,000 <i>catties</i>
Buffalo horn	3,000 pieces	Silk cloth	20 rolls	Crystal Sugar	3,500 <i>catties</i>
Goatskin	10 pieces	Buffalo horn	450 pieces	Sapanwood	520,000 <i>catties</i>
Deerskin	30 pieces	Deerskin	12 pieces	White wax	16,000 <i>catties</i>
Sapanwood	324,000 <i>catties</i>	Goatskin	20 pieces	"Roet"	70,000 <i>catties</i>
Black Lacquer	10,400 <i>catties</i>	Ray skin	1,560 pieces	Tin	30,000 <i>catties</i>
Tin	14,700 <i>catties</i>	Cotton	90 <i>catties</i>	Black Lacquer	14,000 <i>catties</i>
Elephant tusk	6,300 <i>catties</i>	Brown Sugar	591,00 <i>catties</i>	Fishing line	3,000 <i>catties</i>
Musk	7 <i>catties</i>	Sapanwood	659,000 <i>catties</i>	Pepper	300 <i>catties</i>
Eaglewood	3 <i>catties</i>	Black Lacquer	45,000 <i>catties</i>	Elephant task	100 <i>catties</i>
Drugs	2,000 <i>catties</i>	Elephant tusk	9,200 <i>catties</i>	Buffalo horn	7,000 <i>catties</i>
		Pepper	300 <i>catties</i>	Deerskin	700 <i>catties</i>
		Wax	2,900 <i>catties</i>	Drugs	100 <i>catties</i>
		"Roet"	79,600 <i>catties</i>		16,000 <i>catties</i>
		Tin	36,800 <i>catties</i>		
		Rattan	1,400 <i>catties</i>		
		Clove	420 <i>catties</i>		
		Aloeswood	30 <i>catties</i>		
		Camphor	10 <i>catties</i>		
		Drugs	14,500 <i>catties</i>		
Total Value	33,400 taels	Total Value	66,390 taels	Total Value	53,190 taels

Source: Kurihara, "17-18 seiki no nihon-siam boueki ni tsuite," 16.

deerskins because they were under the Dutch trade monopoly. Although the value of the export items of Siamese junks in 1690 constituted only ten percent of the total trade value of the Chinese junks, it was equivalent to the total trade volume of the VOC.<sup>36</sup>

From 1690 to 1694, a total number of fourteen junks left Siam for Japan, but only thirteen junks actually arrived in Nagasaki.<sup>37</sup> Not all the captains of these junks testified that they traveled to Nagasaki under the order of the king. However, in the light that all these junks were large in size, and without exception, carried a few Siamese aboard, it is fair to say that the king commissioned these junks.<sup>38</sup> In 1692, four Siamese junks came to Nagasaki (Ships No. 55, 64, 71, and one unnumbered junk).<sup>39</sup> The four *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* submitted by these junks suggest that they were fitted out in Siam. On the other hand, the VOC documents reveal that King Phetracha and Prince Sorasak sent these four junks in 1692 to

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Japanese unit *kin*. One *kin* was equivalent to approximately 600 kg. Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand*, 135.

<sup>36</sup> Kurihara, "17-18 seiki no nihon-siam boueki ni tsuite (On Japan-Siam trade during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries)," *Tokyo joshi daigaku shakai gakkai kiyo*, no. 22 (1994): 18.

<sup>37</sup> In 1693, one Chinese junk from Ningbo came to Siam in order to buy some Siamese goods for the Japan market. This junk left Siam accompanied by another Siamese junks, which commissioned by the king (Ship No. 93) but failed to complete the voyage to Japan. See Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 2, 1588-1591; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 68.

<sup>38</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 2, 1273-1274, 1279-1280, 1283, 1384-1385, 1387-1388, 1394-1395, 1466-1467, 1478-1479, 1486-1487, 1491-1492, 1588-1591, 1655-1656, 1674-1675; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 52-73.

<sup>39</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 2, 1466-1467, 1478-1479, 1486-1387, 1491-1492; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 62-68.

Japan.<sup>40</sup>

During that time, Siamese junks were loaded with *aramono* (sundry goods) such as sugar, sapanwood, and other miscellaneous products. However, they were bulky and had a low unit-value.<sup>41</sup> As a result, a great deal of labor was involved in handling these products, which made the trade an unrewarding business.<sup>42</sup> For instance, there were complaints in 1690 that the Siamese junks could barely sell their sugar in Japan for the last several years. Due to the implementation of the trade quota, these junks were forced to take the unsold sugar back to Siam. In addition, they face the risk of the returning voyages, as the moisture from the sea could easily dampen the load and dissolve the sugar. The Siamese court decided to suspend their junks to Japan in 1695, and no junk left Siam for Japan in that year.<sup>43</sup> However, a Chinese junk originating in Amoy came to Japan via Siam (Ship No. 30) in 1695. In Siam, the junk sold most of its original goods and procured new suitable merchandizes for trade in Japan.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Dhiravat, "Ayutthaya at the End of the Seventeenth Century: Was There a Shift to Isolation?" 261.

<sup>41</sup> On the other hand, the VOC determined which goods that could bring the highest real profits. Then, the VOC concentrated on exporting deerskins, especially high-quality ones, and eliminated the bulky, low-unit-value goods such as sapanwood and lead. The Company left these goods to the king on purpose. Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand*, 80-81.

<sup>42</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 2, 1279-1280; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 56.

<sup>43</sup> Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 73. For the exports of Siamese junks see, for example, Table 5.

<sup>44</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 2, 1735-1737; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 73-74.

After a year of suspension, King Phetracha resumed the junk trade with Japan in 1696. Hence, three junks departed from Siam for Nagasaki in June. One of them was a Chinese junk originally from Ningbo (Ship No. 71).<sup>45</sup> The other two were fitted out in Siam, invested in by King Phetracha's son, Prince Sorasak.<sup>46</sup> Only one of these two junks successfully entered Nagasaki (Ship No. 74),<sup>47</sup> while the other one could not complete the voyage. In the following year, three Siamese junks came to Nagasaki (Ship No. 85, 88, and 100). According to the Dutch sources, King Phetracha only sent two junks to Japan in 1697.<sup>48</sup> Both Ships No. 85 and 88 had Siamese aboard. However, Ship No. 100 carried no Siamese and was a smaller junk with just sixty-six crew members.<sup>49</sup> Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that Ships No. 85 and 88 belonged to the king whereas No.100 might not have.

From 1698 to 1702, there were fewer Siamese junks arriving in Japan. It is pointed out that at the turn of the century, the crown's capacity to participate in international trade was declining because of the constant

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<sup>45</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 2, 1828-1829; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 74-75.

<sup>46</sup> Dhiravat, "Ayutthaya at the End of the Seventeenth Century: Was There a Shift to Isolation?" 257.

<sup>47</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 2, 1832-1833; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 75-76.

<sup>48</sup> Dhiravat, "Ayutthaya at the End of the Seventeenth Century: Was There a Shift to Isolation?" 263.

<sup>49</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 2, 1932-1933, 1935-1936, 1947-1948; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 76-78.

lack of silver as well as internal unrest.<sup>50</sup> During these years, seven junks left Siam for Japan and six of them sailed into Nagasaki. In 1698, only one junk sent by the king departed from Siam for Japan (Ship No. 43).<sup>51</sup> In 1699, two royal commissioned junks came to Nagasaki (Ships No. 54 and 63).<sup>52</sup> One of them belonged to King Phetracha and the other to Prince Sorasak.<sup>53</sup> Since the only junk which left Siam for Japan in 1700 drifted to Amoy,<sup>54</sup> no trade was conducted between Siam and Japan that year. One Siamese junk (Ship No. 30) arrived in Nagasaki on 27 July 1701 and seemed to have no royal consignment goods. Although its captain Xu Wei Guan suggested that one or two junks commissioned by the King of Siam would come to Japan for trade, no further junk arrived that year.<sup>55</sup> Between December 1701 and October 1702, King Phetracha himself did not send any ship overseas.<sup>56</sup> One of the two Siamese junks (Ship No. 39 and 66) entered Nagasaki in 1702 was sent by Prince Sorasak.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Dhiravat, "Ayutthaya at the End of the Seventeenth Century: Was There a Shift to Isolation?" 261.

<sup>51</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 3, 1997-1998; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 79.

<sup>52</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 3, 2080-2081, 2090-2091; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 79-81.

<sup>53</sup> Dhiravat, "Ayutthaya at the End of the Seventeenth Century: Was There a Shift to Isolation?" 263.

<sup>54</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 3, 2163.

<sup>55</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 3, 2204-2205; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 83-84.

<sup>56</sup> Dhiravat, "Ayutthaya at the End of the Seventeenth Century: Was There a Shift to Isolation?" 261.



### King Sua, 1703-1709

King Phetracha's successor King Sua (r. 1703-1709) was on the throne for six years. During his reign, a total of twelve junks visited Japan. Since there is no available *Tosen Fusetsu-gaki* submitted in 1705 and 1706, it is impossible to know for sure who sent or commissioned the five Siamese junks (Ships Nos. 36, 52, and 69 in 1705, as well as Ships Nos. 74 and 80 in 1706) entering Japan during these two years.<sup>58</sup> On the other hand, the Japanese record clearly shows that the rest of the Siamese junks were fitted out by order of the king. They include Ships Nos. 64 and 80 in 1704, Ships Nos. 79, 80 and 82 in 1707, Ship No. 100 in 1708, together with Ship No. 53 in 1709.<sup>59</sup>

Although the trade restrictions imposed by the Japanese government, the number of Siamese junks sailing into Nagasaki did not decrease in the reigns of King Phetracha and King Sua. As far as the Japanese trade was concerned, both kings dispatched as many junks every year as King Narai had. Anthony Reid states that under the new Ban Phul Luang dynasty "trade did continue, but it both declined in overall volume and shifted towards the East Asian pattern of

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<sup>57</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 3, 2163; Tokyo daigaku shiryō hensen syo, *Totsuji kaisho nichu roku*, vol. 3, 310.

<sup>58</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 3, 2409-2419, 2496-2497, 2579-2580, 2667-2668; Tokyo daigaku shiryō hensen syo, *Totsuji kaisho nichu roku*, vol. 4, 62-63.

<sup>59</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 3, 2409-2410, 2496-2499, 2579-2580, 2636-2637; *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 85-89; Tokyo daigaku shiryō hensen syo, *Totsuji kaisho nichu roku*, vol. 4, 21.

overwhelming dependence on the Chinese junk trade."<sup>60</sup> Although the number of Chinese junks entered Siam might decrease as Reid argues,<sup>61</sup> King Phetracha's and King Sua's commitments to the Japan trade were no less than King Narai's. Table 9 reveals the average number of the Siamese junks entering Japan per year slightly decreased during the reigns of King Phetracha and King Sua. However, it was not the result of a change in the Siamese kings' commercial interest or trade policy. Rather, it was the Japanese restrictive policy that affected the Siamese-Japanese trade during these years. In fact, the Siamese trade with Japan came to standstill in the last few years of King Narai's reign, owing to Japan's newly implemented trade regulations. Despite the number of junks which left Siam for Japan, some of them were not allowed to trade with Japan and suffered great losses. The picture of a prosperous trading relation between Siam and Japan during King Narai's reign might in fact be overplayed. On the other hand, most junks in the reign of King Phetracha reached Japan between 1689 and 1703 and succeeded in doing their business,<sup>62</sup> although Japanese records provide no concrete data on volume of trade.

### King Thaisa and the *Shinpai*

During the reign of King Thaisa (r. 1709-1733), the eldest son of King Sua,

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<sup>60</sup> Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680, Volume II: Expansion and Crisis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 308. Later, he again confirmed his view in Reid, "Documenting the Rise and Fall of Ayutthaya as a Regional Trade Centre," in *Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia* (Chaing Mai: Silkworm Books, 1999), 96-97.

<sup>61</sup> Reid, "Documenting the Rise and Fall of Ayutthaya," 97.

<sup>62</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 3, 213.

Table 9. Siamese Junks Bound for JAPAN\*, 1679-1709

King Narai (r. 1679-July 1688)		King Phetracha (r. July 1688-1703) King Sua (r.1703-1709)	
Year	Number	Year	Number
1661	2	1689	2
1663	3	1690	3
1665	1	1691	3
1666	2	1692	4
1671	1	1693	2
1672	3	1694	2
1674	2	1695	0
1676	1	1696	2
1677	1	1697	3
1678	3	1698	1
1679	2	1699	2
1680	4	1700	1
1681	1	1701	1
1682	3	1702	2
1683	4	1703	3
1684	3	1704	2
1685	4	1705	3
1686	3	1706	2
1687	1	1707	3
1688	2	1708	1
		1709	1
Total	46		43
Average	2.3		2.0

\*The number of junks which set sail Siam for Japan including those that got wrecked on the way and never reached Nagasaki.

Sources: Nagashima, "Persian Muslim Merchants in Thailand and their Activities in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century," 5; Iwao, "Edojidai no sato-boeki ni tsuite (The sugar trade during the Edo period)," *Nihongakushiin kiyo (Transactions of the Japan Academy)* 31, no. 1 (March 1963), 5; Iwao, "Reopening of the Diplomatic and Commercial Relations between Japan and Siam during the Tokugawa period," 29; *Wakan yosebumi*, 160; Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*; Matsumiya, 296-2335.

Siamese-Japanese trade faced another restrictive policy enforced by the Japanese government. In 1715, the *bakufu* adopted new trade regulations at Nagasaki, known as the "*Shotoku shinrei* (New Regulations of Shotoku Era)."<sup>63</sup> The "New Regulations" aimed at limiting the number of junks trading at Nagasaki, the volume of trade, and the export of Japanese copper.

The regulations made compulsory for the incoming Chinese merchants to obtain *shinpai* (credentials) or visa in advance issued by the Chinese Interpreters at the Nagasaki Office. The visa noted the captain's name, the ship's port of origin, and the specific year in which the trade was permitted.<sup>64</sup> In addition, the annual entry of Chinese junk was restricted to the thirty. However, when the "New Regulations" were announced to the Chinese trading community in Nagasaki, there were already fifty-one junks in port. Since one of the principal goals of the *shinpai* system was to reduce the number of Chinese ships calling at Nagasaki, it was inevitable that some would be forced out of the trade. Only forty-seven of them were granted for the trade passport in the

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<sup>63</sup> The shogun's chief Confucian adviser, Arai Hakuseki (1657-1725) drafted the regulations. The initial regulations were dated 18 February 1715, and were followed by further regulations including the promulgation of the credentials to be required of Chinese merchant junk. Toby, *State and Diplomacy*, 198. For the text of the "New Regulations" see Hayashi Akira, *Tsuko ichiran*, vol. 2, 356-436.

<sup>64</sup> The issuance of credentials modeled on the Chinese trade tallies of the Ming dynasty. A photo-reproduction of a *shinpai* of 1621 can be found in Ishii Yoneo, ed., *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia: Translations from the Tosen Fusetsu-gaki, 1674-1723*, Data Paper Series: Source for the Economic History of Southeast Asia, no. 6 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998), 91.

future.<sup>65</sup> Once the *shinpai* system was in force, no junk without a *shinpai* was allowed to enter Nagasaki for trade.<sup>66</sup>

Among the thirty licenses issued each year, two were given to the Siamese junks. Consequently, from 1715 onward, no more than two Siamese junks could visit Nagasaki annually. In 1715, two junks from Siam arrived at Nagasaki, Ship No. 7 and another unnumbered junk. Both captains of these junks, Yan Yu Chen and Guo Tian Yu, obtained the *shinpai*.<sup>67</sup> They left Japan that year, but Guo's junk was so damaged that he asked Yan to take him home.<sup>68</sup> Because of the adverse winds, the junk could not go straight back to Siam and had to spend some time in Guangdong until the autumn of 1716.<sup>69</sup>

When King Thaisa (r. 1709-1733) dispatched another junk to Japan in 1716, the details of the new Japan's trade regulations had not yet

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<sup>65</sup> Toby, *State and Diplomacy*, 197-199.

<sup>66</sup> For the detailed analysis of economic significance of the "New Regulations" see Yamawaki Teijiro, *Nagasaki no tojin boeki*, 346-355; Yano Jinichi, *Nagasaki-shi: tsuko boeki hen toyo shokoku* (A history of Nagasaki city: traffic and trade) (Nagasaki: Nagasaki Shiyakusho, 1938), chap. 5.

<sup>67</sup> Oba Osamu, ed., *Tosen shinko kaitoroku; Shimabarabon tojin fusetu gaki; Wappu tomecho* (Material for study of Chinese merchants sailing to and from Japan in the Edo period), Sources and Materials Series of the Institute of Oriental and Occidental Studies 9, no. 1 (Suita: Kansai University Press, 1974), 1-2.

<sup>68</sup> Therefore, the Chinese interpreters did not give Guo's junk its own number for the record. Ura Renichi, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 3, 2717; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 92.

<sup>69</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol. 3, 2737-2738; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 92.

reached Siam.<sup>70</sup> The junk arrived at Nagasaki without a legitimate *shinpai*. The Captain Li Lue Guan asked the Chinese interpreters to make an exception for his junk since he did not know the new regulations when he left Siam and the King of Siam commissioned his junk. Nevertheless, the determined Nagasaki authorities did not allow the junk to unload its cargo.<sup>71</sup>

At last, Yan Yu Chen returned to Siam in early 1717 and informed the king about the new regulations and the *shinpai* trade system of Japan. The captain presented the *shinpai*, which he had obtained in 1715, to the king. Since Yan became ill and could not afford to travel to Japan, King Thaisa appointed Guo Yi Zhou his new captain and passed Yan's *shinpai* to Guo.<sup>72</sup> Guo Yi Zhou's junk left Siam on 29 June 1717 and sailed into Nagasaki as the second junk of that year (Ship No. 2). Although Guo brought the *shinpai* in Yan Yu Chen's name, the Nagasaki authority seemed to have no problem to trade with his junk. This time, a new *shinpai* was granted to Guo Yi Zhou by the Nagasaki authorities,<sup>73</sup> and Guo's

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<sup>70</sup> In fact, two more junks left Siam for Japan in 1616. However, both seemed to be shipwrecked and could not complete the voyages to Japan. Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol 3, 2718-2720; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 90-94, 95.

<sup>71</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol 3, 2718-2720; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 90.

<sup>72</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol 3, 2737-2738; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 94.

<sup>73</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol 3, 2849-2850; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 97.

junk returned safely to Siam.<sup>74</sup> The *shinpai* granted to the captains of Siamese junks were presented to King Thaisa. After King Thaisa took the license, he often gave it to another captain to conduct trade with Japan on his behalf.<sup>75</sup>



จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

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<sup>74</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol .3, 2805-2806; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 96.

<sup>75</sup> Ura, *Ka-i Hentai*, vol .3, 2718-2720; Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia*, 93.

## CONCLUSION

Throughout the seventeenth century, the trade between Siam and Japan flourished. Until the *bakufu* forbade the Japanese from going abroad by issuing a series of *sakoku* edicts in the late 1630s, Japan's *Shuin-sen* dominated the trade between the two countries. When King Prasatthong came to the throne as a usurper, the *bakufu* ruptured diplomatic relations with the kingdom. During his reign, King Prasatthong dispatched several junks loaded with the commodities for the Japan market to ask the trade at Nagasaki and to restore the diplomatic relations. But his efforts were in vain. On the pretext of King Prasatthong's illegal seizure of the throne, all the junks were forced to leave Nagasaki without unloading any cargoes. Therefore, it was Chinese private junks that took over from the *Shuin-sen* from the 1630s to the 1650s.

At the beginning of the 1660s, however, King Narai resumed investing in Japan-bound junks. King Narai and his successors continued to send their junks to Japan. This time, they never tried to carry on diplomatic relations and the *bakufu* never considered Siamese crown junks as governmental missions. Thus, the relationship between Siam and Japan remain commercial and unofficial. The Siamese crown trade with Japan existed in harmony with Chinese junk trade. Chinese style junks manned mainly by the Chinese provide Siamese kings, as chief investors, with the traffic from Siam to Nagasaki. Siamese kings consigned their cargoes, accompanied with a few Siamese to watch the trade, to the Chinese junks.

Despite the implementations of distinctive trade quotas, the involvement of the Siamese kings in the Japan trade was never reversed. In the late seventeenth century, the number of Siamese junks arriving in Nagasaki decreased. However, the actual trade volume carried by Siamese junks is still debatable.





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